Misplaced Pages

Ideology of the Sheikh Said rebellion: Difference between revisions

Article snapshot taken from Wikipedia with creative commons attribution-sharealike license. Give it a read and then ask your questions in the chat. We can research this topic together.
Browse history interactively← Previous editNext edit →Content deleted Content addedVisualWikitext
Revision as of 20:18, 26 December 2024 editArjayay (talk | contribs)Autopatrolled, Extended confirmed users, Page movers, Pending changes reviewers, Rollbackers625,991 editsm Duplicate word removed← Previous edit Revision as of 15:58, 27 December 2024 edit undoIlamxan (talk | contribs)Extended confirmed users7,098 editsNo edit summaryTags: Visual edit Mobile edit Mobile web edit Advanced mobile editNext edit →
Line 2: Line 2:


==Ideology== ==Ideology==
Sheikh Said was a local leader of the ] sect. He was an ardent Kurdish nationalist and had ties to the ] organisation. Sheikh Said was one of the most outspoken nationalists during the first Azadi congress in 1924.<ref>The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925, Robert Olson, pp. 92-101</ref><ref>The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925, Robert Olson, pp. 114, 153</ref> The Azadi organisation planned the revolt, and its leaders elected Sheikh Said as the general leader due to his ] and religious credentials.<ref>Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan, Martin van Bruinessen, 1992, pp. 265-66</ref><ref> The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity, David Romano, 2006, pp. 34</ref><ref>The Kurds and the Politics of Turkey: Agency, Territory and Religion, Deniz Çifçi, 2019, pp. 60-61</ref> Sheikh Said was among the first to ].<ref>Violent Radical Movements in the Arab World: The Ideology and Politics of Non-State Actors, 2019, pp. 184</ref> Sheikh Said claimed that since Turks "broke" their unity with Kurds, the only option was for Kurds "to secure their own future."<ref>Nation-Building in Turkey and Morocco: Governing Kurdish and Berber Dissent, Senem Aslan, 2015, pp. 44</ref> In Sheikh Said's mind, Islam and Kurdishness could not be separated.<ref>Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 247</ref> Sheikh Said was a local leader of the ] sect. He was an ardent Kurdish nationalist and had ties to the ] organisation. Sheikh Said was one of the most outspoken nationalists during the first Azadi congress in 1924.<ref>The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925, Robert Olson, pp. 92-101</ref><ref>The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925, Robert Olson, pp. 114, 153</ref> The Azadi organisation planned the revolt, and its leaders elected Sheikh Said as the general leader due to his ] and religious credentials.<ref>Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan, Martin van Bruinessen, 1992, pp. 265-66</ref><ref> The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity, David Romano, 2006, pp. 34</ref><ref>The Kurds and the Politics of Turkey: Agency, Territory and Religion, Deniz Çifçi, 2019, pp. 60-61</ref> Sheikh Said was among the first to ].<ref>Violent Radical Movements in the Arab World: The Ideology and Politics of Non-State Actors, 2019, pp. 184</ref> According to Sheikh Said, Islam and Kurdishness could not be separated.<ref>Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 247</ref>


Sheikh Said was not only provoked by the secularism of the new republic, but also the Turkish character.<ref>The New Turkey and Its Discontents, Simon Waldman, Emre Caliskan, 2017, pp. 166</ref> While the Turkish government knew of the separatist intentions of Sheikh Said, they claimed to domestic and international media that the Sheikh Said revolt was a Turkish religious uprising aimed at reinstating the Ottoman dynasty.<ref>Political Function of Religion in Nationalistic Confrontations in Greater Kurdistan, Sabah Mofidi, 2022, pp. 34</ref><ref>Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 246</ref> The Turkish state later contradicted itself during the trial of Sheikh Said, which condemned him to death as a Kurdish separatist. Historians worldwide later agreed that the Ottomanist motives were a Turkish government fabrication.<ref>Violent Radical Movements in the Arab World: The Ideology and Politics of Non-State Actors, 2019, pp. 184</ref> The Turkish judge during the trial claimed that the revolt was "heading toward one direction: the creation of an independent Kurdistan."<ref>Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 245</ref> ], in his own report, described the revolt as a separatist and "fully-fledged nationalist movement".<ref>Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 248</ref> During his trial, Sheikh Said stated "we had a national goal and were ready to sacrifice our wealth and our lives to achieve that goal. We are not traitors. We fought to liberate Kurdistan and the Kurdish nation."<ref>Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 245-247</ref> Sheikh Said was provoked by both the Turkish character and secularism of the new republic.<ref>The New Turkey and Its Discontents, Simon Waldman, Emre Caliskan, 2017, pp. 166</ref> Sheikh Said claimed that since Turks "broke" their unity with Kurds by establishing a Turkish ], the only option was for Kurds "to secure their own future."<ref>Nation-Building in Turkey and Morocco: Governing Kurdish and Berber Dissent, Senem Aslan, 2015, pp. 44</ref> While the Turkish government knew of the separatist intentions of Sheikh Said, they claimed to domestic and international media that the Sheikh Said revolt was a Turkish religious uprising aimed at reinstating the Ottoman dynasty.<ref>Political Function of Religion in Nationalistic Confrontations in Greater Kurdistan, Sabah Mofidi, 2022, pp. 34</ref><ref>Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 246</ref> The Turkish state later contradicted itself during the trial of Sheikh Said, which condemned him to death as a Kurdish separatist. Historians worldwide later agreed that the Ottomanist motives were a Turkish government fabrication.<ref>Violent Radical Movements in the Arab World: The Ideology and Politics of Non-State Actors, 2019, pp. 184</ref> The Turkish judge during the trial claimed that the revolt was "heading toward one direction: the creation of an independent Kurdistan."<ref>Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 245</ref> ], in his own report, described the revolt as a separatist and "fully-fledged nationalist movement".<ref>Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 248</ref> During his trial, Sheikh Said stated "we had a national goal and were ready to sacrifice our wealth and our lives to achieve that goal. We are not traitors. We fought to liberate Kurdistan and the Kurdish nation."<ref>Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 245-247</ref>


The Ottoman Empire had given Kurds autonomy in exchange for allegiance to the ], therefore the majority of Kurds were indeed upset when the Ottoman Empire was replaced with Turkey.<ref>The New Turkey and Its Discontents, Simon Waldman, Emre Caliskan, 2017, pp. 166</ref> However, the Shafi'i clerics largely rejected the authenticity of the Ottoman sultans as legitimate caliphs. In a 1924 speech in defence of the ], Seyyid Bey, the ], stated that "from a religious point of view, the Shafi'i ] of ], ], ], ], and that of ], do not recognize ] as caliphs. Do you believe the ulama in Kurdistan take the debate over the Caliphate seriously? The ulama of those regions have never recognized our kings as caliphs."<ref>Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 248</ref> The Ottoman Empire had given Kurds autonomy in exchange for allegiance to the ], therefore the majority of Kurds were indeed upset when the Ottoman Empire was replaced with Turkey.<ref>The New Turkey and Its Discontents, Simon Waldman, Emre Caliskan, 2017, pp. 166</ref> However, the Shafi'i clerics largely rejected the authenticity of the Ottoman sultans as legitimate caliphs. In a 1924 speech in defence of the ], Seyyid Bey, the ], stated that "from a religious point of view, the Shafi'i ] of ], ], ], ], and that of ], do not recognize ] as caliphs. Do you believe the ulama in Kurdistan take the debate over the Caliphate seriously? The ulama of those regions have never recognized our kings as caliphs."<ref>Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 248</ref>

Revision as of 15:58, 27 December 2024

The ideology of the Sheikh Said rebellion refers to the Kurdish nationalism motivated by Islamism which was the ideology and motive of the Sheikh Said rebellion.

Ideology

Sheikh Said was a local leader of the Naqshbandi sect. He was an ardent Kurdish nationalist and had ties to the Azadi organisation. Sheikh Said was one of the most outspoken nationalists during the first Azadi congress in 1924. The Azadi organisation planned the revolt, and its leaders elected Sheikh Said as the general leader due to his charisma and religious credentials. Sheikh Said was among the first to link Kurdish nationalism with Islam. According to Sheikh Said, Islam and Kurdishness could not be separated.

Sheikh Said was provoked by both the Turkish character and secularism of the new republic. Sheikh Said claimed that since Turks "broke" their unity with Kurds by establishing a Turkish ethnostate, the only option was for Kurds "to secure their own future." While the Turkish government knew of the separatist intentions of Sheikh Said, they claimed to domestic and international media that the Sheikh Said revolt was a Turkish religious uprising aimed at reinstating the Ottoman dynasty. The Turkish state later contradicted itself during the trial of Sheikh Said, which condemned him to death as a Kurdish separatist. Historians worldwide later agreed that the Ottomanist motives were a Turkish government fabrication. The Turkish judge during the trial claimed that the revolt was "heading toward one direction: the creation of an independent Kurdistan." İsmet İnönü, in his own report, described the revolt as a separatist and "fully-fledged nationalist movement". During his trial, Sheikh Said stated "we had a national goal and were ready to sacrifice our wealth and our lives to achieve that goal. We are not traitors. We fought to liberate Kurdistan and the Kurdish nation."

The Ottoman Empire had given Kurds autonomy in exchange for allegiance to the Sublime Porte, therefore the majority of Kurds were indeed upset when the Ottoman Empire was replaced with Turkey. However, the Shafi'i clerics largely rejected the authenticity of the Ottoman sultans as legitimate caliphs. In a 1924 speech in defence of the abolition of the Caliphate, Seyyid Bey, the Minister of Justice, stated that "from a religious point of view, the Shafi'i ulama of India, Egypt, Najd, Yemen, and that of Kurdistan, do not recognize our kings as caliphs. Do you believe the ulama in Kurdistan take the debate over the Caliphate seriously? The ulama of those regions have never recognized our kings as caliphs."

Sheikh Said himself had spoken negatively of the Ottoman Empire, stating that "under the pretext of religion and the Caliphate, the Turks and the Ottomans have for over 400 years been pushing us gradually towards slavery, darkness, ignorance and destruction." Sheikh Said intended to revolt against Turkish rule in general, claiming that "we have not made the spirits of our ancestors happy. We have not fulfilled the wishes of Ahmadi Khani. That is why we live in misery and make our enemies glad." He also claimed that Turks were merely "migrants". The Sheikh Said revolt was very unpopular with Turks, and it did not spread to the Turks of Eastern Anatolia. The majority of Sheikh Said's soldiers were illiterate monolingual Kurds. The core of Sheikh Said's commanders were Hamidiye officers, such as Halid Beg Cibran, who was an in-law of Sheikh Said.

Sheikh Said planned on implementing Sharia and restoring the title of Caliph, however the caliph would be in his new Kurdish state, which would be an Islamic state based on the Shafi'i school. Sheikh Said claimed that his "caliphate" would safeguard "Kurdish honor and religion", and would not extend beyond Kurdistan. Some non-Muslims supported Sheikh Said due to the shared nationalism, even if it meant living under Sharia.

Sheikh Said had invited Said Nursi to the revolt, although Said Nursi had rejected and criticised it. Despite his tensions with Sheikh Said, on many occasions, Said Nursi had been mistaken for Sheikh Said and was targeted. Said Nursi specifically opposed Kurdish independence and preferred an Ottoman revival. Said Nursi claimed that Turks were the "standard-bearers" of the Islamic world for centuries and that "the sword may not be drawn against the sons of such a nation", while Sheikh Said claimed that Turks abandoned Islam and their promises to Kurds, and that it was necessary to fight them. Sheikh Said claimed that Turkish society practiced a "deceptive" form of Islam.

Sheikh Said and his fighters were known for their strong belief in their ideology and their high morale, and they captured over one third of Turkish Kurdistan, including many major cities and eventually sieging Diyarbakir, with over half of the Turkish army being deployed to suppress the revolt. The Turkish army reportedly lost more soldiers during the Sheikh Said rebellion than they did during the Turkish War of Independence. Turkey initially wanted to keep all of Greater Kurdistan within its borders. However, the Sheikh Said revolt was a major turning point, as Turkey stopped its claim over the Mosul vilayet shortly after. The Turkish government were convinced that much difficulties came with ruling over Kurdish regions. Qajar state documents claimed that in order to win Kurdish support in the Mosul question, Turkey claimed that the Sheikh Said revolt was a British plot and that they only killed the rebels due to their collaboration with the British, however it was ineffective. Qajar authorities were also worried as many Iranian Kurds were ready to fight against Turkey in support of Sheikh Said.

Sheikh Said attempted to gain the support of Kurdish Alevis. Some individual Alevis, notably Hasan Hayri, joined him. However, Kurdish Alevis refused to join the revolt, claiming that they were better off in a secular Turkey than a Sunni Kurdistan. Some Alevi tribes, such as Xurmek and Lewlan, even assisted Turkish forces during the revolt.

See also

References

  1. The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925, Robert Olson, pp. 92-101
  2. The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925, Robert Olson, pp. 114, 153
  3. Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan, Martin van Bruinessen, 1992, pp. 265-66
  4. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity, David Romano, 2006, pp. 34
  5. The Kurds and the Politics of Turkey: Agency, Territory and Religion, Deniz Çifçi, 2019, pp. 60-61
  6. Violent Radical Movements in the Arab World: The Ideology and Politics of Non-State Actors, 2019, pp. 184
  7. Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 247
  8. The New Turkey and Its Discontents, Simon Waldman, Emre Caliskan, 2017, pp. 166
  9. Nation-Building in Turkey and Morocco: Governing Kurdish and Berber Dissent, Senem Aslan, 2015, pp. 44
  10. Political Function of Religion in Nationalistic Confrontations in Greater Kurdistan, Sabah Mofidi, 2022, pp. 34
  11. Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 246
  12. Violent Radical Movements in the Arab World: The Ideology and Politics of Non-State Actors, 2019, pp. 184
  13. Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 245
  14. Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 248
  15. Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 245-247
  16. The New Turkey and Its Discontents, Simon Waldman, Emre Caliskan, 2017, pp. 166
  17. Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 248
  18. ^ Political Function of Religion in Nationalistic Confrontations in Greater Kurdistan, Sabah Mofidi, 2022, pp. 32-33
  19. Kurdish Nationalism on Stage: Performance, Politics and Resistance in Iraq, Mari R. Rostami, 2019, pp. 63
  20. Turkey, Islamists and Democracy: Transition and Globalization in a Muslim State, Yildiz Atasoy · 2005, pp. 45
  21. Under the Banner of Islam: Turks, Kurds, and the Limits of Religious Unity, Gülay Türkmen, 2021, pp. 40
  22. From Caliphate to Secular State: Power Struggle in the Early Turkish Republic, Hakan Özoglu, 2011, pp. 120
  23. The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925, Robert Olson, pp. 47, 94
  24. Political Function of Religion in Nationalistic Confrontations in Greater Kurdistan, Sabah Mofidi, 2022, pp. 32-33
  25. ^ Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 245
  26. Violent Radical Movements in the Arab World: The Ideology and Politics of Non-State Actors, 2019, pp. 184
  27. Turkey, Islamists and Democracy: Transition and Globalization in a Muslim State, Yildiz Atasoy, 2005, pp. 45
  28. Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement, 2003, pp. 152
  29. Bediuzzaman Said Nursi and Risale-i Nur, Extended Special Text Version, Ediz SÖZÜER, pp. 42
  30. Bediuzzaman Said Nursi: Author of the Risale-i Nur, Şükran Vahide, 2019, pp. 197-198
  31. Islam at the Crossroads: On the Life and Thought of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, 2003, pp. 64
  32. Violent Radical Movements in the Arab World: The Ideology and Politics of Non-State Actors, 2019, pp. 184
  33. The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913-1950, Ugur Ümit Üngör, 2011, pp. 124-125
  34. From Caliphate to Secular State: Power Struggle in the Early Turkish Republic, Hakan Özoglu, 2011, pp. 89
  35. The New Turkey and Its Discontents, Simon Waldman, Emre Caliskan, 2017, pp. 166
  36. Osman's Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire, Caroline Finkel, 2007 pp. 550
  37. Dersim as an Internal Colony: The Turkish Civilizing Mission (1927–1952), Murat Devres, 2024, pp. 72
  38. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East, Robert Olson, 1996, pp. 67
  39. Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 253
  40. Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 245
  41. Political Function of Religion in Nationalistic Confrontations in Greater Kurdistan, Sabah Mofidi, 2022, pp. 35
  42. The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925, Robert Olson, pp. 94
  43. Political Function of Religion in Nationalistic Confrontations in Greater Kurdistan, Sabah Mofidi, 2022, pp. 35
  44. The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925, Robert Olson, pp. 110
Categories: