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{{Infobox military conflict {{Infobox military conflict
| conflict = Battle of Umberkhind | conflict = Battle of Umberkhind

Revision as of 15:56, 20 December 2024

Battle of Umberkhind
Part of Mughal-Maratha Wars
Date3 February 1661
LocationUmberkhind (present-day Maharashtra)18°45′N 73°05′E / 18.750°N 73.083°E / 18.750; 73.083
Result Maratha Empire victory
Belligerents
Maratha Empire Mughal Empire
Commanders and leaders
Shivaji
Netaji Palkar
Kartalab Khan  Surrendered
Rai Bagan  Surrendered
Strength
20,000 10,000 regular infantry
Historic battle between the Mughals and Maratha Empire

The Battle of Umberkhind took place on 3 February 1661 in the mountain range of Sahyadri near the city of Khopoli, Maharashtra, India. The battle took place between the Mughal and Maratha Empire. Shivaji's Maratha forces defeated the invading Mughal army, resulting in the Mughal army's surrender. The battle demonstrated Shivaji's Ganimi kava and Guerrilla warfare tactics, marking a significant victory for the Marathas and strengthening their position against the Mughals.

Background

See also: Battle of Chakan

After his victory at Chakan, the Mughal general Shaista Khan aimed to expand his control over Maratha territories but initially faced a shortage of troops. Once reinforcements arrived, he initiated an offensive targeting the forts in the Konkan region. At the same time, Shivaji began organizing his forces to counter the invasion. Shaista Khan, along with Rai Bagan, a Maratha Brahmin lady, led the campaign, entrusting the mission to capture the forts to Uzbek commander Kartalab Khan.

The expeditionary force, comprising contingents from various clans and commanders such as Kachhwah, Chauhan, Amar Singh, Mitrasen, Sarjerao Gadhe, Rai Bagan, Jaswantrao Kokate, and Jadhavrao, began its descent from the Sahyadri range via the north-south route near Lohagad. Subsequently, the army entered a dense forest known as Umbarkhand. This terrain, described as a virtual death-trap, limited the army's mobility and exposed them to ambushes from adversaries concealed in the surrounding terrain. It is speculated that the Bor Pass, a more commonly used route, may have been heavily fortified by Shivaji's forces, prompting Khan to attempt an outflanking maneuver through the less guarded Kuruwande Pass. However, historical records do not provide definitive explanations for this strategic decision.

Ambush at Umberkhind Pass

After Kartalab Khan descended the Sahyadri range and entered the forest, Shivaji, fully aware of his plans, tactically positioned his forces for an ambush. The surprise guerrilla attack threw the Mughal army into chaos, leading to a stampede among the troops, despite efforts by some commanders to put up resistance. Rai Bagan, a commander accompanying Kartalab Khan, advised surrender due to the hopeless situation. Kartalab Khan dispatched an emissary to negotiate with Shivaji, who agreed to allow the Mughal army safe passage in return for their surrender of all possessions. As a result, the Mughals abandoned their belongings and quickly exited the forest. The precise date of the battle is not documented in contemporary records, but it is believed to have taken place around January 15, 1661. Shivaji's choice to grant safe passage to Kartalab Khan's forces instead of fully capturing them remains a subject of speculation.

Negotiation with Kartalab Khan

Capturing the Mughal forces might not have greatly benefited Shivaji’s position, as the Mughals viewed him more as a rebellious leader than an equal authority. Furthermore, given the Mughal Empire's vast manpower, the loss of Kartalab Khan's contingent would have had little effect on their overall military strength. For Shivaji, taking a large number of prisoners would have created logistical difficulties with minimal strategic advantage. Instead, he ambushed Kartalab Khan’s advancing Mughal forces at the Umberkhind pass, causing significant casualties. Facing an unfavorable situation, Mughal commander Rai Bagan recommended surrender, enabling the Mughal army to retreat safely to Pune.

Resemblance with roman tactics

According to Gajanan Bhaskar Mehendale, The Battle of Umbarkhind shares similar tactics with the Battle of Lake Trasimene(217 BCE). In both cases, the general used deception to lure the enemy into a trap. Hannibal had drawn the Romans into an ambush by threatening Rome and positioning himself along their route as they rushed to its defense. However, it is unclear whether Shivaji intentionally set up his trap in a similar way or simply took advantage of the enemy's mistake.

Monument Made at Umberkhind.

Aftermath

Shivaji allowed safe passage to Kartalab Khan’s forces after the Battle of Umberkhind to focus on diplomacy over conflict. His goal was to compel the Mughals to accept a political settlement rather than escalate the war. Given his limited resources, Shivaji sought to demonstrate to the Mughals that imposing their will on him would come at a high cost, while also asserting his determination to defend his territory.

See also

References

  1. Sardesai, GS (1946). "New History of the Marathas". Phœnix Publications. p. 137.
  2. Vaibhav, Purandare (22 August 2022). Shivaji: India' Great Warrior King. Juggernaut Books. p. 53. ISBN 9789391165505.
  3. "A Guerilla Victory At Umberkhind!". Chanakya Forum. Retrieved 2024-12-20.
  4. Sorokhaibam, Jeneet (2013-01-01). Chhatrapati Shivaji: The Maratha Warrior and His Campaign. Vij Books India Pvt Ltd. ISBN 978-93-82573-49-4.
  5. Bhave, Shreyas. The Legend of Bahirji-Naik: Siege of Panhala (Book II). Leadstart Publishing Pvt Ltd. ISBN 978-93-5559-089-3.
  6. C V Vaidya (2005). Shivaji_The_Founder_Of_Maratha_Swaraj. DR BR AMBEDKAR, Digital Library Of India. Poona. p. 157.
  7. ^ Gajanan Bhaskar Mehendale (2011). Shivaji His Life and Times. pp. 471–476.
  8. ^ Maratha Generals and Personalities: A gist of great personalities of Marathas. Pratik gupta. 2014-08-01. p. 127.
  9. ^ Kulkarni V. B. (1963). Shivaji The Portrait Of A Patriot. p. 78.
  10. ^ Setumadhavarao S Pagadi (1983). Shivaji. pp. 35–36.
  11. ^ S_R_Sharma (2005). Maratha_History. DR BR AMBEEDKAR, Digital Library Of India. karnatak_Publishing_House. p. 141.
  12. Gajanan Bhaskar Mehendale (2011). Shivaji His Life and Times. The Battle of Umbarkhind has a close tactical resemblance to the battle of Lake Trasimene (217 BCE). Hannibal had deliberately lured the Romans into a trap by threatening Rome and placing himself astride their route as they were hurrying to its relief. We do not know whether Shivaji had deliberately baited his trap by some such move or had merely exploited the opportunity presented by the enemy's carelessness.
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