Misplaced Pages

Revision as of 13:21, 20 June 2008

This article may require cleanup to meet Misplaced Pages's quality standards. No cleanup reason has been specified. Please help improve this article if you can. (March 2008) (Learn how and when to remove this message)

Ukrainian Insurgent Army
Flag of the UPA
Leaders	Vasyl Ivakhiv, Dmytro Klyachkivsky, Roman Shukhevych, Vasyl Kuk
Dates of operation	1943-1955
Active regions	primarily in territories of prewar Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia populated with Ukrainian majority, with raids as far east as Kiev region
Allies	temporary arrangements with Nazi Germany
Opponents	Nazi German SS , the Polish Armia Krajowa, Soviet partisans, the Soviet Red Army, NKVD
Battles and wars	mainly guerrilla activity

This article provides insufficient context for those unfamiliar with the subject. Please help improve the article by providing more context for the reader. (Learn how and when to remove this message)

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Template:Lang-ua) was a Ukrainian military organization formed initially in Volyn (in north-western Ukraine) in 1941. The UPA's primary purpose was to protect the interests, of the Ukrainian population starting out as a resistance group that grew into a guerrilla army. The UPA was the military branch of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the (OUN). During its existence, the UPA fought a large variety of military forces, including Nazi Germany, the Polish underground army (Armia Krajowa), and Soviet forces including Soviet partisans, the Red Army, NKVD, SMERSH, NKGB, MVD. Throughout its existence, the UPA cooperated both with Soviet partisan forces and the German Wehrmacht.

In order to differentiate itself from Soviet "Partisans" (a term commonly used by communist underground forces) the members UPA tended to use the Ukrainian term "Povstantsi" (insurgents).

After World War II, the UPA remained active and continued open battles against Poland until 1947 and the Soviet Union until the 1949. It was particularly strong in the Carpathian Mountains and in Volyn - in Western Ukraine. Among the anti-Nazi resistance movements it was unique, in that it had no significant foreign support. Its growth and strength was reflected in its popularity it received from the people of Western Ukraine. Outside of Western Ukraine, support was minimal, and most of the Soviet Ukrainian population considered, the OUN/UPA to have been collaborators with the Germans.

(Note: Another group also often popularly entitled UPA also existed in Volyn. It was nominally formed earlier in late November 1941 before the formal formation of UPA and was initially known as the Polissian Sich. This group had no direct connections with the OUN(B), and allied itself politically with OUN(M) and OUN(UNR). This grouping led by Taras Bulba-Borovets had links to the UNR in exile. It was renamed the Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army in July 1943 before being later absorbed into the UPA of the OUN(B).

Organization of UPA

UPA's command structure overlapped with that of the OUN in a sophisticated network that was highly centralized. The UPA was responsible for operations while the OUN was in charge of administrative duties; each had their own chain of command. The six main departments were military, political, security service, mobilization, supply, and the Ukrainian Red Cross. There was overlap between OUN and UPA posts and the local OUN and UPA leader were frequently the same person. Organizational methods were borrowed and adapted from the German, Polish and Soviet military, while UPA units trained based on a modified Red Army field unit manual. The General Staff consisted of operations, intelligence, training, logistics, personnel and political education departments. UPA's largest units, Kurins, consisting of 500-700 soldiers [, were equivalent to battalions in a regular army, and its smallest units, Riys (literally beeswarm), with 8-10 soldiers [, were equivalent to squads. Occasionally, and particularly in Volyn, during some operations three or more Kurins would unite and form a Zahin or Brigade [.

UPA's leaders were: Vasyl Ivakhiv (spring – 13 of May 1943), Dmytro Klyachkivsky, Roman Shukhevych (January 1944 until 1950) and finally Vasyl Kuk.

In November 1943, UPA adopted a new structure, creating a Main Military Headquarters and three areas (group} commands: UPA-West, UPA-North and UPA-South. Three military schools for low-level command staff were also established.

UPA's membership is estimated to have consisted of 60% peasants of low to moderate means, 20-25% workers (primarily from the rural lumber and food industries), and 15% from the intelligentsia (students, urban professionals). The latter group provided a large portion of UPA's military trainers and officer corps. Sixty percent of UPA's membership was from Galicia and 30% from Volyn and Polesia By late 1943 and early 1944, the UPA controlled much of the territory of Volyn, outside of the major cities, and was able to organize basic services for the villagers such as schools, hospitals, and the printing of newspapers. The number of UPA fighters varied. A German Abwehr report from November 1943 estimated that UPA had 20,000 soldiers; other estimates at that time placed the number at 40,000. By the summer of 1944, estimates of UPA membership varied from 25-30 thousand fighters up to 100,000 soldiers.

UPA Formation

1941

In a Memorandum from August, 14 1941 OUN (B) proposed to the Germans, to create a Ukrainian Army “which will join the German Аrmy … until the latter will win”, in exchange for German recognition of an allied Ukrainian independent state The Ukrainian Army was planned to have been formed on the basis of DUN (Detachments of Ukrainian nationalists - Druzhyny Ukrainskykh Natsiоnalistiv) and specifically on the basis of the “Ukrainian legion”, at that time composed of two battalions “Nachtigall” and “Roland.” These two battalions were included in the Abwehr special regiment “Brandenburg-800”. These proposals however, were not accepted by the Germans, and by the middle of September 1941 the Germans began a campaign of repression against the most proactive OUN members.

At the beginning of October 1941, during the first OUN Conference the OUN formulated its future strategy. This called for transferring part of its organizational structure underground, in order to avoid conflict with the Germans. It also refrained from open anti-German propaganda activities. At the same time, the OUN tried to infiltrate its own members into and create its own network within the German Auxiliary police.

A captured German document of November 25, 1941 (Nuremberg Trial O14-USSR) ordered: "It has been ascertained that the Bandera Movement is preparing a revolt in the Reichskommissariat which has as its ultimate aim the establishment of an independent Ukraine. All functionaries of the Bandera Movement must be arrested at once and, after thorough interrogation, are to be liquidated..." By the end of November 1941, both the “Ukrainian Legions” Roland and Nachtigall were disbanded and the remaining soldiers (approximately 650 persons) were given the option of signing a contract for military service after being transferred to Germany for further military training. At the same time (end of November 1941) the Germans started a second wave of repression in Reichskommissariat Ukraine specifically targeting OUN (B) members. Most of the captured OUN activists in Reichskommissariat Ukraine however, belonged to OUN (M) wing.

1942

At the Second OUN(B) conference held in April 1942 the policies for the “creation, build-up and development of Ukrainian political and future military forces”, “action against partisan activity supported by Moscow” were adopted. The primary enemy targeted were the Soviet partisans. German policy was also criticized.

In July 1942 OUN (B) issued a statement in which it stated that the main enemy targeted was “Moscow”, while the Germans was ephemerally criticized for their policy concerning the Ukrainian independent state. Until December 1942, OUN(B)'s principal activity was propaganda and the development of its own underground network, while actions against the Germans were described at that time as undesirable and provocative.

In December 1942 near Lviv the “Military conference of OUN(B)” was held. It resulted in the adoption of a policy for the accelerated growth for the establishment of OUN(B) Military forces. The Conference emphasised that “all combat capable population must support, under OUN banners, the struggle against the Bolsheviks enemy”. On May 30, 1947 the Main Ukrainian Liberation Council (Головна Визвольна Рада) adopted the date of October 14, 1942 as the official day for celebrating UPA's creation.

UPA's relations with Germany

Hostilities

Despite the stated opinions of Dmytro Klyachkivsky and Roman Shukhevych that the Germans were a secondary threat compared to their main enemies; the Soviet partisans and Poles, the Third Conference of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists held near Lviv 17-21 February 1943, adopted the decision to commence open warfare against the Germans,. (OUN fighters had already attacked a German garrison earlier on February 7th of that year). Accordingly, the OUN (B) leadership issued secret instructions ordering their members who had joined the German auxiliary police in 1941-1942 to desert with their weapons and to join the units of UPA in Volyn. This process often involved engaging in armed conflict with German forces trying to prevent them from doing so. The number of trained and armed soldiers deserting into the ranks of UPA was estimated as being between 4 to 5 thousand. Initially, the military formation of the OUN under Bandera's leadership was called the "military detachment of OUN (SD)" but after April 1943 UPA, the name "Ukrainska Povstanska Armiya" (UPA) was adopted as the official title .

Under German occupation, the UPA conducted hundreds of raids on German police stations and military convoys. In the region of Zhytomyr (which was taken from the Nazi by the Red Army in November 1943-January 1944, with groups of Soviet partisans moving there by February-March 1943), the insurgents were estimated by the German General-Kommissar Leyser to be in control of 80% of the forests and 60% of the farmland. The UPA were able to send small groups of raiders deep into eastern Ukraine.

As a rule the UPA did not attack units of the Wehrmacht, knowing that they were also fighting against the Russian Communism. Likewise, the frontline forces of the German army did not take any part in operation against the UPA, sometimes even refusing to assist the German security and police forces against UPA. Indeed, according to German Eastern Front General Ernst Kostring, UPA fighters "fought almost exclusively against German administrative agencies, the German police and the SS in their quest to establish an independent Ukraine controlled by neither Moscow nor Germany."

According to the OUN/UPA, on May 12, 1943 Germans attacked the town of Kolki using several SS-Divisions (SS units operated alongside the Nazi Army who were responsible for intelligence, central security, policing action, and the mass extermination), where the Germans as well as insurgents suffered heavy losses. Although there were no SS-divisions mentioned at this time in the identified areas according to mainstream historians,, Soviet partisans reported the reinforcement of German auxiliary forces at Kolki for the end of April until mid of May, 1943

In June 1943 German SS and police forces under the command of General von dem Bach-Zalewski, seen as an expert in anti-guerrilla warfare, attempted to destroy UPA-North in Volyn during Operation "BB" (Bandenbekampfung). He was chosen by Himmler to destroy the UPA in this operation.

According to the UPA/OUN, the initial stage of “BB” (Bandenbekempfung) operation under the command of Sturbahnfuehrer SS General Platle and later under General Hintzler against the UPA produced no results whatsoever. This catastrophic development was the subject of several discussions by Himmler's staff that resulted in General von dem Bach-Zalewski being sent to Ukraine and being responsible only to Hitler himself.

According to UPA/OUN(B) estimates, during Operation "BB" Bach-Zalewski had under his disposal 10 battalions of motorized SS troops with heavy weapons and artillery, 10,000 German and Polish police, 2 regiments of the Hungarian army, and three battalions of Cossacks organized from among Soviet POWs and 50 tanks, 27 planes and 5 armored trains. Another UPA estimate assessed the situation during Operation "BB" as follows: Germans send military division which formed from SS regiment, 2 Hungarian regiments, Cossacks regiment and unit of German gendarmes. Their losses from UPA was – 193 persons. By August, the operation proved to be a military failure. On August 19-20, the UPA captured the military center of Kamin Koshyrsky, capturing large quantities of arms and ammunition.As a result of the complete failure of the operations General von dem Bach-Zalewski recalled from his command.

General Prutzmann, von dem Bach-Zalewski's successor as commander of the "BB" did not introduce any new methods in combating the UPA. The UPA-North grew steadily, and the Germans, apart from terrorizing the civilian population, were virtually limited to defensive actions.

According to post-war estimates, the UPA had the following number of clashes with the Germans in mid to late 1943 in Volyn: in July, 35; in August, 24; in September, 15; October-November, 47. "Cite error: The <ref> tag has too many names (see the help page). During the summer of 1943, according to post-war estimates, the Germans lost over 3,000 men killed or wounded while the UPA lost 1237 killed or wounded.

The Carpathian mountains saw some of the heaviest fighting between UPA and German forces in late 1943 and early 1944, as the UPA struggled to maintain control over several of the mountain passes. In one engagement, Ukrainian insurgents numbering about 600 men (including numbers of Ukrainian self-defense force), invoked the panic and retreat of 2 German divisions which initially took up positions in the villages of Maidan, Posich and Zaviy on November 27, 1943. As the result of this operation the Ukrainian insurgents captured a great quantity of arms and ammunition at the cost only 4 dead and 11 wounded.

UPA, fighting a two-front war against both the Germans and approaching Soviets (as well as Soviet partisans), did not focus all of its efforts against the Germans. Indeed, it considered the Soviets to be a greater threat. Adopting a strategy analogous to that of the Chetnik leader General Draža Mihailović, UPA held back against the Germans in order to better prepare itself for and engage in the struggle against the Communists. Because of this, although UPA managed to limit German activities to a certain extent, it failed to prevent the Germans from deporting approximately 500,000 people from Western Ukrainian regions and from economically exploiting Western Ukraine.

Collaboration

In autumn 1943 some detachments of UPA attempted to find reproachment with Germans. Although doing so was condemned by an OUN/UPA order from November 25, 1943 such actions were not halted In May 1944 the OUN submitted instructions to "switch the struggle, which was conducted against Germans, completely into a struggle against the Soviets."Cite error: The <ref> tag has too many names (see the help page).. Nevertheless, according to the UPA/OUN, in July 1944, two more attempts by the Germans to capture the Carpathian mountain passes were repulsed. Near the villages of Kamianka and Lypa, 3 insurgent battalions repulsed the incursions of 2 German SS divisions, totaling 30,000 soldiers (7-9 July), and on the 12th of July Germans reinforced them with a 3rd division. These Divisions were alternatively described as SS and as police Divisions by UPA/OUN sources. Avoiding direct confrontation, the UPA battalions inflicted a high number of casualties through sniping, ambushes, and attacks from the flanks and rear while abandoning their fixed positions. On 14-16 of July all of the German Divisions retreated with the loss over 600 dead. The insurgents suffered only a dozen casualties. Although according to German data and mainstream historians there were no SS divisions at this time in the mentioned area..

In order to fight the mutual Soviet enemy in early 1944, UPA forces in Volyn and Lviv regions engaged in limited cooperation with the German Wehrmacht contingent upon the Germans leaving Ukrainian villagers and UPA undisturbed. However, in the winter and spring of 1944 it would be incorrect to state that there was a complete cessation of armed conflict between UPA and Nazi forces because UPA continued to defend Ukrainian villages against repressive actions of the German administration. For example, on January 20th, 200 German soldiers on their way to the Ukrainian village of Pyrohivka were forced to retreat after a several-hours long firefight with a group of 80 UPA soldiers after having lost 30 killed and wounded.Cite error: The <ref> tag has too many names (see the help page).. Such hostilities ended by late spring 1944 due to much of the disputed territory no longer being under German occupation, and to negotiations between UPA and the Germans.

In a top secret memorandum, General-Major Brigadefuhrer Brenner wrote in mid-1944 to SS-Obergruppenfuhrer General Hans Prutzmann, the highest ranking German SS officer in Ukraine, that “The UPA has halted all attacks on units of the German army. The UPA systematically sends agents, mainly young women, into enemy-occupied territory, and the results of the intelligence are communicated to Department 1c of the Army Group” on the southern Front. By the autumn of 1944, the German press was full of praise for UPA for their Anti-Bolshevik successes, referring to the UPA fighters as "Ukrainian fighters for freedom"

In a debriefing before U.S. authorities in 1948, a Committee of former German commanders on the Eastern front claimed that "the Ukrainian Nationalist movement formed the strongest partisan movement in the East, with the exception of the Russian Communists."

UPA and Poles

It is claimed that the UPA was active in the ethnic cleansing actions of ethnic Poles from areas of Ukrainian autonomous settlement. The methods used included terrorist acts and mass-murder of Polish civilians. Ehnic cleansing operations of the Polish population began on a large scale in February-March 1943, although these early actions occurred in areas under the control of Taras Bulba-Borovets rather than of the OUN

Soviet partisans in the Rivne region reported that terror actions committed by “nationalists” against the Polish population commenced in April 1943) and lasted until 1944. Professor Władysław Filar from Polish Institute of National Remembrance, an eyewitness to the massacres, claims that it is impossible to establish whether these events were ever planned. Although in August 1943 UPA placed notices in every Polish village stating "in 48 hours leave beyond the Buh or the Sian river - otherwise Death" no known documents exist proving that UPA-OUN made a decision to exterminate Poles in Volhynia.

The UPA was active in the ethnic cleansing of Poles from areas that it regarded as indigenously Ukrainian. The methods used included terrorist acts and murder of Polish civilians. The systematic killing of Polish civilians began in February-March 1943 in the Volyn region and in autumn 1943 spread over to Galicia and other territories of the General Government. Soviet partisans in the Rivne region reported that mass terror committed by “nationalists” against the Polish population started in April 1943). According to the vision of the Polish historians the decision about “cleaning of Volyn from the Polish element” was adopted in February 1943 at Third Conference of OUN(B), however according to modern Ukrainian historians it was ordered of Klym Savur (D.Klyachkivskyy) and was adopted on a regional level by the OUN (B). Professor Władysław Filar from Polish Institute of National Remembrance, an eyewitness to the massacres, claims that it is impossible to establish whether these events were ever planned. In addition to the UPA, Ukrainian peasants also participated in the violence , and large groups of armed "bandit" marauders unaffiliated with UPA brutalized civilians. so the exact number of Poles killed specifically by UPA is unknown. The UPA's activities can be seen as a reaction to past policies and actions of the inter-war Polish government, such as shutting down Ukrainian schools and churches or encouraging Polish settlement in the regions considered by OUN to be "ethnically Ukrainian". The UPA also killed ethnic Ukrainians, those who did not cooperate with them, as well as those Ukrainians who had intermarried. OUN(B) war-time (1943-44) claims the AK action against Ukrainians which co-operated with the German Occupying Administration at end of 1942 as a reasons for the anti-Polish actions mentioned. In anti-Polish actions from autumn 1943 in Galicia, the UPA conducted cooperative actions with detachments of regiments of Galician Division.. The estimates of the number of Poles murdered in Ukraine range from 100,000 to 500,000; many more Poles left the area because of the UPA actions.

Polish-Ukrainian hatred was often provoked by Soviet forces, who used Poles as informants and in anti-Ukrainian destructive battalions, resulting in savage reprisals..

The UPA actions were matched by similar actions by the Polish Armia Krajowa. The brutal conflict escalated out of control with many thousand of civilians being murdered by both Ukrainian and Polish forces. Speaking of the escalation in violence, a former soldier in a Polish nationalist partisan unit stated

"The ethnic Ukrainians responded by wiping out an entire Polish colony, setting fire to the houses, killing those inhabitants unable to flee and raping the women who fell into their hands, no matter how old or how young...we retaliated by attacking an even bigger Ukrainian village and... killed women and children. Some of our men were so filled with hatred after losing whole generations of their family in the Ukrainian attacks that they swore they would take an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth...This was how the fighting escalated. Each time more people were killed, more houses burnt, more women raped."

Estimates of the death tolls from the retaliatory actions of the Polish Home Army forces include numbers such as 2,000 Ukrainian civilians or as high as 20 thousand in Volhynia alone.

UPA's war with Soviet Union

Under German occupation

The total number of local Soviet Partisans acting in western Ukraine was never high, due to the region enduring only two years of Soviet rule (some places even less). Only towards the end of the war, in 1944 was the numbers of the Soviet Partisans in Ukraine, and their activity increased. UPA first encountered them in late 1942.

In early 1943, the Soviet partisan leader Sydir Kovpak established himself and in the summer of 1943, well-armed with supplies delivered to secret airfields formed a group numbering several thousand men which went deep into the Carpathians. Attacks by the German air force and military forced Kovpak to break up his force into smaller units, whose remnants were subsequently harassed by UPA in the Carpathian mountains, and some destroyed altogether. In 1944, famous Soviet intelligence agent Nikolai Kuznetsov was captured and executed by UPA members, after unwittingly entering their camp while wearing a Wehrmacht officer uniform.

Fighting the Soviet Army (1944-45)

With the occupation of Ukraine by the Red Army, the UPA avoided clashes with the regular units of the Soviet military fearing their offensive action would annihilate them. Instead, the UPA focused its energy on NKVD units and Soviet officials of all levels, from NKVD and military officers to the school teachers and postal workers attempting to establish Soviet administration. Soviet archival data shows that UPA attacks were focussed on small units and groups of Soviet soldiers, often ending with killing of the captured and wounded. The UPA opposed the mobilization of able-bodied men into the Soviet Army through the extermination of whole families of those who joined. The UPA also disrupted Soviet efforts at collectivization.

In March 1944, UPA insurgents mortally wounded front commander Army General Nikolai Vatutin, who led the liberation of Kiev. Several weeks later an NKVD battalion was annihilated by UPA near Rivne. This began a full-scale operation in the spring of 1944, initially involving 30,000 Soviet troops against UPA in Volyn. (Estimates of casualties vary depending on the source). A letter to the state defense committee of the USSR, Lavrentiy Beria stated that in spring 1944 clashes between Soviet forces and UPA resulted in 2018 killed and 1570 captured UPA fighters and only 11 Soviet killed and 46 wounded.

Soviet archives show that a captured UPA member stated that he received a reports about UPA losses of 200 fighters while their Soviet forces lost 2,000.. The first significant sabotage operations against communications of Soviet Army before their offensive against the Germans was conducted by UPA in April-May 1944. Such actions were promptly stopped by Soviet Army and NKVD troops. The OUN/UPA submitted an order to temporarily cease anti-Soviet activities and prepare for further struggle against the Soviets.

Despite heavy casualties on both sides, the struggle was inconclusive. New large scale actions of UPA, especially in Ternopil Oblast, were launched in July-August 1944, when the Red Army advanced West. By the autumn of 1944, UPA forces enjoyed virtual freedom of movement over an area 160,000 kilometers in size and home to over 10 million people and had established a shadow government.

In November 1944, Khrushchev launched the first of several large-scale Soviet assaults on UPA throughout western Ukraine, involving according to OUN/UPA estimates at least 20 NKVD combat divisions supported by artillery and armored units. They blockaded villages and roads and set forests on fire. Soviet archival data states that on October 9, 1944 1 NKVD Division, eight NKVD brigades, and an NKVD cavalry regiment with the total number of 26, 304 NKVD soldiers stationed in Western Ukraine. In addition, 2 regiments with 1500 and 1200 persons, 1 battalion (517 persons) and three armored trains with 100 additional soldiers each, as well as 1 border guards regiment and 1 unit were starting to relocate there in order to reinforce them.

During late 1944 and the first half of 1945, according to Soviet data, UPA suffered approximately 89,000 killed, approximately 91,000 captured, and approximately 39,000 surrendered while the Soviet forces lost approximately 12,000, approximately 6,000 wounded and 2,600 MIA. In addition, during this time, according to Soviet data UPA actions resulted in the killing of 3,919 civilians and disappearance of 427 others. Despite the heavy losses, as late as summer 1945, many battalion-size UPA units still continued to control and administer large areas of territory in western Ukraine. In February 1945 UPA issued an order to liquidate kurins (battalions) and sotnya’s (companies) and to act predominantly by choty’s (platoons).

Spring 1945- late 1946

After the Germany surrendered in May 1945, the Soviet authorities, turned their attention to insurgencies taking place in Ukraine, and the Baltics. Combat units were re-organised and special forces were routed. One of the major complications that arose was the local support the UPA had from the population, which became a priority for the Soviets.

Areas of UPA activity were depopulated, the estimates on numbers vary, officially Soviet archives state that between 1944 and 1952 a total of 182,543 people to 500,000 . Mass arrests of suspected UPA informants or family members were conducted; between February 1944 and May 1946 over 250,000 people were arrested in Western Ukraine . Those arrested typically experienced beatings or other violence. Those suspected of being UPA members underwent torture; (reports exist of some prisoners being burned alive). The many arrested women believed to be affiliating with UPA were subjected to torture, deprivation, and rape at the hands of Soviet security in order to "break" them and get them to reveal UPA members' identities and locations or to turn them into Soviet double-agents. Mutilated corpses of captured rebels were put on public display.

UPA responded to the Soviet methods by unleashing their own terror against Soviet activists, suspected collaborators and their families. This work was particularly attributed to the Sluzhba Bezbeky (SB), the anti-espionage wing of UPA. Due to public outrage violent punitive acts UPA stopped the practice of killing the families of collaborators by mid 1945. Other victims of UPA included Soviet activists sent to Galicia from other parts of the Soviet Union; heads of village Soviets, those sheltering or feeding Red Army personnel, and even people turning food in to collective farms. The effect of such terrorist acts was such that people refused to take posts as village heads, and until the late 1940's villages chose single men with no dependants as their leaders.

The UPA proved to be especially adept at assassinating key Soviet administrative officials. According to NKVD data, between February 1944 and December 1946 11,725 Soviet officers, agents and collaborators were assassinated and 2,401 were "missing", presumed kidnapped, in Western Ukraine . In one county in Lviv region alone, from August 1944 until January 1945 Ukrainian rebels killed ten members of the Soviet activ and a secretary of the county Communist party, and also kidnapped four other officials. UPA travelled at will throughout the area. In this county, there were no courts, no prosecutor's office, and the local NKVD only had three staff members. According to a 1946 report by Khrushchenv's deputy for West Ukrainian affairs A.A. Stoiantsev, out of 42,175 operations and ambushes against UPA by Destructive Battalions in Western Ukraine, only 10 percent had positive results - in the vast majority there was either no contact or the individual unit was disarmed and pro-Soviet leaders murdered or kidnapped. Morale amongst the NKVD in Western Ukraine was particularly low. Even within the dangerous context of of Soviet state service in the late-Stalin era, West Ukraine was considered to be a "hardship post", and personnel files reveal higher rates of transfer requests, alcoholism, and nervous breakdowns and refusal to serve among NKVD field agents there at that time.

The first success of the Soviet authorities came in early 1946 in the Carpathians, which were blockaded from January 11 until April 10. The UPA operating there ceased to exist as a combat unit. The continuous heavy casualties elsewhere forced the UPA to split into small units consisting of 100 soldiers. Many of the troops demobilized and returned home, when the Soviet Union offered three amnesties during 1947-1948

By 1946, UPA was reduced to a core group of 5-10 thousand fighters, and large-scale UPA activity shifted to the Soviet-Polish border. Here, in 1947, they allegedly killed the Polish Communist deputy defense minister General Karol Świerczewski. In spring 1946, the OUN/UPA established contacts with the Intelligence services of France, Great Britain and the USA. Although the UPA obtained some help from the CIA and British intelligence during the latter phase of its struggle, the operation was betrayed by Kim Philby. After the huge winter 1945/46 operation by the NKVD, UPA/OUN fielded 479 units and had 3,735 fighters, according to an NKVD estimate from April 1, 1946. By January 1, 1947 MGB estimated OUN and UPA as having 530 fighting units with 4,456 fighters.

The end of the UPA (1947-1955)

The turning point in the struggle against the UPA came in 1947, when the Soviets established an intelligence gathering network within the UPA and shifted the focus of their actions from mass terror to infiltration and espionage. On May 30, 1947 Shukhevych issued instructions joining the OUN and UPA in underground warfare . In 1947-1948 UPA resistance has weakened enough to allow the Soviets to begin implementation of large-scale collectivization throughout western Ukraine. On September 3, 1949 Shukhevych issued an order, liquidating UPA units and headquarters and integrating UPA's personnel in the OUN (B) underground. In 1948, the Soviet central authorities purged local officials who had mistreated peasants and engaged in "vicious methods". At the same time, Soviet agents planted within the UPA had taken their toll on morale and on the UPA's effectiveness. According to the writing of one slain Ukrainian rebel, "the Bolsheviks tried to take us from within...you can never know exactly in whose hands you will find yourself. From such a network of spies, the work of whole teams is often penetrated..." In November 1948, the work of Soviet agents led to two important victories against the UPA: the defeat and deaths of the heads of the most active UPA network in Western Ukraine, and the removal of "Myron", the head of the the UPA's counterintelligence SB unit.

The Soviet authorities tried to win over the local population by making significant investments into Western Ukraine, and by setting up a quick dispatch groups in many regions to combat the UPA. According to one retired MVD major, by 1948 ideologically we had the support of most of the population. The Soviets skillfully exploited Polish-Ukrainian ethnic friction by recruitiing Poles as informants. This contributed to the growing isolation of the UPA which was further helped by the Polish government implementing Operation Wisła in 1947.

After 1947 the UPA's activity began to calm down. The UPA's leader, Roman Shukhevych, was killed himself during an ambush near Lviv on March 5, 1950. Although sporadic UPA activity continued until the mid 1950's, after Shukhevich's death the UPA rapidly lost its fighting capability. An assessment of UPA's manpower by Soviet authorities in April 17, 1952 indicated that UPA/OUN had only 84 fighting units consisting of 252 persons. UPA's last commander, Vasyl Kuk, was captured on May, 24 1954. Despite the existence of some insurgent groups, according to a report by the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR, the "liquidation of armed units and OUN underground was accomplished by the beginning of 1956". .

A controversy exists that there were NKVD units dressed as UPA fighters and committed atrocities in order to demoralize the civilian population.; among these NKVD units were those composed of former UPA fighters working for the NKVD.The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) recently published information about 150 such special groups consisting of 1,800 people operated until 1954. One famous example of an ex-UPA turned MVD fighter was Bohdan Stashynsky who would then climb the ladder of MGB (and later KGB) hierarchy to become a foreign agent who assassinated the OUN chief Lev Rebet in 1957 and later Stepan Bandera in 1959.

Prominent people killed by the UPA insurgents during the anti-Soviet struggle included Metropolitan Oleksiy (Hromadsky) of the Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church and pro-Soviet writer Yaroslav Halan.

In 1951 CIA covert operations chief Frank Wisner estimated that some 35,000 Soviet police troops and Communist party cadres had been eliminated by guerrillas affiliated with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the period after the end of World War II. Official Soviet figures for the losses inflicted by all types of "Ukrainian nationalists" during the period 1944-1953 referred to 30,676 persons; amongst them were 687 NKGB-MGB personnel, 1,864 NKVD-MVD personnel, 3,199 Soviet Army, Border Guards, and NKVD-MVD troops, 241 communist party leaders, 205 komsomol leaders and 2,590 members of self-defense units. According to Soviet data the remaining losses were among civilians, including 15,355 peasants and kolkhozniks. Soviet archives state that between February 1944 and January 1946 the Soviet forces conducted 39,778 operations against the UPA, during which they killed a total of 103,313, captured a total of 8,370 OUN members and captured a total of 15,959 active insurgents.

The armaments of the UPA

For the most part, the UPA used primarily light infantry weapons of those armies that it fought, mostly Soviet and German. Trophy weapons were the basic source for the insurgent arsenals. In 1943-44 during large-scale operations, insurgent forces also used heavy artillery and sometimes even tanks. However, insurgents used heavy technology more as a means of propaganda of their military might, rather than as an actual means of conducting battles, so the light infantry weapon remained the basic weapon used by the UPA.

Women in the UPA

The all-national character of the liberation struggle of Ukrainian insurgents is confirmed by the large scale participation of women. Ukrainian women were amongst the first to assist UPA soldiers, providing them with food, clothing and shelter. For this, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian women were arrested as "bandit supporters" and were deported or killed. However, many were active members. In 1943-44 there was an autonomous women's network. Certain aspects of insurgent activity depended mainly on women. Most couriers and messengers, medical personnel, workers in the underground printing establishments, and were also active as intelligence agents. Some women occupied high posts in the underground. Kalyna Lukan - "Halyna" was the leader of the Kosiv nadryon leadership, Iryna Tymochko "Khrytsia" supervise the Verkhovyna nadryon in Lemkivshchyna, Daria Rebet was a member of the OUN Leadership and a member of th presidium of the underground parliament.

Publishing activity of the UPA

One of the more important aspects of the Ukrainian national liberation movement was its publishing activity. Its main directions were: the publication of propaganda-ideological materials, textbooks, works of military-theoretical character, periodicals and literary works. The earliest leaflets appeared in 1943 and were a way in which the Ukrainian movement waged war against the enemy. The most renown publicists of the time were Petro Fedun "Poltava", Osyp Diakiv "Hornovy", Dmyro Mayivsky "Petro Duma". In their works they concentrated on the principles of the Ukrainian national liberation struggle, the geopolitical situation in Europe and the world in connection with the Ukrainian question, problems of national transformations in the USSR and socialist satellites.

UPA periodicals contained ideological articles, informational reports and decrees, interesting facts from Ukrainian history and training materials as well as prose and poetry of Ukrainian underground members.

Over 130 periodicals appeared, 500 brochures, dozens of training manuals, memoirs, poetic collections, thousands of leaflets, appeals and responses were published.

UPA and Soviet infiltration

From the beginning of 1944, the Soviets waged an active war against the UPA launching a large-scale assault against the Ukrainian underground in several directions, propaganda among the population; military operations; repression against members and their families. Soviet anti-insurgent propaganda was concentrated on discrediting and dividing the national liberation movement. Soviet propaganda emphasised their thesis on the treason and crimes of "Ukrainian-German nationalists" and their collaboration with "fascist invaders".

From 1944 through the 1950's initially frontal sections of the Red Army and SMERSH were directed against the UPA. Later the function of fighting the UPA fell to the NKVD.

In 1944-1945 the NKVD carried out 26,693 operations against the Ukrainian underground. These resulted in the deaths of 22.474 Ukrainian soldiers and the capture of 62,142 prisoners. During this time the NKVD formed special groups known as spetshrupy made up of former Soviet partisans. The goal of these groups was to discredit the and disorganize the OUN and UPA. In August 1944 Sydir Kovpak was placed under NKVD authority. Posing as Ukrainian insurgents these special formations used violence against the civilian population of Western Ukraine. In Jun 1945 there were 156 such special groups with 1783 members.

The Soviets used"extermination battalions" (strybky) recruiting secret collaborators in each population point. Attempts were made to place agents at all leading levels of the OUN and UPA.

From December 1945-1946 15,562 operations were carried out in which 4,200 were killed and more than 9,400 were arrested. From 1944-1953,the Soviets killed 153,000 and arrested 134,000 members of the UPA. 66,000 Families (204,000 people) were forcibly deported to Siberia and half a million people were subject to repressions. In the same period Polish authorities deported 450,000 people.

UPA's relationships with Western Ukraine's Jews

In contrast to the well established links between UPA and atrocities committed on Polish civilians, there is a lack of consensus among historians about the involvement of UPA in the massacre of western Ukraine's Jews. Numerous accounts ascribe to UPA a role in the tragic fate of the Ukrainian Jews under the German occupation. Some historians, however, do not support the claims that UPA was involved in anti-Jewish massacres.

Prior to the formation of UPA, in 1941-1942, the political organization from which it was formed, the OUN, made numerous violently antisemitic statements. For example, in instructions to its members concerning how the OUN should behave during the war, it declared that "in times of chaos...one can allow oneself to liquidate Polish, Russian and Jewish figures, particularly the servants of Bolshevik-Muscovite imperialism" and further, when speaking of Russians, Poles, and Jews, to "destroy in the struggle, especially those, who defend the regime: send them to their lands, destroy them especially the intelligentsia...assimilation of the Jews is ruled out." Nevertheless, some Jews were protected by the OUN. According to a report to the Chief of the Security Police in Berlin dated March 30, 1942, "...it has been clearly established that the Bandera movement provided forged passports not only for its own members, but also for Jews."

By early 1943 the OUN had entered into open armed conflict with Nazi Germany. In 1944, the OUN formally "rejected racial and ethnic exclusivity" Despite the allegations of UPA's involvement in the killing of Jews and earlier anti-Jewish statements by the OUN, there were cases of Jewish participation within the ranks of UPA, some of whom held high positions. Jewish participation included fighters but was particularly visible among its medical personnel. These included Dr. Margosh, who headed UPA-West's medical service, Dr. Marksymovich, who was the Chief Physician of the UPA's officer school, and Dr. Abraham Kum, the director of an underground hospital in the Carpathians. One Ukrainian historian has claimed that almost every UPA unit included Jewish support personnel. The latter individual was the recipient of UPA's Golden Cross of Merit. Isolated reports of the Jewish families being sheltered by UPA have also surfaced. UPA's cooperation with Jews was extensive enough that, according to former head of the Office to Counter Soviet Disinformation at the USIA, some Soviet propaganda works complained about Zionists "closely cooperating with" Bandera ringleaders. One can conclude that the relationship between UPA and Western Ukraine's Jews was complex and not one-sided.

Aftermath

According to Columbia University professor John Armstrong "If one takes into account the duration, geographical extent, and intensity of activity, the UPA very probably is the most important example of forceful resistance to an established Communist regime prior to the decade of fierce Afghan resistance beginning in 1979...the Hungarian revolution of 1956 was, of course, far more important, involving to some degree a population of nine million...however it lasted only a few weeks. In contrast, the more-or-less effective anti-Communist activity of the Ukrainian resistance forces lasted from mid-1944 until 1950.".

During the following years the UPA was however officially taboo in the Soviet Union, and mentioned only as a terrorist organization. After Ukraine gained independence in 1991, there have been heated debates to award former UPA members official recognition as legitimate combatants, with accompanying pensions and benefits due to war veterans. UPA veterans have also striven to hold parades and commemorations of their own, especially in Western Ukraine. This, in turn, led to opposition from the Soviet Army veterans and some Ukrainian politicians particularly from the south and east of the country. Neighbouring governments in Russia and Poland have also reacted negatively.

Attempts to reconcile the two groups of veterans have made little progress. An attempt to hold a joint parade in Kiev in May, 2005, to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II, proved unsuccessful. The assessment of the historical role of UPA remains a controversial issue in Ukrainian society, although Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko joined several public Ukrainian organizations in calls for reconciliation, pensions, and other benefits for UPA veterans that would equate them in status with the veterans of the Soviet Army, and aid the understanding of their role in the chaotic times of UPA operations. In 2007, president Yushchenko awarded the title "Hero of Ukraine", the country's highest honour to UPA leader Roman Shukhevych.

Recently, attempts to reconcile former Armia Krajowa and UPA soldiers have been made by both the Ukrainian and Polish sides. Individual former members UPA have expressed their readiness for mutual apology. Some of the past soldiers of both organisations have met and asked for forgiveness for the past misdeeds. Restoration of graves and cemeteries in Poland, where fallen UPA soldiers were placed have been agreed to by the Polish side.

In late 2006 the Lviv city administration announced the future transference of the tombs of Stepan Bandera, Yevhen Konovalets, Andriy Melnyk and other key leaders of OUN/UPA to a new area of Lychakivskiy Cemetery specifically dedicated to Ukrainian nationalists.

Without waiting for official Kiev notice, many regional authorities have already decided to approach the UPA history on their own. In many western cities and villages monuments, memorials and plaques to the leaders and troops of the UPA have been erected, including a monument to Stepan Bandera himself which opened in October 2007. In response to this, many eastern provinces responded with opening of memorials to their victims, the first one of which opened in Simferopol, Crimea in September 2007.

On January 10, 2008 Viktor Yushchenko, Presidents of Ukraine submitted a draft law "On the official Status of Fighters for Ukraine’s Independence in 20s-90s of the 20th century". Under the draft, persons who took part in political, guerrilla, underground and combat activities for the freedom and independence of Ukraine from 1920-1990 as part of the:

• Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO)
• Karpatska Sich
• OUN
• UPA
• Ukrainian Main Liberation Army,

as well as persons who assisted these organizations shall be recognized as war veterans.

In 2007, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) set up a special working group to study archive documents of the activity of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in order to make public original sources.

See also

• 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS Galizien (1st Ukrainian)
• Galicia (Central Europe)
• Operation Wisła
• Ukrainian Military Organization

Footnotes

References

1. SS-Galizien (?)
2. (Ukrainian) Українська Повстанська Армія - Історія нескорених - Львів, 2007 p.28
3. Subtelny, p. 474 Subtelny, Orest (1988). Ukraine: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. p. 800. ISBN 0802083900.
4. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 4, p. 180
5. Організація українських націоналістів і Українська повстанська армія
6. )
7. ^ [http://yurizhukov.com/doc/070900_Zhukov_UPA_Final.pdf Yuri Zhukov, "Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter-insurgency: The Soviet Campaign Against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army", Small Wars and Insurgencies, v.18, no. 3, pp.439-466] Cite error: The named reference "Zhukov" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
8. ^ Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 12, p. 169
9. Пастка для «Щура» 4 листопада одному з засновників УПА Дмитрові Клячківському виповнилося 95 років in Ukrainian-Russian "Zerkalo Nedeli" Magazine
10. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 12, p. 172
11. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 14, p. 188
12. ^ Magoscy, R. (1996). A History of Ukraine. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
13. Petro Sodol - Ukrainian Insurgent Army 1943-1949. Handbook. New – York 1994 p.28
14. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chapter 1 p.69
15. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chapter 2 P.92
16. InfoUkes: Ukrainian History - World War II in Ukraine
17. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chapter 2 P.95-97.
18. Banderivtsi Nationalistic Portal (Бандерівці ідуть! in Націоналістичний портал) Template:Uk icon
19. p.164
20. p.181
21. p.165
22. Toynbee, T.R.V. (1954). Survey of International Affairs: Hitler's Europe 1939-1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. (page # missing).
23. Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 P.232
24. Debriefing of General Kostring Department of the Army, 3 November 1948, MSC - 035, cited in Sodol, Petro R., 1987, UPA: They Fought Hitler and Stalin, New York: Committee for the World Convention and Reunion of Soldiers in the UIA, pg. 58.
25. Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 P.58-59
26. Wegner, B. (1990). The Waffen-SS. Padstow: TJ Press.
27. Williamson, G., & Andrew, S. (2004a). The Waffen-SS (2): 6 to 10 Divisions. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
28. Williamson, G., & Andrew, S. (2004b). The Waffen-SS (3): 11 to 23 Divisions. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
29. Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 p, 384 p.391
30. James K. Anderson, Unknown Soldiers of an Unknown Army, Army Magazine, May 1968, p. 63
31. Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 p.238-239
32. Krokhmaluk, Y. (1973). UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York: Vantage Press. pp. p. 242. {{cite book}}: |pages= has extra text (help)
33. P.Mirchuk “Ukrainian Insurgent Army 1942-1952” –Munich; 1953 p.41-42
34. ^ Krokhmaluk, Y. (1973). UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York: Vantage Press. pp. (page 242). Cite error: The named reference "Krohmaliuk" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
35. Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 p.140-142
36. Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 p.242-243
37. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 14, p. 186
38. L. Shankovskyy (1953). History of Ukrainian Army (Історія українського війська). Winnipeg. pp. p.32. {{cite book}}: |pages= has extra text (help)CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
39. Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 P.67
40. Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 4, pp. 179-180
41. p.190-194
42. Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 P.69-73
43. Wegner, B. (1990). The Waffen-SS. Padstow: TJ Press.
44. Williamson, G., & Andrew, S. (2004a). The Waffen-SS (2): 6 to 10 Divisions. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
45. Williamson, G., & Andrew, S. (2004b). The Waffen-SS (3): 11 to 23 Divisions. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
46. Tieke, W. (1999). In the Firestorm of the Last Years of the War: II SS-Panzerkorps with the 9 and 10 SS-Divisions "Hohenstaufen" and Frundsberg". Winnipeg: JJ Fedorowicz Publishing
47. p.192
48. Yaroslav Hrytsak, "History of Ukraine 1772-1999"
49. p.196
50. http://www.history.neu.edu/fac/burds/Gender.pdf
51. Martovych O. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). – Munchen, 1950 p.20
52. Russian Combat Methods in World War II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. 1950. p. 111.
53. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 16, pg. 242
54. Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 p.391
55. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 11, pg. 24
56. Antypolskie akcje nacjonalistów ukraińskich
57. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 16
58. Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 p.391
59. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 16
60. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 11, pg. 24
61. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 16
62. Norman Davies. (1996). Europe: a History. Oxford: Oxford University Press
63. Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11 pp.118-119
64. Subtelny, p. 475
65. on Chapter Ethnicity, Memory, and Violence: Reflections on Special Problems in Soviet and East European Archives, by Jeffrey Burds, 2005, in Archives, Documentation, and the Institutions of Social Memory: Essays from the Sawyer Seminar, Francis X. BLouin and William G. Rosenberg, eds. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
66. J. Turowski, Pożoga. Walki 27 Wołyńskiej dywizji AK, Warszawa 1990, p. 513
67. Analysis: Ukraine, Poland Seek Reconciliation Over Grisly History, Jan Maksymiuk, RFE/RL, May 12, 2006
68. Partisan Movement in Ukraine
69. Subtelny, p. 476
70. Ihor Sundiukov, "The Other Side of the Legend: Nikolai Kuznetsov Revisited", 24 Jan. 2006. Retrieved on 18 December 2007.
71. ^ Vladimir Perekrest, former NKVD officer, Source: FSB.ru
72. Grenkevich, L., translated by David Glantz. (1999). The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1944: Critical analysis of. Routledge. p. 134.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
73. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 15, p. 213-214
74. Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kiev Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 pp.549-570
75. Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kiev Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 pp.549-570
76. According to Soviet archives, the NKVD units located in Western Ukraine were: the 9th Rifle division; 16, 20, 21, 25, 17, 18, 19, 23rd brigades; 1 cavalry regiment. Sent to reinforce them: 256, 192nd regiments; 1 battalion three armored trains (45, 26, 42). The 42nd border guard regiment and another unit (27th) were sent to reinforce them. From Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kiev Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 P.478-482
77. Exact statistics of UPA casualties by the Soviets and Soviet casualties by UPA, in specific time periods, according to data compiled by the NKVD of the Ukrainian SRR: during February - December 1944 UPA suffered the following casualties: 57,405 killed; 50,387 captured; 15,990 surrendered. During the period from January 1, 1945 until May 1,1945 the following casualties were reported: 31,157 killed; 40,760 captured; 23,156 surrendered. The UPA's actions numbered 2,903 in 1944, and from January 1, 1945 until May 1, 1945 - 1,289. During February until December 1944 Soviet losses were: 9,521 "killed and hanged"; 3,494 wounded; 2,131 MIA; amongst them NKVD-NKGB suffered 401 killed and hanged, 227 wounded, 98 MIA and captured. From January 1, 1945 until May 1, 1945 the NKVD and Soviet Army troops suffered 2,513 killed, 2,489 wounded, 524 MIA and captured. Soviet Authorities personnel suffered 1,225 killed or hanged, 239 wounded, 427 MIA or captured. In addition, 3,919 civilians were killed or hanged, 320 wounded, and 814 MIA or captured. From Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kiev Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 pp.604-605
78. ^ Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: a history, pp. 489, University of Toronto Press, 2000, ISBN 0-8020-8390-0 Cite error: The named reference "Subtelny367" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
79. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
80. Theses include deported (1944-47): families of OUN/UPA members–– 15,040 families (37,145) persons; OUN/UPA underground families – 26,332 (77,791 persons) taken from: Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kiev Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 P.545-546
81. Subtelny, p. 489
82. Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11 pg. 97
83. http://www.history.neu.edu/fac/burds/Gender.pdf
84. Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11.
85. Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11 pp. 106 - 110
86. Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11 pp. 113-114
87. Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11 pp. 113-114
88. Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11 pg. 123
89. Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11 pg. 120
90. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
91. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
92. Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11 pp. 125-130
93. Wilson, A. (2005). Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World. New Haven: Yale University Press. p. 15.
94. Ukrainian Weekly, July 28, 2002, written by Dr. Taras Kuzio
95. Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 P 460-464, 470-477
96. Ukranian News
97. Simpson, Christopher (1988). "Guerrillas for World War III". - America's recruitment of Nazis, and its disastrous effect on our domestic and foreign policy. Collier Books / Macmillan. p. 148. ISBN 978-0020449959. {{cite book}}: External link in |chapterurl= (help); Unknown parameter |chapterurl= ignored (|chapter-url= suggested) (help)
98. http://history.org.ua/oun_upa/upa/24.pdf p.439
99. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 21, pp. 385-386
100. (Ukrainian) Українська Повстанська Армія - Історія нескорених - Львів, 2007 p.203
101. (Ukrainian) Українська Повстанська Армія - Історія нескорених - Львів, 2007 p.211
102. (Ukrainian) Українська Повстанська Армія - Історія нескорених - Львів, 2007 p.227
103. (Ukrainian) Українська Повстанська Армія - Історія нескорених - Львів, 2007 p.307-310
104. (Ukrainian) Українська Повстанська Армія - Історія нескорених - Львів, 2007 p.307-310
105. Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the Encyclopaedia of the Holocaust, Israel Gutman, editor-in-chief. New York: Macmillan, 1990. 4 volumes. ISBN 0-02-896090-4.
106. Tadeusz Piotrowski, Ukrainian Collaboration in Poland's Holocaust: Ethnic Strife, Collaboration with Occupying Forces and Genocide in the Second Republic, 1918–1947 pp. 220–59, McFarland & Company, 1998, ISBN 0-7864-0371-3
107. Himka, John-Paul. "War Criminality: A Blank Spot in the Collective Memory of the Ukrainian Diaspora" (PDF). Spaces of Identity. 5 (1): 5–24. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)
108. Institute of History, Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Ukrainian Insurgent Army
109. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 2, pp.62-63
110. Divide and Conquer: the KGB Disinformation Campaign Against Ukrainians and Jews. Ukrainian Quarterly, Fall 2004. By Herbert Romerstein
111. Leo Heiman, "We Fought for Ukraine - The Story of Jews Within UPA", Ukrainian Quarterly Spring 1964, pp.33-44.
112. Friedman, P. "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations During the Nazi Occupation, YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science v. 12, pp. 259–96, 1958–59". {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
113. Divide and Conquer: the KGB Disinformation Campaign Against Ukrainians and Jews. Ukrainian Quarterly, Fall 2004. By Herbert Romerstein
114. John Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 3rd edition. Englewood, Colorado: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990. ISBN: 0872877558 (2nd edition: New York: Columbia University Press, 1963) pp.223-224
115. A.Przewoźnik: w Polsce nie można stawiać pomników UPA
116. Lenta.ru В Крыму открыт монумент жертвам бандеровцев 14.September 2007. Retrived 2nd April 2008.
117. Yushchenko pushes for official recognition of OUN-UPA combatants
118. SBU to study archive documents on activity of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists / News / NRCU

Books and Articles

• Subtelny, Orest (1988). Ukraine: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. ISBN 0-8020-5808-6.
• Davies, Norman (2005). God's playground: a history of Poland: in two volumes, Vol. 2, Chapter 19. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-925340-4.
• Template:Pl icon Sowa, Andrzej (1998). Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie 1939-1947. Kraków. ISBN 83-909631-5-8.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
• Template:Pl icon Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960. Warszawa: ISP PAN / RYTM. ISBN 83-788373-163-8. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: length (help)
• Template:Uk icon УПА розпочинає активні протинімецькі дії (UIA Start the Active anti-German actions) (За матеріалами звіту робочої групи істориків Інституту історії НАН України під керівництвом проф. Станіслава Кульчицького)
• Documents on Ukrainian Polish Reconciliation

External links

• UPA - Ukrainian Insurgent Army
• Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Encyclopedia of Ukraine
• Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
• Critical point of view on the movement Ukrainian Insurged Army (Polish)

• Articles needing cleanup from March 2008
• Cleanup tagged articles without a reason field from March 2008
• Misplaced Pages pages needing cleanup from March 2008
• Articles with disputed statements from May 2008
• Anti-communism
• Guerrilla organizations
• Military history of Ukraine
• History of Poland
• History of the Soviet Union and Soviet Russia
• National liberation movements
• World War II resistance movements
• Eastern European World War II resistance movements
• Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists