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Bosnian ]<ref>Also spelt '''Mujahedin''' in a minority of articles</ref> were predominantly foreign ] volunteers who fought on the side of the Bosnian government during the 1992-1995 ].<ref name=ICTY-Antonetti>, Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, ] 2006. See section "VI. The Mujahedin"</ref><ref>Staff. From the newsroom of the BBC World Service, ], 2000,</ref> The number of volunteers is estimated to have been between 3,000 and 7,000<ref>,, Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists, 8 October 2001</ref><ref> by Yossef Bodansky, 1996. Part 1, Chapter 3</ref><ref>, Bosnia-Herzegovina: New Book Investigates Presence Of Al-Qaeda, June 1, 2007</ref><ref>, Al-Qaeda's Recruitment Operations in the Balkans by Ines Alic, Volume 4, Issue 12 (June 15, 2006)</ref> with the majority coming from countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia. In addition, local ] (Bosnian Muslims) fought alongside the foreign mujahideen. Initially, the mujahideen units operated independently of the ] (ARBiH). However, as the war progressed they became increasingly integrated into the regular Bosnian army and its command structure.<ref> by Yossef Bodansky, 1996. Part 1, Chapter 3</ref> In addition to the Mujahideen volunteers, there were also several hundred Iranian ] supporting the Bosnian government during the war. <ref>, Dayton Implementation: The Train and Equip Program, September 1997 | Special Report No. 25</ref><ref>, What's Iran Doing In Bosnia, Anyway?, by Elaine Sciolino, 10 December 1995</ref><ref></ref> Many of the Bosnian Mujahideen were supported financially from Saudi Arabia, including persons and organizations later connected with ]<ref>., Al Qaeda Recruited U.S. Servicemen: Testimony Links Plot To Saudi Gov't, 2004</ref><ref>, By, Evan F. Kohlmann (page 2), as published on the web site of the Swedish National Defence College</ref>
{{POV|date=April 2008}}
'''Mujahideen''' came in ] during the 1992-1995 ] after the ]s committed by the ] forces on ] (]) ]s. They intended to vage a ''holy war'' against the ''perpetrators''. The number of volunteers is estimated by some newspaper reports to have been about 4,000,<ref></ref> but some recent research discards such claims estimating 400 foreign volunteers.<ref></ref> They came from countries such as ], ], ], ] and ], to quote summary of the ICTY judgement:<ref>ICTY: Summary of the judgement for Enver Hadžihasanović and Amir Kubura - </ref>


== Role during the Bosnian War 1992-1995 ==
{{quote|The evidence shows that foreign volunteers arrived in central Bosnia in the second half of 1992 with the aim of helping their ] ]s against the ] ]s. Mostly they came from ], the Near East and the Middle East. The foreign volunteers differed considerably from the local population, not only because of their physical appearance and the language they spoke, but also because of their fighting methods.}}


Foreign mujahideen arrived in central Bosnia in the second half of ] with the aim of helping their Bosnian ] (]) coreligionists against the ] and ] forces. Mostly they came from ], the ] and the ]. On 13 August 1993, the Bosnian government officially mobilized the ''Kateebat al-Mujahideen'' ("Battalion of the Holy Warriors") or ''El Mudžahid'', on the personal orders of Bosnian president ], to whom the unit was directly responsible.<ref>{{cite book |title=Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network |last=Kohlmann |first=Evan |authorlink=Evan Kohlmann |coauthors= |year=2004 |publisher=Berg Publishers |location= |isbn=1859738079 |pages=91, 92}}</ref> Initially, the foreign Mujahideen gave food and other basic necessities to the local Muslim population, deprived many necessities by the Bosnian Serb forces. Once hostilities broke out between the Bosnian government (ABiH) and the Bosnian Croat forces (HVO), the Mujahideen also participated in battles against the HVO alongside ABiH units.<ref>, Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref>
It is alleged that mujahideen participated in some incidents considered to be ] according to the international law. However no indictment was issued by the ] against them, but a few Bosnian Army officers were indicted on the basis of superior criminal responsibility. Amir Kubura was found not guilty on all counts related to the incidents involving mujahideen. <ref></ref> On the other hand Enver Hadzihasanović was found guilty for failing to prevent the death of a prisoner of war.<ref>Hadzihasanovic i Kubura - sažetak - </ref> He appealed against the first-instance judgment and was released provisionally in June 2007 pending the judgement of the Appeals Chamber.<ref>Sense - APPELLATE HEARING IN HADZIHASANOVIC - KUBURA CASE</ref>


The foreign mujahideen actively recruited young local men, offering them military training, uniforms and weapons. As a result, local Bosniaks joined the foreign mujahideen and in the process became local "Bosnian Mujahideen".<ref>, Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref> They imitated the foreigners in both the way they dressed and behaved, to such an extent that it was sometimes, according to the ICTY documentation in subsequent war crimes trials, "difficult to distinguish between the two groups. For that reason, the ICTY has used the term "Mujahideen" (which they spell Mujahedin) to designate foreigners from ] countries, but also local Muslims (ie ]) who joined the Mujahideen units.<ref name=ICTY-Antonetti/>
==Background==


The first Bosnian mujahideen training camp was located in ] next to the village of ], in the ] valley, in ] municipality. The mujahideen group established there included mujahideen from Arab countries as well as Bosniaks. Amongst the local Bosniaks were former members of the ] and soldiers who were ] members of 3rd Corps units, namely of the 7th and 306th Brigades. The Mujahideen from Poljanice camp were also established in the towns of ] and Travnik and, from the second half of ] onwards, in the village of ], also located in the Bila valley.<ref>, Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref><ref>, Bosnia: Muslims upset by Wahhabi leaders, Adrian Morgan, 13 November 2006</ref>
During the ], ] received humanitarian aid from Islamic countries as well as from the West, because of intensive and widespread killing, mass rapes, death camps, ] committed by Serb and, to a lesser extent, Croat forces. The main targets were ] civilians. The ] concluded that these crimes, committed during the 1992 -95 war, were ] and ] ('']'') regarding Srebrenica region according to the Genocide Convention.<ref></ref>
Following such ]s, ] volunteers came across ] into Bosnia to help the Bosnian Army protect the Bosnian Muslim civilian population. The number of the ''El-Mudžahid'' volunteers is still disputed, from around 300 <ref>SENSE Tribunal:ICTY - WE FOUGHT WITH THE BH ARMY, BUT NOT UNDER ITS COMMAND </ref><ref name="""""""""Predrag"""""""" Matvejević analysis">{{cite web |url=http://www.islam.co.ba/razmisljanja/index.php?subaction=ostalo&id=1070747643|title=Predrag Matvejević analysis}}</ref> to 1,500.<ref>SENSE Tribunal:ICTY - WE FOUGHT WITH THE BH ARMY, BUT NOT UNDER ITS COMMAND </ref> According to witness at the trial of Bosnian commander Rasim Delic a group of foreign fighters of Arab origin entered Bosnia from Zagreb together with the Croatian Army unit "Zengas". <ref>Mujahideen came with Zengas </ref>
These caused particular controversy: foreign fighters, styling themselves '']'', turned up in Bosnia around 1993 with ]n identity documents, passports and IDs. They quickly attracted heavy criticism, who considered their presence to be evidence of violent Islamic fundamentalism at the heart of Europe. However, the foreign volunteers became unpopular even with many of the Bosniak population, because the ] had thousands of troops and had no need for more soldiers, but for arms. Many Bosnian Army officers and intellectuals were suspicuos regarding foreign volunteers arrival in central part of the country, because they came from ] and ] in Croatia, and were passed through the self-proclaimed ] without problems unlike Bosnian Army soldiers who were regularly arrested by Croat forces. According to general ], the highest ranking ethnic Croat in Bosnian Army, the key role in foreign volunteers arrival was played by ] and Croatian ] underground with the aim to justify involvement of Croatia in Bosnian War and mass crimes committed by Croat forces. Although Izetbegović regarded them as symbolically valuable as a sign of the Muslim world's support for Bosnia, they appear to have made little military difference and became a major political liability.
<ref name="""""""""Predrag"""""""" Matvejević analysis">{{cite web |url=http://www.islam.co.ba/razmisljanja/index.php?subaction=ostalo&id=1070747643|title=Predrag Matvejević analysis}}</ref>


According to the ICTYs indictment of Rasim Delic, Commander of Main Staff of the Bosnian army (ABiH), after the formation of the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade of the ABiH 3rd Corps on 19 November 1992 the El Mujahid were subordinated within its structure. The Bosnian Mujahideen were involved in combat activities of units of the ABiH 3rd Corps, including the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade, and frequently spearheaded ABiH 3rd Corps combat operations. On 13 August 1993 Rasim Delic then ordered the establishment within the ABiH 3rd Corps area of responsibility of the "EL Mujahed" unit, effective no later than 31 August 1993. The El Mujahed unit remained part of the ABiH 3rd Corps until its disbandment on 12 December 1995.
==El Mujahid Detachment==


The military effectiveness of the Bosnian mujahideen is disputed. However, former US Balkans peace negotiator ] said in an interview that "I think the Muslims wouldn't have survived without this" help. At the time a U.N. arms embargo diminished the Bosnian government's fighting capabilities. Holbrooke called the arrival of the moujahedeen "a pact with the devil" from which Bosnia still is recovering.<ref>,, Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists, 8 October 2001</ref>
A small group of Arab volunteers arrived in central Bosnia in the second half of ] with the aim of helping their Bosnian ] coreligionists to defend from the ] and ] attacks. Mostly they came from ], the ] and the ]. On August 13, 1993, the Bosnian Army decided to form a unit, ''Kateebat al-Mujahideen'' ("Battalion of the Holy Warriors") or ''El Mudžahid'' in order to impose control over the foreign fighters whose number increased. Initially, the foreign Mujahideen gave food and other basic necessities to the local Muslim population, deprived many necessities by the Serb forces. Once hostilities broke out between the Bosnian government (ABiH) and the Croat forces (HVO), the Mujahideen also participated in battles against the HVO alongside Bosnian Army units.<ref>, Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref>


===Bosnian mujahideen units===
According to the Arab fighters who testified as the prosecution witnesses at the trial of Bosnian general Rasim Delic indicted by ] on the basis of superior criminal responsibility, the El Mujahid Detachment was only formally part of the Bosnian Army chain of command. All decisions were taken by the ''emir'' and the ''shura'', the Mujahideen commander and the Mujahideen supreme council respectively. This was because the ‘Army couldn’t be trusted’. <ref>ICTY: MUJAHIDEEN DIDN’T TRUST THE ARMY -
</ref>


At the end of the war there were a number of Bosnian mujahideen units in the Bosnian government army:
==Incidents==


*''']''' (the "''el Mudzahidin''"): this was the main Bosnian mujahideen unit with its main headquarters in ], central Bosnia. The 3rd Mujahedin Corps was composed of three Brigades, each of about 1,500 troops. These brigades were: the ] in ], the ] in ] (now operating under the ]-based 2nd Corps), the ] initially deployed in the front lines in the "bulge" (Botsilo region) and then in ] and the ], was established on 20 December, 1995. The 807th Muslim Liberation Brigade is an integral component of the ]-based 81st Division.<ref> by Yossef Bodansky, 1996. Part 1, Chapter 3</ref>
On ], 1993, ] attacked Croat forces in the area of Maline village. After the village was taken, a military police unit of the 306th Brigade of Bosnian Army arrived in Maline. These ] were to evacuate and protect the civilians in the villages taken by the Bosnian Army. The wounded were left on-site and around 200 people, including civilians and Croat soldiers, were taken by the police officers towards Mehurici. The commander of the 306th Brigade authorised the wounded be put onto a truck and transported to Mehurici. Suddenly, a number of mujahideen stormed the village of Maline. Even though the commander of the Bosnian Army 306th Brigade forbade them to approach, they didn't submit. The 200 villagers who were being escorted to Mehurici by the 306th Brigade military police were intercepted by the mujahideen in Poljanice. They took 20 military-aged Croats and a young woman wearing a Red-Cross armband. The prisoners were taken to Bikoci, between Maline and Mehurici. 23 Croatian soldiers and one young woman were executed in Bikoci while they were being held prisoner.<ref>Judgement Summary - Kubura and Hadzihasanovic </ref>


*''']''' (the "''al Ansar''"): this was a separate force in the Zenica-Travnik area. The Ansar was 300 to 600 troops strong. The main headquarters was in the Vatrostalno Factory building in Podbrijezje (near Zenica). In addition, there was a camp called the "Martyrs' Detachment", which, since the Spring of 1995, had absorbed a few hundred new volunteers arriving from ], ] and ].<ref> by Yossef Bodansky, 1996. Part 1, Chapter 3</ref>
==Propaganda==


*''']''' (the "''Kata 'eb al-Manikin''"): this force included mainly Arabs. They were serving under the command of military officers from Pakistan and Afghanistan. The trainers and leadership were from Iran. Each Battalion was 300 to 600 troops strong. The first operational battalion was based in the ] area (north west Bosnia). Another battalion served as a special forces unit for the 2nd Corps in the ] area.<ref> by Yossef Bodansky, 1996. Part 1, Chapter 3</ref>
Although Serb and Croat media created much controversy about alleged war crimes committed by the squad, no indictment was issued by ] against any of these foreign volunteers. The only foreign person convicted of war crimes was ] ] ], who fought in the ] (first convicted by a Bosnian court, later by a Swedish court).


*''']''': named after the ] which served under the ] flag in ]. The contemporary Handzar Division was a 2,500 to 3,000 elite force deployed in ] and a 6,000 to 7,500 strong back-up force at a major training base around ], but is moved around to augment major fighting fronts. The majority of the troops of the Handzar Division come from the region's non-Bosnian Muslim minorities, primarily Albanians, and were led by veteran Pakistani and Afghan experts.<ref> by Yossef Bodansky, 1996. Part 1, Chapter 3</ref>
According to ], a notable Italian and Croatian modern prosaist who analyzed the situation, the number of Arab volunteers who came to help the Bosnian Muslims, ''was much smaller than the number presented by Serb and Croat propaganda''.<ref> Predrag Matvejević analysis </ref>


===Relationship to the Bosnian government army (ABiH) ===
According to the ICTY verdicts, Serb propaganda was very active, constantly propagated false information about the foreign fighters in order to inflame ] hatred among Serbs. After the takeover of Prijedor by Serb forces in 1992, Radio Prijedor propagated Serb nationalistic ideas characterising prominent non-Serbs as ]s and ]s who should be punished for their behaviour. One example of such propaganda was the derogatory language used for referring to non-Serbs such as '''], ] or ]''', although at the time there were no foreign volunteers in Bosnia. According to ICTY conclusion in ] ] Mile Mutić, the director of Kozarski Vjesnik and the ] Rade Mutić regularly attended meetings of Serb ]s (local authorities) in order to get informed about next steps of spreading propaganda. <ref> ICTY: Milomir Stakić judgement - The media </ref>


The extent to which the Bosnian mujahideen were controlled by the Bosnian government is contentious. According to a UN communiqué of 1995, the El Mujahid battalion was "directly dependent on BiH staff for supplies" and for "directions" during combat with the Bosnian Serbs.<ref>, The Bosnian Connection, by Brendan O’Neill, 16 July 2007</ref> The issue has formed part of two ] ] trials. In its judgement in the case of ICTY v. ] (commander of the 3rd Corps of the army of the Sarajevo-based government (ABiH), he was later made part of the joint command of the ABiH and was the Chief of the Supreme Command Staff) and ] (commander of the ] of the 3rd Corps of the ABiH) the ICTY found that <blockquote>"there are significant indicia of a subordinate relationship between the Mujahedin and the Accused ''prior'' to 13 August 1993. Testimony heard by the Trial Chamber and, in the main, documents tendered into evidence demonstrate that the ABiH maintained a close relationship with the foreign Mujahedin as soon as these arrived in central Bosnia in 1992. Joint combat operations are one illustration of that. In Karaula and Visoko in 1992, at Mount Zmajevac around mid-April 1993 and in the Bila valley in June 1993, the Mujahedin fought alongside AbiH units against Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat forces." <ref>, Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref></blockquote>
Another example of propaganda about ''Islamic holy warriors'' is presented in the ICTY ''Kordić and Čerkez verdict'' for ] and ] committed by ] leadership on Bosniak civilians. ] was attacked by ] (HV) and ] (HVO) in January 1993 followed by heavy shelling of the town by Croat artillery. During ] ]s at the Britbat HQ in Gornji Vakuf, ] Andrić, representing the HVO, demanded that the Bosnian forces lay down their arms and accept HVO control of the town, threatening that if they did not agree he would flatten Gornji Vakuf to the ground. <ref>ICTY: Kordić and Čerkez verdict - IV. Attacks on towns and villages: killings - 2. The Conflict in Gornji Vakuf </ref> <ref> SENSE Tribunal: Poziv na predaju </ref> The HVO demands were not accepted by the ] and the attack continued, followed by massacres on Bosnian Muslim civilians in the neighbouring villages of Bistrica, Uzričje, Duša, Ždrimci and Hrasnica.<ref> SENSE Tribunal: Ko je počeo rat u Gornjem Vakufu </ref> <ref> SENSE Tribunal: "James Dean" u Gornjem Vakufu</ref>The shelling campaign and the attackes during the war resulted in hundreds of injured and killed, mostly Bosnian Muslim civilians. Although Croats often cited it as a major reason for the attack on Gornji Vakuf in order to justify attacks and massacres on civilians, the commander of the British Britbat company claimed that there were no Muslim ''holy warriors'' in Gornji Vakuf and that his soldiers did not see any. <ref>ICTY: Kordić and Čerkez verdict - IV. Attacks on towns and villages: killings - 2. The Conflict in Gornji Vakuf </ref>


After the official formation of the ''El Mujahid'' battalion on 13 August 1993 it became part of the Bosnian Army, though with its own commanders. According to testimony and evidence presented at the ] trial of Bosnian government General ], which began in July 2007, the Bosnian Mujahideen operated under the control of the Bosnian army (ABiH) though with their own commanders. <ref>, Muslim fighter begins testimony in Bosnia trial, 7 September 2007</ref> <ref>, Tape suggests Bosnian general lied about mujahideen, 14 September 2007</ref>
Mujahideen phenomenon is often used by Serb scholars as an instrument in denying and relativising war crimes committed by the Serbs. On ], 2003, former President ] honored the ] dead and condemned the ''genocidal madness''.<ref>The New York Times - At Memorial In Bosnia, Clinton Helps Mourn 7,000 </ref> Soon after, Serb historian ] wrote that Clinton attended a memorial for dead mujahedeen troops in Bosnia.<ref>Serbianna: Carl Savich - </ref>


===War crimes===
==Al Qaeda speculation==


The judgements of ] and ] concerned a number of war crimes involving the Bosnian mujahideen. Those included in the judgement are recounted below:
Following the end of the ] and, especially, after the ] attacks on the World Trade Center, Serbian propaganda started to fabricate the links between ] and Al Qaeda, in order to move the focus from the ] to more interesting topic such as terrorism in the ] era. According to ] produced research by Vlado Azinović about alleged links between Bosnia and Al Qaeda ''"Al Qaeda in Bosnia: Myth Or Present Danger"'', the claims about the alleged presence of Al Qaeda in Bosnia are unverified and mostly fabricated. The presence of Wahhabism and of the remaining Muslim fighters do not qualify Bosnia as a particular threat to international security, according to the Azinovic's conclusion. Furthermore, Azinovic quotes Evan F. Kohlmann:<ref>Al-Kai'da u Bosni i Hercegovini:Mit ili stvarna opasnost?</ref>
::*on 26 January 1993, following an attack on the village of Miletici in Travnik Municipality, four Bosnian Croat men were captured, had their hands tied behind their backs and subsequently had their throats slit and their blood collected in a pan.<ref>, Summary of the judgement for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref>
{{quote|Serb propaganda throughout the whole war had portrayed the ] as violent extremists, fundamentalists, and as eager to jump on the bandwagon of the mujahedin.}}
::*on 8 June 1993, 23 Croatian men and one young woman were executed in Bikoci while they were being held prisoner. The Trial Chamber finds that the perpetrators of the massacre were foreign and local Mujahedin.<ref>, Summary of the judgement for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref>
::*from 26 January 1993 to 20 August 1993 and on 20 September 1993 civilian prisoner were held at the Music School in the town of Zenica, were victims of cruel treatment and physical and psychological abuse. During that period more than one hundred detainees were imprisoned at the Music School. 10 detainees described the violence they were subjected to. One witness told how during the night, detainees were taken out one by one from their cells upstairs at the Music School and that, with the lights out, they had to go through a line of soldiers who beat them with wooden shovel handles. The same witness stated that one day a military policeman ordered a father to beat his mentally handicapped son. When the father refused to do so, another detainee was forced to carry out the order.<ref>, Summary of the judgement for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref>
::*on 18 May 1993, 16 Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serbs civilians were taken to the Motel Sretno where they were beaten several times until the next morning, 19 May 1993, when they were set free. In the first phase of the interrogation, they were kicked with boots and beaten with rifle butts and fists. In the second phase, the detainees were forced to hit each other. In the third phase, they were forced to go through a row of soldiers who beat them with rifle butts. A witness told how he did not get up and how he lost consciousness after being beaten a dozen times by a truncheon on the head. In the fourth and last phase, the detainees were made to place their heads between the bars of their cells and were then beaten by pieces of wood. Evidence has indicated that after such brutalities some of the victims suffered several broken ribs, dislocated kidneys, and damaged spinal columns.<ref>, Summary of the judgement for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref>
::*In late July or early August 1993, several detainees, including Mario Zrno, a prisoner of war, were taken outside the Bugojno Convent and subjected to severe beatings. Mario Zrno did not survive.<ref>, Summary of the judgement for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref>
::*On the night of 5 August 1993, five or six prisoners, including Mladen Havranek, a prisoner of war, were severely beaten on the upper floor of the Slavonija Furniture Salon. Several witnesses stated that from the cell in the basement they heard Mladen Havranek screaming and begging for the beatings to cease. After repeated beatings, Mladen Havranek was unable to walk and was dragged down the stairs to the cell in the basement. Malden Havranek died as a result of his injuries that same night.<ref>, Summary of the judgement for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref>
::*On 21 October 1993, Dragan Popovic, a Bosnian Serb civilian, was executed by members of the Bosnian Mujahideen detachment. In its judgement the ICTY notes that this murder was "particularly heinous". Dragan Popovic was taken with three other prisoners to a meadow where a pit had been dug. About 50 to 100 soldiers from the El Mujahed detachment stood around the pit shouting. Dragan Popovic was pushed to the edge of the pit and fell on his side after being tripped. One soldier then tried unsuccessfully to behead him with a hatchet, so another soldier had to finish the execution. The other prisoners were then forced to kiss the head of the deceased while the soldiers shouted in ritual celebration.<ref>, Summary of the judgement for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref>
::*the Monastery of Guča Gora and the Church of St. John the Baptist in Travnik were damaged in June 1993 by Bosnian Mujahideen. In the Monastery of Guča Gora - which was both a sacred and historical site for the Croatian Catholic community - steles and the organ were destroyed, and the frescoes and walls were partially covered with inscriptions in Arabic. Similar destruction and damage was recorded at the church in Travnik: paintings, organs and windows were destroyed or vandalised and the statues of saints were decapitated.<ref>, Summary of the judgement for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref>
The ICTY indictment of ], the Bosnian mujahideen were involved in numerous war crimes during the summer of 1995. These are listed below:
::*21 July 1995: the El Mujahed unit decapitated the captured Bosnian Serb soldiers Momir Mitrovic and Predrag Knezevic.<ref> against Rasim Delic</ref>
::*24 July 1995: while held at the Kamenica prison camp, the Bosnian Serb soldier Gojko Vujicic was behaded and the other prisoners were forced to kiss the severed head after which the head was placed on a hook on the wall in the room in which the prisoners were held.<ref> against Rasim Delic</ref>
::*the Bosnian Serb prisoners held at the Kamenica Camp, run by the El Mujahed, were beaten and tortured, including with electrical shocks.<ref> against Rasim Delic</ref>
::*60 Bosnian Serb males captured by the El Mujahed and held at the Kamenica Camp are missing and presumed to have been killed by the El Mujahed.<ref> against Rasim Delic</ref>
::*an elderly Bosnian Serb man, held in the Kamenica Camp was beaten and forced to drink water mixed with petrol. He later died in the camp as a result of the mistreatment.<ref> against Rasim Delic</ref>
::*three civilian female prisoners held at the Kamenica camp were beaten, kicked, hit with metal sticks and rifle butts, and subject to sexual assaults, including rape.<ref> against Rasim Delic</ref>


==Other information== == After the war ==


The foreign mujahideen units were supposed to be disbanded and required to leave the Balkans under the terms of the 1995 ]. But many stayed - about 400, according to official Bosnian government estimates. Although the US State Department report suggested that the number could be higher, a senior ] official said allied military intelligence estimated that no more than 200 foreign-born militants actually live in Bosnia, of which closer to 30 represent a hard-core group with direct links to terrorism.<ref> , Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists, 8 October 2001</ref><ref></ref>
After the war, many of the Arabs attained Bosnian citizenship and settled in several villages throughout Bosnia. It is known that those who remained are concentrated around the cities of ], ] and Bočinja and in villages near ].{{Fact|date=October 2007}}


A sizeable number were granted citizenship by ] in exchange for their fighting in the Bosnian civil war. In September, 50 of these individuals had their citizenship status revoked. Since then 100 more individuals have been prevented from claiming citizenship rights. 250 more were under investigation, while the body which is charged to reconsider the citizenship status of these former mujahideen states that 1,500 cases will eventually be examined.<ref>, Bosnia: Muslims upset by Wahhabi leaders, Adrian Morgan, 13 November 2006</ref>
==Notes==


* (] conclusion) ''The evidence shows that foreign volunteers arrived in central Bosnia in the second half of 1992 with the aim of helping their Muslim brothers against the Serbian aggressors. Mostly they came from North Africa, the Near East and the Middle East. The foreign volunteers differed considerably from the local population, not only because of their physical appearance and the language they spoke, but also because of their fighting methods. Initially, the foreign volunteers gave food and other basic necessities to the local Muslim population. Once hostilities broke out between the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the HVO (Croat forces), they also participated in battles against the HVO alongside Army of BiH units.'' <ref></ref>


== Links to Al Qaeda and Islamic terrorism==
==References==


Following the end of the Bosnian War and, especially, after the ] on the World Trade Center, the links between the Bosnian Mujahideen, Al Qaeda and the radicalization of some European Muslims has become more widely discussed. In an interview with US journalist ] former US peace envoy to Bosnia ] states:
{{Reflist}}


<blockquote>There were over 1,000 people in the country who belonged to what we then called Mujahideen freedom fighters.
{{Yugoslav wars}}


We now know that that was ]. I'd never heard the word before, but we knew who they were. And if you look at the 9/11 hijackers, several of those hijackers were trained or fought in Bosnia. We cleaned them out, and they had to move much further east into Afghanistan. So if it hadn't been for Dayton, we would have been fighting the terrorists deep in the ravines and caves of Central Bosnia in the heart of Europe. <ref>, A New Constitution for Bosnia, 22 November 2005</ref></blockquote>

In 1996, in a book titled "Offensive In the Balkans", Dr. ], Director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the ] from 1988 to 2004, wrote as follows on the "Bosnian Jehad":

<blockquote>"...The build-up of new Islamist units was completed in Bosnia- Herzegovina in the Spring of 1995. These forces are closely associated with the Armed Islamist Movement (AIM) and Islamist international terrorismsuicide terrorists), both veteran Arabs and newly trained Bosnians. <ref>, Bosnia & Hyderabad, by B.Raman, 3 September 2001</ref></blockquote>

London's '']'' has noted, "If Western intervention in Afghanistan created the mujahedin, Western intervention in Bosnia appears to have globalised it." Several current and former top al-Qaeda militants and financiers reportedly participated in the Bosnian civil war with the full support of the United States. It was for the Bosnian jihad that the 9/11 'paymaster', ], was reportedly recruited to fight by the CIA and MI6. Al-Qada, in addition to his reported financing of the Bosnian jihad, has been identified as one of ]'s "chief money launderers". <ref>, Scratching the Surface, by Devlin Buckley, 16 November 2006</ref> In his paper on the connection between Bosnian mujahideen and 'home grown' terrorists in Europe, terrorism expert Evan F. Kohlmann writes that:
<blockquote>Indeed, some of the most important factors behind the contemporary radicalization of European Muslim youth can be found in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the cream of the Arab mujahideen from Afghanistan tested their battle skills in the post-Soviet era and mobilized a new generation of pan-Islamic revolutionaries. <ref>, by Evan F. Kohlmann</ref></blockquote>

== Further reading ==

*, by, Evan F. Kohlmann. The paper was presented at a conference held by the Swedish National Defence College's Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS) in Stockholm in May 2006 at the request of Dr. Magnus Ranstorp - former director of the St. Andrews University Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence - and now Chief Scientist at CATS). It is also the title of a by the same author.

== See also ==

*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]

== External links ==

*, Balkan extremists, 12 July 2007
*, Bahraini key witness in Hague atrocity trial, 7 September 2007
*, Muslim fighter begins testimony in Bosnia trial, 7 September 2007
*, The Bosnian Connection, The civil war that inspired both liberal hawks and Islamist jihadis, by Brendan O’Neill
* video of Bosnian General Rasim Delic delivering his farewell speech to the El Mujaheed
*, Survivor from Kamenica Camp testifies at Rasim Delic trial, 3 October 2007
*, CTY: BiH Army Knew About Mujahedin Crimes, 8 September 2007
*, profile of Rasim Delic, former Chief of Staff of the Army of Bosnian Muslims responsible for the Bosnian Mujahideen
* against Rasim Delic
*, Republican Policy Committee, by Chairman Larry E. Craig, 16 January 1997
*, by Carl Savich for ''Serbianna'' (Serbian organization based in the United States), 4 December 2007
* by Michal Warczakowski at vojska.net

== References and notes ==
{{Reflist}}

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{{Yugoslav wars}}

Revision as of 23:24, 13 April 2008

Bosnian mujahideen were predominantly foreign Muslim volunteers who fought on the side of the Bosnian government during the 1992-1995 Bosnian War. The number of volunteers is estimated to have been between 3,000 and 7,000 with the majority coming from countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia. In addition, local Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) fought alongside the foreign mujahideen. Initially, the mujahideen units operated independently of the Bosnian government army (ARBiH). However, as the war progressed they became increasingly integrated into the regular Bosnian army and its command structure. In addition to the Mujahideen volunteers, there were also several hundred Iranian Revolutionary Guards supporting the Bosnian government during the war. Many of the Bosnian Mujahideen were supported financially from Saudi Arabia, including persons and organizations later connected with Al-Qaeda

Role during the Bosnian War 1992-1995

Foreign mujahideen arrived in central Bosnia in the second half of 1992 with the aim of helping their Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) coreligionists against the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat forces. Mostly they came from North Africa, the Near East and the Middle East. On 13 August 1993, the Bosnian government officially mobilized the Kateebat al-Mujahideen ("Battalion of the Holy Warriors") or El Mudžahid, on the personal orders of Bosnian president Alija Izetbegović, to whom the unit was directly responsible. Initially, the foreign Mujahideen gave food and other basic necessities to the local Muslim population, deprived many necessities by the Bosnian Serb forces. Once hostilities broke out between the Bosnian government (ABiH) and the Bosnian Croat forces (HVO), the Mujahideen also participated in battles against the HVO alongside ABiH units.

The foreign mujahideen actively recruited young local men, offering them military training, uniforms and weapons. As a result, local Bosniaks joined the foreign mujahideen and in the process became local "Bosnian Mujahideen". They imitated the foreigners in both the way they dressed and behaved, to such an extent that it was sometimes, according to the ICTY documentation in subsequent war crimes trials, "difficult to distinguish between the two groups. For that reason, the ICTY has used the term "Mujahideen" (which they spell Mujahedin) to designate foreigners from Arab countries, but also local Muslims (ie Bosniaks) who joined the Mujahideen units.

The first Bosnian mujahideen training camp was located in Poljanice next to the village of Mehurici, in the Bila valley, in Travnik municipality. The mujahideen group established there included mujahideen from Arab countries as well as Bosniaks. Amongst the local Bosniaks were former members of the Muslim Forces of Travnik and soldiers who were de jure members of 3rd Corps units, namely of the 7th and 306th Brigades. The Mujahideen from Poljanice camp were also established in the towns of Zenica and Travnik and, from the second half of 1993 onwards, in the village of Orasac, also located in the Bila valley.

According to the ICTYs indictment of Rasim Delic, Commander of Main Staff of the Bosnian army (ABiH), after the formation of the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade of the ABiH 3rd Corps on 19 November 1992 the El Mujahid were subordinated within its structure. The Bosnian Mujahideen were involved in combat activities of units of the ABiH 3rd Corps, including the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade, and frequently spearheaded ABiH 3rd Corps combat operations. On 13 August 1993 Rasim Delic then ordered the establishment within the ABiH 3rd Corps area of responsibility of the "EL Mujahed" unit, effective no later than 31 August 1993. The El Mujahed unit remained part of the ABiH 3rd Corps until its disbandment on 12 December 1995.

The military effectiveness of the Bosnian mujahideen is disputed. However, former US Balkans peace negotiator Richard Holbrooke said in an interview that "I think the Muslims wouldn't have survived without this" help. At the time a U.N. arms embargo diminished the Bosnian government's fighting capabilities. Holbrooke called the arrival of the moujahedeen "a pact with the devil" from which Bosnia still is recovering.

Bosnian mujahideen units

At the end of the war there were a number of Bosnian mujahideen units in the Bosnian government army:

  • Volunteer Mujahedin Battalion (the "al Ansar"): this was a separate force in the Zenica-Travnik area. The Ansar was 300 to 600 troops strong. The main headquarters was in the Vatrostalno Factory building in Podbrijezje (near Zenica). In addition, there was a camp called the "Martyrs' Detachment", which, since the Spring of 1995, had absorbed a few hundred new volunteers arriving from Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
  • Battalions of Believers (the "Kata 'eb al-Manikin"): this force included mainly Arabs. They were serving under the command of military officers from Pakistan and Afghanistan. The trainers and leadership were from Iran. Each Battalion was 300 to 600 troops strong. The first operational battalion was based in the Buzim area (north west Bosnia). Another battalion served as a special forces unit for the 2nd Corps in the Tuzla area.
  • Handzar Division: named after the 13th Waffen-SS Handschar Division which served under the German flag in World War II. The contemporary Handzar Division was a 2,500 to 3,000 elite force deployed in Sarajevo and a 6,000 to 7,500 strong back-up force at a major training base around Fojnica, but is moved around to augment major fighting fronts. The majority of the troops of the Handzar Division come from the region's non-Bosnian Muslim minorities, primarily Albanians, and were led by veteran Pakistani and Afghan experts.

Relationship to the Bosnian government army (ABiH)

The extent to which the Bosnian mujahideen were controlled by the Bosnian government is contentious. According to a UN communiqué of 1995, the El Mujahid battalion was "directly dependent on BiH staff for supplies" and for "directions" during combat with the Bosnian Serbs. The issue has formed part of two ICTY war crimes trials. In its judgement in the case of ICTY v. Enver Hadzihasanovic (commander of the 3rd Corps of the army of the Sarajevo-based government (ABiH), he was later made part of the joint command of the ABiH and was the Chief of the Supreme Command Staff) and Amir Kubura (commander of the 7th Muslim Brigade of the 3rd Corps of the ABiH) the ICTY found that

"there are significant indicia of a subordinate relationship between the Mujahedin and the Accused prior to 13 August 1993. Testimony heard by the Trial Chamber and, in the main, documents tendered into evidence demonstrate that the ABiH maintained a close relationship with the foreign Mujahedin as soon as these arrived in central Bosnia in 1992. Joint combat operations are one illustration of that. In Karaula and Visoko in 1992, at Mount Zmajevac around mid-April 1993 and in the Bila valley in June 1993, the Mujahedin fought alongside AbiH units against Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat forces."

After the official formation of the El Mujahid battalion on 13 August 1993 it became part of the Bosnian Army, though with its own commanders. According to testimony and evidence presented at the ICTY trial of Bosnian government General Rasim Delic, which began in July 2007, the Bosnian Mujahideen operated under the control of the Bosnian army (ABiH) though with their own commanders.

War crimes

The judgements of Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kabura concerned a number of war crimes involving the Bosnian mujahideen. Those included in the judgement are recounted below:

  • on 26 January 1993, following an attack on the village of Miletici in Travnik Municipality, four Bosnian Croat men were captured, had their hands tied behind their backs and subsequently had their throats slit and their blood collected in a pan.
  • on 8 June 1993, 23 Croatian men and one young woman were executed in Bikoci while they were being held prisoner. The Trial Chamber finds that the perpetrators of the massacre were foreign and local Mujahedin.
  • from 26 January 1993 to 20 August 1993 and on 20 September 1993 civilian prisoner were held at the Music School in the town of Zenica, were victims of cruel treatment and physical and psychological abuse. During that period more than one hundred detainees were imprisoned at the Music School. 10 detainees described the violence they were subjected to. One witness told how during the night, detainees were taken out one by one from their cells upstairs at the Music School and that, with the lights out, they had to go through a line of soldiers who beat them with wooden shovel handles. The same witness stated that one day a military policeman ordered a father to beat his mentally handicapped son. When the father refused to do so, another detainee was forced to carry out the order.
  • on 18 May 1993, 16 Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serbs civilians were taken to the Motel Sretno where they were beaten several times until the next morning, 19 May 1993, when they were set free. In the first phase of the interrogation, they were kicked with boots and beaten with rifle butts and fists. In the second phase, the detainees were forced to hit each other. In the third phase, they were forced to go through a row of soldiers who beat them with rifle butts. A witness told how he did not get up and how he lost consciousness after being beaten a dozen times by a truncheon on the head. In the fourth and last phase, the detainees were made to place their heads between the bars of their cells and were then beaten by pieces of wood. Evidence has indicated that after such brutalities some of the victims suffered several broken ribs, dislocated kidneys, and damaged spinal columns.
  • In late July or early August 1993, several detainees, including Mario Zrno, a prisoner of war, were taken outside the Bugojno Convent and subjected to severe beatings. Mario Zrno did not survive.
  • On the night of 5 August 1993, five or six prisoners, including Mladen Havranek, a prisoner of war, were severely beaten on the upper floor of the Slavonija Furniture Salon. Several witnesses stated that from the cell in the basement they heard Mladen Havranek screaming and begging for the beatings to cease. After repeated beatings, Mladen Havranek was unable to walk and was dragged down the stairs to the cell in the basement. Malden Havranek died as a result of his injuries that same night.
  • On 21 October 1993, Dragan Popovic, a Bosnian Serb civilian, was executed by members of the Bosnian Mujahideen detachment. In its judgement the ICTY notes that this murder was "particularly heinous". Dragan Popovic was taken with three other prisoners to a meadow where a pit had been dug. About 50 to 100 soldiers from the El Mujahed detachment stood around the pit shouting. Dragan Popovic was pushed to the edge of the pit and fell on his side after being tripped. One soldier then tried unsuccessfully to behead him with a hatchet, so another soldier had to finish the execution. The other prisoners were then forced to kiss the head of the deceased while the soldiers shouted in ritual celebration.
  • the Monastery of Guča Gora and the Church of St. John the Baptist in Travnik were damaged in June 1993 by Bosnian Mujahideen. In the Monastery of Guča Gora - which was both a sacred and historical site for the Croatian Catholic community - steles and the organ were destroyed, and the frescoes and walls were partially covered with inscriptions in Arabic. Similar destruction and damage was recorded at the church in Travnik: paintings, organs and windows were destroyed or vandalised and the statues of saints were decapitated.

The ICTY indictment of Rasim Delic, the Bosnian mujahideen were involved in numerous war crimes during the summer of 1995. These are listed below:

  • 21 July 1995: the El Mujahed unit decapitated the captured Bosnian Serb soldiers Momir Mitrovic and Predrag Knezevic.
  • 24 July 1995: while held at the Kamenica prison camp, the Bosnian Serb soldier Gojko Vujicic was behaded and the other prisoners were forced to kiss the severed head after which the head was placed on a hook on the wall in the room in which the prisoners were held.
  • the Bosnian Serb prisoners held at the Kamenica Camp, run by the El Mujahed, were beaten and tortured, including with electrical shocks.
  • 60 Bosnian Serb males captured by the El Mujahed and held at the Kamenica Camp are missing and presumed to have been killed by the El Mujahed.
  • an elderly Bosnian Serb man, held in the Kamenica Camp was beaten and forced to drink water mixed with petrol. He later died in the camp as a result of the mistreatment.
  • three civilian female prisoners held at the Kamenica camp were beaten, kicked, hit with metal sticks and rifle butts, and subject to sexual assaults, including rape.

After the war

The foreign mujahideen units were supposed to be disbanded and required to leave the Balkans under the terms of the 1995 Dayton peace accord. But many stayed - about 400, according to official Bosnian government estimates. Although the US State Department report suggested that the number could be higher, a senior SFOR official said allied military intelligence estimated that no more than 200 foreign-born militants actually live in Bosnia, of which closer to 30 represent a hard-core group with direct links to terrorism.

A sizeable number were granted citizenship by Izetbegovic in exchange for their fighting in the Bosnian civil war. In September, 50 of these individuals had their citizenship status revoked. Since then 100 more individuals have been prevented from claiming citizenship rights. 250 more were under investigation, while the body which is charged to reconsider the citizenship status of these former mujahideen states that 1,500 cases will eventually be examined.


Links to Al Qaeda and Islamic terrorism

Following the end of the Bosnian War and, especially, after the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Center, the links between the Bosnian Mujahideen, Al Qaeda and the radicalization of some European Muslims has become more widely discussed. In an interview with US journalist Jim Lehrer former US peace envoy to Bosnia Richard Holbrooke states:

There were over 1,000 people in the country who belonged to what we then called Mujahideen freedom fighters. We now know that that was al-Qaida. I'd never heard the word before, but we knew who they were. And if you look at the 9/11 hijackers, several of those hijackers were trained or fought in Bosnia. We cleaned them out, and they had to move much further east into Afghanistan. So if it hadn't been for Dayton, we would have been fighting the terrorists deep in the ravines and caves of Central Bosnia in the heart of Europe.

In 1996, in a book titled "Offensive In the Balkans", Dr. Yossef Bodansky, Director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the US House of Representatives from 1988 to 2004, wrote as follows on the "Bosnian Jehad":

"...The build-up of new Islamist units was completed in Bosnia- Herzegovina in the Spring of 1995. These forces are closely associated with the Armed Islamist Movement (AIM) and Islamist international terrorismsuicide terrorists), both veteran Arabs and newly trained Bosnians.

London's The Spectator has noted, "If Western intervention in Afghanistan created the mujahedin, Western intervention in Bosnia appears to have globalised it." Several current and former top al-Qaeda militants and financiers reportedly participated in the Bosnian civil war with the full support of the United States. It was for the Bosnian jihad that the 9/11 'paymaster', Omar Sheikh, was reportedly recruited to fight by the CIA and MI6. Al-Qada, in addition to his reported financing of the Bosnian jihad, has been identified as one of Osama bin Laden's "chief money launderers". In his paper on the connection between Bosnian mujahideen and 'home grown' terrorists in Europe, terrorism expert Evan F. Kohlmann writes that:

Indeed, some of the most important factors behind the contemporary radicalization of European Muslim youth can be found in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the cream of the Arab mujahideen from Afghanistan tested their battle skills in the post-Soviet era and mobilized a new generation of pan-Islamic revolutionaries.

Further reading

  • The Afghan-Bosnian Mujahideen Network in Europe, by, Evan F. Kohlmann. The paper was presented at a conference held by the Swedish National Defence College's Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS) in Stockholm in May 2006 at the request of Dr. Magnus Ranstorp - former director of the St. Andrews University Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence - and now Chief Scientist at CATS). It is also the title of a book by the same author.

See also

External links

References and notes

  1. Also spelt Mujahedin in a minority of articles
  2. ^ ICTY, Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006. See section "VI. The Mujahedin"
  3. Staff. Bosnian police begin Mujahedin evictions From the newsroom of the BBC World Service, 24 July, 2000,
  4. ,LA Times, Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists, 8 October 2001
  5. Some Call It Peace: Waiting for the War In the Balkans by Yossef Bodansky, 1996. Part 1, Chapter 3
  6. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Bosnia-Herzegovina: New Book Investigates Presence Of Al-Qaeda, June 1, 2007
  7. Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation), Al-Qaeda's Recruitment Operations in the Balkans by Ines Alic, Volume 4, Issue 12 (June 15, 2006)
  8. Some Call It Peace: Waiting for the War In the Balkans by Yossef Bodansky, 1996. Part 1, Chapter 3
  9. United States Institute of Peace, Dayton Implementation: The Train and Equip Program, September 1997 | Special Report No. 25
  10. NY Times, What's Iran Doing In Bosnia, Anyway?, by Elaine Sciolino, 10 December 1995
  11. SENATE RESOLUTION 225--RELATIVE TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (Senate - February 07, 1996)
  12. .Free Republic, Al Qaeda Recruited U.S. Servicemen: Testimony Links Plot To Saudi Gov't, 2004
  13. The Afghan-Bosnian Mujahideen Network in Europe, By, Evan F. Kohlmann (page 2), as published on the web site of the Swedish National Defence College
  14. Kohlmann, Evan (2004). Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network. Berg Publishers. pp. 91, 92. ISBN 1859738079. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  15. ICTY, Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006
  16. ICTY, Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006
  17. ICTY, Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006
  18. Spero News, Bosnia: Muslims upset by Wahhabi leaders, Adrian Morgan, 13 November 2006
  19. ,LA Times, Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists, 8 October 2001
  20. Some Call It Peace: Waiting for the War In the Balkans by Yossef Bodansky, 1996. Part 1, Chapter 3
  21. Some Call It Peace: Waiting for the War In the Balkans by Yossef Bodansky, 1996. Part 1, Chapter 3
  22. Some Call It Peace: Waiting for the War In the Balkans by Yossef Bodansky, 1996. Part 1, Chapter 3
  23. Some Call It Peace: Waiting for the War In the Balkans by Yossef Bodansky, 1996. Part 1, Chapter 3
  24. The American Conservative, The Bosnian Connection, by Brendan O’Neill, 16 July 2007
  25. ICTY, Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006
  26. Reuters, Muslim fighter begins testimony in Bosnia trial, 7 September 2007
  27. Reuters, Tape suggests Bosnian general lied about mujahideen, 14 September 2007
  28. ICTY, Summary of the judgement for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006
  29. ICTY, Summary of the judgement for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006
  30. ICTY, Summary of the judgement for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006
  31. ICTY, Summary of the judgement for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006
  32. ICTY, Summary of the judgement for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006
  33. ICTY, Summary of the judgement for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006
  34. ICTY, Summary of the judgement for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006
  35. ICTY, Summary of the judgement for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006
  36. ICTY indictment against Rasim Delic
  37. ICTY indictment against Rasim Delic
  38. ICTY indictment against Rasim Delic
  39. ICTY indictment against Rasim Delic
  40. ICTY indictment against Rasim Delic
  41. ICTY indictment against Rasim Delic
  42. LA Times, Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists, 8 October 2001
  43. BBC, Mujahideen fight Bosnia evictions, 18 July 2000
  44. Spero News, Bosnia: Muslims upset by Wahhabi leaders, Adrian Morgan, 13 November 2006
  45. PBS Newshour with Jim Jim Lehrer, A New Constitution for Bosnia, 22 November 2005
  46. South Asia Analysis Group, Bosnia & Hyderabad, by B.Raman, 3 September 2001
  47. The American Monitor, Scratching the Surface, by Devlin Buckley, 16 November 2006
  48. The Afghan-Bosnian Mujahideen Network in Europe, by Evan F. Kohlmann

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