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The Iraqi insurgency comprises various guerrilla and insurgent groups who are engaged in a struggle, sometimes violent, against the foreign occupation forces (the vast majority of whom are from the US) and the new Iraqi Army. The insurgency began shortly after the 2003 Invasion of Iraq and increased during the occupation as a new Iraqi government was being established under the auspices of the United Nations. It has continued throughout the occupation of Iraq.

Not all those opposed to the new Iraqi government, the multinational force and/or the reconstruction use violent means; there are various Iraqi groups and political parties advocating peaceful, non-violent resistance. Thus the alternative term "Iraqi resistance" is favored by some, especially when discussing these groups.

Composition

The Iraqi insurgency is composed of at least a dozen major guerilla organizations and perhaps as many as 40 distinct groups. These groups are subdivided into countless smaller cells. Due to its clandestine nature, the exact composition of the Iraqi insurgency is difficult to determine. It is often divided by analysts into several main ideological strands, some of which are believed to overlap:

• Ba'athists, the armed supporters of Saddam Hussein;
• Nationalists, mostly Sunni Muslims, who fight for Iraqi independence;
• Sunni Muslims who fight to regain the power they held under previous regimes;
• Sunni Islamists, the indigenous armed followers of the Salafi movement;
• Foreign Islamist fighters, largely driven by the similar Sunni Wahabi doctrine, as well as the remnants of Ansar al-Islam;
• Militant followers of Shi'a Islamist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr (this group is currently not taking part in the insurgency); and
• Nonviolent resistance groups and political parties.

Ba'athists

The Ba'athists include former Ba'ath Party officials, the Fedayeen Saddam, and some former agents of the Iraqi intelligence elements and security services, such as the Mukhabarat and the Special Security Organization. Their goal, at least before the capture of Saddam Hussein, was the restoration of the former Ba'athist regime to power. The pre-war organization of the Ba'ath Party and its militias as a cellular structure aided the continued pro-Saddam insurgency after the fall of Baghdad, and Iraqi intelligence operatives may have developed a plan for guerrilla war following the toppling of Saddam Hussein from power. Following Saddam's capture, the rhetoric of the Ba'athist insurgents gradually shifted to become either nationalist or Islamist, with the goal of restoring the Ba'ath Party to power as it once was seemingly out of reach. Many former Ba'athists have adopted an Islamist façade in order to attract more credibility within the country, and perhaps support from outside Iraq. Others, especially following the January 2005 elections, became more interested in political pursuits.

Sunni Muslims

The so-called Nationalists from the Sunni Arab regions are drawn from former members of the Iraqi military as well as other Sunnis. Their reasons for opposing the occupation vary between a rejection of the foreign presence as a matter of principle to the failure of the occupation force to fully restore public services and to quickly restore complete sovereignty. Some Iraqis who have had relatives killed by coalition soldiers may also be involved in the insurgency. Most likely, the majority of the low-level members of the indigenous Sunni insurgency (such as foot soldiers) fall under this broad category. Some of those insurgents pursue the restoration of the power previously held by the Sunni minority in Iraq, who controlled all previous Iraqi regimes since the departure of the British. One former minister in the interim government, Ayham al-Samarai, "launched a new political movement, saying he aimed to give a voice to figures from the 'legitimate Iraqi resistance. The birth of this political bloc is to silence the skeptics who say there is no legitimate Iraqi resistance and that they cannot reveal their political face,' he told a news conference." The coalition supports the development of opposition and resistance by political means.

Moqtada al-Sadr

Supporters of the young Shi'a Islamist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr are largely young, unemployed and often impoverished men from the Shi'a urban areas and slums in Baghdad and the southern Shi'a cities. The Mahdi Army area of operation stretches from Basra in the south to the Sadr City section of Baghdad in central Iraq (some scattered Shi'a militia activity has also been reported in Baquba and Kirkuk, where Shi'a minorities exist).

Sadr was suspected by U.S and Iraqi authorities of ordering the assassination of a returning moderate Shiite cleric, Imam Abdul Majid al-Khoei, in Najaf on April 12, 2003. On April 5, 2004, an warrant was issued for Sadr's arrest in connection with this killing; this, in addition to the closing of his newspaper al-Hawza on March 29, the arrrest of one of his aides, and other actions to suppress his movement led to an armed attack by the Mahdi Army in April of 2004. This initial attack in southern Iraq was suppressed by June. A second attack by his militia, centered in a mosque in Najaf, began in August; this was resolved in an agreement brokered by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Since that point, Sadr 's opposition to the U.S-led occupation has mainly been in the realm of politics, although the Mahdi Army has been maintained as an organized force. Sadr supporters also continue to engage in peaceful resistance such as the large anti-occupation protests in Baghdad on April 9, 2005.

Supporters of Moqtada al-Sadr are driven by a variety of beliefs and grievances which combine both the nationalist and ultra-conservative religious tendencies of the movement. They believe that the U.S. and UK are foreign occupiers and oppressors, that they have failed to live up to their promises, and that Islamic law must eventually be established in Iraq. Al-Sadr's movement also opposes any breakup of Iraq according to ethnic, religious, or other lines.

The Mahdi Army is believed by some sources to number between 3,000 and 10,000 guerrillas.

Sunni Islamists

The Sunni Islamists are composed of Iraqis belonging to the Salafi branch of Sunni Islam, which advocates a return to the pure Islam of the time of the Prophet Mohammed and opposes any foreign non-Muslim influence. The beliefs of Salafi Islam are roughly similar to the Wahabi sect of nearby Saudi Arabia (of which Osama bin Laden is a member), one difference being that Salafis in Iraq do not usually condone intolerance towards the Shi'a. Hard-line clerics and remaining underground cells of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq have helped provide support for the indigenous militant Islamist movement. Emerging as the most public face of this faction of the Iraqi insurgency, and the most influential of the hard-line Salafi clerics, is the founder of the ultra-conservative Association of Muslim Scholars, Sheikh Hareth al-Dhari.

Foreign fighters

These are non-Iraqi Muslims, mostly Arabs from neighboring countries, who have entered Iraq, primarily through the porous desert borders of Syria and Saudi Arabia, to assist the Iraqi insurgency. Many of these fighters are Wahabi fundamentalists who see Iraq as the new "field of jihad" in the battle against U.S. forces. It is generally believed that most are freelance fighters, but a few members of Al-Qaeda and the related group Ansar al-Islam, members of whom are suspected of infiltrating into the Sunni areas of Iraq through the mountainous northeastern border with Iran, may be involved. The U.S. and its allies point to Jordanian-born Al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as the key player in this group. Zarqawi is believed to be the head of an insurgent group called Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad ("Monotheism and Holy War"), which according to U.S. estimates numbers in the low hundreds.

The extent of Zarqawi's influence is a source of controversy. The U.S. government describes him as the single most dangerous and capable insurgent operative working against the U.S.-led coalition and its Iraqi allies, responsible for a large number of major terrorist attacks. There are signs that an increasing rift is developing between supporters of al-Zarqawi, including both foreign guerrillas and some Iraqis who have adopted a hard-line Wahabi philosophy, and the nationalists and more moderate religious elements of the insurgency. The main source of the divide is over the suicide bombings that have inflicted heavy Iraqi civilian casualties, along with disagreements about whether to cooperate with the Shi'a and their insurgency. However, the publicity given to Zarqawi has ensured that he has become an iconic figure to various Sunni Islamist groups, regardless of the actual scope of his influence, by much the same process that has made Osama bin Laden a symbol of the causes of various Islamist groups following the events of September 11th, 2001.

Usage of the term "foreign fighters" has received criticism as being US-centric because taken literally, the term would encompass coalition forces. Zarqawi himself has taken to taunting the American occupiers about the irony of the term: "Who is the foreigner, O cross worshippers? You are the ones who came to the land of the Muslims from your distant corrupt land." (Communiqué of 10 May 2005 ). Zarqawi's group has since announced the formation of the Ansar platoon, a squad of Iraqi suicide bombers, which an AP writer called "an apparent bid to deflect criticism that most suicide bombers in Iraq are foreigners."

While it is not known how many of those resisting the U.S. occupation in Iraq are not Iraqi, it is generally agreed that foreign fighters make up a small percentage of the insurgency. Major General Joseph Taluto, head of the 42nd Infantry Division, said that "99.9 per cent" of captured insurgents are Iraqi. This estimate is bolstered by the Pentagon's own figures; in an analysis of over 1,000 insurgents captured in Fallujah, U.S. Ground Commander General George Casey found only 15 non-Iraqis.

There are many other historical guerrilla wars in which foreign fighters played an important role. It should be noted that many of the US-backed guerrillas fighting the Soviet-backed government and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s were not Afghans--many were Arab Islamists recruited outside Afghanistan.

Non-violent groups

Apart from the armed insurgency, there are important non-violent groups that resist the foreign occupation through other means. The National Foundation Congress set up by Sheikh Jawad al-Khalisi includes a broad range of religious, ethnic, and political currents united by their opposition to the occupation. Although it does not reject armed insurgency, which it regards as any nation's right, it favors non-violent politics and criticizes the formation of militias. It opposes institutions designed to implement American plans, such as the Iyad Allawi government and the U.S.-organized national conference designed as the antecedent to a parliament.

Although the CPA enforced a 1987 law banning unions in public enterprises, trade unions such as the Iraqi Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) and Iraq's Union of the Unemployed have also mounted effective anti-occupation opposition. . Trades unions have, however, themselves been subject to attacks from the insurgency. Hadi Saleh of the IFTU was assassinated under circumstances that pointed to a Ba'athist insurgency group on the 3rd of January 2005. No trades unions support the armed insurgency.

Another union federation, the General Union of Oil Employees (GUOE) opposes the occupation and calls for immediate withdrawal but was neutral on participation in the election. Whereas the GUOE wants all foreign troops out immediately, both the IFTU and the Workers Councils call for replacement of US and British forces with neutral forces from the UN, the Arab League and other nations as a transition. Many unions see the war as having two dimensions: military and economic. The GUOE has won strikes against both the Governing Council for pay raises and against Halliburton over the use of foreign workers.

Insurgency tactics

Insurgent tactics vary widely, as well as the targets. Jihadist elements of the insurgency favor the use of car bombs, kidnappings, hostage-taking, shootings and other types of attacks to target Iraqi "collaborators" and U.S. forces with little regard for civilian casualties. Other groups claim to target their attacks on U.S forces and avoid the targeting of civilians.

For most attacks, the Iraqi guerrillas operate in small teams of 5-10 men in order to maintain mobility and escape detection. Larger attacks involving as many as 150 men have appeared on occasion since April, 2004 (although large units had also appeared in a few instances beforehand, such as a battle near the Syrian border town of Rawa on June 13, 2003 and a large ambush of a U.S. convoy in the town of Samarra on November 30, 2003).

All of the following methods of attack are designed to allow insurgent teams to strike quickly and escape detection afterwards.

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

Many Iraqi guerrilla attacks against coalition targets have taken the form of attacks on convoys and patrols using improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. These explosive devices, made from former Iraqi military armaments and/or home-made materials, are concealed or camouflaged along main roads and detonated when a convoy or patrol passes. The method of detonation has varied as the U.S has adapted to insurgent tactics; originally using simple wires, U.S forces later became skilled as observing such devices and cell-phone signals and garage-door openers were used. These signals were eventually encrypted to avoid jamming by U.S devices and, more recently, infrared lasers have been used. 155 mm artillery shells rigged with plastic explosives have been the most commonly used, but the bombs have also gradually become larger as U.S forces add more armor to their vehicles.

IEDs are often hidden behind roadside rails, on telephone poles, buried in the ground or in piles of garbage, disguised as rocks or bricks, and even placed inside dead animals. This has emerged as the most lethal and favored method the insurgents have developed to attack coalition forces, and the number of these attacks have steadily increased.

Ambushes

In addition, Iraqi guerrillas have frequently launched ambushes of U.S. convoys and patrols, along with those of Iraqi security forces, using AK-47 assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. Soft-skinned humvees have been the most commonly targeted. The congested and constricted terrain of the urban areas, and in the rural areas, palm groves and other crops, offer cover and concealment for insurgents launching ambushes. These attacks are usually broken off before support can be called in, in traditional guerrilla fashion. Direct ambushes of U.S forces have declined, however, to avoid insurgent casualties as U.S defenses improve (armored Humvees and tanks are unaffected by insurgent AK-47 fire).

US casualties from mines or improvised explosives has risen to 70%.

Ambushes against the poorly protected Iraqi police and security forces, however, have proven very lethal. There have been isolated cases of larger ambushes, such as an attack on a coalition convoy in Samarra on November 30, 2003 that involved 100 fighters and a massive ambush of a coalition convoy in Sadr City on April 4, 2004 by Mahdi Army militiamen numbering over 1,000 men.

Mortar and rocket strikes

Another common form of attack involves hit-and-run mortar or rocket strikes on coalition bases, or locations associated with the Iraqi government or a foreign presence. Insurgents fire a few mortar rounds or rockets and quickly escape before their position can be identified and effective counter-fire directed. Insurgents use urban areas heavily populated by civilians as firing positions to discourage counter-fire, and in the countryside, palm groves and orchards are used for concealment.

This method is very inaccurate and rarely hits the intended target, since the guerrillas don't have time to aim properly, but casualties are still periodically inflicted by incoming mortar rounds and rockets. Improvised multiple-rocket launchers have also been used to target specific buildings in urban areas.

Attacks on helicopters

Since the beginning of November, 2003, helicopters have also been increasingly targeted. The insurgents, often concealed in palm groves, lie in wait for the helicopters and then, usually, attack the helicopter from the rear. The weapons used include rocket-propelled grenades and heat-seeking shoulder fired missiles such as the SA-7, SA-14, and in one case the SA-16. Countermeasures taken by helicopter pilots, such as flying very low at a high speed, have considerably reduced the number of helicopters shot down by reducing the accuracy of the heat-seeking missiles and rocket-propelled grenades.

Sabotage

Insurgent saboteurs have also repeatedly assaulted the Iraqi oil industry. Guerrillas, using either rocket-propelled grenades or explosives, regularly destroy portions of oil pipeline in northern Iraq, and had expanded to southern Iraq by April, 2004. This sabotage hampers the activities of the Iraqi government and the foreign occupation forces by reducing oil revenues. Among the reasons the insurgency gives for sabotage is to prevent supposed American control of Iraq's hydrocarbon reserves. Efforts to bring oil production back to pre-war levels have been repeatedly frustrated by these attacks.

There have also been allegations of attacks on water pipelines and the electrical grid by the Iraqi insurgents, although there is controversy as to whether the incidents in question did indeed represent intended sabotage.

Suicide bombers

Since August, 2003, as the U.S-led coalition forces gradually strengthened their defenses, suicide car bombs have been increasingly used as weapons by guerrilla forces. The car bombs, known in the military as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, have emerged as one of their most effective weapons, along with the roadside improvised explosive devices. They are often driven by suicide bombers and directed against targets such as Iraqi police stations, recruiting centers for the security services, and U.S convoys. They have a number of benefits for the insurgency: they deliver a large amount of firepower and inflict large amounts of casualties at little cost to the attackers. However, large numbers of Iraqi civilians are usually killed in such attacks (see below).

Suicide bombers invariably violate the laws and customs of war that combatants should not claim the status of non-combatants. They also generally violate Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions which states non-uniformed guerrillas must bear their arms openly during military opperations. Legally this is classified as perfidy which is a war crime because it increases the risk that opposing forces may kill civilians by mistake. Suicide bombers are not unique in not wearing uniforms and not openly carrying weapons but their tactic depends to a far greater extent on their feigning the status of non-combatant.

Non-military and civilian targets

There have also been many attacks on non-military and civilian targets, beginning in earnest in August 2003 and steadily increasing since then. These include the assassination of Iraqis cooperating with the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Governing Council--considered collaborators by the guerrillas, and suicide bombings targeting the U.N., the Jordanian Embassy, Shi'a mosques and civilians, the International Red Cross, Kurdish political parties, the president of the Iraqi Governing Council, hotels, Christian churches, diplomats and a restaurant. Armed and unarmed Iraqi police and security forces are also targeted, who are also considered collaborators. It has been argued that armed Iraqi "collaborationist" soldiers and police could be considered combatants in the guerrilla war with the insurgents. Sometimes they are killed in ambushes and sometimes in execution-style killings. Militants have targeted private contractors working for the coalition as well as other non-coalition support personnel.

Some have labelled security contractors as mercenaries, classifying them as non-civilians, arguing that many are armed and take park in the conflict. Others point out that private contractors frequently carry out entirely civilian functions, such as protecting Iraqi infrastructure and Iraqi-elected representatives, and do not plan or execute offensive military operations.

The origin of the large-scale bombings is considered by many observers to most likely be foreign fighters, former Iraqi secret service operatives, or a combination of the two. It is believed that most of the actual suicide attackers are from outside Iraq, although they most likely are facilitated by Iraqis. The network of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is frequently blamed by the U.S and the Iraqi government for suicide attacks on non-military targets.

Coalition officials and some analysts suspect that the aim of these attacks is to sow chaos and sectarian discord. Coalition officials point to an intercepted letter suspected to be from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in which he makes the case for attacking Shi'a in order to provoke an anti-Sunni backlash and thereby galvanize the Sunni population in support of the insurgents, as evidence. While hardcore Wahabi mujahideen among the insurgency may indeed desire a sectarian war, other insurgents (both Sunni and Shiite) charge that the coalition is attempting to instill a fear of civil war as part of a divide and conquer strategy.

Assassinations and kidnappings

Assassination of local and government officials, translators for coalition forces, employees at coalition bases, informants, and other (so-called) collaborators has been a regular occurrence. Assassinations have taken place in a variety of ways, from close-range small arms fire and drive-by shootings to suicide car-bombers ramming convoys.

Kidnapping, and in some cases, beheadings, have emerged as another insurgent tactic since April. Foreign civilians have borne the brunt of the kidnappings, although U.S military personnel have also been targeted. After kidnapping the victim, the insurgents typically make some sort of demand of the government of the hostage's nation and give a time limit for the demand to be carried out, often 72 hours. Beheading is often threatened if the government fails to heed the wishes of the hostage takers. Several individuals, including an American civilian (Nicholas Berg) and a South Korean (Kim Sun-il), among others, have been beheaded. In many cases, tapes of the beheadings are distributed for propaganda purposes. 80% of hostages taken by insurgents, however, have been peacefully released. The number of insurgent kidnappings has gradually diminished over the past year.

The goal of the kidnappings appears mainly to be to terrify foreign civilians into immobilization and to attract media attention and possibly inspire recruits. Almost all of the kidnappings have been conducted by radical Sunni groups on the fringe of the insurgency. The Mahdi Army, as well as the nationalist and more moderate religious elements of the Sunni insurgency, have rejected kidnapping as a legitimate tactic.

Attacks on security forces

Another insurgent tactic that has been increasingly used since April of 2004 includes large-scale assaults and raids on police stations and compounds of Iraqi security forces, whom insurgents view as collaborators, involving platoon-sized elements or larger, oftentimes up to 150 men. Large-scale attacks have also been occasionally advanced against U.S forces. They have been launched both by Sunni insurgents in cities such as Ramadi, Fallujah, and al-Qaim and Shiite militiamen in cities such as Baghdad, Najaf, and Kufa during the twin uprisings of 2004. Some attacks may combine multiple weapons and tactics at once, such as rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, and car bombs. Although these attacks usually fail militarily, they are designed to convey an impression of strength on the part of the guerillas (part of the psychological warfare campaign) and to sow general chaos.

Analysis and polls

A great deal of attention has been focused on how much support the guerrillas have among the Iraqi population and on winning hearts and minds. It appears as though the Iraqi insurgency retains a degree of popular support in the Sunni Triangle, especially in cities like Fallujah. The tribal nature of the area and its concepts of pride and revenge, the prestige many received from the former regime, and civilian casualties resulting from intense coalition counter-insurgency operations have resulted in the opposition of many Sunni Arabs to the occupation.

Polls indicate that the greatest support for the insurgency is in al-Anbar province, a vast area extending from the Syrian border to the western outskirts of Baghdad. This is for a number of reasons; many residents received employment and opportunities from the former regime, the area has a history of strong tribalism and suspicion of outsiders, it is religiously conservative, and it has seen civilian casualties from coalition counter-insurgency operations.

Some observers, such as political scientist Wamidh Nadhmi, believe that the major division in Iraq is not between religious/ethnic groups nor between the general population and violent groups, but between those who collaborate with the foreign occupation and those who resist it.

Outside the Sunni Triangle and in the Shiite and Kurdish areas, violence is largely eschewed. Many, however, especially in the Shiite community, although supportive of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, are very unhappy with the occupation. Farther north in the Kurdish areas, there is a great deal of pro-American sentiment and an almost unanimous distaste for anti-coalition violence. The situation is more complicated in the Shiite regions. Support for violent insurgency is notably less enthusiastic in the Shiite than the Sunni community since the Shiites, like the Kurds, saw persecution under the Ba'ath regime and from the Sunnis. Shiites have also been influenced by a moderate clerical establishment under Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani that has advocated a political solution. However, Moqtada al-Sadr (a radical Shiite cleric who has advocated violent insurgency) has drawn support from a portion of the Shiite community, mainly young and unemployed men in urban areas. Sadr's support varies region by region; while likely drawing under 10% support in Najaf (a stronghold of the clerical establishment which was occupied by Sadr's militia and has been the scene of some of the heaviest fighting), some polls have indicated Sadr's support among the Shiites of Baghdad may be as high as 50%. This support did not translate into direct electoral winnings for Sadr supporters during the January 2005 elections, however.

Spontaneous peaceful protests have appeared in Shiite areas against the occupation. The Shiite intellectuals and the upper classes, as well as the inhabitants of rural regions in the south and followers of more moderate clerics such as Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, tend to cooperate with the coalition and the Iraqi interim government and participate in peaceful protest instead of violence. Sistani's political pressure is largely credited with enabling the elections of January 2005.

Many Shiites and Kurds suffered heavy persecution under the rule of Saddam Hussein's regime, which may cause a reluctance to use violence against Coalition forces. This is in contrast to the more radical Moqtada al-Sadr, who draws his support from the lower classes, the uneducated, and the Shiite urban population. Both united, however, on the United Iraqi Alliance ticket that brought in the largest share of the votes in the January 2005 elections.

A series of several polls have been conducted to ascertain the position of the Iraqi public further on the insurgency and the Coalition occupation. All of the polls seem to consistently find the following:

• A large minority, if not a majority, of Sunni Arabs consider armed attacks on U.S forces legitimate and justified resistance.
• The greatest support for resistance is in al-Anbar province.
• The majority of Iraqis disapprove of the presence of coalition forces.
• A majority of both Sunnis and Shiites want an end to the occupation as soon as possible, although Sunnis are opposed to the occupation in somewhat greater margins.

Polls conducted in June 2005 suggest even more anti-occupation sentiment; most alarming to American policymakers is rising support for the insurgency. According to the Boston Globe (10 June 2005): "a recent internal poll conducted for the US-led coalition found that nearly 45 percent of the population supported the insurgent attacks, making accurate intelligence difficult to obtain. Only 15 percent of those polled said they strongly supported the US-led coalition." Demands for U.S. withdrawal have also been signed on by one third of Iraq's Parliament.

Scope and size of the insurgency

The most intense Sunni insurgent activity takes place in the cities and countryside along the Euphrates River from the Syrian border town of al-Qaim through Ramadi and Fallujah to Baghdad, as well as along the Tigris river from Baghdad north to Tikrit. Heavy guerilla activity also takes place in around the cities of Mosul and Tal Afar in the north, as well as the "Triangle of Death" south of Baghdad, which includes the cities of Iskandariya, Mahmudiya, Latifiya, and Yusufiya. Lesser activity takes place in several other areas of the country. The insurgency is believed to maintain a key supply line stretching from Syria through al-Qaim and along the Euphrates to Baghdad and central Iraq, the Iraqi equivalent of the Ho Chi Minh trail. A second "ratline" (the U.S term) runs from the Syrian border through Tal Afar to Mosul.

Although estimates of the total number of Iraqi guerrillas varies by group and fluctuates under changing political climate, the latest assessments put the present number at between 12,000 and 20,000 hardcore fighters, along with numerous supporters and facilitators throughout the Sunni Arab community. At various points U.S forces provided estimates on the number of fighters in specific regions. A few are provided here (although these numbers almost certainly have fluctuated):

• Fallujah (mid-2004): 2,000-5,000 (since a November 2004 operation, the Fallujah insurgency has since been destroyed or dispersed)
• Samarra (December 2003): 2,000
• Baquba (June 2004): 1,000.
• Baghdad (December 2003): 1,000 (this number has may have increased by a significant amount)

Guerilla forces control most of the cities and towns of al-Anbar province, with U.S troop numbers in the area (less than 20,000) too small to contest them and with negligible Iraqi security force presence. Ramadi, the capital of the province, is under guerilla control with the exception of about half a dozen small forts operated by U.S. Marines. al-Qaim, the first stop on an insurgent infiltration route from Syria, also is under rebel control. Fallujah, once the heart of the insurgency and formerly under rebel control, has since been largely leveled and is under a permanent lockdown by U.S forces.

Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, is still one of the most contested regions of the country. Insurgents maintain a campaign of terror over much of the city's population and many Sunni neighborhoods such as Adhamiya are largely under their control. Suicide attacks and car bombs are near daily occurrences in Baghdad. The road from Baghdad to the city airport is the most dangerous in the country, if not the world. Iraqi security and police forces have also been significantly built up in the capital and, despite being constantly targetted, have enjoyed some successes such as the pacification of Haifa Street.

Insurgents are also vigorously contesting control of the ethnically diverse northern city of Mosul, with much of the city, especially the western Arab half, slipping in and out of their control.

Rate of attacks and Coalition casualties

Main article: Invasion and occupation of Iraq casualties

In the July 4, 2005 issue of Newsweek, Fareed Zakaria reports that "insurgents launched 700 attacks against U.S. forces last month, the highest number since the invasion. They are getting more sophisticated, now using shaped charges, which concentrate the blast of a bomb, and infrared lasers, which cannot be easily jammed. They kill enough civilians every week that Iraq remains insecure, and electricity, water and oil are still supplied in starts and stops."

As of August 3, 2005, 1821 U.S. soldiers, 93 British soldiers, 101 soldiers from other nations have died in Iraq. 13,657 U.S. soldiers had been wounded in action. Over 5,000 American soldiers have also deserted.

History of the Insurgency

Main article: History of Iraqi insurgency

(This is the latest entry; see the main article for the complete history)

Announcement of the Government and Renewed Fighting (April-June 2005)

The talks for the new government seemed to continually drag on over the months and a power vacuum began to develop in Baghdad as Allawi waited to hand over power. As the political progress slowed, guerilla attacks also began to gradually rise once more in April. Insurgents began a renewed effort to dispel any beliefs that they were weakening and to discredit the formation of the new government. The attacks inched up until finally, on April 28, the new government, led by Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafarri of the Sistani-backed political party, was announced.

The announcement, however, was followed by an explosion of attacks designed to undermine the new government. Car bombings and suicide bombings increased to a level never seen previously in the war, and attacks on U.S troops also increased. As of June 21, at least 1,617 people had been killed by insurgents since the announcement of the government. This includes 169 coalition troops, 527 Iraqi troops, and 931 civilians.

The U.S began stepping up its counterinsurgency operations in response. Operations began to interdict the flow of weapons, personnel, and suicide bombers from the Syrian border to Baghdad in what is the Iraqi equivalent of the Ho Chi Minh trail. U.S. forces swept through the towns of Haditha, Qaim, and Karabila along this Euphrates River route, clearing them of insurgents. They lacked the manpower, however, to establish a permanent presence in the towns, leaving them vulnerable to insurgent re-infiltration as in previous instances.

Meanwhile, the Iraqi government launched Operation Lightening, cordoning off Baghdad with 40,000 troops, setting up checkpoints, and conducting house-to-searches. The sweeps effectively hampered insurgent movements, according to officials. Attacks in central Iraq, however, continued unabated despite the sweeps.

Iraqi Insurgency Organizations

Major Iraqi guerrilla groups include, but are not limited to, the following:

• Mahdi Army (Jaish-i-Mahdi)
• The Return (al-Awda)
• Fedayeen Saddam
• Jama'at al-Tawhid wal Jihad ("Monotheism and Holy War")
• Jaish Ansar al-Sunna
• Snake Party
• Black Banner Organization (ar-Rayat as-Sawda)
• Mohammad's Army (Jaish Mohammed)
• Iraqi National Islamic Resistance ("1920 Revolution Brigades," Moqawama al-Iraqiya al-Islamiya)
• Nasserites
• Wakefulness and Holy War
• Mujahideen Battalions of the Salafi Group of Iraq
• Liberating Iraq's Army

An English article detailing the many insurgency groups:

See also

• Iraqi civil war - The ongoing insurgency (mostly against Iraqi civilians) during the Iraqi reconstruction serve as a sign of a future sectarian civil war in the country.

External links

Middle East

• "An Inventory of Iraqi Resistance Groups." Al-Zawra (Baghdad). September 19, 2004.
• Biedermann, Ferry. "Portrait of an Iraqi Rebel." Salon. August 16, 2003, via globalpolicy.
• "Powell Denounces Iraqi Insurgent Leader." The Guardian (UK). August 13, 2004.
• "Crushing Iraq's insurgency may take up to 10 years." Middle East Online (UK). August 23, 2004.
• "In Western Iraq, Fundamentalists Hold U.S. at Bay." New York Times. August 29, 2004.
• "Najaf assault turns allies against US." Reuters. August 13, 2004.
• "Families return to devastated Falluja." Al-Jazeera. May 1, 2004.
• "Falluja breathes easy." Al-Jazeera. May 1, 2004.
• "U.S. War Crimes: Torture of Iraqi Prisoners Exposed." Tehran Times. May 1, 2004.
• "NYT: Shiite uprising may not be confined to al-Sadr followers." New York Times. April 8, 2004. Registration-free copies at

Contra Costa Times and Smirking Chimp.

• Fisk, Robert. "Iraq on the brink of anarchy." The Independent (Fallujah). April 6, 2004.
• Rasan, Dhiya. "Resistance Reveals Post-US Plan." IWPR (Baghdad). February 23, 2004.
• "Diplomats stunned by abduction wave, Workers held in bid to force companies to leave." Detroit Free Press. July 27, 2004.
• "Al-Sadr's star fades among Iraqis." Mail & Guardian. August 30, 2004.
• "Saddam's Baath Party is back in business." Knight Ridder Newspapers. September 7, 2004.
• "Why the insurgency won't go away." Boston Review. October, 2004.

Support for Iraqi Resistance

• Iraqi Resistance Reports from albasrah.net.
• Soldz, Stephen. "Iraq Occupation and Resistance Report."
• "Iraqi resistance hailed in Brazil" Al-Jazeera.August 24, 2004.
• Kais al-Rubai, Ali. "Islamists Pledge Continued War on Coalition." IWPR (Baaqouba). May 14, 2004.
• "Sadr urges Iraqis to fight occupation." Al-Bawaba April 13, 2004. Sources claim negotiations with U.S.-led forces are progressing.
• "Washington Unleashes Bloodbath in Iraq." Tehran Times. April 29, 2004.
• Iraqi Resistance News and Discussion from Mirror of the World Foundation.
• The Resistance to the United States Occupation in Iraq: A pro-resistance text on a personal website.

Editorials

• Salam Pax discusses the motivations of supporters of Moqtada al-Sadr.
• "Iraq resistance far from over." New Straits Times. August 28, 2004.
• "Ignorance in US foreign policy." Al-Bawaba. April 7, 2004.
• Ritter, Scott. "The Saddamist / Islamist Resistance Will Win." July 24, 2004.
• Finish it or Forget it - This is War - not terrorism, insurgency or uprising." April 11, 2004. The nature of warfare in Iraq.
• History's verdict: The Summers of 1944 and 2004." July 16, 2004. On Iraq and World War II combat compared.
• "Casualties of Colonial Wars: Kenya and Iraq"

• Current events
• U.S.-Iraqi relations
• Iraqi insurgency
• Rebellions in Asia
• Revolutions
• Terrorism
• National liberation movements