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The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Template:Lang-ua) was a Ukrainian military organization formed in Volhynia (located in north-western Ukraine). UPA's primary purpose was to protect the interests, of Ukrainians. UPA started as a resistance group that grew into a guerrilla army. UPA was the military branch of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Some UPA units were involved in the killing and ethnic cleansing of much of western Ukraine's Polish population.

During its existence, the UPA fought a large variety of military forces, including:

• Nazi German SS
• Polish resistance movement (Armia Krajowa)
• Soviet partisans
• Soviet Red Army
• NKVD
• SMERSH, NKGB, MVD (Soviet anti-espionage and police forces)

After World War II, UPA partisans continued fighting against Poland until 1947 and the Soviet Union until the 1949. It was especially strong in the Carpathian Mountain and Volhynia regions. UPA was unique among practically all resistance movements in Nazi-occupied Europe in that it had no significant foreign support. Its growth and strength reflected its popularity among the people of Western Ukraine. In other regions of Ukraine, on the other hand, the majority of the people assumed that Ukrainian nationalists (OUN/UPA) were collaborators of the Germans occupants.

(Note: Another UPA also existed in Volhynia. It was nominally formed earlier in late November 1941 before initially known as the Polissian Sich and had no connections with the OUN(B) but tied with OUN(M) and OUN(UNR). This UPA, led by Taras Bulba-Borovets & had links to the UNR in exile. It was renamed to the Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army in July 1943 before being later partially and forcibly absorbed and disbanded by the UPA of the OUN(B). )

Organization of UPA

UPA's command structure overlapped with that of the OUN in a sophisticated and highly centralized way. UPA was responsible for operations while the OUN was in charge of administrative duties; each had their own chain of command. The six main departments were military, political, security service, mobilization, supply, and the Ukrainian Red Cross. There was overlap between OUN and UPA posts and the local OUN and UPA leader were frequently the same person. Organizational methods were borrowed and adapted from German, Polish and Soviet armed forces, while UPA units trained based on a modified Red Army field unit manual. The General Staff consisted of operations, intelligence, training, logistics, personnel and political education departments. UPA's largest units, Kurins, consisting of 500-700 soldiers [, were equivalent to battalions in a regular army, and its smallest units, Riys, with 8-10 soldiers [, were equivalent to squads. Occasionally, and particularly in Volyn, during some operations three or more Kurins would unite and form a Zahon or Brigade [.

UPA's leaders were: Vasyl Ivakhiv (spring – 13 of May 1943), Dmytro Klyachkivskiy, Roman Shukhevych (January 1944 until 1950) and finally Vasyl Kuk. In November 1943, UPA adopted a new structure, creating a Main Military Headquarters and three areas (group} commands: UPA-West, UPA-North and UPA-South. Three military schools for low-level command staff were established.

UPA's membership is estimated to have consisted of 60% peasants of low to moderate means, 20-25% workers (primarily rural lumber and food industries), and 15% from the intelligentsia (students, urban professionals). The latter group provided a large portion of UPA's military trainers and officer corps. Sixty percent of UPA's membership was from Galicia and 30% from Volhynia and Podolia By late 1943 and early 1944, the UPA controlled much of the territory of Volyn, outside of the major cities, and was able to organize basic services for the villagers such as schools, hospitals, and the printing of newspapers. The number of UPA fighters varied with time. A German Abwehr report from November 1943 estimated that UPA had 20,000 soldiers; other estimates at that time placed the number at 40,000. By the summer of 1944, estimates of UPA membership varied from 25-30 thousand fighters up to 100,000 soldiers.

UPA's History

Background

1941

In a Memorandum from August, 14 1941 OUN (B) proposed to the Germans, to create a Ukrainian Army “which will join the German army … until the latter will win”, in exchange for German recognition of an allied Ukrainian independent state The Ukrainian Army was planned to have been formed on the basis of DUN (Detachments of Ukrainian nationalists - Druzhyny Ukrainskykh Natsinalistiv) and specifically on the basis of the “Ukrainian legion”, at that time composed of two battalions (kurins) “Nachtigal” and “Roland.” At this time these two battalions were included in the Abwehr special regiment “Brandenburg-800”. However, such propositions were not adopted by the Germans, and by the middle of September 1941 the Germans began a repression campaign against the most proactive OUN members.

During the first OUN Conference which held at the beginning of October 1941, the OUN formulated its strategy for the future. It called on moving some part of its organizational structure to underground, avoiding conflicts with Germans and refraining from anti-German propaganda activities. At the same time, in some areas the OUN tried to infiltrate its own members into and create its own network within the German Auxiliary police.

A captured German document of November 25, 1941 (Nuremberg Trial O14-USSR) ordered: "It has been ascertained that the Bandera Movement is preparing a revolt in the Reichskommissariat which has as its ultimate aim the establishment of an independent Ukraine. All functionaries of the Bandera Movement must be arrested at once and, after thorough interrogation, are to be liquidated..." By the end of November 1941, the remains of the “Ukrainian Legion” (approximately 650 persons) signed a contract for military service with the Germans and transferred to Germany for military training for further usage at Eastern Front. At the same time (end of November 1941) the Germans started a second wave of repression in Reichskommissariat Ukraine specially targetting OUN (B) members. However, most of the captured OUN activists in Reichskommissariat Ukraine belonged to OUN (M) wing.

1942

In April 1942 at the Second OUN(B) conference, the policies of “creation, build-up and development of own political and future military forces”, “action against own partisan activity inflicted by Moscow” were adopted. The primary enemy to fight against were the Soviet partisans. German policy was criticized, but no more.

During service from May till October 1942 the “Ukrainian Legion” in which Shukhevych was deputy commander lost 49 killed and 40 wounded (all of them in 5 clashes with soviet partisans) while claiming more than 2000 killed Soviet partisans.

In July 1942 OUN (B) issued a statement in which the main enemy mentioned was “Moscow”, while the Germans was ephemerally criticized for their policy concerning the Ukrainian independent state. Unil December 1942, OUN(B)'s principal activity was propaganda and the development of its own underground network, while any current actions against the Germans were described as undesirable and provocative.

In the beginning of December 1942 near Lviv the “Military conference of OUN(B)” was held. It resulted in the adoption of a speed-up of the build-up process for the creation of Military forces of OUN(B). The Conference Statement underlined what “all combat capable population must stand straight under OUN banners for fight against dreadful bolsheviks enemy”.

1943

• Jan: From beginning of December 1942 till beginning of January 1943 Germans relocated to General Government disbanded “Ukrainian Legion” which used as battalion in 201 Wehrmacht Guard (Defense) Division at Belarus against soviet partisans .

• Apr: Later most of the “Ukrainian Legion” joined the UPA or Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (galizische Nr.1) at spring 1943.

UPA's warfare against Germany

Despite the stated opinions of D.Klyachkivskyy and Roman Shukhevych that the Germans were a secondary threat compared to the main enemies, the Soviet partisans and Poles, the Third Conference of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists which was held near Lviv 17-21 February 1943, adopted the decision to begin open warfare against the Germans, although OUN fighters had already attacked a German garrison on February 7th of that year. Accordingly, the OUN (B) leadership issued secret instructions ordering their members who had infiltrated the German auxiliary police in 1941-1942 to desert with their weapons to join the units of UPA at Volhynia. This process often involved engaging in armed conflict with German forces trying to prevent them from doing so. The number of well-trained and well-armed policemen deserting into the ranks of UPA was estimated as being between 4 to 5 thousand. Initially, the military formation of the OUN under Bandera's leadership was called "military detachment of OUN (SD)" but after April 1943 UPA, a name more well-known and popular among Ukrainians, was adopted as the official name . On May 30, 1947 the Main Ukrainian Liberation Council (Головна Визвольна Рада) adopted the date of October 14, 1942 as the official day for celebrating UPA's creation.

By late 1943 and early 1944, the UPA controlled much of the territory of Volyn, outside of the major cities, and was able to organize basic services for the villagers such as schools, hospitals, and the printing of newspapers. Under German occupation, the UPA conducted hundreds of raids on German police stations and military convoys. In the region of Zhytomyr (which was taken from the Nazi by the Red Army in November 1943-January 1944, with groups of Soviet partisans moving there by February-March 1943), the insurgents were estimated by the German General-Kommissar Leyser to be in control of 80% of the forests and 60% of the farmland. The UPA were able to send small groups of raiders deep into eastern Ukraine.

As a rule the UPA did not attack units of the Wehrmacht, knowing that they were fighting against Russian Communism. Likewise, the frontline forces of the German army did not take any part in manhunts and operation against the UPA, sometimes even refusing to assist the German security and police forces against UPA. Indeed, according to German Eastern Front General Ernst Kostring, UPA fighters "fought almost exclusively against German administrative agencies, the German police and the SS in their quest to establish an independent Ukraine controlled by neither Moscow or Germany."

According to the OUN/UPA, on May 12, 1943 Germans attacked the town of Kolki using several SS-Divisions (SS units operated alongside the Nazi Army who were responsible for intelligence, central security, policing action, and the mass extermination), but the Germans as well as insurgents suffered heavy losses. Although there were no SS-divisions mentioned at this time in the identified areas according to mainstream historians,, Soviet partisans reported about the reinforcement of German auxiliary forces at Kolki for the end of April until mid of May, 1943

In June 1943 German SS and police forces under the command of General von dem Bach-Zalewski, seen as an expert in fighting against guerrillas, attempted to destroy UPA-North in Volyn during Operation "BB" (Bandenbekampfung). He was chosen specifically by Himmler to destroy the UPA in this operation.

According to the UPA/OUN, the initial stage of “BB” (Bandenbekempfung) operation under the command of Sturbahnfuehrer SS General Platle and later under General Hintzler against the UPA produced no results whatsoever. This catastrophic development was the subject of several discussions by Himmler's staff that resulted in the sending to Ukraine of General von dem Bach-Zalewski, responsible only to Hitler himself.

According to UPA/OUN(B) estimates, during Operation "BB" Bach-Zalewski had under his disposal 10 battalions of motorized SS troops with heavy weapons and artillery, 10,000 German and Polish police, 2 regiments of the Hungarian army, and three battalions of Cossacks organized from among Soviet POWs and 50 tanks, 27 planes and 5 armoured trains. Another UPA estimate assessed the situation during Operation "BB" as follows: Germans send military division which formed from SS regiment, 2 Hungarian regiments, Cossacks regiment and unit of German gendarmes. Their losses from UPA was – 193 persons. By August, the operation proved to be a military failure.On August 19-20, the UPA captured the military center of Kamin Koshyrsky, capturing large quantities of arms and ammunition.As a result of the complete failure of the operations General von dem Bach-Zalewski recalled from his command.

General Prutzmann, von dem Bach-Zalewski's successor as commander of the "BB" did not introduce any new methods in combating the UPA. The UPA-North grew steadily, and the Germans, apart from terrorizing the civilian population, were virtually limited to defensive actions.

According to post-war estimates, the UPA had the following number of clashes with the Germans in mid to late 1943 in Volyn: in July, 35; in August, 24; in September, 15; October-November, 47. "Cite error: The <ref> tag has too many names (see the help page). During the summer of 1943, according to post-war estimates, the Germans lost over 3,000 men killed or wounded while the UPA lost 1237 killed or wounded.

The Carpathian mountains saw some of the heaviest fighting between UPA and German forces in late 1943 and early 1944, as the UPA struggled to maintain control over several of the mountain passes. In one engagement, Ukrainian insurgents numbering about 600 men (including numbers of Ukrainian self-defense force), invoked the panic and retreat of 2 German divisions which initially took up positions in the villages of Maidan, Posich and Zaviy on November 27, 1943. As the result of this operation the Ukrainian insurgents captured a great quantity of arms and ammunition at the cost only 4 dead and 11 wounded.

UPA's cooperation with Germany

In autumn 1943 some detachments of UPA began to find reppoachment with Germans. Although doing so was condemned by an OUN/UPA order from November 25, 1943 such actions were not halted In May 1944 the OUN submitted instructions to "switch the struggle, which was conducted against Germans, completely into a struggle against the Soviets."Cite error: The <ref> tag has too many names (see the help page).. Nevertheless, according to the UPA/OUN, in July 1944, two more attempts by the Germans to capture the Carpathian mountain passes were repulsed. Near the villages of Kamyanka and Lypa, 3 insurgent battalions repulsed the incursions of 2 German SS divisions, totaling 30,000 soldiers (7-9 July), and on the 12th of July Germans reinforced them with a 3rd division. These Divisions were alternatively described as SS and as police Divisions by UPA/OUN sources, Avoiding direct confrontation, the UPA battalions inflicted a high number of casualties through sniping, ambushes, and attacks from the flanks and rear while abandoning their fixed positions. On 14-16 of July all of the German Divisions retreated with the loss over 600 dead. The insurgents suffered only a dozen casualties. Although according to German data and mainstream historians there were no SS divisions at this time in the mentioned area..

In order to fight the mutual Soviet enemy in early 1944, UPA forces in Volyn and Lviv regions engaged in limited cooperation with the German Wehrmacht contingent upon leaving Ukrainian villagers and UPA undisturbed by the Germans. However, in the winter and spring of 1944 it would be incorrect to state that there was a complete cessation of armed conflict between UPA and Nazi forces because UPA continued to defend Ukrainian villages against repressive actions of the German administration. For example, on January 20th, 200 German soldiers on their way to the Ukrainian village of Pyrohivka were forced to retreat after a several-hours long firefight with a group of 80 UPA soldiers after having lost 30 killed and wounded.Cite error: The <ref> tag has too many names (see the help page).. Such hostilities ended by late spring 1944 due to much of the disputed territory no longer being under German occupation, and to negotiations between UPA and the Germans.

In a top secret memorandum, General-Major Brigadefuhrer Brenner wrote in mid-1944 to SS- Obergruppenfuhrer General Hans Prutzmann, the highest ranking German SS officer in Ukraine, that “The UPA has halted all attacks on units of the German army. The UPA systematically sends agents, mainly young women, into enemy-occupied territory, and the results of the intelligence are communicated to Department 1c of the Army Group” on the southern Front. By the autumn of 1944, the German press was full of praise for UPA for their Anti-Bolshevik successes, referring to the UPA fighters as "Ukrainian fighters for freedom"

In a debriefing before U.S. authorities in 1948, a Committee of former German commanders on the Eastern front claimed that "the Ukrainian Nationalist movement formed the strongest partisan movement in the East, with the exception of the Russian Communists."

UPA and the destruction of Western Ukraine's Polish community

The UPA was active in the ethnic cleansing of Poles from areas that it regarded as indigenously Ukrainian. The methods used included terrorist acts and mass-murder of Polish civilians. Massacres of Polish civilians began on a large scale in February-March 1943, although these early actions occurred in areas under the control of Taras Bulba-Borovets rather than of the OUN Soviet partisans in the Rivne region reported that mass terror committed by “nationalists” against the Polish population started in April 1943) and lasted until 1944. Professor Władysław Filar from Polish Institute of National Remembrance, an eyewitness to the massacres, claims that it is impossible to establish whether these events were ever planned. Although in August 1943 UPA placed notices in every Polish village stating "in 48 hours leave beyond the Buh or the Sian river - otherwise Death" no known documents exist proving that UPA-OUN made a decision to exterminate Poles in Volhynia. In addition to UPA, Ukrainian peasants also participated in the violence , and large groups of armed "bandit" marauders unaffiliated with UPA brutalized civilians, serving as a useful propaganda tool for the Soviets . so the exact number of Poles killed specifically by UPA is unknown. Brutal methods such as beheadings, disemboweling, and killing with knives and axes were employed against Polish villagers. In anti-Polish actions since autumn 1943 in Galicia UPA conducted cooperative actions with detachments of regiments of the Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (galizische Nr.1) ).Cite error: A <ref> tag is missing the closing </ref> (see the help page).. The estimates of the number of Poles murdered in Ukraine range from 100,000 to 500,000; many more Poles left the area because of the UPA actions.

The UPA's activities can be seen as a reaction to past policies and actions of the inter-war Polish government, such as shutting down Ukrainian schools and churches or encouraging Polish settlement in the regions considered by OUN to be "ethnically Ukrainian". However, UPA also killed ethnic Ukrainians, those who did not cooperate with them, as well as those Ukrainians who had Polish wives.

The UPA actions resulted in similar reaction of the Polish Armia Krajowa and the extremely brutal conflict escalated out of control with many thousand of civilians being murdered by both Ukrainian and Polish forces. Estimates of the death tolls from the retaliatory actions of the Polish Home Army forces include 2 thousand Ukrainian civilians., as little as eight hundred, or as high as 20 thousand in Volhynia alone.

UPA's war with Soviets

UPA's struggle against Soviet forces began when they encountered Soviet partisans in late 1942 and early 1943. In early 1943, the famous Communist partisan leader Sydir Kovpak established himself in Ukraine and in the summer of 1943, well-armed with supplies delivered to secret airfields and with several thousand soldiers (only one third of his men were ethnic Ukrainians), launched a raid deep into the Carpathians. Attacks by the German air force and military forced Kovpak to break up his force into smaller units, whose remnants were subsequently mostly destroyed by UPA in the Carpathian mountains. In 1944, famous Soviet intelligence agent Nikolai Kuznetsov was captured and executed by UPA members, after unwittingly entering their camp while wearing a Wehrmacht officer uniform. The total number of Soviet partisans in Ukraine is estimated anywhere from 47,800 to 500,000, only 46% of whom were ethnic Ukrainians.

UPA began fighting Soviet military units when they appeared on its territory as the Soviet Army advanced into western Ukraine. UPA tried to avoid clashes with the regular units of the Soviet military because many of them were ethnic Ukrainians and were seen as a source of recruits into UPA. Instead, UPA focused its energy on NKVD units and Soviet officials of all levels, from high rank NKVD and military officers to the school teachers and postal workers attempting to establish Soviet control over western Ukraine after the front line had passed. Soviet archival data shows that UPA attacks were focussed on small units and groups of Soviet Army soldiers, commonly ending with brutal killing (burning alive, cutting noses and ears etc) of the captured and wounded. UPA also acted against the mobilization of able-bodied men into the Soviet Army through the extermination of whole families of those who joined the Soviet Army. UPA also disrupted Soviet efforts at collectivization. In March 1944, UPA insurgents mortally wounded Nikolai Vatutin, the famous commander of the Battle of Kursk, who led the liberation of Kiev. Several weeks later an NKVD battalion was annihilated by UPA near Rivne, beginning the full-scale struggle in the spring and summer of 1944, involving 30,000 Soviet troops against UPA in Volyn. Estimates of casualties vary depending on the source. In a letter to the state defense committee of the USSR, Lavrentiy Beria stated that in spring 1944 clashes between Soviet forces and UPA resulted in 2018 killed and 1570 captured UPA fighters and only 11 Soviet killed and 46 wounded. However, Soviet archives show that a captured UPA member stated that he received a reports about UPA losses of 200 fighters while their Soviet enemies lost 2,000.. The first significant sabotage operations against communications of Soviet Army before their offensive against the Germans was conducted by UPA in April-May 1944. However, such actions was promptly stopped by Soviet Army and NKVD troops. OUN/UPA submitted an order temporarily cease anti-Soviet activities and prepare for further struggle against the Soviets. Despite heavy casualties on both sides, the struggle was inconclusive. New large scale actions of UPA, especially in Ternopilska region, were launched in July-August 1944, when the Soviet Army advanced West. By the autumn of 1944, UPA forces enjoyed virtual freedom of movement over an area 160,000 kilometers in size and home to over 10 million people and had established a shadow government.

In November 1944, Khrushchev launched the first of several large-scale Soviet assaults on UPA throughout western Ukraine, involving according to OUN/UPA estimates at least 20 NKVD combat divisions supported by artillery and armored units. They blockaded villages and roads and set parts of the forests on fire. Soviet archival data states that on October 9, 1944 1 NKVD Division, eight NKVD brigades, and an NKVD cavalry regiment with the total number of 26, 304 NKVD soldiers stationed in Western Ukraine. In addition, 2 regiments with 1500 and 1200 persons, 1 battalion (517 persons) and three armored trains with 100 additional soldiers each, as well as 1 border guards regiment and 1 unit were starting to relocate there in order to reinforce them. During late 1944 and the first half of 1945, according to Soviet data, UPA suffered approximately 89,000 killed, approximately 91,000 captured, and approximately 39,000 surrendered while the Soviet forces lost approximately 12,000 "killed or hanged", approximately 6,000 wounded and 2,600 MIA. In addition, during this time, according to Soviet data UPA actions resulted in the killing of 3,919 civilians and disappearance of 427 others. Despite the heavy losses, as late as summer 1945, many battalion-size UPA units still continued to control and administer large areas of territory in western Ukraine. In February 1945 UPA issued an order to liquidate kurins (battalions) and sotnya’s (companies) and to act predominantly by choty’s (platoons).

During the Great Blockade by MVD troops from January 11 until April 10, 1946 UPA in the Carpathian region suffered very heavy losses and ceased to exist as a combat unit. Although the Soviets failed to wipe out UPA, the continuous heavy casualties forced UPA to split into small units consisting of 100 soldiers. Many of the troops demobilized and returned home. For this reason, by 1946, UPA was reduced to a core group of 5-10 thousand fighters, and large-scale UPA activity shifted to the Soviet-Polish border. Here, in 1947, they allegedly killed the Polish Communist deputy defense minister General Karol Świerczewski. In spring 1946, the OUN/UPA established contacts with the Intelligence services of France, Great Britain and the USA. Although the UPA obtained some help from the CIA and British intelligence during the latter phase of its struggle, the operation was betrayed by Kim Philby. After the huge winter 1945/46 operation by the NKVD, UPA/OUN fielded 479 units and had 3,735 fighters, according to an NKVD estimate from April 1, 1946. By January 1, 1947 MGB estimated OUN and UPA as having 530 fighting units with 4,456 fighters. [

On May 30, 1947 Shukhevych issued instructions joining the OUN and UPA in underground warfare . Only in 1947-1948 was UPA resistance broken enough to allow the Soviets to implement large-scale collectivization throughout western Ukraine. On September 3, 1949 Shukhevych issued an order, liquidating UPA units and headquarters and integrating UPA's personnel in the OUN (B) underground.

UPA's leader, general Roman Shukhevych, was killed in an ambush near Lviv on March 5, 1950. Although sporadic UPA raids continued until the mid 1950's, after Shukhevich's assassination UPA rapidly lost its fighting capability. An assessment of UPA's manpower by Soviet authorities in April 17, 1952 indicated that UPA/OUN had only 84 fighting units consisting of 252 persons. UPA's last commander, Vasyl Kuk, was captured on May, 24 1954. Despite the existence of some insurgent groups, according to a report by the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR, the "liquidation of armed units and OUN underground was accomplished at the beginning of 1956". .

Prominent people killed by the UPA insurgents during the anti-Soviet struggle included Metropolitan Oleksiy (Hromadsky) of the Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church and pro-Soviet writer Yaroslav Halan.

In 1951 CIA covert operations chief Frank Wisner estimated that some 35,000 Soviet police troops and Communist party cadres had been eliminated by guerrillas connected with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army after the end of World War II. Official Soviet figures for the losses inflicted by all types of "Ukrainian nationalists" during the period 1944-1953 referred to 30,676 persons; amongst them were 687 NKGB-MGB personnel, 1,864 NKVD-MVD personnel, 3,199 Soviet Army, Border Guards, and NKVD-MVD troops, 241 communist party leaders, 205 komsomol leaders and 2,590 members of self-defense units. According to Soviet data the remaining losses were among civilians, including 15,355 peasants and kolkhozniks. Soviet archives state that between February 1944 and January 1946 the Soviet forces conducted 39,778 operations against UPA, during which they killed a total of 103,313, captured a total of 8,370 OUN members and captured a total of 15,959 active insurgents. According to Columbia University professor John Armstrong "If one takes into account the duration, geographical extent, and intensity of activity, the UPA very probably is the most important example of forceful resistance to an established Communist regime prior to the decade of fierce Afghan resistance beginning in 1979...the Hungarian revolution of 1956 was, of course, far more important, involving to some degree a population of nine million...however it lasted only a few weeks. In contrast, the more-or-less effective anti-Communist activity of the Ukrainian resistance forces lasted from mid-1944 until 1950.".

Soviet Counterinsurgency Tactics and UPA's Response

The Soviets were ultimately successful in subduing UPA. They used multiple methods to defeat UPA. NKVD units dressed as UPA fighters and committed atrocities in order to demoralize the civilian population.; among these NKVD units were those composed of former UPA fighters working for the NKVD. Areas of UPA activity were depopulated; the estimates of Ukrainians deported from 1944 to 1952 range from 182,543 in official Soviet archives to 500,000 . The Soviets skillfully exploited Polish-Ukrainian ethnic hatred by using Poles as informants. Mass arrests of suspected UPA informants or family members were conducted; between February 1944 and May 1946 over 250,000 people were arrested in Western Ukraine . Those arrested typically experienced beatings or other violence. Those suspected of being UPA members underwent extensive torture; some prisoners were burned alive. The many arrested women believed to be affiliating with UPA were subjected to months of torture, deprivation, and rape at the hands of Soviet security in order to "break" them reveal UPA members' identities and locations or to turn them into Soviet double-agents. Mutilated corpses of captured rebels were frequently put on public display.

UPA responded to the Soviet terror by unleashing their own terror against Soviet activists, suspected collaborators and their families. This work was particularly attributed to the feared Sluzhba Bezbeky (SB), the anti-espionage and punishment wing of UPA. In a typical incident in Lviv region, in front of horrified villagers, UPA troops gouged out the eyes of two entire families suspected of reporting on insurgent movements to Soviet authorities, before hacking their bodies to pieces. Due to public outrage about such acts UPA stopped killing the families of those it deemed collaborators by mid 1945. Other victims of UPA included Soviet civilian activists sent to Galicia from other parts of the Soviet Union, who were often forced to recite anti-Stalinist slogans before being brutally executed in public; heads of village Soviets, those sheltering or feeding Red Army personnel, and even people turning food in to collective farms. The effect of such terror was such that people refused to take posts as village heads, and until the late 1940's villages chose single men with no dependents as their leaders. When committing such acts, UPA fighters generally targeted specifically those people who were seen as cooperating with the Soviet authorities and were expressly forbidden from spreading terror to the general population. This contrasted with the Soviet practice of mass terror.

Particularly during the first years of Soviet occupation, UPA proved to be especially adept at assassinating key Soviet administrative officials. According to NKVD data, between February 1944 and December 1946 11,725 Soviet officers, agents and collaborators were assassinated and 2,401 were "missing", presumed kidnapped, in Western Ukraine. In one county in Lviv region alone, from August 1944 until January 1945 Ukrainian rebels killed ten members of the Soviet activ and a secretary of the county Communist party, and kidnapped four other officials. UPA travelled at will throughout the area. In this county, there were no courts, no prosecutor's office, and the local NKVD only had three staff members.

Initially, in the first years of the struggle, the OUN was able to establish its own network of informants within the NKVD, compromising many anti-insurgency missions. In the first quarter of 1947, bandit and rebel actiivty in Western Ukraine increased by over 100 percent compared to the last quarter of 1946.

The turning point in the struggle against UPA did not come until 1947, when the Soviets were able to establish their own spy network within UPA and when they shifted their struggle from one of mass terror to one of infiltration and espionage. By 1948, the Soviet central authorities purged local officials who had mistreated peasants and engaged in "vicious methods". At the same time, Soviet agents planted within UPA had taken their toll on morale and on UPA's effectiveness. According to the writing on one slain Ukrainian rebel, "the Bolsheviks try to take us from within...you can nebver know directly in whose hands you will find yourself. From such a network of spies, thw work of whole teams is often penetrated..." In November 1948, the work of Soviet agents led to two important victories against UPA: the defeat and deaths of the heads of the most active UPA network in Western Ukraine, and the annhialiation of "Myron", the head of the UPA's counterintelligence SB unit.

In 2008, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has published information about the actions of special groups from the NKVD posing as fighters of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in the western regions of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic during the 1944-1954 period. About 150 such special groups consisting of 1,800 people operated until 1954.

UPA's relationships with Western Ukraine's Jews

In contrast to the well established links between UPA and atrocities committed on Polish civilians, there is a lack of consensus among historians about the involvement of UPA in the massacre of western Ukraine's Jews. Numerous accounts ascribe to UPA a role in the tragic fate of the Ukrainian Jews under the German occupation. Some historians, however, do not support the claims that UPA was involved in anti-Jewish massacres.

Prior to the formation of UPA, in 1941-1942, the political organization from which it was formed, the OUN, made numerous violently antisemitic statements. For example, in instructions to its members concerning how the OUN should behave during the war, it declared that "in times of chaos...one can allow oneself to liquidate Polish, Russian and Jewish figures, particularly the servants of Bolshevik-Muscovite imperialism" and further, when speaking of Russians, Poles, and Jews, to "destroy in the struggle, especially those, who defend the regime: send them to their lands, destroy them especially the intelligentsia...assimilation of the Jews is ruled out." Nevertheless, some Jews were protected by the OUN. According to a report to the Chief of the Security Police in Berlin dated March 30, 1942, "...it has been clearly established that the Bandera movement provided forged passports not only for its own members, but also for Jews."

By early 1943 the OUN had entered into open armed conflict with Nazi Germany. In 1944, the OUN formally "rejected racial and ethnic exclusivity" Despite the allegations of UPA's involvement in the killing of Jews and earlier anti-Jewish statements by the OUN, there were cases of Jewish participation within the ranks of UPA, some of whom held high positions. Jewish participation included fighters but was particularly visible among its medical personnel. These included Dr. Margosh, who headed UPA-West's medical service, Dr. Marksymovich, who was the Chief Physician of the UPA's officer school, and Dr. Abraham Kum, the director of an underground hospital in the Carpathians. One Ukrainian historian has claimed that almost every UPA unit included Jewish support personnel. The latter individual was the recipient of UPA's Golden Cross of Merit. Isolated reports of the Jewish families being sheltered by UPA have also surfaced. UPA's cooperation with Jews was extensive enough that, according to former head of the Office to Counter Soviet Disinformation at the USIA, some Soviet propoganda works complained about Zionists "closely cooperating with" Bandera ringleaders. One can conclude that the relationship between UPA and Western Ukraine's Jews was complex and not one-sided.

Aftermath

During the period of Soviet occupation of Ukraine, UPA was mentioned by Soviet officials only in negative terms. They considered UPA to be a terrorist organization. After Ukraine gained independence in 1991, former UPA members struggled for official recognition as legitimate combatants, with the accompanying pensions and benefits due to war veterans. They have also striven to hold parades and commemorations of their own, especially in Western Ukraine. This, in turn, led to opposition from the Ukrainian veterans of the Soviet Army, and disapproval from the Russian government too. So far the attempts to reconcile the two groups of veterans have made little progress. An attempt to hold a joint parade in Kiev in May, 2005, to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II, proved unsuccessful. The assessment of the historical role of UPA remains a controversial issue in Ukrainian society, although Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko joined several public Ukrainian organizations in calls for reconciliation, pensions, and other benefits for UPA veterans that would equate them in status with the veterans of the Soviet Army, and aid the understanding of their role in the chaotic times of UPA operations.

Recently, attempts to reconcile former Armia Krajowa and UPA soldiers have been made by both the Ukrainian and Polish sides. Individual former members UPA have expressed their readiness for mutual apology. Some of the past soldiers of both organisations have met and asked for forgiveness for the past misdeeds.

Restoration of graves and cemeteries in Poland, where fallen UPA soldiers were placed have been agreed to by the Polish side.

In late 2006 the Lviv city administration announced the future transference of the tombs of Stepan Bandera, Yevhen Konovalets, Andriy Melnyk and other key leaders of OUN/UPA to a new area of Lychakivskiy Cemetery specifically dedicated to Ukrainian nationalists.

In October of 2007, the city of Lviv erected, after many years of delays, a statue dedicated to the OUN and UPA leader Stepan Bandera. The appearance of the statue has engendered a far-reaching debate about the role of Stepan Bandera and UPA in Ukrainian History.

On January 10, 2008 Viktor Yushchenko, Presidents of Ukraine submitted a draft law "On the Official Status of Fighters for Ukraine’s Independence in 20s-90s of the 20th century". Under the draft, persons who took part in political, guerrilla, underground and combat activities for the freedom and independence of Ukraine from 1920 -1990 as part of the:

• Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO)
• Karpatska Sich
• OUN
• UPA
• Ukrainian Main Liberation Army,

as well as persons who assisted these organizations shall be recognized as war veterans.

In 2007, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) set up a special working group to study archive documents of the activity of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in order to make public original sources. This will help to determine what is the "truth" and what is "fabrication".

See also

• 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS Galizien (1st Ukrainian)
• Galicia (Central Europe)
• Operation Wisła
• Ukrainian Military Organization

Footnotes

References

1. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, [http://www.history.org.ua/oun_upa/oun/16.pdf Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 16
2. Subtelny, p. 474
3. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 4, p. 180
4. ^ [http://yurizhukov.com/doc/070900_Zhukov_UPA_Final.pdf Yuri Zhukov, "Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter-insurgency: The Soviet Campaign Against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army", Small Wars and Insurgencies, v.18, no. 3, pp.439-466] Cite error: The named reference "Zhukov" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
5. ^ Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 12, p. 169
6. Пастка для «Щура» 4 листопада одному з засновників УПА Дмитрові Клячківському виповнилося 95 років in Ukrainian-Russian "Zerkalo Nedeli" Magazine
7. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 12, p. 127
8. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 14, p. 188
9. ^ Magoscy, R. (1996). A History of Ukraine. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
10. Petro Sodol - Ukrainian Insurgent Army 1943-1949. Handbook. New – York 1994 p.28
11. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chapter 1 p.69
12. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chapter 2 P.92
13. http://www.infoukes.com/history/ww2/page-08.html
14. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chapter 2 P.95-97.
15. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chapter 1,2,3
16. p.164
17. p.181
18. p.165
19. Бандерівці ідуть! in Націоналістичний портал Template:Uk icon
20. Toynbee, T.R.V. (1954). Survey of International Affairs: Hitler's Europe 1939-1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. (page # missing).
21. Yuriy Tys- Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 P.232
22. Debriefing of General Kostring Department of the Army, 3 November 1948, MSC - 035, cited in Sodol, Petro R., 1987, UPA: They Fought Hitler and Stalin, New York: Committee for the World Convention and Reunion of Soldiers in the UIA, pg. 58.
23. Yuriy Tys- Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 P.58-59
24. Wegner, B. (1990). The Waffen-SS. Padstow: TJ Press.
25. Williamson, G., & Andrew, S. (2004a). The Waffen-SS (2): 6 to 10 Divisions. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
26. Williamson, G., & Andrew, S. (2004b). The Waffen-SS (3): 11 to 23 Divisions. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
27. Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 p, 384 p.391
28. James K. Anderson, Unknown Soldiers of an Unknown Army, Army Magazine, May 1968, p. 63
29. Yuriy Tys- Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 p.238-239
30. Krokhmaluk, Y. (1973). UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York: Vantage Press. pp. p. 242. {{cite book}}: |pages= has extra text (help)
31. P.Mirchuk “Ukrainian Insurgent Army 1942-1952” –Munich; 1953 p.41-42
32. ^ Krokhmaluk, Y. (1973). UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York: Vantage Press. pp. (page 242). Cite error: The named reference "Krohmaliuk" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
33. Yuriy Tys- Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 p.140-142
34. Yuriy Tys- Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 p.242-243
35. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 14, p. 186
36. L. Shankovskyy (1953). History of Ukrainian Army (Історія українського війська). Winnipeg. pp. p.32. {{cite book}}: |pages= has extra text (help)CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
37. Yuriy Tys- Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 P.67
38. p.190-194
39. Yuriy Tys- Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 P.69-73
40. Wegner, B. (1990). The Waffen-SS. Padstow: TJ Press.
41. Williamson, G., & Andrew, S. (2004a). The Waffen-SS (2): 6 to 10 Divisions. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
42. Williamson, G., & Andrew, S. (2004b). The Waffen-SS (3): 11 to 23 Divisions. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
43. Tieke, W. (1999). In the Firestorm of the Last Years of the War: II SS-Panzerkorps with the 9 and 10 SS-Divisions "Hohenstaufen" and Frundsberg". Winnipeg: JJ Fedorowicz Publishing
44. p.192
45. Yaroslav Hrytsak, "History of Ukraine 1772-1999"
46. p.196
47. http://www.history.neu.edu/fac/burds/Gender.pdf
48. Martovych O. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). – Munchen, 1950 p.20
49. Russian Combat Methods in World War II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. 1950. p. 111.
50. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 16, pg. 242
51. Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 p.391
52. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 11, pg. 24
54. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 11, pg. 24
55. Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11 p 96
56. Norman Davies. (1996). Europe: a History. Oxford: Oxford University Press
57. Subtelny, p. 475
58. Speaking of the escalation in violence, a former soldier in a Polish nationalist partisan unit stated "The ethnic Ukrainians responded by wiping out an entire Polish colony, setting fire to the houses, killing those inhabitants unable to flee and raping the women who fell into their hands, no matter how old or how young...we retaliated by attacking an even bigger Ukrainian village and... killed women and children. Some of our men were so filled with hatred after losing whole generations of their family in the Ukrainian attacks that they swore they would take an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth...This was how the fighting escalated. Each time more people were killed, more houses burnt, more women raped." Taken from the chapter Ethnicity, Memory, and Violence: Reflections on Special Problems in Soviet and East European Archives, by Jeffrey Burds, 2005, in Archives, Documentation, and the Institutions of Social Memory: Essays from the Sawyer Seminar, Francis X. BLouin and William G. Rosenberg, eds. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
59. J. Turowski, Pożoga. Walki 27 Wołyńskiej dywizji AK, Warszawa 1990, p. 513
60. W.Siemaszko, E.Siemaszko, Ludobójstwo dokonane przez nacjonalistów Ukraińskich na ludności polskiej Wołynia 1939-1945, Warszawa 2000
61. Analysis: Ukraine, Poland Seek Reconciliation Over Grisly History, Jan Maksymiuk, RFE/RL, May 12, 2006
62. ^ Subtelny, p. 476
63. Ihor Sundiukov, "The Other Side of the Legend: Nikolai Kuznetsov Revisited", 24 Jan. 2006. Retrieved on 18 December 2007.
64. "Soviet partisans in Ukraine, 1941–5". Encyclopedia of Ukraine. Retrieved 2007-12-20.
65. Grenkevich, L., translated by David Glantz. (1999). The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1944: Critical analysis of. Routledge. p. 134.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
66. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 15, p. 213-214
67. Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 pp.549-570
68. Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 pp.549-570
69. According to Soviet archives, the NKVD units located in Western Ukraine were: the 9th Rifle division; 16, 20, 21, 25, 17, 18, 19, 23rd brigades; 1 cavalry regiment. Sent to reinforce them: 256, 192nd regiments; 1 battalion three armored trains (45, 26, 42). The 42nd border guard regiment and another unit (27th) were sent to reinforce them. From Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 P.478-482
70. Exact statistics of UPA casualties by the Soviets and Soviet casualties by UPA, in specific time periods, according to data compiled by the NKVD of the Ukrainian SRR: during February - December 1944 “OUN –bandits” suffered the following casualties: 57,405 killed; 50,387 captured; 15,990 surrendered. During the period from January 1, 1945 until May 1,1945 the following casualties were reported: 31,157 killed; 40,760 captured; 23,156 surrendered. “OUN –bandits'” actions numbered 2,903 in 1944, and from January 1, 1945 until May 1, 1945 - 1,289. During February until December 1944 Soviet losses were: 9,521 "killed and hanged"; 3,494 wounded; 2,131 MIA; amongst them NKVD-NKGB suffered 401 killed and hanged, 227 wounded, 98 MIA and captured. From January 1, 1945 until May 1, 1945 the NKVD and Soviet Army troops suffered 2,513 killed, 2,489 wounded, 524 MIA and captured. Soviet Authorities personnel suffered 1,225 killed or hanged, 239 wounded, 427 MIA or captured. In addition, 3,919 civilians were killed or hanged, 320 wounded, and 814 MIA or captured. From Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 pp.604-605
71. ^ Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: a history, pp. 489, University of Toronto Press, 2000, ISBN 0-8020-8390-0 Cite error: The named reference "Subtelny367" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
72. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
73. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
74. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
75. Simpson, Christopher (1988). "Guerrillas for World War III". - America's recruitment of Nazis, and its disastrous effect on our domestic and foreign policy. Collier Books / Macmillan. p. 148. ISBN 978-0020449959. {{cite book}}: External link in |chapterurl= (help); Unknown parameter |chapterurl= ignored (|chapter-url= suggested) (help)
76. http://history.org.ua/oun_upa/upa/24.pdf p.439
77. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 21, pp. 385-386
78. John Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism New York: Columbia University Press, 1963
79. Wilson, A. (2005). Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World. New Haven: Yale University Press. p. 15.
80. Ukrainian Weekly, July 28, 2002, written by Dr. Taras Kuzio
81. Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 P 460-464, 470-477
82. The exact figures of deportees according to Soviet archives - deported (1944-47): families of OUN/UPA members–– 15,040 families (37,145) persons; OUN/UPA underground families – 26,332 (77,791 persons) taken from: Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 P.545-546
83. Subtelny, p. 489
84. Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11 pg. 97
85. Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11 pp. 106 - 110
86. Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11 pp. 113-114
87. Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11 pp. 125-130
88. http://www.ukranews.com/eng/article/84498.html
89. Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the Encyclopaedia of the Holocaust, Israel Gutman, editor-in-chief. New York: Macmillan, 1990. 4 volumes. ISBN 0-02-896090-4.
90. Tadeusz Piotrowski, Ukrainian Collaboration in Poland's Holocaust: Ethnic Strife, Collaboration with Occupying Forces and Genocide in the Second Republic, 1918–1947 pp. 220–59, McFarland & Company, 1998, ISBN 0-7864-0371-3
91. Himka, John-Paul. "War Criminality: A Blank Spot in the Collective Memory of the Ukrainian Diaspora" (PDF). Spaces of Identity. 5 (1): 5–24. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)
92. Institute of History, Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Ukrainian Insurgent Army
93. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 2, pp.62-63
94. Divide and Conquer: the KGB Disinformation Campaign Against Ukrainians and Jews. Ukrainian Quarterly, Fall 2004. By Herbert Romerstein
95. Leo Heiman, "We Fought for Ukraine - The Story of Jews Within UPA", Ukrainian Quarterly Spring 1964, pp.33-44.
96. Friedman, P. "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations During the Nazi Occupation, YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science v. 12, pp. 259–96, 1958–59". {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
97. Divide and Conquer: the KGB Disinformation Campaign Against Ukrainians and Jews. Ukrainian Quarterly, Fall 2004. By Herbert Romerstein
98. http://zik.com.ua/en/news/2008/01/11/121551
99. http://www.nrcu.gov.ua/index.php?id=148&listid=57477

Books and Articles

• Subtelny, Orest (1988). Ukraine: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. ISBN 0-8020-5808-6.
• Davies, Norman (2005). God's playground: a history of Poland: in two volumes, Vol. 2, Chapter 19. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-925340-4.
• Template:Pl icon Sowa, Andrzej (1998). Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie 1939-1947. Kraków. ISBN 83-909631-5-8.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
• Template:Pl icon Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960. Warszawa: ISP PAN / RYTM. ISBN 83-788373-163-8. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: length (help)
• Template:Uk icon УПА розпочинає активні протинімецькі дії (UIA Start the Active anti-German actions) (За матеріалами звіту робочої групи істориків Інституту історії НАН України під керівництвом проф. Станіслава Кульчицького)
• Documents on Ukrainian Polish Reconciliation

External links

• UPA - Ukrainian Insurgent Army
• Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Encyclopedia of Ukraine
• Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
• Critical point of view on the movement Ukrainian Insurged Army (Polish)

• Anti-communism
• Guerrilla organizations
• History of Ukraine
• History of Poland
• History of the Soviet Union and Soviet Russia
• National liberation movements
• World War II resistance movements
• Eastern European World War II resistance movements
• Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists