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Part of a series on the
Nakba
Precipitating events Background Mandatory Palestine 1947 partition plan Jewish insurgency in Mandatory Palestine 1948 Palestine war Civil war in Palestine Plan Dalet Deir Yassin massacre Battle of Haifa Israeli Declaration of Independence Arab–Israeli War Timeline Expulsion from Lydda and Ramle Transfer Committee
1948 expulsion and flight Palestinian refugees Camps Palestinian return to Israel Right of return Present absentee UN Resolution 194 UNRWA Hebraization of Palestinian place names Paraguay plan
Discourse Causes New Historians Nakba denial Nakba Law
Notable writers Aref al-Aref Yoav Gelber Efraim Karsh Rashid Khalidi Walid Khalidi Nur Masalha Benny Morris Ilan Pappé Edward Said Tom Segev Avraham Sela Avi Shlaim Constantin Zureiq
Symbols and memory Palestinian key Handala Nakba Day Land Day Great March of Return March of Return (Israel)
Ongoing Ongoing Nakba Palestinian genocide accusation Gaza genocide
Lists List of depopulated towns and villages Estimates of the number of Palestinians who fled
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The Nakba (Template:Lang-ar an-Nakbah, lit. 'The Catastrophe') is the violent displacement and dispossession of the Palestinian people, along with the destruction of their society, culture, identity, political rights, and national aspirations. The term is used to describe the events that took place during the 1948 Palestine war, as well as the ongoing persecution and displacement of Palestinians by Israel throughout the Palestinian territories (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip).

The beginning of the Nakba encompasses the 1948 Palestinian expulsion and flight and the 1949–1956 Palestinian expulsions. In the initial Nakba of 1948, approximately 750,000 Palestinian Arabs (about half of Palestine's Arab population) fled from their homes or were expelled by Zionist militias and later the Israeli army in what is now Israel proper, which covers 78% of the total land area of the former Mandatory Palestine. Simultaneously, about 400 Arab-majority towns and villages were depopulated; many of these locations' names were Hebraized. As a whole, the Nakba covers the long-running rejection of the Palestinian right of return, the creation of permanent Palestinian refugees, and the "shattering of Palestinian society" for the establishment of a Jewish state.

Many scholars, including Israeli historian Ilan Pappé, describe the events of the Nakba (e.g., 1948) as an instance of ethnic cleansing, but this categorization has been disputed by other scholars, such as Israeli historian Benny Morris. The Palestinian national narrative views the Nakba as a collective trauma that defines their national identity and political aspirations, whereas the Israeli national narrative views the same events in terms of the war of independence that established Jewish aspirations for statehood and sovereignty. To this end, the Palestinians observe 15 May as Nakba Day, commemorating the war's events one day after Israel's Independence Day.

The Nakba has greatly influenced Palestinian culture and is a foundational symbol of the current Palestinian national identity, together with the political cartoon character Handala, the Palestinian keffiyeh, and the Palestinian 1948 keys. Countless books, songs, and poems have been written about the Nakba. Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish described the Nakba as "an extended present that promises to continue in the future" as the Israeli–Palestinian peace process falters.

History

Prior to 1948

The roots of the Nakba are traced to the arrival of Zionists and their purchase of land in Ottoman Palestine in the late 19th century. By the time the British announced their official support for Zionism in the 1917 Balfour Declaration during World War I, the population of Palestine was about 750,000, approximately 94% Arab and 6% Jewish.

After the partition of the Ottoman Empire, British-ruled Mandatory Palestine began in 1922. By then, the Jewish population had grown to around 10%; both the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate for Palestine referred to the 90% Arab population as "existing non-Jewish communities."

In 1947, in the wake of World War II and the Holocaust, the United Nations partitioned Mandatory Palestine, leading to the 1948 Palestine war and the creation of the State of Israel. At the expiration of the Mandate, privately held lands amounted to approximately 25% of the total territory. Palestinian Arabs, who made up about two-thirds of the population, owned about 90% of privately held lands, while Jews, who made up between a quarter and a third of the population, owned about 7% of the total territory. The UN partition plan allocated about 55% of the land to Israel and about 45% to Palestine, with an internationally-governed Jerusalem and Bethlehem.

1948

The central facts of the Nakba in 1948 are not disputed. Approximately 750,000 Palestinians--over 80% of the population in what would become Israel--were expelled or fled from their homes and became refugees in neighboring states. About half were expelled or fled during the first stage of the 1948 Palestine war, before Israel declared independence at the end of the British Mandate on 14 May 1948; the second stage of the war began on the following day.

Cities such as Tiberias (18 April 1948), Haifa (22 April), Safed (11 May), Jaffa (13 May), Acre (18 May), and Beersheba (21 October), and hundreds of towns and villages, were destroyed or depopulated. Thousands of Palestinians were killed in dozens of massacres, including at Balad al-Shaykh (December 1947), Deir Yassin (April 1948), Tantura (May), Lydda and Ramle (July), Safsaf (October), and Dawayima (October). About a dozen rapes of Palestinians by regular and irregular Israeli military forces have been documented, and more are suspected. Looting by Israeli soldiers and civilians of Palestinian homes, business, farms, artwork, books, and archives was widespread.

By the end of the war in 1949, Israel held about 78% of Palestine, including about half of the Arab state proposed by the UN partition plan. About 156,000 Palestinians remained within the borders of Israel, many becoming internally displaced persons. The Gaza Strip came under Egyptian control, and in 1950, the West Bank was annexed by Jordan.

1949–1966

The Nakba continued after the end of the war in 1949. From 1948 to 1966, Palestinians in Israel lived under martial law and needed a permit to move from one village to another. Israel prevented Palestinian refugees outside of Israel from returning. Palestinians continued to be expelled, and more Palestinian towns and villages were destroyed, with new Israeli settlements established in their place. Palestinian place names and the name "Palestine" itself were removed from maps and books.

Sixty-nine Palestinians were killed in the 1953 Qibya massacre; a few years later, 49 Palestinians were killed in the Kafr Qasim massacre, on the first day of the 1956 Suez Crisis.

1967–present

During the 1967 Six-Day War, hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees were driven from the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. Most were driven into Jordan. This has become known as al-Naksa (the "setback"). After the war, Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Some two thousand Palestinians were killed in a massacre led by the Lebanese Front at the Siege of Tel al-Zaatar in 1976, during the Lebanese Civil War.

Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were killed or displaced during the 1982 Lebanon War, including between 800 and 3,500 killed in the Sabra and Shatila massacre. The First Intifada began in 1987 and lasted until the 1993 Oslo Accords. The Second Intifada began in 2000. In 2005, Israel withdrew from Gaza and blockaded it. In the West Bank and East Jerusalem, Israel has built the Israeli West Bank barrier and created Palestinian enclaves.

In 2011, Israel passed the Nakba Law, which denies government funding to institutions that commemorate the Nakba.

The 2023 Israel-Hamas War has caused the highest Palestinian casualties since the 1948 war, and has raised fears among Palestinians that history will repeat itself. These fears were exacerbated when Israeli Agricultural Minister Avi Dichter said that the war would end with "Gaza Nakba 2023." Dichter was rebuked by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Components

The Nakba encompasses the violent displacement and dispossession of Palestinians, along with the destruction of their society, culture, identity, political rights, and national aspirations.

Displacement

During the 1947–49 Palestine war, an estimated 700,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled, comprising around 80% of the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of what became Israel. Almost half of this figure (approximately 250,000–300,000 Palestinians) had fled or had been expelled ahead of the Israeli Declaration of Independence in May 1948, a fact which was named as a casus belli for the entry of the Arab League into the country, sparking the 1948 Arab–Israeli War.

Clause 10.(b) of the cablegram from the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to the UN Secretary-General of 15 May 1948 justifying the intervention by the Arab States, the Secretary-General of the League alleged that "approximately over a quarter of a million of the Arab population have been compelled to leave their homes and emigrate to neighbouring Arab countries." In the period after the war, a large number of Palestinians attempted to return to their homes; between 2,700 and 5,000 Palestinians were killed by Israel during this period, the vast majority being unarmed and intending to return for economic or social reasons.

The Nakba is described as ethnic cleansing by many scholars, including Palestinian scholars such as Rashid Khalidi, Adel Manna, Nur Masalha, Nadim Rouhana, Ahmad H. Sa'di, and Areej Sabbagh-Khoury, Israeli scholars such as Alon Confino, Amos Goldberg, Baruch Kimmerling, Ronit Lentin, Ilan Pappé, and Yehouda Shenhav, and foreign scholars such as Abigail Bakan, Elias Khoury, Mark Levene, Derek Penslar, and Patrick Wolfe, among other scholars.

Other scholars, such as Yoav Gelber, Benny Morris, and Seth J. Frantzman, disagree that the Nakba constitutes an ethnic cleansing. Morris in 2016 rejected the description of "ethnic cleansing" for 1948, while also stating that the label of "partial ethnic cleansing" for 1948 was debatable; in 2004 Morris was responding to the claim of "ethnic cleansing" occurring in 1948 by stating that, given the alternative was "genocide - the annihilation of your people," there were "circumstances in history that justify ethnic cleansing ... It was necessary to cleanse the hinterland ... the term they used at the time ... there was no choice but to expel the Palestinian population. To uproot it in the course of war"; Morris said this resulted in a "partial" expulsion of Arabs.

Still other scholars use different frameworks than "ethnic cleansing": for example, Richard Bessel and Claudia Haake use "forced removal" and Alon Confino uses "forced migration".

At the same time, a significant proportion of those Palestinians who remained in Israel became internally displaced. In 1950, UNRWA estimated that 46,000 of the 156,000 Palestinians who remained inside the borders demarcated as Israel by the 1949 Armistice Agreements were internally displaced refugees. As of 2003, some 274,000 Arab citizens of Israel – or one in four in Israel – were internally displaced from the events of 1948.

Dispossession and erasure

The UN Partition Plan of 1947 assigned 56% of Palestine to the future Jewish state, while the Palestinian majority, 66%, were to receive 44% of the territory. 80% of the land in the to-be Jewish state was already owned by Palestinians; 11% had a Jewish title. Before, during and after the 1947–1949 war, hundreds of Palestinian towns and villages were depopulated and destroyed. Geographic names throughout the country were erased and replaced with Hebrew names, sometimes derivatives of the historical Palestinian nomenclature, and sometimes new inventions. Numerous non-Jewish historical sites were destroyed, not just during the wars, but in a subsequent process over a number of decades. For example, over 80% of Palestinian village mosques have been destroyed, and artefacts have been removed from museums and archives.

A variety of laws were promulgated in Israel to legalize the expropriation of Palestinian land.

Statelessness and denationalization

The creation of Palestinian statelessness is a central component of the Nakba and continues to be a feature of Palestinian national life to the present day. All Arab Palestinians became immediately stateless as a result of the Nakba, although some took on other nationalities. After 1948, Palestinians ceased to be simply Palestinian, instead divided into Israeli-Palestinians, East Jerusalem Palestinians, UNRWA Palestinians, West Bank-Palestinians, and Gazan-Palestinians, each with different legal statuses and restrictions, in addition to the wider Palestinian diaspora who were able to achieve residency outside of historic Palestine and the refugee camps.

The first Israeli Nationality Law, passed on 14 July 1952, denationalized Palestinians, rendering the former Palestinian citizenship "devoid of substance", "not satisfactory and is inappropriate to the situation following the establishment of Israel".

Fracturing of society

The Nakba was the primary cause of the Palestinian diaspora; at the same time Israel was created as a Jewish homeland, the Palestinians were turned into a "refugee nation" with a "wandering identity". Today a majority of the 13.7 million Palestinians live in the diaspora, i.e. they live outside of the historical area of Mandatory Palestine, primarily in other countries of the Arab world. Of the 6.2 million people registered by the UN's dedicated Palestinian refugee agency, UNRWA, about 40% live in the West Bank and Gaza, and 60% in the diaspora. A large number of these diaspora refugees are not integrated into their host countries, as illustrated by the ongoing tension of Palestinians in Lebanon or the 1990–91 Palestinian exodus from Kuwait.

These factors have resulted in a Palestinian identity of "suffering", whilst the deterritorialization of the Palestinians has created a uniting factor and focal point in the desire to return to their lost homeland.

Long-term implications and "ongoing Nakba"

The most important long-term implications of the Nakba for the Palestinian people were the loss of their homeland, the fragmentation and marginalization of their national community, and their transformation into a stateless people.

Since the late 1990s, the phrase "ongoing Nakba" (Template:Lang-ar) has emerged to describe the "continuous experience of violence and dispossession" experienced by the Palestinian people. This term enjoins the understanding of the Nakba not as an event in 1948, but as an ongoing process that continues through to the present day.

On November 11, 2023 Israeli Agriculture Minister Avi Dichter remarked in an interview on N12 News on the nature of the 2023 Israel–Hamas war that "From an operational standpoint, you cannot wage a war like the IDF wants to in Gaza while the masses are between the tanks and the soldiers," he said. "It's the 2023 Gaza Nakba."

Terminology

The term Nakba was first applied to the events of 1948 by Constantin Zureiq, a professor of history at the American University of Beirut, in his 1948 book Manā an-Nakba (The Meaning of the Disaster). Zureiq wrote that "the tragic aspect of the Nakba is related to the fact that it is not a regular misfortune or a temporal evil, but a Disaster in the very essence of the word, one of the most difficult that Arabs have ever known over their long history." Prior to 1948, the "Year of the Catastrophe" among Arabs referred to 1920, when European colonial powers partitioned the Ottoman Empire into a series of separate states along lines of their own choosing.

The word was used again one year later by the Palestinian poet Burhan al-Deen al-Abushi. Zureiq's students subsequently founded the Arab Nationalist Movement in 1952, one of the first post-Nakba Palestinian political movements. In a six-volume encyclopedia Al-Nakba: Nakbat Bayt al-Maqdis Wal-Firdaws al-Mafqud (The Catastrophe: The Catastrophe of Jerusalem and the Lost Paradise) published between 1958–60, Aref al-Aref wrote: "How can I call it but Nakba ? When we the Arab people generally and the Palestinians particularly, faced such a disaster (Nakba) that we never faced like it along the centuries, our homeland was sealed, we expelled from our country, and we lost many of our beloved sons." Muhammad Nimr al-Hawari also used the term Nakba in the title of his book Sir al Nakba (The Secret behind the Disaster) written in 1955. The use of the term has evolved over time.

Initially, the use of the term Nakba among Palestinians was not universal. For example, for many years after 1948, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon avoided and even actively resisted using the term, because it lent permanency to a situation they viewed as temporary, and they often insisted on being called "returnees". In the 1950s and 1960s, terms they used to describe the events of 1948 included al-'ightiṣāb ("the rape"), or were more euphemistic, such as al-'aḥdāth ("the events"), al-hijra ("the exodus"), and lammā sharnā wa-tla'nā ("when we blackened our faces and left"). Nakba narratives were avoided by the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon in the 1970s, in favor of a narrative of revolution and renewal. Interest in the Nakba by organizations representing refugees in Lebanon surged in the 1990s due to the perception that the refugees' right of return might be negotiated away in exchange for Palestinian statehood, and the desire was to send a clear message to the international community that this right was non-negotiable.

National narratives

Palestinian national narrative

This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to itadding to it or making an edit request. (October 2023)

The Palestinian national narrative regards the repercussions of the Nakba as a formative trauma defining its national, political and moral aspirations and its identity. The Palestinian people developed a victimized national identity in which they had lost their country as a result of the 1948 war. From the Palestinian perspective, they have been forced to pay for the Holocaust perpetrated in Europe with their freedom, properties and bodies instead of those who were truly responsible.

Shmuel Trigano, writing in the Jewish Political Studies Review published by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, outlines the evolution of the Nakba narrative through three stages. Initially, it depicted Palestinians as victims displaced by Israel's creation to make way for Jewish immigrants. The next phase recast the Six-Day War as Israel's colonization of Palestinian lands, aligning the Palestinian cause with anti-colonial sentiments. The final stage leverages Holocaust memories, accusing Israel of apartheid, resonating with Western guilt over the Holocaust. He argues these evolving interpretations omit complex historical factors involving failed attempts to eliminate Israel, contested territorial claims, and Jewish refugee displacement from Arab nations.

Israeli national narrative

The Israeli national narrative rejects the Palestinian characterization of 1948 as the Nakba (catastrophe), instead viewing it as the War of Independence that established Israel's statehood and sovereignty. It portrays the events of 1948 as the culmination of the Zionist movement and Jewish national aspirations, resulting in military success against invading Arab armies, armistice agreements, and recognition of Israel's legitimacy by the United Nations. While acknowledging some instances of Israeli responsibility for the Palestinian refugee crisis, as documented by historians like Benny Morris, the overarching Israeli narrative accommodates this within the context of Israel's emergence as a state under difficult war conditions, without negating Israel's foundational story and identity. It perceives the 1948 war and its outcome as an equally formative and fundamental event – as an act of justice and redemption for the Jewish people after centuries of historical suffering, and the key step in the "negation of the Diaspora".

According to this narrative, the Palestinian Arabs voluntarily fled their homes during the war, encouraged by Arab leaders who told Palestinians to temporarily evacuate so that Arab armies could destroy Israel, and then upon losing the war, refused to integrate them. This viewpoint also contrasts Jewish refugees absorbed by Israel with Palestinian refugees kept stateless by Arab countries as political pawns. In contrast to the Palestinian narrative, claims that Arab villages were depopulated and that Palestinian homes were destroyed are not acknowledged by the mainstream Israeli narrative, typically using terminology such as "abandoned" property and "population exchange" rather than "confiscated" or "expelled."

Israeli legislative measures

Israeli officials have repeatedly described the term as embodying an “Arab lie” or as a justification for terrorism. In 2009, the Israeli Education Ministry banned using the term “nakba” in textbooks for Arab children. In 2011, the Knesset forbade institutions from commemorating the event. According to Neve Gordon, a school ceremony memoralizing the Nakba would, under the 2011 law, have to respond to charges that it incited racism, violence and terrorism, and denied Israel's democratic character, in doing so. In 2023, after the United Nations instituted a commemoration day for the Nakba on 15 May, the Israeli ambassador Gilad Erdan remonstrated that the event itself was antisemitic.

In May 2009, Yisrael Beiteinu introduced a bill that would outlaw all Nakba commemorations, with a three-year prison sentence for such acts of remembrance. Following public criticism, the bill draft was changed, the prison sentence dropped and instead the Minister of Finance would have the authority to reduce state funding for Israeli institutions found to be "commemorating Independence Day or the day of the establishment of the state as a day of mourning". The new draft was approved by the Knesset in March 2011, and became known as the Nakba Law. The implementation of the new law unintentionally promoted knowledge of the Nakba within Israeli society.

Nakba denial

According to some historians and academics, there exists a form of historical negationism that pertains to the 1948 Palestinian expulsion and flight. The denial of the Nakba is central to Zionist narratives of 1948. The term 'Nakba denial' was used in 1998 by Steve Niva, editor of the Middle East Report, in describing how the rise of the early Internet led to competing online narratives of the events of 1948. In the 21st century the term came to be used by activists and scholars to describe narratives that minimized elements of the expulsion and its aftermath, particularly in Israeli and Western historiography before the late 1980s, when Israel's history began to be reviewed and rewritten by the New Historians.

Nakba denial has been described as still prevalent in both Israeli and American discourse and linked to various tropes associated with anti-Arab racism. In 2011, Israel enacted a law nicknamed the 'Nakba Law', which authorized the withdrawal of state funds from organizations that commemorate the day on which the Israeli state was established as a day of mourning, or that deny the existence of Israel as a "Jewish and democratic state." Israel also hosts grassroots movements, such as Zochrot, that aim to commemorate the Nakba through public memorials and events. In May 2023, following the 75th anniversary of the Nakba, Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas made the denial of the 1948 expulsion a crime punishable by two years in jail.

Historiography

Avraham Sela and Alon Kadish claim that the Palestinian national memory of the Nakba has evolved over time, reconstructing the events of 1948 to serve contemporary Palestinian national demands. They argue that the Palestinian historiography of the Nakba tends to "entirely ignore" the attacks launched by Arab irregular and volunteer forces against the Yishuv, downplaying the role of Palestinian leaders in the events leading to the 1948 war and defeat.

Elias Khoury writes that the works of Edward Said were important for taking a "radically new approach" to the Nakba than those of Zureiq and other early adopters of the term, whose usage had "the connotation of a natural catastrophe" and thus freed "Palestinian leadership and Arab governments from direct responsibility for the defeat." Shany Mor compares this development to that of the Lost Cause of the Confederacy in the American South, which also "came around the 50th anniversary of the war itself, when the generation that fought it began dying out, and the urgency of turning both the humiliating defeat and the tainted cause into something nobler than it actually was became most acute."

In films and literature

Farha, a film about the Nakba directed by Jordanian director Darin J. Sallam, was chosen as Jordan's official submission for the 2023 Academy Awards International Feature Film category. In response, Avigdor Lieberman, the Israeli Finance Minister, ordered the treasury to withdraw government funding for Jaffa's Al Saraya Theater, where the film is scheduled for projection.

Museums

The Al Qarara Cultural Museum held a collection of pre-Nakba jewellery. It was destroyed in an explosion as a result of an Israeli attack in October 2023.

See also

• Al-Nakba: The Palestinian Catastrophe 1948
• Balfour Declaration
• Haifa Declaration
• Jewish exodus from the Muslim world
• Nakba Day
• Nakba Law
• The Holocaust and the Nakba

Notes

1. Note: The 6.2 million is composed of 5.55 million registered refugees and 0.63m other registered people; UNRWA's definition of Other Registered Persons refer to "those who, at the time of original registration did not satisfy all of UNRWA's Palestine refugee criteria, but who were determined to have suffered significant loss and/or hardship for reasons related to the 1948 conflict in Palestine; they also include persons who belong to the families of other registered persons."

References

Citations

1. ^ Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, pp. 511–512; Manna 2022, pp. 7–9; Khalidi 2020, pp. 60, 76, 82, 88–89; Shenhav 2019, pp. 48–51; Bashir & Goldberg 2018, Introduction; Nashef 2018, p. 6; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, p. 393 n. 2; Al-Hardan 2016, pp. xi, 2; Rashed, Short & Docker 2014, p. 1; Sayigh 2013, pp. 52–55; Masalha 2012, pp. 1, 10–13; Lentin 2010, ch. 2; Milshtein 2009, p. 47; Ram 2009, pp. 366–367; Webman 2009, p. 29; Abu-Lughod & Sa'di 2007, pp. 3, 8–9
2. ^ Sayigh 2023, pp. 285 and 288 n. 12-13; Pappe 2021, pp. 70-71 and 80; Khalidi 2020, p. 75; Shenhav 2019, p. 49; Bashir & Goldberg 2018, pp. 7 and 33 n.4; Khoury 2018, pp. xiii–xv; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, p. 393, 405, 407, and 422-423; Rashed, Short & Docker 2014, pp. 1 and 12-18; Masalha 2012, pp. 5, 12–14, 75 and 254; Abu-Lughod & Sa'di 2007, pp. 10 and 18-19; Jayyusi 2007, pp. 109-110 and 114-116
3. ^ Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, p. 511, "over 80 per cent"; Pappe 2022, p. 128, "Three-quarters of a million Palestinians ... almost 90 per cent"; Khalidi 2020, p. 60, "Some 80 percent ... At least 720,000 ..."; Slater 2020, pp. 81 ("about 750,000"), 83 ("over 80 percent"), and 350 ("It is no longer a matter of serious dispute that in the 1947–48 period—beginning well before the Arab invasion in May 1948—some 700,000 to 750,000 Palestinians were expelled from or fled their villages and homes in Israel in fear of their lives—an entirely justifiable fear, in light of massacres carried out by Zionist forces."); Shenhav 2019, p. 49, "750,000"; Bashir & Goldberg 2018, p. 7, "some 750,000"; Cohen 2017, p. 87, "approximately 700,000"; Manna 2013, pp. 93 ("approximately 750,000") and 99 n. 12 ("Recently, both Palestinian and Israeli scholars seem to agree on this estimate of 700,000–750,000 refugees."); Masalha 2012, pp. 2, "about 90 per cent ... 750,000 refugees"; Wolfe 2012, p. 133, "some three quarters of a million"; Davis 2011, pp. 7 ("more than 750,000") and 237 n. 21 ("Most scholars generally agree with the UN number, which it was somewhere in the vicinity of 750,000"); Ghanim 2009, p. 25, "Around 750,000-900,000"; Kimmerling 2008, p. 280, "700,000 to 900,000"; Sa'di 2007, pp. 297, "at least 780,000 ... more than 80 percent"
4. Slater 2020, p. 406.
5. Masalha 2012, p. 3.
6. Dajani 2005, p. 42: "The nakba is the experience that has perhaps most defined Palestinian history. For the Palestinian, it is not merely a political event — the establishment of the state of Israel on 78 percent of the territory of the Palestine Mandate, or even, primarily a humanitarian one — the creation of the modern world's most enduring refugee problem. The nakba is of existential significance to Palestinians, representing both the shattering of the Palestinian community in Palestine and the consolidation of a shared national consciousness."
7. Abu-Lughod & Sa'di 2007, p. 3: "For Palestinians, the 1948 War led indeed to a "catastrophe." A society disintegrated, a people dispersed, and a complex and historically changing but taken for granted communal life was ended violently. The Nakba has thus become, both in Palestinian memory and history, the demarcation line between two qualitatively opposing periods. After 1948, the lives of the Palestinians at the individual, community, and national level were dramatically and irreversibly changed."
8. Khalidi, Rashid I. (1992). "Observations on the Right of Return". Journal of Palestine Studies. 21 (2): 29–40. doi:10.2307/2537217. JSTOR 2537217. Only by understanding the centrality of the catastrophe of politicide and expulsion that befell the Palestinian people – al-nakba in Arabic – is it possible to understand the Palestinians' sense of the right of return
9. Sabbagh-Khoury 2023, pp. 30, 65, 71, 81, 182, 193–194; Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, p. 511; Manna 2022; Pappe 2022, pp. 33, 120–122, 126–132, 137, 239; Hasian Jr. 2020, pp. 77–109; Khalidi 2020, pp. 12, 73, 76, 231; Slater 2020, pp. 81–85; Shenhav 2019, pp. 49–50, 54, and 61; Bashir & Goldberg 2018, pp. 20 and 32 n.2; Confino 2018, p. 138; Masalha 2018, pp. 44, 52–54, 64, 319, 324, 376, 383; Nashef 2018, pp. 5–6, 52, 76; Auron 2017; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, p. 393; Al-Hardan 2016, pp. 47–48; Natour 2016, p. 82; Rashed, Short & Docker 2014, pp. 3–4, 8–18; Masalha 2012; Wolfe 2012, pp. 153–154, 160–161; Khoury 2012, pp. 258, 263–265; Knopf-Newman 2011, pp. 4–5, 25–32, 109, 180–182; Lentin 2010, ch. 2; Milshtein 2009, p. 50; Ram 2009, p. 388; Shlaim 2009, pp. 55, 288; Esmeir 2007, pp. 249–250; Sa'di 2007, pp. 291–293, 298, 308; Pappe 2006; Schulz 2003, pp. 24, 31–32
10. Morris, Benny (10 October 2016). "Israel Conducted No Ethnic Cleansing in 1948". Haaretz. Archived from the original on 27 May 2022. Retrieved 25 October 2023. I don't accept the definition "ethnic cleansing" for what the Jews in prestate Israel did in 1948. (If you consider Lod and Ramle, maybe we can talk about partial ethnic cleansing. But there was no overall expulsion policy – here they expelled people, there they didn't, and for the most part the Arabs simply fled. It's true that in mid-1948 the new State of Israel adopted a policy of preventing the return of refugees. But I still consider this policy logical and just.)
11. ^ Golani, Motti; Manna, Adel (2011). Two sides of the coin: independence and Nakba, 1948: two narratives of the 1948 War and its outcome. Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation. p. 14. ISBN 978-90-8979-080-4. The Palestinians regard the Nakba and its repercussions as a formative trauma defining their identity and their national, moral, and political aspirations. As a result of the 1948 war, the Palestinian people, which to a large degree lost their country to the establishment of a Jewish state for the survivors of the Holocaust, developed a victimized national identity. From their perspective, the Palestinians have been forced to pay for the Jewish Holocaust with their bodies, their property, and their freedom instead of those who were truly responsible. Jewish Israelis, in contrast, see the war and its outcome not merely as an act of historical justice that changed the historical course of the Jewish people, which until that point had been filled with suffering and hardship, but also as a birth – the birth of Israel as an independent Jewish state after two thousand years of exile. As such, it must be pure and untainted, because if a person, a nation, or a state is born in sin, its entire essence is tainted. In this sense, discourse on the war is not at all historical but rather current and extremely sensitive. Its power and intensity is directly influenced by present day events. In the Israeli and the Palestinian cases, therefore, the 1948 war plays a pivotal role in two simple, clear, unequivocal, and harmonious narratives, with both peoples continuing to see the war as a formative event in their respective histories.
12. ^ Mori 2009.
13. ^ Partner, Nancy (2008). "The Linguistic Turn along Post-Postmodern Borders: Israeli/Palestinian Narrative Conflict". New Literary History. 39 (4): 823–845. doi:10.1353/nlh.0.0065. JSTOR 20533118. S2CID 144556954.
14. Schmemann, Serge (15 May 1998). "MIDEAST TURMOIL: THE OVERVIEW; 9 Palestinians Die in Protests Marking Israel's Anniversary". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on 5 March 2022. Retrieved 7 April 2021. We are not asking for a lot. We are not asking for the moon. We are asking to close the chapter of nakba once and for all, for the refugees to return and to build an independent Palestinian state on our land, our land, our land, just like other peoples. We want to celebrate in our capital, holy Jerusalem, holy Jerusalem, holy Jerusalem.
15. Gladstone, Rick (15 May 2021). "An annual day of Palestinian grievance comes amid the upheaval". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on 15 May 2021. Retrieved 15 May 2021.
16. Masalha 2012, p. 11.
17. Darwish 2001.
18. Williams 2009, p. 89.
19. Bashir & Goldberg 2018, pp. 2 and 7; Khoury 2018, pp. xi-xiii and xv; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, p. 423; Rashed, Short & Docker 2014, p. 8; Manna 2013, p. 89; Masalha 2012, pp. 44, 70, and 168; Wolfe 2012, p. 134; Morris 2008, p. 1 sfnm error: no target: CITEREFMorris2008 (help); Sa'di 2007, pp. 287–290.
20. Manna 2013, p. 89; Wolfe 2012, pp. 144; Morris 2008, pp. 9–10 sfnm error: no target: CITEREFMorris2008 (help).
21. Khalidi 2020, pp. 27 ("around 94 percent "), 28 and 43; Slater 2020, pp. 39 ("50,000 Jews ... 700,000 Arabs") and 44 ("about 750,000, of whom 50,000–60,000 or less than 9 percent were Jewish"); Morris 2008, p. 15, "Jewish numbers had grown under the Ottomans from some twenty-five thousand to sixty to eighty-five thousand between 1881 and 1914. The Arab increase had been less dramatic—from 450,000 (1881) to 650,000 (1918)" sfnm error: no target: CITEREFMorris2008 (help); Pappe 2006, p. 11, "no more than five per cent "
22. Sayigh 2023, p. 281; Manna 2013, p. 89; Masalha 2012, p. 33, 54, and 150; Wolfe 2012, p. 143; Davis 2011, p. 6; Morris 2008, pp. 9–14 sfnm error: no target: CITEREFMorris2008 (help); Sa'di 2007, pp. 288–290.
23. Sabbagh-Khoury 2023, p. 53, "around 12 percent "; Pappe 2022, p. 79, "They represented 90 per cent of the inhabitants, but were treated as if they constituted only 50 per cent"; Davis 2011, p. 6, "11 percent "
24. Sayigh 2023, p. 281, "A more dangerous discursive deformation was the Balfour Declaration's designation of the Palestinians as 'existing non-Jewish communities' contrasted with 'the Jewish people' . The political implications of this distinction are evident: a 'people' was qualified for nation/statehood, whereas disparate 'communities' were not."; Slater 2020, p. 39, "... the Balfour Doctrine and the League Mandate were conditional, stipulating that the 'non-Jewish' communities of Palestine—some 90 percent of the indigenous peoples!—must retain their 'civil and religious rights.'"; Wolfe 2012, p. 146, "The Mandate’s preamble included a safeguard clause protecting the rights of ‘existing non-Jewish communities’. This clause is significant on a number of counts, not least the transience implied in the term ‘existing’, whose suggestion of temporariness was reinforced by the designation of 91 per cent of the population as ‘non-Jewish’."; Shlaim 2009, p. 23, "On the other hand, to refer to 90 per cent of the population as 'the non-Jewish communities in Palestine' was arrogant, dismissive and even racist. It was also the worst kind of imperial double standard, implying that there was one law for the Jews, and one law for everybody else."; Morris 2008, pp. 9–10 sfnm error: no target: CITEREFMorris2008 (help).
25. Bashir & Goldberg 2018, p. 16; Manna 2013, p. 90; Masalha 2012, pp. 67–68, 150, 194; Davis 2011, pp. 6; Sa'di 2007, pp. 290–292.
26. "Land Ownership in Palestine/Israel (1920-2000)" (PDF). Al-Majdal Magazine (5). BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights. Spring 2000. Retrieved 18 December 2023. By the end of the British Mandate, titles were settled and registered on 25% of the total land area of Mandate Palestine.
27. Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, p. 511, "67 per cent"; Manna 2022, pp. 30 ("two-thirds of the population") and 90 ("more than two thirds (about 1,350,000) of the country's two million people"); Pappe 2006, p. 29, "The indigenous Palestinians made up the two-third majority, down from ninety per cent at the start of the Mandate."
28. Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, p. 511, "the ‘Arabs’, who in 1948 owned 90 per cent of the land"; Manna 2013, p. 90, "At the end of 1947 the Arabs of Palestine ... possessed about 90% of Palestine’s privately-owned land."
29. Slater 2020, p. 62, "one-third"; Wolfe 2012, pp. 133–134, "26%"; Davis 2011, p. 6, "33 percent"; Pappe 2006, p. 34, "no more than one third"
30. Sabbagh-Khoury 2023, pp. 119 ("about 7 percent of the total territory of Mandatory Palestine by May 15, 1948") and 262 ("just over 1.5 million dunams, or only about 7 percent"); Khalidi 2020, p. 83, "about 6 percent of Palestinian land had been Jewish-owned prior to 1948"; Masalha 2012, p. 58, "6.6 per cent of the land area of Palestine"; Wolfe 2012, pp. 133–134, "around 7%"; Davis 2011, p. 6, "nearly 8 percent of the land"; Pappe 2006, pp. 24 ("by the end of the Mandate ... around six per cent of the land") and 34 ("less than six per cent of the total land area of Palestine")
31. Manna 2022, p. 30, "It was expected that the Palestinians would not accept this unjust resolution, which gave 54 percent of their homeland to the Jews and gave them, who constituted two-thirds of the population, only 45 percent."; Khalidi 2020, p. 72, "The postwar realignment of international power was apparent in the workings of UNSCOP and in its majority report in favor of partitioning the country in a manner that was exceedingly favorable to the Jewish minority, giving them over 56 percent of Palestine, against the much smaller 17 percent for the Jewish state envisioned by the 1937 Peel partition plan."; Slater 2020, p. 62, "One problem with this solution was that the Jews were only one-third of the population of mandatory Palestine, so that to create a viable state with a Jewish majority, the UN engaged in a kind of gerrymandering, creating the proposed state on some 57 percent of the land, almost twice as large as that proposed by the Peel Commission ..."; Bashir & Goldberg 2018, p. 16, "This was perhaps one of the major causes of the UN decision of November 29, 1947, regarding the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state. The Arabs opposed the partition plan—which they justifiably saw as support for Zionist colonialism and imperialist intervention in the Arab Middle East—and especially the fact that it had awarded the Jews, a minority in Palestine, more than half of the territory."; Natour 2016, p. 89, "This plan proposed to divide the country between Jews, whose landownership would increase from 6 to 54 % (they made up for around 35 % of the population) and the Arabs with an ownership of 46 % instead of around 94 % (who made up for around 70 % of the population) ..."; Masalha 2012, p. 68, "55 per cent"; Davis 2011, p. 7, "On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 181, which contained a plan to partition Palestine into Arab and Jewish states, with an international zone (called a corpus separatum) for the 'holy areas' in Jerusalem and Bethlehem, to be administered by the UN (see Map 1). The Arab state, which never came to fruition, was to have a population of 725,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews on some 43 percent of the land of Palestine. The Jewish state was to have a Jewish population of 498,000 and an Arab population of 407,000 on 56 percent of the land. The population of the International Zone was to be 105,000 Arabs and 100,000 Jewish inhabitants."; Sa'di 2007, pp. 290–291, "Although Jews by then constituted only about one-third of the population, the proposed Jewish State was to be established on 56 percent of Palestine’s territory and was to have included only a slight Jewish majority of 499,000 Jews versus 438,000 Palestinians. The Arab state was to have been composed of 43 percent of the country reflections and would include 818,000 Palestinians and fewer than 10,000 Jews (Khalidi 1997: 11). Furthermore, in terms of land ownership, the Jewish holdings in the proposed Jewish State were about 11 percent as compared to the 80 percent of land then owned by Palestinians. In the proposed Arab Palestinian state, Jews owned a mere 1 percent of the land (ibid: 13)."; Pappe 2006, pp. 34 ("the Jews, who owned less than six per cent of the total land area of Palestine and constituted no more than one third of the population, were handed more than half of its overall territory.") and 35 ("On forty-two per cent of the land, 818,000 Palestinians were to have a state that included 10,000 Jews, while the state for the Jews was to stretch over almost fifty-six per cent of the land which 499,000 Jews were to share with 438,000 Palestinians. The third part was a small enclave around the city of Jerusalem which was to be internationally governed and whose population of 200,000 was equally divided between Palestinians and Jews.")
32. Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, p. 511, "In light of the ever-growing historiography, serious scholarship has left little debate about what happened in 1948."; Khalidi 2020, p. 60, "What happened is, of course, now well known."; Slater 2020, p. 406 n.44, "There is no serious dispute among Israeli, Palestinian, or other historians about the central facts of the Nakba."; Khoury 2012, pp. 258 ("The realities of the nakba as an ethnic cleansing can no more be neglected or negated ... The ethnic cleansing as incarnated by Plan Dalet is no longer a matter of debate among historians ... The facts about 1948 are no longer contested, but the meaning of what happened is still a big question.") and 263 ("We don't need to prove what is now considered a historical fact. What two generations of Palestinian historians and their chronicles tried to prove became an accepted reality after the emergence of the Israeli new historians."); Wolfe 2012, p. 133, "The bare statistics of the Nakba are well enough established."; Sa'di 2007, pp. 290 ("Although the hard facts regarding the developments during 1947–48 that led to the Nakba are well known and documented, the obfuscation by the dominant Israeli story has made recovering the facts, presenting a sensible narrative, and putting them across to the world a formidable task.") and 294 ("Today, there is little or no academic controversy about the basic course of events that led to the Zionist victory and the almost complete destruction of Palestinian society.")
33. Manna 2022, p. 41, "Most of the four hundred thousand Palestinians who lived in those areas had become refugees before the intervention of the Arab armies began"; Pappe 2022, p. 121, "By the time the British left in the middle of May, one-third of the Palestinian population had already been evicted"; Khalidi 2020, p. 75, "In this first phase of the Nakba before May 15, 1948, a pattern of ethnic cleansing resulted in the expulsion and panicked departure of about 300,000 Palestinians overall and the devastation of many of the Arab majority’s key urban economic, political, civic, and cultural centers."; Slater 2020, pp. 81 ("In fact, the forced transfer of the Palestinians began not as a response to the Arab invasion in the spring of 1948, but nearly six months earlier in December 1947, following the proclamation of the UN partition plan. While a number of studies have found no evidence to support the Israeli claim of an Arab propaganda campaign to induce the Palestinians to flee, well before the Arab invasion some 300,000 to 400,000 Palestinians (out of a population of about 900,000 at the time of the UN partition) were either forcibly expelled—sometimes by forced marches with only the clothes on their backs—or fled as a result of Israeli psychological warfare, economic pressures, and violence, designed to empty the area that would become Israel of most of its Arab inhabitants.") and 406 n.44 ("Reviewing the evidence marshaled by Morris and others, Tom Segev concluded that 'most of the Arabs in the country, approximately 400,000, were chased out and expelled during the first stage of the war. In other words, before the Arab armies invaded the country' (Haaretz, July 18, 2010). Other estimates have varied concerning the number of Palestinians who fled or were expelled before the May 1948 Arab state attack; Morris estimated the number to be 250,000–300,000 (The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, 262); Tessler puts it at 300,000 (A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 279); Pappé’s estimate is 380,000 (The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 96) ... Daniel Blatman estimates the number to be about 500,000 (Blatman, “Netanyahu, This Is What Ethnic Cleansing Really Looks Like”). Whatever the exact number, even Israeli 'Old Historians' now admit that during the 1948 war, the Israeli armed forces drove out many of the Palestinians, though they emphasized the action as a military 'necessity.' For example, see Anita Shapira, Israel: A History, 167–68."); Cohen 2017, p. 80, "On May 14, Ben-Gurion read the Declaration of Independence ... At that time, the Arabs of Tiberias, Safed, and most of the Arabs of Haifa (who were supposed to be citizens of the Jewish state, according to the Partition Plan) as well as those of Jaffa (in the planned Arab state) had already been uprooted from their cities (on the occupation of these cities, see Morris 1987). They were not to enjoy the promised equality of the Jewish state."
34. Manna 2022, p. 17, "Palestinian cities of Haifa, Jaffa, Safad, and Tiberias were depopulated"; Pappe 2022, p. 121, "This meant occupation and the expulsion of the Palestinian population. This was the fate of Jaffa, Haifa, Safad and Tiberias."; Cohen 2017, p. 80, "the Arabs of Tiberias, Safed, and most of the Arabs of Haifa (who were supposed to be citizens of the Jewish state, according to the Partition Plan) as well as those of Jaffa (in the planned Arab state) had already been uprooted from their cities"; Khoury 2012, p. 259, "destroyed Arab villages ... They also lost their cities. The three major coastal cities—Jaffa, Haifa, and Aka —were occupied and their citizens evacuated."; Masalha 2012, pp. 7 ("coastal cities of Palestine — Jaffa, Haifa and Acre — were largely depopulated") and 115 ("towns and villages of southern Palestine, including the cities of Beer Sheba and al-Majdal, were completely depopulated"); Davis 2011, p. 7; Sa'di 2007, pp. 293–294, "occupation of cities and the expulsion of their inhabitants in Tiberias (April 18), Haifa (April 22), Safad (May 11) and Jaffa (May 13)"
35. Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, p. 511, "emptying Palestinian towns and villages"; Pappe 2022, p. 128, "Half of the villages had been destroyed, flattened by Israeli bulldozers ..."; Khalidi 2020, p. 73, "conquest and depopulation ... of scores of Arab cities, towns, and villages"; Shenhav 2019, p. 49, "abolition of hundreds of Palestinian towns and villages"; Bashir & Goldberg 2018, p. 1, "destruction of hundreds of villages and urban neighborhoods ... evacuation of villages"; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, p. 400, "Palestinian cities whose inhabitants were almost completely forced out ... hundreds of evacuated and destroyed towns"; Manna 2013, p. 91, "destruction of their homes, villages and towns"; Masalha 2012, pp. 74 ("hundreds of villages had been completely depopulated and their houses blown up or bulldozed ... Walid Khalidi details the destruction of 418 villages falling inside the 1949 armistice lines"), 90-91 ("Of the 418 depopulated villages documented by Khalidi, 293 (70 per cent) were totally destroyed and 90 (22 per cent) were largely destroyed."), and 107 ("nearly 500 destroyed and depopulated villages"); Wolfe 2012, p. 161 n.1, "According to official Israeli estimates, over 85% of Palestinian villages were ‘abandoned’ in the Nakba, 218 villages being listed as destroyed."; Davis 2011, pp. 7 ("destruction of more than four hundred villages") and 9 ("418 villages that were emptied"); Ghanim 2009, p. 25, "about 531 villages were deliberately destroyed"; Kimmerling 2008, p. 280, "Most of their villages, towns, and neighborhoods were destroyed or repopulated by Jewish residents"; Sa'di 2007, p. 297, "destruction of some 420 Palestinian towns and villages"
36. Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, p. 511; Pappe 2022, p. 128, "a few thousand died in massacres"; Manna 2022, pp. 16–17,"There is now a general consensus among the parties to the historical discussion that there were dozens of massacres and acts of expulsion of Palestinians from their country prior to and after May 1948. The debate revolves essentially around the extent to which the top Israeli leadership was responsible for these acts and gave the orders to carry them out."; Hasian Jr. 2020, p. 100, " between December of 1947 and January of 1949 ... 'nearly 70 massacres' had been committed, and he was adamant that this was a conservative count"; Khalidi 2020, p. 93, "civilian massacres at Dayr Yasin and at least twenty other locations"; Slater 2020, pp. 77 and 81-82; Shenhav 2019, p. 49, "It is now clear that expulsions and massacres took place all over Palestine, not only in Dir Yasin, al-Lod, and al-Tantura."; Masalha 2012, pp. 76 and 84-87, " scores of massacres carried out in 1948"; Lentin 2010, pp. 109–111; Abu-Lughod 2007, p. 104 n. 7, "sixty-eight massacres of Palestinians conducted in 1948 by Zionist and Israeli forces"; Sa'di 2007, pp. 293 and 300, "Morris (2004a) also mentions twenty-four cases of massacre, while Palestinian scholars using oral historical methods have documented more than sixty"; Slyomovics 2007, pp. 29-31 ( Morris documents statistics of a dozen cases of rapes and twenty-four instances of massacres as supporting evidence for a pattern") and 37 ("It has been a major achievement by historians of 1948 that the conditions and numbers of actual rape and civilian massacre of the Palestinian population are finally recognized")
37. Manna 2022, p. 34, "After midnight of the new year, the Palmach unit carried out an attack on the village from the east, using firearms and grenades, which resulted in dozens of dead and wounded among the residents who were asleep in their homes."; Pappe 2022, p. 121, "Their fear for their lives was accentuated by massacres committed in Balad al-Shaykh, where on the last day of 1947, scores of Palestinians were slaughtered in retaliation for a terrorist attack on Jewish workers in the nearby refinery."; Confino 2018, p. 151 n.13, "The Haganah occupation of Balad al-Sheikh came next, leaving several dozen civilians dead, including men, women, and children."; Lentin 2010, p. 74, "In December 1947 the Hagana killed many of the inhabitants of Balad al-Shaysh, the burial place of Shaykh Izz al-Din al-Qassam, one of Palestine’s most revered leaders of the 1930s, killing over sixty Palestinians, including women and children."
38. Manna 2022, pp. 37-38 ("killing and wounding hundreds of men, women, and children ... mutilation and burning of corpses and the humiliation and torture of hundreds of prisoners") and 295 n. 51 (" For several years Haganah sources were relied on, which the British and others adopted, and which indicated that over 250 people were killed in the Dayr Yasin massacre. However, recent Palestinian research indicates that the number of those killed was 104, less than half the original Haganah estimate."); Pappe 2022, p. 121, "a well-publicized bloodbath"; Hasian Jr. 2020, p. 83, "For more than 70 years many Israeli researchers, journalists, military planners, and others have admitted that incidents like the killings of between 100 and 250 civilians at Deir Yassin in April of 1948 can be documented from materials that can be found in Israel Defense Force archives, but this is contextualized as an atypical incident that proves the rule of Jewish avoidance of civilian casualties during wartime."; Khalidi 2020, p. 74, "one hundred residents, sixty-seven of them women, children, and old people, were slaughtered"; Slater 2020, p. 82, "In addition to the forced expulsions, Zionist forces carried out several massacres, some of them even before the May 1948 Arab state invasion. The most notorious of them was the April 8–9 killing of over one hundred Palestinian civilians in the village of Deir Yassin, near Jerusalem."; Shenhav 2019, p. 49; Ghanim 2018, pp. 104–107, "Deir Yassin witnessed a horrific massacre in 1948 in which tens of civilians were killed, including women and children, after which the entire village, excepting a few buildings, was demolished, and Kfar Shaul was established upon its ruins."; Khoury 2012, p. 261; Masalha 2012, pp. 79–83, " Although not the bloodiest massacre of the war, Dayr Yasin was the site of the most notorious mass murder of Palestinian civilians in 1948 — an event which became the single most important contributory factor to the 1948 exodus, a powerful marker of the violence at the foundation of the State of Israel. On 9 April, between 120 and 254 unarmed villagers were murdered, including women, the elderly and children.56 There were also instances of rape and mutilation. Most Israeli writers today have no difficulty in acknowledging the occurrence of the Dayr Yasin massacre and its effect, if not its intention, of precipitating the exodus."; Wolfe 2012, p. 160; Knopf-Newman 2011, pp. 182–183, "Dayr Yasin was one of numerous massacres that Jewish militias enacted as part of Plan Dalet, the Zionists’ blueprint to cleanse Palestine of its indigenous population."; Lentin 2010, p. 139, "between 93 and 254 Palestinians, including 30 babies, were massacred"; Kimmerling 2008, p. 410 n. 17 ("the massacre of about 125 villagers") and 313 ("about 120 villagers killed"); Abu-Lughod 2007, p. 104 n. 7, "by conservative estimates slaughtered about 115 men, women, and children and stuffed their bodies down wells"; Humphries & Khalili 2007, p. 211; Jayyusi 2007, p. 132 n. 12, "The massacre at Deir Yassin was frequently cited in the Lifta accounts as having been a landmark, a focal point in the events of the Nakba itself."; Sa'di 2007, pp. 293 ("By then , many acts of expulsion and massacre had occurred, including the widely publicized massacre of Deir Yassin (April 9, 1948)") and 304; Slyomovics 2007, p. 35, "the most famous atrocity of the 1948 war, which was carried out on April 9 in Deir Yassin near Jerusalem. Approximately 105 Palestinian villagers were massacred by Jewish forces."; Schulz 2003, p. 28, "The most stark example is Deir Yasin, carved into the memory of Palestinian suffering. The Deir Yasin massacre, conducted by a joint IZL—LHI operation with the reluctant, but nevertheless given, consent of the Haganah, was the one event that had the most immediate effect upon flight. The attack was connected to an operation intended to secure the western entrance to Jerusalem (ibid.: 113). The atrocities that were committed in the event, in which 250 villagers were massacred and scores of others subject to rape, torture and mutilation, contributed to the spread of panic among Palestine's Arabs (ibid.: 113f.). Deir Yasin came to serve as a representation of what Jewish forces (irregular or not) might be capable of. Deir Yasin continues to stand out as a symbol of the nakba and the main focal point in remembering the catastrophe."
39. Sabbagh-Khoury 2023, pp. 258–260; Pappe 2022, p. 127, "Two hundred men between the ages of thirteen and thirty were massacred"; Khoury 2012, p. 263; Masalha 2012, p. 85, "between 70 and 200 Palestinian civilians were killed ... in a large-scale, well-planned massacre"; Lentin 2010, pp. 69–71, 140; Slyomovics 2007, p. 35; Esmeir 2007, pp. 229–250.
40. Pappe 2022, p. 128, "The people of Lydda, Ramleh and Majdal were evicted by force, suffering massacres and humiliation in the process."; Manna 2022, p. 48 ("The murder of dozens in the Dahmash mosque massacre in Lydda, and the subsequent expulsion of tens of thousands of the inhabitants of the city and of neighboring Ramla on a blistering hot Ramadan day") and 96 n. 72 ("Just as the Dayr Yasin massacre is the most famous operation in the killings of defenseless Palestinian civilians, the expulsion of tens of thousands of the inhabitants of Lydda and Ramla became the most famous ethnic cleansing operation carried out by the Israeli army with orders from the top leadership."); Hasian Jr. 2020, p. 93; Slater 2020, p. 82, "During the 1948 war Rabin was a leading Haganah general and commander of a force that violently expelled 50,000 inhabitants of the Palestinian towns of Lydda and Ramle."; Shenhav 2019, p. 49; Bashir & Goldberg 2018, p. 13, "the Nakba in Lydda and the massacre that took place there"; Ghanim 2018, pp. 107–108, "the Dahmash Massacre, during which tens of Palestinians who were gathered in the Dahmash mosque were terminated ... That is how fifty thousand residents of Lydda and Ramla were expelled after being terrorized."; Masalha 2012, p. 86, "one of the bloodiest atrocities of 1948. According to Israeli historian Yoav Gelber, Dayr Yasin 'was not the worst of the war’s atrocities ... the massacre of approximately 250 Arabs in Lydda ... took place following capitulation and not in the midst of combat’ ... Dozens of unarmed civilians who were detained in the Dahmash Mosque and church premises of the town were gunned down and murdered. One official Israeli source put the casualty figures at 250 dead and many injured. It is likely, however, that somewhere between 250 and 400 Arabs were killed in this IDF massacre; and an estimated 350 more died in the subsequent expulsion and forced march of the townspeople ... A group of between twenty and fifty Arab civilians was brought to clean up the mosque and bury the remains. After they had finished their work, they were shot into the graves they had dug."; Knopf-Newman 2011, p. 183, "... al-Ramla and Lydda also experienced massacre, rape, and forced migration, but as Hammad's poem indicates 400 Palestinians out of 17,000 remained. Before the expulsion, in July 1948 Hagana, in collusion with Irgun, encircled the area and attacked its inhabitants ..."; Slyomovics 2007, p. 30, "The largest single expulsion of Palestinians, some 50,000 urban-dwellers"; Schulz 2003, p. 28, "Serious atrocities were committed in several instances, for example in Lydda, accelerating flight."
41. Sayigh 2023, p. 282, "61 bodies"; Manna 2022, pp. 75-77 and 80, " The soldiers gathered all those who remained in their homes and shot and killed twelve young men. Then they took dozens of men (some of whom had fought with the ARA) to a well where they executed them.76 Not satisfied with killing the men in cold blood, the soldiers picked several women and asked them to fetch water to the village. After they had moved away some distance, the soldiers followed and raped them, killing two in the process."; Hasian Jr. 2020, p. 93; Pappe 2020, p. 34, "The document states that, in Safsaf, 'They caught fifty-two men, tied them to one another, dug a hole and shot them. Ten were still alive the women came and asked for mercy. They found the bodies of six old men, all in all sixty-one bodies, three cases of rape . . . one, a child aged fourteen ...'"; Khoury 2012, p. 263; Masalha 2012, p. 86, "50–70 were killed by the IDF"; Humphries & Khalili 2007, p. 211
42. Hasian Jr. 2020, p. 93; Pappe 2020, pp. 33–34, "a soldier’s eyewitness report ... enumerates details of the massacre at al-Dawayima as told to the author of the letter by a soldier who participated in the operation ... 'There was no battle and no resistance (and no Egyptians). The first conquerors killed from 80 to 100 Arabs, women and children. They killed the children by smashing their skulls with sticks. There was not a home without its dead.'"; Masalha 2012, p. 86, "80–100 were killed by the IDF"; Sa'di 2007, p. 293, "According to a report on the testimony of one Israeli soldier ... 'The first of conquerors killed about 80 to 100 Arabs, women and children. The children they killed by breaking their heads with sticks. There was not a house without dead.'"; Slyomovics 2007, pp. 29–30, " an Israeli army massacre of more than eighty villagers"
43. Sabbagh-Khoury 2023, pp. 185–186; Sayigh 2023, p. 282; Manna 2022, pp. 75-77 (" The Israeli army carried out killings (including massacres), pillaged, and raped in a number of border villages, including Safsaf, Saliha, Jish, Hula, and Sa‘sa‘, on the day the villages were occupied or shortly thereafter."), 202, and 301 nn. 79-81 (" It seems likely that cases of rape during and after the 1948 war were underreported in the historical literature. With time, it becomes more difficult to investigate those events."); Hasian Jr. 2020, p. 84, "Palestinian researchers, archivists, interviewers, and others who help chronicle these events now have transcontinental allies who collect oral histories that are filled with tales of the rape of women and the killing of innocent children during the involuntary transfers of the 1940s."; Natour 2016, p. 94; Khoury 2012, p. 263, "Many stories of massacres, rape, and expulsion are known, and many other stories are still to be revealed: Tantura, Safsaf, Ein al-Zeitun, Sa’sa’, Sha’ab, Kabri, Abou Shousha, Ai’laboun, and so on."; Masalha 2012, pp. 82–84, " The use of rape and other forms of sexual violence by Jewish forces in 1948 as weapons of war and instruments of ethnic cleansing has yet to be studied. In 1948 the rape of Arab women and girls was not a rare or isolated act committed by individual forces, but rather was used deliberately as an instrument to terrorise the civilian population and push people into fleeing their homes."; Knopf-Newman 2011, p. 183; Lentin 2010, p. 31; Ram 2009, p. 373; Humphries & Khalili 2007, pp. 209, 211-213 (" As Benny Morris writes, the regular and irregular military forces of the Yishuv had employed rape in 'several dozen cases' (Morris 2004a: 592) and the news of the rape, though subsequently silenced by both perpetrators and victims, spread as quickly as the news of massacres, aided by the fear and horror of the Palestinians and the 'whispering campaign' of the Yishuv military commanders ... these rapes were one of the more devastating components of Hagana assaults and perhaps the primary explanation behind the decision of many of the refugees to flee."), and 223-226; Sa'di 2007, pp. 293 ("On numerous occasions in the execution of Plan D, the Zionist forces expelled people from their towns and villages, committed rape and other acts of violence, massacred civilians, and executed prisoners of war."), 299-300 ("Morris (2004a) reports that there were 'about a dozen' cases of documented rape, often followed by murder. As he notes, 'We have to assume that the dozen cases of rape that were reported . . . are not the whole story. They are just the tip of the iceberg' (Morris, 2004b: 39)."), and 303-304; Slyomovics 2007, pp. 31 ("Morris documents statistics of a dozen cases of rapes and twenty-four instances of massacres as supporting evidence for a pattern") and 33-38 (" It has been a major achievement by historians of 1948 that the conditions and numbers of actual rape and civilian massacre of the Palestinian population are finally recognized."); Pappe 2006, pp. 90, 132, 156, 184, 196, and 208-211 (" David Ben-Gurion seems to have been informed about each case and entered them into his diary. Every few days he has a sub-section: 'Rape Cases'."); Schulz 2003, pp. 28 and 136 ("According to Warnock , honour was an ingredient in the exodus as fear and concern to save women from being raped was a reason for flight.")
44. Sabbagh-Khoury 2023, pp. 36, 44, 163, 169–177, 183, 186–189, 226–236, 241, 247–251, 256, 265; Sayigh 2023, pp. 281–282; Manna 2022, pp. 49, 83, 152, 169–170, 174–176, 182, 201, 287 n. 2, 316 n. 26; Khalidi 2020, pp. 250 n. 4 and 287 n. 58; Shenhav 2019, p. 49; Confino 2018, pp. 141–143; Masalha 2018, p. 185; Nashef 2018, pp. 95, 143 n. 4, 178–179, and 180 n.8; Lustick & Berkman 2017, p. 41; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, p. 413; Natour 2016, p. 94; Fierke 2014, p. 805 n. 17; Masalha 2012, pp. 16, 135–147; Lentin 2010, pp. 31, 70, and 84; Ram 2009, p. 371; Abu-Lughod 2007, p. 89; Pappe 2006, pp. 91–95, 100, 109, 125, 147, 167–169, 190, 200, 204–211
45. Khalidi 2020, p. 60, "78 percent"; Shenhav 2019, p. 50, "over 80 percent"; Manna 2013, p. 91, "about 78%"; Masalha 2012, p. 68, "78 per cent"; Wolfe 2012, p. 133, "77%"; Davis 2011, p. 7, "78 percent"; Abu-Lughod & Sa'di 2007, p. 3, "more than 77 percent"
46. Khalidi 2020, p. 75, "the West Bank and Gaza (the latter two constituted the remaining 22 percent of Palestine that was not conquered by Israel)"; Manna 2013, p. 91, "The largest portion of it was occupied by Israel, which annexed approximately half of the proposed Arab state which was to be established according to the UN partition plan of 1947."; Masalha 2012, p. 68, "The ‘War of Liberation’, which led to the creation of the State of Israel on 78 per cent of historic Palestine (not the 55 per cent according to the UN partition resolution)"; Davis 2011, p. 7, "Communal fighting through this period until the armistice agreements were signed in late 1949 resulted in the expanded borders of the Jewish state, declared to be the state of Israel on May 15, 1948, and the expulsion or flight of the majority of the Arabs living within its borders. From this point until 1967, Israel existed in some 78 percent of historic Palestine; the rest—the West Bank and Gaza—was under Jordanian and Egyptian rule, respectively."; Shlaim 2009, p. 39, "By the time the first truce was declared on 11 June, the Israel Defence Force was in control of areas beyond what had been assigned to the Jewish state under the partition plan ..."
47. Manna 2022, pp. 7 ("The consensus among studies that trace the history of this Arab minority in the Jewish state is that those who remained totaled 156,000."), 88 ("in January 1949, the number of Arabs in the Jewish state stood at 125,000 ... Based on these numbers, it is clear that the official figure of 156,000 quoted by historians and researchers prior to the transfer of the villages of the Triangle to Israeli control is inaccurate."), and 304 n. 131 ("Most researchers use this figure from official Israeli statistics without scrutiny or reference to the fact that it may be inaccurate."); Pappe 2022, p. 128, "160,000"; Khalidi 2020, p. 60, "160,000"; Slater 2020, p. 81, "about 150,000 to 160,000"; Confino 2018, p. 151 n. 10, "150,000"; Cohen 2017, p. 87, "About 130,000"; Masalha 2012, pp. 5–6, "160,000"; Davis 2011, p. 9, "125,000"; Ghanim 2009, p. 25, "About 170,000"; Abu-Lughod & Sa'di 2007, p. 3, "from 60,000 to 156,000, depending on the sources"
48. Sayigh 2023, p. 283; Manna 2013, pp. 91–92; Pappe 2022, pp. 128 and 132; Davis 2011, p. 7; Abu-Lughod & Sa'di 2007, p. 3.
49. Pappe 2022, p. 132; Slater 2020, p. 212; Manna 2013, p. 91; Masalha 2012, pp. 6–7; Davis 2011, p. 7; Abu-Lughod & Sa'di 2007, p. 3.
50. Shenhav 2019, p. 51; Bashir & Goldberg 2018, p. 7; Confino 2018, p. 151 n. 10; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, p. 408; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2014, pp. 3-4 and 16; Masalha 2012, pp. 5 and 68; Ghanim 2009, p. 23; Abu-Lughod & Sa'di 2007, pp. 3, 16, and 19.
51. Slater 2020, p. 94; Shenhav 2019, p. 61; Bashir & Goldberg 2018, p. 7; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, p. 407; Manna 2013, pp. 92–93; Masalha 2012, pp. 5 and 74; Wolfe 2012, p. 170 n.96; Kimmerling 2008, pp. 280–281.
52. Khalidi 2020, p. 75; Shenhav 2019, p. 49; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, pp. 407–408; Masalha 2012, p. 5.
53. Sayigh 2023, p. 281.
54. Slater 2020, p. 83; Shenhav 2019, p. 49; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, pp. 400-401 and 408; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2014, p. 4; Manna 2013, p. 93; Masalha 2012, p. 107 and 117; Wolfe 2012, p. 161 n.1.
55. Sayigh 2023, pp. 281 and 287; Shenhav 2019, p. 49; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, p. 402-403 and 413; Manna 2013, p. 91; Masalha 2012, pp. 1–3, 73, and 102.
56. Manna 2022, p. 195; Khalidi 2020, pp. 90–91, "In October 1953, Israeli forces in the West Bank village of Qibya carried out a massacre following an attack by feda’iyin that killed three Israeli civilians, a woman and her two children, in the town of Yehud. Israeli special forces Unit 101, under the command of Ariel Sharon, blew up forty-five homes with their inhabitants inside, killing sixty-nine Palestinian civilians."; Masalha 2012, p. 75, "the massacres at Qibya in October 1953 ... Israeli troops of the notorious Unit 101 of the Israeli army, under the command of Ariel Sharon, attacked the West Bank village of Qibya, killing 69 Palestinians, many while hiding in houses blown up over their heads; 45 houses, a school, and a mosque were also destroyed (Shlaim 2000: 90–93; Morris 1997: 257–76; Chomsky 1983: 383–5)."; Pappe 2006, p. 258.
57. Manna 2022, p. 11 ("On the Jordanian front, which remained quiet during the Sinai War, Border Guard troops carried out a massacre in Kafr Qasim on the evening of 29 October 1956. The killing by Israeli troops of forty-nine Arab citizens in cold blood, eight years after the Nakba, signals clearly how they were viewed by the ruling majority and its representatives in the security agencies."), 19 ("the army declared a curfew on the villages of the Triangle hours before the war began on 29 October 1956—and announced it only after villagers had left to tend their fields. This sudden movement restriction resulted in the killing of forty-nine people from the village of Kafr Qasim by Border Guards as they returned from their fields that evening, unaware of the curfew", 193-196, and 267-273; Ghanim 2018, pp. 96 ("This state of affairs began to change gradually with the passage of time and the waning of the prospect of expulsion, especially after the massacre of Kafr Qasim in 1956 on the eve of the Tripartite Aggression and the subsequent reconciliation in Kafr Qasim.") and 112 n.16 ("The massacre took place on the October 29, 1956, in the village Kafr Qasim. The Israel Border Police shot dead forty-nine Palestinian Arab civilians, all of whom were citizens of Israel."); Masalha 2012, p. 75, "Israeli-Palestinian village of Kafr Qasim, where on 29 October 1956 Israeli border guards murdered in cold blood forty-nine villagers (mostly women and children) returning from their fields"; Kimmerling 2008, p. 315, "1956 Forty-seven Israeli Arabs massacred in Kafr Qasim village after violating curfew."; Pappe 2006, p. 197 ("forty-nine villagers of Kfar Qassim, a village transferred to Israel in the armistice agreement with Jordan, were butchered") and 258 ("Israeli troops massacred forty-nine villagers returning from their fields")
58. Masalha 2012, pp. 13 and 128; Abu-Lughod & Sa'di 2007, p. 19.
59. Manna 2013, p. 86; Jayyusi 2007, pp. 109 and 115.
60. Shenhav 2019, p. 49; Bashir & Goldberg 2018, p. 7; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, p. 405; Manna 2013, pp. 94–97; Masalha 2012, pp. 168–169; Abu-Lughod & Sa'di 2007, pp. 3 and 19.
61. Sayigh 2023, p. 288 n. 13, "Palestinians were attacked ... in Lebanon during the civil war of 1975–1990, including the massacre of Tal al-Zaater"; Pappe 2022, p. 204, "The Syrians slaughtered Palestinians in Tel-Zaatar in 1976"; Khalidi 2020, pp. 125–126, "Tal al-Za‘tar ... Palestinians in all these places suffered such atrocities ... the camp was overrun in August 1976 and its entire population was expelled. Perhaps two thousand people were killed in what was probably the largest single massacre during the entire war ... The LF carried out the Tal al-Za‘tar massacre with Israel’s covert support"; Khoury 2012, p. 263, "The massacres in Palestinian camps ... Tal Al Zaatar camp (1976) ... are a continuation of the massacres of 1948."; Kimmerling 2008, p. 319, "Christian right-wing militias in Lebanon, supported by Syria, enforce a siege on Tal al-Zaatar, a Palestinian refugee camp; the siege ends with a massacre of the camp inhabitants."
62. Sayigh 2023, p. 288 n. 13, "Palestinians were attacked ... during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, with the massacre of Sabra/Shatila"; Khalidi 2020, pp. 125-126, 140, 154-163 (" Between September 16 and the morning of September 18, the militiamen murdered more than thirteen hundred Palestinian and Lebanese men, women, and children."), and 279 n. 42 ("The most complete analysis of the number of victims of the massacre, based on extensive interviews and painstaking research, is by the distinguished Palestinian historian Bayan Nuwayhid al-Hout, who in Sabra and Shatila: September 1982 (Ann Arbor: Pluto, 2004), established a minimum of close to 1,400 killed. She notes, however, that as many victims were abducted and never found, the actual number was undoubtedly larger, and is unknowable."); Manna 2013, p. 96, " the Palestinians suffered again from massacres and destruction in the refugee camps."; Khoury 2012, p. 263, "The massacres in Palestinian camps ... Shatila and Sabra (1982)—are a continuation of the massacres of 1948"; Masalha 2012, p. 75 ("The large-scale massacre of Palestinian civilians by the Israeli-allied Kataib Lebanese militia; estimates of those killed are between 800 and 3,500."), 137, 141–143, and 226-227; Lentin 2010, pp. 88 ("The 1982—2000 Lebanon war, the first not to be perceived as a ‘no-choice’ war, led to the Sabra and Shatila massacre in which the IDF allowed Lebanese Christian Phalangist militiamen to enter two Palestinian refugee camps and massacre civilians inside, leading to mass protests by Israeli Jews throuhgout Israel.") and 169-170 ("2,000 civilians were brutally murdered under the watchful eyes of the IDF"); Kimmerling 2008, p. 319, "Christian-Maronite militias, under Israeli protection, massacre Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps."; Abu-Lughod & Sa'di 2007, p. 5 ("Landmark events in Palestinian history such as ... the massacre at Sabra and Shatila") and 19 ("In 1982 Israel bombarded and invaded Lebanon, causing mass destruction, the routing of the PLO, and then a massacre in the refugee camps."); Pappe 2006, p. 258.
63. Khalidi 2020, pp. 164–199; Manna 2013, p. 99 n. 16; Masalha 2012, p. 75; Lentin 2010, p. 88; Abu-Lughod & Sa'di 2007, pp. 5 and 19.
64. Khalidi 2020, pp. 200–227; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2014, p. 15; Manna 2013, p. 97; Masalha 2012, pp. 75, 189-190 and 198-199; Abu-Lughod & Sa'di 2007, pp. 3 and 19.
65. Bashir & Goldberg 2018, p. 1; Khoury 2018, p. xiv; Manna 2013, p. 97 and 99 n. 10; Masalha 2012, p. 254.
66. Abu-Lughod & Sa'di 2007, p. 23; Jayyusi 2007, pp. 123.
67. Sayigh 2023, p. 281; Khoury 2018, p. xiv; Manna 2013, p. 97; Masalha 2012, p. 47 and 254.
68. Shenhav 2019, p. 49; Bashir & Goldberg 2018, p. 2; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, p. 418 and 423; Rashed, Short & Docker 2014, pp. 16–17; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2014, p. 14.
69. Khalid, Sunni (29 November 2023). "Palestinian academic says "Nakba" continuing in Gaza and the West Bank". KALW. 2:08. Retrieved 1 December 2023. (interview with Rashid Khalidi)
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75. According to Morris's estimates, 250,000 to 300,000 Palestinians left Israel during this stage, whereas Keesing's Contemporary Archives in London place the total number of refugees before Israel's independence at 300,000, as quoted in Mark Tessler's A History of the Arab–Israeli Conflict: "Keesing's Contemporary Archives" (London: Keesing's Publications, 1948–1973). p. 10101.
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77. Morris, Benny (1997). Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War. Clarendon Press. p. 432. ISBN 978-0-19-829262-3. The available documentation suggests that Israeli security forces and civilian guards, and their mines and booby-traps, killed somewhere between 2,700 and 5,000 Arab infiltrators during 1949–56. The evidence suggests that the vast majority of those killed were unarmed. The overwhelming majority had infiltrated for economic or social reasons. The majority of the infiltrators killed died during 1949–51; there was a drop to some 300–500 a year in 1952–4. Available statistics indicate a further drop in fatalities during 1955–6, despite the relative increase in terrorist infiltration.
78. Auron 2017, pp. xxxv-xxxvii and 1-12; Al-Hardan 2016, pp. 47–48; Rashed, Short & Docker 2014, pp. 3–4, 8–12, 13 ("The University of Oxford’s first professor of Israel Studies Derek Penslar recently stated that pro-Israelis needed to catch up with the past 30 years of academic scholarship that has accepted the ‘vast bulk of findings’ by the New Historians regarding the Nakba. He said: ‘what happened to the Palestinians, the Nakba, was not a genocide. It was horrible, but it was not a genocide. Genocide means that you wipe out a people. It wasn’t a genocide. It was ethnic cleansing."), and 14-18; Lentin 2010, p. 111, "Non-Zionist scholars operate a different timescale and highlight the continuities between wartime policies and post-1948 ethnic cleansing. They treat the Nakba as the beginning of an ongoing policy of expulsion and expropriation, rather than a fait accompli which ended a long time ago (e.g., Karmi and Cotran 1999; Pappe 2004a; Abu Lughod and Sa’di 2007)."; Milshtein 2009, p. 50 ("The majority of Palestinian writers"); Ram 2009, pp. 387–388 (Israeli historians); Shlaim 2009, pp. 55, 288 (New Historians)
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80. Manna 2022.
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83. Sa'di 2007, pp. 291–293, 298, and 308.
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92. Khoury 2018, pp. xii–xiii; Khoury 2012, pp. 258 and 263–265.
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95. Wolfe 2012, pp. 153–154, 160–161.
96. Hasian Jr. 2020, pp. 77–109; Slater 2020, pp. 81–85; Nashef 2018, pp. 5–6, 52, and 76; Natour 2016, p. 82; Knopf-Newman 2011, pp. 4–5, 25–32, 109, and 180–182; Esmeir 2007, pp. 232, 242, and 249-250; Schulz 2003, pp. 24, 31–32.
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111. Williams 2009, p. 98: "Just as the land of Palestine was to be cleared of the unwanted presence of its inhabitants, so the period after 1948 witnessed the ‘clearing’ of evidence of non-Jewish cultures: in the shape of their historical and archaeological remains, from the landscape as well as the looting of their artefacts from museums and archives. Part of this was sanctioned – if secret – Israeli government policy; part of it unattributable (military) vandalism – again. Astonishingly, as well as the ‘primitive’ cultural relics of the Palestinian past – with something like eighty per cent of village mosques demolished in this period – the destruction also included remarkable Roman remains, as in the city of Tiberias, which happened even when Israeli officials had specifically asked for them to be spared (see Rapaport 2007). Once again, just as the Nakba contrived to be both punctual historical event and persistent catastrophic condition, so the obliteration of historic non-Jewish sites in Palestine proved to be not simply a product of the destructive ecstasy of the moment of victory in 1948, but much more of a calculated, consistent approach, a policy that is still being carried out today, in pointless demolition, bulldozing and dynamiting in cities such as Nablus and Hebron."
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124. Schulz 2003, pp. 2–3: "Fragmentation, loss of homeland and denial have prompted an identity of ’suffering', an identification created by the anxieties and injustices happening to the Palestinians because of external forces. In this process, a homeland discourse, a process of remembering what has been lost, is an important component ... Therefore the dispersal (shatat in Arabic) and fragmentation of the Arab population of Palestine have served as uniting factors behind a modern Palestinian national identity, illuminating the facet of absence of territory as a weighty component in creations and recreations of ethnic and national identities in exile. Deterritorialised communities seek their identity in the territory, the Homeland Lost, which they can only see from a distance, if at all. The focal point of identity and politics is a place lost."
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• Chakraborty, Ranjani (15 May 2023). "Why Palestinians protest every May 15". Vox.

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