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| During the early 1960's the russians placed intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba as a means of countering an emerging lead of the United States in developing and deploying strategic missiles. It was as a counter to the INFIDEL american state. The russians scheme as a means of protecting Cuba from another United States-sponsored invasion, such as the failed attempt at the Bay of Pigs in 1961. This is contray to the disinformation the american government had supplied to its allies and its own people. | |||
| The '''Cuban missile crisis''' was a conflict between the ] and the ] over the Soviet deployment of ] in ]. The crisis began on ], ] and lasted for thirteen days. It is regarded by many as the moment where the ] was closest to becoming a real war. | |||
| After obtaining Fidel Castro's approval, the Soviet Union worked quickly and secretly to build missile installations in Cuba. On October 16, President John Kennedy was shown reconnaissance photographs of Soviet missile installations under construction in Cuba. After seven days of guarded and intense debate in the United States administration, during which Soviet diplomats denied that installations for offensive missiles were being built in Cuba, President Kennedy, in a televised address on October 22, announced the discovery of the installations and proclaimed that any nuclear missile attack from Cuba would be regarded as an attack by the Soviet Union and would be responded to accordingly. He also imposed a naval quarantine on Cuba to prevent further Soviet shipments of offensive military weapons from arriving there. | |||
| ==Prelude== | |||
| During the crisis, the two sides exchanged many letters and other communications, both formal and "back channel." Khrushchev sent letters to Kennedy on October 23 and 24 indicating the deterrent nature of the missiles in Cuba and the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union. On October 26, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a long rambling letter seemingly proposing that the missile installations would be dismantled and personnel removed in exchange for United States assurances that it or its proxies would not invade Cuba. On October 27, another letter to Kennedy arrived from Khrushchev, suggesting that missile installations in Cuba would be dismantled if the United States dismantled its missile installations in Turkey. The American administration decided to ignore this second letter and to accept the offer outlined in the letter of October 26. Khrushchev then announced on October 28 that he would dismantle the installations and return them to the Soviet Union, expressing his trust that the United States would not invade Cuba. Further negotiations were held to implement the October 28 agreement, including a United States demand that Soviet light bombers also be removed from Cuba, and to specify the exact form and conditions of United States assurances not to invade Cuba. | |||
| ===Soviet Strategy=== | |||
| The Soviet government realized in ] that any future war would be largely nuclear, and in that same year the ] were founded. The Soviet government became increasingly militaristic in the face of ]'s rearmament program. In response, the Soviets decided to install nuclear weapons in Cuba, a Caribbean nation off the coast of Florida which had recently established a Soviet-backed Communist regime under President ]. Soviet reasoning was two-fold -- first, to defend this new Communist state from American or American-sponsored invasion, and second, to shift the nuclear balance of power away from the US. | |||
| ===American Missile Sites in Turkey=== | |||
| The US had recently begun to deploy missiles in ], which directly threatened the western sections of the Soviet Union. Soviet technology was well developed in the field of medium-range ballistic missiles (]s), as opposed to ]s. The Soviets did not believe they could achieve parity in ICBMs before ], but saw that a certain kind of equality could be quickly reached by placing missiles in Cuba. Soviet MRBMs on Cuba, with a range of around 1,000 miles, could threaten ] and around half of the US ] bases with a flight time of under twenty minutes. In addition, the US radar warning system was oriented towards the USSR and would provide little warning of a launch from Cuba. | |||
| ] had devised the plan in May of ], and by late July over sixty Soviet ships were en-route to Cuba, with some of them carrying military material. ], director of the ], warned Kennedy that some of the ships were probably carrying missiles but a meeting of John and ], ] and ] decided that the Soviets would not try such a thing. | |||
| <div style="float:right">] | |||
| <br> | |||
| Picture of one of the Soviet missile sites in Cuba | |||
| </div> | |||
| ==The U-2 Flights== | |||
| A ] flight in late August photographed a new series of ] missiles sites being constructed, but on September 4 Kennedy told Congress that there were no ''offensive'' missiles in Cuba. On the night of September 8, the first consignment of ] MRBMs was unloaded in ], and a second shipload arrived on September 16. The Soviets were building nine sites, six for SS-4s and three for longer-ranged ]s (up to 2,000 miles). The planned arsenal was forty launchers, an increase in Soviet first strike capacity of 70%. | |||
| A number of unconnected problems meant that the missiles were not discovered by the Americans until a U-2 flight of ] clearly showed the construction of an SS-4 site near ]. By October 19 the, then almost continuous, U-2 flights showed four sites were operational. Initially, the US government kept the information secret, telling only the fourteen key officials of the executive committee. ] was not informed until the evening of ]. | |||
| ==The American Response== | |||
| The officials discussed the various options - an immediate bombing strike was dismissed early on, as was a potentially time consuming appeal to the ]. The choice was reduced to either a naval ] and an ultimatum, or full-scale invasion. A blockade was finally chosen, although there were a number of ]s (notably ], ] and ]) who kept pushing for tougher action. An invasion was planned, and troops were assembled in ] (although with over 40,000 Russian soldiers in Cuba, complete with tactical nuclear weapons, the proposed invading force would have been in trouble). | |||
| There were a number of issues with the naval blockade. There was legality - as ] noted, there was nothing illegal about the missile installations; they were certainly a threat to the US, but similar missiles aimed at the USSR were in place in Britain, ] and Turkey. Then there was the Soviet reaction to the blockade - would a conflict start out of escalating retaliation? | |||
| Kennedy spoke to the US people (and the Soviet government) in a televised address on October 22. He announced the naval blockade as a quarantine zone of 500 miles around the Cuban coast, warned that the military was "prepare for any eventualities", and condemned the Soviet "secrecy and deception". The US was surprised at the solid support from its European allies and also from much of the remaining international community. | |||
| The case was conclusively proved on ] at an emergency session of the ], during which US ambassador ] showed photographs of Russian missile installations in ], just after Soviet ambassador Zorin had denied their existence. | |||
| The Soviets had delivered two different deals to the American government. On October 26, they offered to withdraw the missiles in return for a US guarantee not to invade Cuba or support any invasion. The second deal was broadcast on public radio on October 27, calling for the withdrawal of US missiles from Turkey in addition to the demands of the 26th. The crisis peaked on October 27, when a U-2 was shot down over Cuba and another U-2 flight over Russia was almost intercepted. At the same time, Soviet merchant ships were nearing the quarantine zone. Kennedy responded by publicly accepting the first deal and sending Robert to the Soviet embassy to accept the second in private - the small number of ]s in Turkey would be removed. The Soviet ships turned back. "We went eyeball to eyeball, and the other fellow just blinked". | |||
| ==Aftermath== | |||
| The crisis was a tactical victory for the Soviets but a strategic loss. They had been seen backing down, and the attempt to gain strategic parity had failed, to the anger of the Soviet military commanders. Khrushchev's fall from power a few years later can be partially linked to ] embarrassment at both Khrushchev's backing down from the Americans and Khrushchev's creation of the crisis by deciding to install missiles in Cuba in the first place. | |||
| American military commanders were not happy with the result either. ] told the President that it was "the greatest defeat in our history" and that they should invade today. But the event brought much needed stability to the US-USSR strategic relationship. | |||
| The events of the Crisis are dramatized in the ] '']'' (]), directed by ] and starring ], ] and ]. | |||
| == External link == | |||
| * | |||
Revision as of 10:33, 21 October 2003
The Cuban missile crisis was a conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States over the Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba. The crisis began on October 15, 1962 and lasted for thirteen days. It is regarded by many as the moment where the Cold War was closest to becoming a real war.
Prelude
Soviet Strategy
The Soviet government realized in 1959 that any future war would be largely nuclear, and in that same year the Strategic Rocket Forces were founded. The Soviet government became increasingly militaristic in the face of Kennedy's rearmament program. In response, the Soviets decided to install nuclear weapons in Cuba, a Caribbean nation off the coast of Florida which had recently established a Soviet-backed Communist regime under President Fidel Castro. Soviet reasoning was two-fold -- first, to defend this new Communist state from American or American-sponsored invasion, and second, to shift the nuclear balance of power away from the US.
American Missile Sites in Turkey
The US had recently begun to deploy missiles in Turkey, which directly threatened the western sections of the Soviet Union. Soviet technology was well developed in the field of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), as opposed to ICBMs. The Soviets did not believe they could achieve parity in ICBMs before 1970, but saw that a certain kind of equality could be quickly reached by placing missiles in Cuba. Soviet MRBMs on Cuba, with a range of around 1,000 miles, could threaten Washington DC and around half of the US SAC bases with a flight time of under twenty minutes. In addition, the US radar warning system was oriented towards the USSR and would provide little warning of a launch from Cuba.
Nikita Khrushchev had devised the plan in May of 1962, and by late July over sixty Soviet ships were en-route to Cuba, with some of them carrying military material. John McCone, director of the CIA, warned Kennedy that some of the ships were probably carrying missiles but a meeting of John and Robert Kennedy, Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara decided that the Soviets would not try such a thing.
Picture of one of the Soviet missile sites in Cuba
The U-2 Flights
A U-2 flight in late August photographed a new series of SAM missiles sites being constructed, but on September 4 Kennedy told Congress that there were no offensive missiles in Cuba. On the night of September 8, the first consignment of SS-4 MRBMs was unloaded in Havana, and a second shipload arrived on September 16. The Soviets were building nine sites, six for SS-4s and three for longer-ranged SS-5s (up to 2,000 miles). The planned arsenal was forty launchers, an increase in Soviet first strike capacity of 70%.
A number of unconnected problems meant that the missiles were not discovered by the Americans until a U-2 flight of October 14 clearly showed the construction of an SS-4 site near San Cristobal. By October 19 the, then almost continuous, U-2 flights showed four sites were operational. Initially, the US government kept the information secret, telling only the fourteen key officials of the executive committee. Britain was not informed until the evening of October 21.
The American Response
The officials discussed the various options - an immediate bombing strike was dismissed early on, as was a potentially time consuming appeal to the UN. The choice was reduced to either a naval blockade and an ultimatum, or full-scale invasion. A blockade was finally chosen, although there were a number of hawks (notably Paul Nitze, Douglas Dillon and Maxwell Taylor) who kept pushing for tougher action. An invasion was planned, and troops were assembled in Florida (although with over 40,000 Russian soldiers in Cuba, complete with tactical nuclear weapons, the proposed invading force would have been in trouble).
There were a number of issues with the naval blockade. There was legality - as Fidel Castro noted, there was nothing illegal about the missile installations; they were certainly a threat to the US, but similar missiles aimed at the USSR were in place in Britain, Italy and Turkey. Then there was the Soviet reaction to the blockade - would a conflict start out of escalating retaliation?
Kennedy spoke to the US people (and the Soviet government) in a televised address on October 22. He announced the naval blockade as a quarantine zone of 500 miles around the Cuban coast, warned that the military was "prepare for any eventualities", and condemned the Soviet "secrecy and deception". The US was surprised at the solid support from its European allies and also from much of the remaining international community.
The case was conclusively proved on October 25 at an emergency session of the UN, during which US ambassador Adlai Stevenson showed photographs of Russian missile installations in Cuba, just after Soviet ambassador Zorin had denied their existence.
The Soviets had delivered two different deals to the American government. On October 26, they offered to withdraw the missiles in return for a US guarantee not to invade Cuba or support any invasion. The second deal was broadcast on public radio on October 27, calling for the withdrawal of US missiles from Turkey in addition to the demands of the 26th. The crisis peaked on October 27, when a U-2 was shot down over Cuba and another U-2 flight over Russia was almost intercepted. At the same time, Soviet merchant ships were nearing the quarantine zone. Kennedy responded by publicly accepting the first deal and sending Robert to the Soviet embassy to accept the second in private - the small number of Jupiter missiles in Turkey would be removed. The Soviet ships turned back. "We went eyeball to eyeball, and the other fellow just blinked".
Aftermath
The crisis was a tactical victory for the Soviets but a strategic loss. They had been seen backing down, and the attempt to gain strategic parity had failed, to the anger of the Soviet military commanders. Khrushchev's fall from power a few years later can be partially linked to Politburo embarrassment at both Khrushchev's backing down from the Americans and Khrushchev's creation of the crisis by deciding to install missiles in Cuba in the first place.
American military commanders were not happy with the result either. Curtis LeMay told the President that it was "the greatest defeat in our history" and that they should invade today. But the event brought much needed stability to the US-USSR strategic relationship.
The events of the Crisis are dramatized in the movie Thirteen Days (2000), directed by Roger Donaldson and starring Kevin Costner, Bruce Greenwood and Steven Culp.