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Attack on Pearl Harbor
Part of the Pacific Theater of World War II
Photograph from a Japanese aircraft of the Pearl Harbor area including Battleship Row at the beginning of the attack.
Date December 7, 1941 Location primarily Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, USA Result Japanese tactical victory, but a strategic and grand strategic failure; Empire of Japan declares war on the United States and the British Empire; United States declares war on the Empire of Japan; Nazi Germany declares war on the United States, which enters World War II on the side of Allies.
Belligerents
United States	Empire of Japan
Commanders and leaders
Navy: Husband Kimmel Army: Walter Short	Navy: Chuichi Nagumo
Strength
8 battleships, 8 cruisers, 29 destroyers, 9 submarines, ~50 other ships, ~390 aircraft	Mobile Unit: 6 aircraft carriers, 9 destroyers, 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 8 tankers, 23 fleet submarines, 5 midget submarines, 414 aircraft
Casualties and losses
2 battleships sunk, 2 destroyers sunk, 1 damaged 1 other ship sunk, 3 damaged 6 battleships damaged, 3 cruisers damaged 188 aircraft destroyed, 155 aircraft damaged, 2,345 military and 57 civilians killed, 1,247 military and 35 civilians wounded	4 midget submarines sunk, 1 midget submarine run aground, 29 aircraft destroyed, 55 airmen, 9 submariners killed and 1 captured

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The attack on Pearl Harbor was a preventive attack on the United States Pacific Fleet base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii by the Empire of Japan's Imperial Japanese Navy, on the morning of Sunday, December 7, 1941 resulting in the United States becoming involved in World War II. Two aerial attack waves, totaling 353 aircraft, were launched from six Japanese aircraft carriers, with the intention of reducing or eliminating the United States' military power in the Pacific.

The attack wrecked two U.S. Navy battleships, one minelayer, and two destroyers beyond repair, and destroyed 188 aircraft; personnel losses were 2,388 killed and 1,178 wounded. Damaged warships included three cruisers, a destroyer, and six battleships (one deliberately grounded, later refloated and repaired; two sunk at their berths, later raised, repaired, and eventually restored to Fleet service). Vital fuel storage, shipyard, maintenance, and headquarters facilities were not hit. Japanese losses were minimal, at 29 aircraft and five midget submarines, with 65 servicemen killed or wounded.

The intent of the strike was to protect Imperial Japan's advance into Malaya and the Dutch East Indies – for their natural resources such as oil and rubber – by neutralizing the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Both the U.S. and Japan had long-standing contingency plans for war in the Pacific, continuously updated as tension between the two countries steadily increased during the 1930s. Japan's expansion into Manchuria and French Indochina were greeted with steadily increasing levels of embargoes and sanctions by the United States and others. In 1940, under the Export Control Act, the U.S. halted shipments of airplanes, parts, machine tools, and aviation gas, which Japan saw as an unfriendly act. Nevertheless, the U.S. continued to export oil to Japan, in part because it was understood in Washington cutting off oil exports would be an extreme step, given Japanese dependence on U.S. oil exports, likely to be taken as a provocation by Japan. In the summer of 1941, after Japanese expansion into French Indochina, the U.S. ceased oil exports to Japan, in part because American restrictions on internal oil use were beginning. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had earlier moved the Pacific Fleet to Hawaii and ordered a buildup in the Philippines, hoping to deter Japanese aggression in the Far East. The Japanese high command was (mistakenly) certain an attack on the United Kingdom's colonies would bring the U.S. into the war, so a preventive strike appeared to be the only way Japan could avoid U.S. interference in the Pacific.

The attack was one of the most important engagements of World War II. Occurring as it did before a formal declaration of war, it pushed U.S. public opinion from isolationism to an acceptance war was unavoidable, as Roosevelt called December 7, 1941 "… a date which will live in infamy."

Background to conflict

War between Japan and the United States had been a possibility each nation had been aware of (and developed contingency planning for) since the 1920s, though tension did not begin to seriously rise until Japan's 1931 invasion of Manchuria. Over the next decade, Japan continued to expand into China leading to all out war between the two in 1937. In 1940, Japan invaded French Indochina, partly in an effort to control supplies reaching China, and partly as a first step to gain improved access to resources in Southeast Asia. This move prompted an American embargo on oil exports to Japan, which caused the Japanese to decide to commence the planned takeover of oil supplies in the Dutch East Indies.

Preliminary planning for an attack at Pearl Harbor, to protect this move into the "Southern Resource Area" (the Japanese term for the East Indies and Southeast Asia generally), had begun in very early 1941, under the auspices of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, then commanding Japan's Combined Fleet. He won assent to formal planning and training for an attack from the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff only after much contention with Naval Headquarters, including a threat to resign his command. Full-scale planning was under way by early spring 1941 primarily by Captain Minoru Genda. Over the next several months, pilots trained, equipment was adapted, and intelligence gathered. Despite these preparations, the actual order to attack was not issued until after the second of two Imperial Conferences which considered the matter, and final release to attack was not given until December 1st, after Japanese leaders decided that the US was not likely to accommodate Japanese demands to avoid interference with Japanese expansion. Hostilities between the US and Japan were expected by many observers, including President Roosevelt, who read a decrypted Japanese message and told his assistant Harry Hopkins, "This means war."

Approach and attack

At 03.42 Hawaiian Time, hours before commanding Admiral Chuichi Nagumo began launching the strike aircraft, the minesweeper USS Condor spotted a midget submarine outside the harbor entrance and alerted destroyer USS Ward. Ward was initially unsuccessful in locating the target. Hours later, Ward fired America's first shots in the Pacific theater of WWII when she attacked and sank a midget submarine, perhaps the same one, at 06:37.

Five midget submarines had been assigned to surface and torpedo U.S. ships of their choice as the attack started. None of these returned, and only four have been found. The last of the submarines has yet to be found. Of the ten sailors aboard the five submarines, nine died; the only survivor, Kazuo Sakamaki, was captured, becoming the first Japanese prisoner of war. The reason was a malfunction in the steering system, they tried for hours to make their way into the harbor. Then they hit a reef, Sakamaki and his friend swam for shore, his friend drowned. The next day a Jappenese American soilder, found Sakamaki and the submarine, which has washed up close to shore. United States Naval Institute analysis of photographs from the attack, conducted in 1999, indicates one of these mini-subs entered the harbor and successfully fired a torpedo into the USS West Virginia, what may have been the first shot by the attacking Japanese. Her final disposition is unknown.

First wave

The first attack wave launched north of Oahu, commanded by Captain Mitsuo Fuchida. It included:

• 1st Group (targets: battleships and aircraft carriers)
  • 50 Nakajima B5Ns armed with 800 kg (1760 lb) armor piercing bombs, in four sections.
  • 40 B5Ns armed with Type 91 torpedoes, also in four sections.
• 2nd Group - (targets: Ford Island and Wheeler Field)
  • • 55 Aichi D3As armed with Template:Auto lb general purpose bombs
• 3rd Group - (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barber’s Point, Kaneohe)
  • 45 A6Ms for air control and strafing Each of the aerial waves started with the bombers and ended with the fighters to deter pursuit.

As the first wave approached Oahu, an Army SCR-270 radar at Opana Point, near the island's northern tip (a post not yet operational, having been in training mode for months), detected them and called in a warning. Although the operators reported a target echo larger than anything they had ever seen, an untrained officer at the new and only partially activated Intercept Center, Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler, presumed the scheduled arrival of six B-17 bombers was the source; the direction from which the aircraft were coming was close (only a few degrees separated the two inbound courses); the operators had never seen a formation as large as the U.S. bombers' on radar; and possibly because the operators had only seen the lead element of incoming attack.

Several U.S. aircraft were shot down as the first wave attacked; one at least radioed a somewhat incoherent warning. Other warnings from ships off the harbor entrance were still being processed, or awaiting confirmation, when the planes began bombing and strafing. Nevertheless, it is not clear any warnings would have had much effect even had they been interpreted correctly and much more promptly. For instance, the results the Japanese achieved in the Philippines were essentially the same as at Pearl Harbor, though MacArthur had almost nine hours warning the Japanese had attacked at Pearl (and specific orders to commence operations) before they actually struck his command.

The air portion of the attack on Pearl Harbor began at 7:48 a.m. Hawaiian Time (3:18 a.m. December 8 Japanese Standard Time, as kept by ships of the Kido Butai), with the attack on Kaneohe. A total of 353 Japanese planes in two waves reached Oahu. Slow, vulnerable torpedo bombers led the first wave, exploiting the first moments of surprise to attack the most important ships present (the battleships), while dive bombers attacked U.S. air bases across Oʻahu, starting with Hickam Field, the largest, and Wheeler Field, the main U.S Army Air Corps fighter base. The 171 planes in the second wave attacked the Air Corps' Bellows Field near Kaneohe on the windward side of the island, and Ford Island. The only air opposition came from a handful of P-36 Hawks and P-40 Warhawks.

Men aboard U.S. ships awoke to the sounds of alarms, bombs exploding, and gunfire prompting bleary eyed men into dressing as they ran to General Quarters stations. (The famous message, "Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is not drill.", was sent from the headquarters of Patrol Wing Two, the first senior Hawaiian command to respond.) The defenders were very unprepared. Ammunition lockers were locked, aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip to deter sabotage, guns unmanned (none of the Navy's 5"/38 AA and only a quarter of its machine guns, and only four of 31 Army batteries got in action), Despite this and low alert status, many American military personnel responded effectively during the battle. Ensign Joe Taussig got his ship, USS Nevada, underway from dead cold during the attack. One of the destroyers, USS Aylwin, got underway with only four officers aboard, all Ensigns, none with more than a year's sea duty; she operated at sea for four days before her commanding officer managed to get aboard. Captain Mervyn Bennion, commanding USS West Virginia (Kimmel's flagship), led his men until he was cut down by fragments from a bomb hit to USS Tennessee, moored alongside.

Gallantry was widespread. In all, 14 officers and sailors were awarded the Medal of Honor. A special military award, the Pearl Harbor Commemorative Medal, was later authorized for all military veterans of the attack.

Second wave composition

The second wave consisted of 54 B5Ns, 81 D3As, and 36 A6Ms, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki. This wave and its targets comprised:

• 1st Group - 54 B5Ns armed with Template:Auto lb and Template:Auto lb general purpose bombs
  • 27 B5Ns - aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island, and Barbers Point
  • 27 B5N - hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field
• 2nd Group (targets: aircraft carriers and cruisers)
  • 81 D3As armed with Template:Auto lb general purpose bombs, in four sections
• 3rd Group - (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickham Field, Wheeler Field, Barber’s Point, Kaneohe)
  • 36 A6Ms for defense and strafing

The second wave was divided into three groups. One was tasked to attack Kāneʻohe, the rest Pearl Harbor proper. The separate sections arrived at the attack point almost simultaneously, from several directions.

Ninety minutes after it began, the attack was over. 2,386 Americans died (55 were civilians, most killed by unexploded American anti-aircraft shells landing in civilian areas), a further 1,139 wounded. Eighteen ships were sunk, including five battleships.

Of the American fatalities, nearly half of the total were due to the explosion of USS Arizona's forward magazine after it was hit by a modified 40 cm (16in) shell.

Already damaged by a torpedo and on fire forward, Nevada attempted to exit the harbor. She was targeted by many Japanese bombers as she got under way, sustaining more hits from 250 lb (113 kg) bombs as she was deliberately beached to avoid blocking the harbor entrance.

USS California was hit by two bombs and two torpedoes. The crew might have kept her afloat, but were ordered to abandon ship just as they were raising power for the pumps. Burning oil from Arizona and West Virginia drifted down on her, and probably made the situation look worse than it was. The disarmed target ship USS Utah was holed twice by torpedoes. USS West Virginia was hit by seven torpedoes, the seventh tearing away her rudder. USS Oklahoma was hit by four torpedoes, the last two above her belt armor, which caused her to capsize. USS Maryland was hit by two of the converted 40 cm shells, but neither caused serious damage.

Although the Japanese concentrated on battleships (the largest vessels present), they did not ignore other targets. The light cruiser USS Helena was torpedoed, and the concussion from the blast capsized the neighboring minelayer USS Oglala. Two destroyers in dry dock were destroyed when bombs penetrated their fuel bunkers. The leaking fuel caught fire; flooding the dry dock in an effort to fight fire made the burning oil rise, and so the ships were burned out. The light cruiser USS Raleigh was holed by a torpedo. The light cruiser USS Honolulu was damaged but remained in service. The destroyer USS Cassin capsized, and destroyer USS Downes was heavily damaged. The repair vessel USS Vestal, moored alongside Arizona, was heavily damaged and beached. The seaplane tender USS Curtiss was also damaged. USS Shaw was badly damaged when two bombs penetrated her forward magazine.

Of the 402 American aircraft in Hawaii, 188 were destroyed and 159 damaged, 155 of them on the ground. Almost none were actually ready to take off to defend the base. Of 33 PBYs in Hawaii, 24 were destroyed, and six others damaged beyond repair. (The three on patrol returned undamaged.) Friendly fire brought down several U.S. planes on top of that, including some from an inbound flight from USS Enterprise. Japanese attacks on barracks killed additional personnel.

Fifty-five Japanese airmen and nine submariners were killed in the action. Of Japan's 414 available planes, 29 were lost during the battle (nine in the first attack wave, 20 in the second), with another 74 damaged by antiaircraft fire from the ground.

• Zeros preparing to take off from Shokaku for Pearl Harbor
• Bombers preparing to take off
• USS California sinking
• Destroyer USS Shaw exploding after her forward magazine was detonated
• USS West Virginia took two aerial bombs (one dud) and seven torpedo hits; of the seven at least five were from aircraft and one from a midget submarine
• B-17 after the attack on Hickam Field.
• Hangar in Ford Island burns

Possible third wave

Several Japanese junior officers, including Fuchida and the chief architect of the attack, Captain Minoru Genda, urged Nagumo to carry out a third strike in order to destroy as much of Pearl Harbor's fuel storage, maintenance, and dry dock facilities as possible. Some military historians have suggested the destruction of these oil tanks and repair facilities would have crippled the U.S. Pacific Fleet far more seriously than loss of its battleships. If they had been wiped out, "serious operations in the Pacific would have been postponed for more than a year." Nagumo, however, decided to forgo a third attack in favor of withdrawal for several reasons:

• American anti-aircraft performance had improved considerably during the second strike, and two-thirds of Japan's losses were incurred during the second wave. Nagumo felt if he launched a third strike, he would be risking three-quarters of the Combined Fleet's strength to wipe out the remaining targets (which included the facilities) while suffering higher aircraft losses.
• The location of the American carriers remained unknown. In addition, the Admiral was concerned his force was now within range of American land-based bombers. Nagumo was uncertain whether the U.S. had enough surviving planes remaining on Hawaii to launch an attack against Japan's carriers.
• A third wave attack would have required substantial preparation and turn-around time, and would have meant returning planes would have faced night landings. At the time, no Navy had developed night carrier techniques, so this was a substantial risk.
• The task force's fuel situation did not permit him to remain in waters north of Pearl Harbor much longer since he was at the very limits of logistical support. To do so risked running unacceptably low on fuel, perhaps even having to abandon destroyers en route home.
• He believed the second strike had essentially satisfied the main objective of his mission—the neutralization of the Pacific Fleet—and did not wish to risk further losses.

At a conference aboard Yamato the following morning, Yamamoto initially supported Nagumo's decision to withdraw. In retrospect, however, Nagumo's decision to spare the vital dockyards, maintenance shops, and oil depots meant the U.S. could respond relatively quickly to Japanese activities in the Pacific. Yamamoto later regretted Nagumo's decision and categorically stated it had been a great mistake not to order a third strike.

Aftermath

Though the attack was notable for its large-scale destruction, the damage was not significant in terms of American fuel storage, maintenance and intelligence capabilities. Had Japan destroyed the American carriers, the U.S. would have sustained significant damage to the Pacific Fleet's ability to conduct offensive operations for a year or so (given no diversions from the Atlantic Fleet). As it was, the elimination of the battleships left the U.S. Navy with no choice but to place its faith in aircraft carriers and submarines—the very weapons with which the U.S. Navy halted and eventually reversed the Japanese advance. A major flaw of Japanese strategic thinking was a belief the ultimate Pacific battle would be between battleships of both sides, in keeping with the doctrine of Captain Alfred Mahan. As a result, Yamamoto (and his successors) hoarded battleships for a "decisive battle" that never happened.

Ultimately, targets not on Genda's list, such as the Submarine Base and the old Headquarters Building, proved more important than any battleship. It was submarines that immobilized IJN's heavy ships and brought Japan's economy to a standstill by crippling transportation of oil and raw materials. And in the basement of the old Administration Building was the cryptanalytic unit, HYPO, which contributed significantly to the Midway ambush and the Submarine Force's success.

Media

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See also

• Attacks on North America during World War II
• Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor
• List of United States Navy losses in World War II
• List of United States Navy ships present at Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941
• Pearl Harbor
• Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate
• Pearl Harbor Survivors Association
• USS Arizona Memorial
• Tora! Tora! Tora!

Notes

1. CinCP report of damage to ships in Pearl Harbor from www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar. Unless otherwise stated, all vessels listed are salvageable.
2. ^ Conn 2000, p. 194 (Navy and Marines: 2,117 killed in action or died of wounds, 779 wounded; Army 215 killed in action or died of wounds, 360 wounded)
3. ^ GPO 1946, pp. 64–65
4. Parillo, Mark. "The United States in the Pacific", in Higham, Robin, and Harris, Stephen, Why Air Forces Fail: the Anatomy of Defeat (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2006), p.288.
5. GPO 1943, p. 96 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFGPO1943a (help) After it was announced in September export of iron and steel scrap would be prohibited, Japanese Ambassador Horinouchi protested to Secretary Hull on October 8, 1940, this might be considered an "unfriendly act".
6. GPO 1943, p. 94 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFGPO1943a (help)
7. Toland, Japan's War.
8. GPO 1943, p. 125 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFGPO1943a (help)
9. ^ Peattie 1997 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPeattie1997 (help)
10. An invasion of the Philippines was taken as necessary by Japanese planners, and reconquest had been a given in War Plan Orange as far back as 1897.
11. This was mainly a Navy preference; the Army would rather have attacked the Soviet Union. Peattie & Evans, Kaigun; Coox, Kobun.
12. Gailey 1995, p. 68 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFGailey1995 (help)
13. Gailey 1995, p. 70 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFGailey1995 (help)
14. Theobold 1954, p. 28
15. Smith 1999, p. 36
16. Sakamaki's unexpected survival was despised by many Japanese, who referred to his dead companions as "The Nine Young Gods."
17. Rodgaard 1999
18. ^ AIRCRAFT ATTACK ORGANIZATION The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, Planning and Execution. First wave: 189 planes, 50 Kates w/bombs, 40 Kates with torpedoes, 54 Vals, 45 Zekes Second wave: 171 planes, 54 Kates w/bombs, 81 Vals, 36 Zekes. The Combat Air Patrol over the carriers alternated 18 plane shifts every two hours with 18 more ready for takeoff on the flight decks and an additional 18 ready on hangar decks.
19. ^ NavSource 2003
20. Prange 1999, p. 98
21. Prange 1999, p. 97
22. Prange 1999, p. 174
23. Parillo, Mark. "The United States in the Pacific", in Higham, Robin, and Harris, Stephen, Why Air Forces Fail: the Anatomy of Defeat (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2006), p.288.
24. In the twenty-five sorties flown, USAF Historical Study No.85 credits six pilots with ten planes destroyed: 1st Lt Lewis M. Sanders (P-36) and 2nd Lts Philip M Rasmussen (P-36), Gordon H. Sterling Jr. (P-36, killed in action), Harry W. Brown (P-36), Kenneth M. Taylor (P-40, 2), and George S. Welch (P-40, 4). Three of the P-36 kills were not verified by the Japanese and may have been shot down by naval anti-aircraft fire.
25. Odd though it may sound, "not" is correct, in keeping with standard Navy telegraphic practice. This was confirmed by Beloite and Beloite after years of research and debate.
26. Parillo, Mark, "The United States in the Pacific", in Higham, Robin, and Harris, Stephen, Why Air Forces Fail: The Anatomy of Defeat (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006), p.293.
27. Parillo, p.293.
28. The gunners that did get in action scored most of the victories against Japanese aircraft that morning, including the first of the attack, by Tautog, and Dorie Miller's Navy Cross-worthy effort. Miller was an African-American cook aboard West Virginia who took over an unattended anti-aircraft gun on which he had no training. He was the first African-American sailor to be awarded the Navy Cross.
29. The wreck has become a memorial to those lost that day, most of whom remain within the ship. She continues to leak small amounts of fuel oil, 65 years after the attack.
30. USS Shaw (DD-373)
31. Parillo, Mark. "The United States in the Pacific", in Higham, Robin, and Harris, Stephen, Why Air Forces Fail: the Anatomy of Defeat (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2006), p.288.
32. Parillo, Mark. "The United States in the Pacific", in Higham, Robin, and Harris, Stephen, Why Air Forces Fail: the Anatomy of Defeat (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2006), p.288.
33. USAAF pilots of the 46th and 47th Pursuit Squadrons, 15th Pursuit Group, claim to have destroyed 10.
34. Gailey 1997, p. 68
35. Gailey 1997, pp. 97–98
36. ^ Hoyt 2000, p. 190
37. Hoyt 2000, p. 191
38. Prange 1999
39. ^ Gailey 1997, p. 97
40. Gailey 1997, p. 98

References

Books

• Conn, Stetson; Fairchild, Byron; Engelman, Rose C. (2000), "7 - The Attack on Pearl Harbor", Guarding the United States and Its Outposts, Washington D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army
• Gailey, Harry A. (1997), War in the Pacific: From Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay, Presidio, ISBN 0891416161
• Hoyt, Edwin P. (2000), Pearl Harbor, G. K. Hall, ISBN 0783893035
• Peattie, David C.; Evans (1997), Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, Naval Institute Press, ISBN 0870211927
• Prange, Gordon W. (1999), Goldstein, Donald M.; Dillon, Katherine V. (eds.), The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans, Brassey's, ISBN 1574882228
• Smith, Carl (1999), Pearl Harbor 1941: The Day of Infamy, Osprey, ISBN 1855327988
• Theobold, Robert Alfred (1954), The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor, New York: Devin-Adair

U.S. Government Documents

• "Document text", US Navy Report of Japanese Raid on Pearl Harbor, United States National Archives, Modern Military Branch, 1942, retrieved 2007-12-25 {{citation}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)

• "Document text", Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941, Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1943, retrieved 2007-12-08 {{citation}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)

• "DAMAGE TO UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS AS A RESULT OF THE ATTACK", INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK, Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946, retrieved 2007-12-08 {{citation}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)

Magazine articles

• Rodgaard, John (1999), "Pearl Harbor—Attack from Below", Naval History, vol. 13, no. 6 {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help) (requires subscription)

Online sources

• Organization of the Japanese Air Attack Units December 7 1941, NavSource Naval History, 2003, retrieved 2007-12-08 {{citation}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
• USS Shaw, destroyerhistory.org, retrieved 2007-12-08 {{citation}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)

Further reading

• McCollum memo A 1940 memo from a Naval headquarters staff officer to his superiors outlining possible provocations to Japan, which might lead to war (declassified in 1994).
• Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept (McGraw-Hill, 1981), Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History (McGraw-Hill, 1986), and December 7, 1941: The Day the Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor (McGraw-Hill, 1988). This monumental trilogy, written with collaborators Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, is considered the authoritative work on the subject.
• Larry Kimmett and Margaret Regis, The Attack on Pearl Harbor: An Illustrated History (NavPublishing, 2004). Using maps, photos, unique illustrations, and an animated CD, this book provides a detailed overview of the surprise attack that brought the United States into World War II.
• Walter Lord, Day of Infamy (Henry Holt, 1957) is a very readable, and entirely anecdotal, re-telling of the day's events.
• W. J. Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific During World War II (Naval Institute, 1979) contains some important material, such as Holmes' argument that, had the U.S. Navy been warned of the attack and put to sea, it would have likely resulted in an even greater disaster.
• Michael V. Gannon, Pearl Harbor Betrayed (Henry Holt, 2001) is a recent examination of the issues surrounding the surprise of the attack.
• Frederick D. Parker, Pearl Harbor Revisited: United States Navy Communications Intelligence 1924–1941 (Center for Cryptologic History, 1994) contains a detailed description of what the Navy knew from intercepted and decrypted Japan's communications prior to Pearl.
• Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee, Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment, (HarperCollins, 2001), an account of the secret "Clausen Inquiry" undertaken late in the war by order of Congress to Secretary of War Stimson.
• Robert A. Theobald, Final Secret of Pearl Harbor (Devin-Adair Pub, 1954) ISBN 0-8159-5503-0 ISBN 0-317-65928-6 Foreword by Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr.
• Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (Henry Holt Co, 1958) ISBN 0-89275-011-1 ISBN 0-8159-7216-4
• Hamilton Fish, Tragic Deception: FDR and America's Involvement in World War II (Devin-Adair Pub, 1983) ISBN 0-8159-6917-1
• John Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (Berkley Reissue edition, 1986 ISBN 0-425-09040-X) is an excellent account by a Pulitzer Prize winning author, though thought by some not to back up his claims as thoroughly as expected by academic conventions.
• Robert Stinnett, Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor (Free Press, 1999) A study of the Freedom of Information Act documents that led Congress to direct clearance of Kimmel and Short. ISBN 0-7432-0129-9
• Edward L. Beach, Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl HarborISBN 1-55750-059-2
• Andrew Krepinevich, Template:PDFlink (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) contains a passage regarding the Yarnell attack, as well as reference citations.
• Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, (Stanford University Press: 1962). Regarded by many as the most important work in the attempt to understand the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor. Her introduction and analysis of the concept of "noise" persists in understanding intelligence failures.
• John Hughes-Wilson, Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups. Robinson, 1999 (revised 2004). Contains a brief but insightful chapter on the particular intelligence failures, and broader overview of what causes them.
• Horn, Steve (2005). The Second Attack on Pearl Harbor: Operation K And Other Japanese Attempts to Bomb America in World War II. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-388-8. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

• Seki, Eiji (2007). Sinking of the SS Automedon And the Role of the Japanese Navy: A New Interpretation. University of Hawaii Press. ISBN 1905246285. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

• Daniel Madsen, Resurrection-Salvaging the Battle Fleet at Pearl Harbor. U.S. Naval Institute Press. 2003. Highly readable and thoroughly researched account of the aftermath of the attack and the salvage efforts from December 8, 1941 through early 1944.

External links

1. Part 1

Accounts

• Guarding The United States And Its Outposts Official U.S. Army history of Pearl Harbor
• War comes to Hawaii Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Monday, Sept. 13, 1999

Media

• Video of first Newsreel from December 23 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor
• Roosevelt's Day Of Infamy Speech Audio of speech given by President Roosevelt shortly after Pearl Harbor Attack

Historic documents

• WW2DB: US Navy Report of Japanese Raid on Pearl Harbor
• Second World War - USA Declaration of War on Japan.
• Collection of extensive Japanese preparation military documents

21°22′N 157°57′W / 21.367°N 157.950°W / 21.367; -157.950

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