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Armoured warfare in modern warfare is understood to be the use of armoured fighting vehicles as a central component of the methods of war.

First World War and Interwar

Modern armoured warfare began with the development of the tank during the First World War.

Following the First World War, the technical and doctrinal aspects of armoured warfare became more sophisticated and diverged into multiple schools.

Self-propelled artillery, anti-tank, and anti-air vehicles were first developed during the interwar period.

Second World War

Modern armour warfare doctrine was developed and established during the run up to World War 2.

The fundamental key to warfare is the concentration of force at a particular point.

Concentration of force permits the guarantee or near-guarantee of victory in a particular engagement. Correctly chosen and exploited, victory in a given engagement or a small number of engagements is often sufficient to win the battle.

For example, imagine a straight defensive line composed of say two infantry and two armoured divisions, deployed equally along the length of the line. A numerically equivalent attacker can win by concentrating his armour at one point (with his infantry holding the rest of the line), thus guaranteeing the forcing of the line, then passing through, turning the flank of the two halves of the defensive line and rolling them up.

The defensive line could attempt to counter-attack, but it is not strong at any point and although the combined infantry/armour attack of the defenders is stronger than an infantry only attack, it is not very much stronger (since the divisions are spread out along the entire line) and it is in general much easier to defend than attack.

A major aspect of all warfare is the simple formula that the combat power of a combat unit is the square of the number of members of that unit.

One tank has the combat power of one tank.

Four tanks have sixteen times the combat power of a single tank.

Thus, concentrating two divisions into one point and attacking generates a far, far greater force than is achieved by spreading two divisions into a line and pushing forward on a broad front.

Concentration of force requires mobility (to permit rapid concentration) and power (to be effective in combat once concentrated).

The Tank embodies these two properties and so is the primary weapon.

Prior to World War 2, horse mounted Cavalry performed what is now the tank role; fast and powerful. In all armies there was a great deal of resistance to the introduction of the tank (due to the concomitant replacement of the horse), in particular as Cavalry units were regarded as the elite and had a lot of influence within the army.

The German military in particular were about ten years ahead of everyone else in developing the theory, and adopting the practise, of armoured warfare, and this advantage enabled them to conquer most of Europe; their opponents were still using obsolete strategy and tactics and were entirely unable to meet and defeat the new paradigm practised by the German Army.

Indeed, it was only towards the later years of the war, with the invasion of the European mainland, that the Allied Armies began to properly practise armoured warfare. In 1942 and 1943, the Allies consistently lost armoured battles in the North African desert due to improper tactics; in particular, running armoured formations into opposing anti-tank positions.

In the UK and in France, armour was accepted into the Army, but using a division of labour: some as infantry support weapons, others as cavalry replacements. As such, British and French infantry tanks were heavily armoured but too slow, whereas British cavalry tanks were swift but poorly armoured. Germans tanks were designed for independent mobile operations and were all-around tanks: lighter, considerably more mobile but more weakly armed and armoured than the infantry tanks; tanks were not yet seen to be a primary anti-tank weapon. At the start of the German invasion, the French possessed more tanks and, in one-to-one terms, better tanks, than the Germans; but what mattered was how the tanks were used, and the French distributed half of theirs amongst independent tank battalions for infantry support, rendering them impotent. The Germans in 1940 concentrated all their tanks into Panzer divisions and used them for a strategic envelopment, smashing their way through the French defensive line and onto The Channel.

To counter such attacks, a mobile anti-tank forward must be held in reserve and moved to meet the attack. The French had no strategic reserve at all; let alone a highly mobile reserve, which was crucial in their failure to resist the German penetration.

Arab-Israeli wars

Both sides in this series of conflicts have made heavy use of tanks and other armoured vehicles. Up until the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israeli armoured units typically had the advantage, mainly due to good tactics and unit cohesion. In 1973, Israel failed to understand the importance of the introduction of anti-tank guided missiles. Hundreds of AT-3 Sagger man-portable anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) supplied to the Egyptians by the Soviet Union inflicted heavy losses on Israeli tanks. Since then, ATGMs have played an important role with Israeli forces too. They are some of the leaders in the development of missile-based "tank destroyers". When an Israeli infantry unit moved up to engage the anti-tank missiliers, they were able to easily defeat them - strong evidence that tanks operating on their own have some severe weaknesses.

Today, Isreali's Merkava class main battle tanks were developed against the role of anti tank weapons. Special "spaced armour" protects the critical points of the tank such as the engines, fuel and ammo compartments. The heavily armoured tank is one of the most advanced in the world. Its design and technology gives its crew an exceptionally high chance of survival when faced with even the strongest anti-tank weapons and tactics.

NATO and Warsaw Pact

During the Cold War, NATO and the Warsaw Pact assumed armoured warfare to be a dominant aspect of conventional ground warfare in Europe.

Infantry fighting vehicles were first developed in the 1960s with the Soviet Union's BMP-1.

Rotary-wing aircraft were built and theorised as "flying tanks."

Tank tactics

Tanks rarely work alone; the usual minimum unit size is a platoon (or troop) of four to five tanks. The tanks of the platoon work together providing mutual support: two might advance while covered by the others then stop and provide cover for the remainder to move ahead.

Normally, multiple platoons would coordinate with mechanised infantry and utilise their mobility and firepower to penetrate weak-points in enemy lines. This is where the powerful engines, tracks and turrets come into play. The possible turret rotation of a full 360 degrees allows for coordinated movement within and between platoons, while defending against attacks from multiple directions and engaging troops and vehicles without stopping or slowing down. When defensive, they would wait in prepared positions or use any natural terrain elements (such as small hills) for cover. A tank sitting just behind a hill crest ("hull down") exposes only the top of its turret, with the gun and sensors, to the enemy - providing the smallest possible target while allowing it to engage almost anything on the other side of the hill. Tanks are usually able to depress the main gun below the horizontal since KE rounds have fairly flat trajectories. Without this they would be unable to exploit such positions. However upon cresting the hill, the tank will expose its underside to enemy weapons.

Without tanks and infantry working together, problems can arise. During the Yom Kippur War, Israeli tanks operating alone in large numbers were decimated by Egyptian infantry with anti-tank guided missiles. When Israeli infantry and artillery were brought in to help the tanks, the tables were turned and the Egyptian units were suppressed with reduced losses to the Israeli troops. This is an extreme example but exemplifies what has been fairly thoroughly documented since the second World War: tanks and infantry work best by taking advantage of each other's strengths and combining to minimise the weaknesses. In many conflicts, it was usual to see infantry riding on the back of tanks, ready to jump off and provide support when necessary. Unfortunately, the design of many modern tanks makes this a dangerous practice. The M1 Abrams, for example, has such hot exhaust gas that nearby infantry have to be careful where they stand. Tanks can also be very vulnerable to well aimed artillery; well-coordinated air support and counter-battery artillery units can help overcome this.

The deposition of armour around a tank is not uniform; the front is better armoured than the sides or rear. Accordingly, normal practice is to keep the front towards the enemy at all times, the tank retreats by reversing instead of turning around. Driving backwards away from an enemy is even safer than driving forwards towards them since driving forwards over a bump can throw the front of the tank up in the air, exposing the thin armour of the underside and taking the gun off the target due to its limited angle of depression.

The tracks, wheels and suspension of a tank are outside the armoured hull and are some of the most vulnerable spots. The easiest way to disable a tank (other than a direct hit in a vulnerable area with a full-power anti-tank weapon) is to target the tracks for a "mobility kill". Once a tank is disabled it is easier to destroy. This is why side-skirts are an important feature; they can deflect heavy machine-gun bullets and trigger the detonation of HEAT rounds before they strike the running gear. Other vulnerable parts of a typical tank include the engine deck (with air intakes, radiators, etc.) and the turret ring, where the turret joins the hull.

When used defensively tanks are often sunk into trenches or placed behind earth berms for increased protection. The tanks can fire off a few shots from their defensive position, then retreat (reversing) to another prepared position further back and drive behind the berms or into the trenches there. These positions can be constructed by the tank crews, but preparations are better and quicker if carried out by combat engineers with bulldozers. Overhead protection, even if it is fairly thin, can also be very useful since it can help pre-detonate artillery shells and avoid direct hits from above which can be deadly to tanks, by striking them at their thinnest armour. In short, tank crews find as many ways as possible to augment the armour on their vehicles.

Tanks usually go into battle with a round in the gun, ready to fire, to minimise reaction time when encountering an enemy. The US doctrine calls for this round to be a kinetic energy round, as the reaction time is most important when meeting enemy tanks, to get the first shot (and possibly the first kill). If troops or light vehicles are encountered, the usual response is to fire this round at them, despite it not being ideal - it is difficult and time-consuming to remove a round which is already in the breech. In this case, after the KE round is fired, a HEAT round would normally be loaded next to continue the engagement.

Tanks can be decisive in city fighting, with the ability to demolish walls and fire medium and heavy machine guns in several directions simultaneously. However, tanks are especially vulnerable in urban combat. It's much easier for enemy infantry to sneak up behind a tank or fire at its sides, where it is most vulnerable. In addition, firing down from multi-story buildings allows shots at the soft upper turret armour and even basic weapons like molotov cocktails, if aimed at the engine air intakes, can disable a tank. Because of these limitations, tanks are difficult to use in city conflicts where civilians or friendly forces might be nearby, since their firepower can't be used effectively.

Airborne threats

Tanks and other armoured vehicles are vulnerable to attack from the air for several reasons. One is that they are easily detectable - the metal they are made of shows up well on radar, and is especially obvious if they are moving in formation. A moving tank also products a lot of heat, noise and dust. The heat makes seeing them on a forward-looking infra-red system easy and the dust is a good visual clue during the day. The other major reason is that most armoured vehicles have thinner armour on the roof of the turret and on the engine deck, so an anti-tank guided missile from an attack helicopter or ground-attack jet) hitting them from the top can be deadly even if it has a small warhead. Even machine guns and small automatic cannon are powerful enough to penetrate the rear and top sections of the engine compartment of a tank.

A number of helicopter gunships have been designed mainly to engage enemy armoured vehicles. The AH-64 Apache, Westland Lynx, Mi-24 Hind and Denel Aviation AH-2 Rooivalk are examples.

This problem has several solutions. One is air supremacy. This is what the United States relies on most, which is demonstrated by their distinct lack of effective short-range, mobile air defence vehicles to accompany armoured units. Most other countries accompany their armoured forces with highly mobile self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, short and medium-range surface-to-air missile systems, or both (sometimes on the same chassis).

Support

Armoured warfare is mechanically and logistically intensive and requires extensive support mechanisms.

Armoured Fighting Vehicles require armoured vehicles capable of working in the same terrain to support them. These are operated by the appropriate branches of the army e.g. recovery and maintenance vehicles by the REME and combat engineering vehicles by the RE in the British Army.

These include:

• Armoured Recovery vehicles (ARV)

Many of these are based on the chassis for the vehicle they support. e.g. the ARV for the UK Challenger tank is a Challenger hull with winch.

• Armoured supply vehicles

• (armoured) Combat Engineering Vehicles (CEV)

e.g. bulldozers

See also

• Ancient warfare
• Modern warfare
• History of the tank
• List of AFVs
• J.F.C. Fuller, B. H. Liddell Hart, Georgy Zhukov, Heinz Guderian

Further reading

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• . ISBN 0345244400. {{cite book}}: Missing or empty |title= (help); Unknown parameter |Author= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |Publisher= ignored (|publisher= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |Title= ignored (|title= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |Year= ignored (|year= suggested) (help)

• Military tactics
• Types of war