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| :::''In spite of this, I hope to offer an entirely different perspective on this familiar campaign of World War II. This will come form a focus on the hitherto neglected Italian involvement. In all previous accounts in English, the Italians have either been ignored completely or afforded little more than an acknowledgement of their presence – yet they made up the bulk of the axis forces involved in this campaign, a fact not yet reflected in existing accounts. They are sometimes allowed a place during the first phase of the campaign as Britain’s only opponents, but the arrival of Rommel in early 1941 quickly relegates them to obscurity thereafter.....In terms of their influence on fighting, however, they are usually dismissed in a few paragraphs that primarily concentrate on describing their many deficiencies. Thereafter, they are usually ignored.....In Britain pople are familiar with the war time propaganda images of endless lines of Italian prisoners...This strong visual image was reinforced by contemporary newsreel and newspaper accounts of Italian military incompetence and cowardice, often involving the use of racial stereotypes. This image was often deliberately contrasted with German military efficiency and ferocity. This produced a strong British prejudice against the Italians very early in the war, which has consistently been reinforced in most histories produced since its end....All this has left a powerful legacy in English-speaking accounts, in which the Italians are widely seen as a nation of dilettantes, devoid of military skills and entirely lacking courage. It high is time, however, that this view was re-examined to reveal what, if any, truth lies behind it. It is only by doing so that we will be able to assess what impact the Italians actually had on this campaign. ....The process really requires a complete re-evaluation of the Italian economy and the political and military systems......'' | :::''In spite of this, I hope to offer an entirely different perspective on this familiar campaign of World War II. This will come form a focus on the hitherto neglected Italian involvement. In all previous accounts in English, the Italians have either been ignored completely or afforded little more than an acknowledgement of their presence – yet they made up the bulk of the axis forces involved in this campaign, a fact not yet reflected in existing accounts. They are sometimes allowed a place during the first phase of the campaign as Britain’s only opponents, but the arrival of Rommel in early 1941 quickly relegates them to obscurity thereafter.....In terms of their influence on fighting, however, they are usually dismissed in a few paragraphs that primarily concentrate on describing their many deficiencies. Thereafter, they are usually ignored.....In Britain pople are familiar with the war time propaganda images of endless lines of Italian prisoners...This strong visual image was reinforced by contemporary newsreel and newspaper accounts of Italian military incompetence and cowardice, often involving the use of racial stereotypes. This image was often deliberately contrasted with German military efficiency and ferocity. This produced a strong British prejudice against the Italians very early in the war, which has consistently been reinforced in most histories produced since its end....All this has left a powerful legacy in English-speaking accounts, in which the Italians are widely seen as a nation of dilettantes, devoid of military skills and entirely lacking courage. It high is time, however, that this view was re-examined to reveal what, if any, truth lies behind it. It is only by doing so that we will be able to assess what impact the Italians actually had on this campaign. ....The process really requires a complete re-evaluation of the Italian economy and the political and military systems......'' | ||
| I recommend this book as part of ones library to all who are interested in the North African campaign, in particular. | |||
| I’ll state now that I will reinsert verifiable statements that are deleted, within reason. | I’ll state now that I will reinsert verifiable statements that are deleted, within reason. | ||
Revision as of 18:04, 4 July 2008
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Referencing and citation: criterion met
 | Italy B‑class High‑importance | |||||||||
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One of the most interesting counterfactuals emerging in World War II history is what would have happened if Italy had been engaged earlier. The tantalizing prospect glimmers that if Britain and France had been able to declare war on Italy as well as Germany in 1939, Mussolini's house of cards could have been torn apart before Germany could have intervened .
There is an even more compelling counterfactual: the British and French gave way to Italy in its Abyssinian adventure, partly, it seems, because they were genuinely impressed by the evident power of Fascist Italy. But it was a sham then, just as much as it was a sham later. One can argue that the history of the 20th Century would have been radically different had Fascist Italy been suppressed in the middle of the 1930s.
From this counterfactual comes a significant question: we know now how feeble Italy was, but why did the military advisors of the day not realize this? The answers to this question have the potential to illuminate not only past history, but also many of the perplexing military questions we face today.
- Well, everybody miscalculated the international situation in the years before the war. The British were paralysed by fear of the Italian Navy throughout the '30s, but they discounted the small and apparently weak German fleet: a serious error
- Mussolini and Stalin also underestimated German power: they were expecting Germany vs. France/Britain to be another slow war of attrition which would take years to decide. If they had foreseen the rapid German victories of 1940 they would have stayed away from Hitler and supported the Allies.
- And of course, Hitler in turn seriously miscalculated Russian power...
- The lesson of the whole sorry episode is "expect the unexpected"
- The reason France and Britain didn't move against Italy during the 30s is part military and part political. Military, it couldn't be known in advance that the British Matilda tanks would be so important in the African war against Italy and neither could the triumph of air power over the battleships be known beforehand. So even though Britain/France had clear advantage over Italy they still saw that they would need to pay a heavy cost in ships and resources to defeat her (the whole point of the Italian navy versus British and the French). If they'd attacked Italy in 1939, they would not only be launching a war of aggression against a neutral nation, but they would also have to gather much bigger forces to defeat the Italians in Africa (which would drain manpower from Europe) than was the case in Operation Compass were a British force defeated the Italians in spite of severe numerical inferiority that wasn't of the British choosing. The political reasons which have been lost in the post-WWII propganda of the allies as the altruistic saviors of mankind is that the French and British governments (if not their populations) prefered a fascist government in Italy (and Spain and Germany) over the leftist government that surely would've taken it's place had Mussolini been brought down, say by military defeat at the hands of the British over Abyssinia. It was this preference that gave the fascist governments such leeway during the 30s although it is generally forgetten. Even Churchill wrote at the time that he would want a Hitler to save Britain should Britain ever face the same ruin as Germany. --Sus scrofa 20:45, 29 January 2006 (UTC)
Inaccuracies
"However, on June 10, 1940, as Rommel reached the English Channel, ..."
1. German forces reached the English Channel, surrounding the French and British armies in northeast France and the low countries on May 20, 1940, not June 10. Indeed, by June 4 the Dunkirk evacuation was over and pocket had surrendered.
2. Rommel was only a division commander in the 1940 campaign, and his panzer division was NOT the one that reached the English Channel on May 20. If you want to attribute the reaching of the channel to a German commander, the appropriate person is Kluge, commander of Panzer Group Kluge and in control of the panzer forces that did reach the channel.
Pre War Naval Demonstration for Germany
Before Italy decalared war, there was a massive and highly complex set of naval demonstations performed with Hitler in attendance. I remember reading about something like 70 Submarines firing deck guns in formation, then submersing and surfacing in perfect formation. There was also some record-breaking fleet sail-past at something like 37 Knots. Does anyone know the details of this, and if so, should it be included in the article? --Zegoma beach 20:56, 31 March 2006 (UTC)
Tone and Citation Tags
I've taken out the Tone tag because I don't see what is wrong with the tone of this article and because I don't think it appropriate this tag should be added by an unidentified IP address. I feel the same way about the citation tag but will leave it pending debate. This article is a summary article and each section has an underlying 'Main article' in Misplaced Pages cited. The contents therefore summarise the underlying articles and don't need citations. If there is a problem with citations this should be addressed in the underlying articles. Stephen Kirrage 11:34, 14 March 2007 (UTC)
- In the absence of any response to the above, I've taken out the unreferenced tag as well Stephen Kirrage 08:41, 27 March 2007 (UTC)
"and thus they have remained theoretically at war with each other up to the present time."
I must say, the notion that two states formerly at war that although for a long time now at peace have failed to agree a peace treaty somehow makes them still "theoretically" at war seems to me rather preposterous. There is no realistic sense, even theoretical, in which one can claim that Italy is still at war with Japan. (This is not even comparable to the two Koreas, which still have a significant military buildup targeted against each other, and in the case of which a return to hostilities is still conceivable -- Italy and Japan do not target each other militarily, and the thought of a resumption of hostilities between them is simply unimaginable.) It seems far saner to say that a peace treaty is not necessary to end a state of war (even a "theoretical" state of war), than to claim that Italy and Japan are still in any sense (however theoretical) at war. --SJK (talk) 08:50, 4 May 2008 (UTC)
Narrative must begin earlier
The history of Italy during the Second World War does not begin with the Nazi invasion of Poland nor with Mussolini's 10 June declaration. While I don't have the time to write this section now, I would hope someone would edit this piece to add Italy's invasions of Ethiopia (1935), Albania, and other territories, without which it is not really possible to understand Italy's position in 1939. Italy's irredentism and Mussolini's ideas about resurrecting a "Roman Empire" begin much earlier than Poland and should be reflected on this page. While Italy may not have been allied with Germany and fighting Britain and France right away, its actions in the Mediterranean and Red Sea were very much a part of the situation in Europe that led to war. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 88.254.241.30 (talk) 22:37, 3 June 2008 (UTC)
Censoring by Nick Dowling
Who gives him the right to decide that the broadcasts by Radio Rome and Radio Berlin concerning the role of Axis forces are unreliable and of dubious nature. I'd hate to see him work for BBC. What has he got the mentality of a child?? Isn't it obvious that historians would've discovered by now that Radio Berlin and Radio Rome had got it all wrong, inventing units that didn't exist and placing them in wrong areas, and ofcourse, getting the dates, timing and weather all wrong when describing actions. Nick Dowling, get real, and have a read of the pages that deal with "Siege Of Tobruk", "Operation Brevity", "Operation Crusader", etcetera, to see that you got it all wrong mate. GENERALMESSE. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Generalmesse (talk • contribs) 03:25, 8 June 2008 (UTC)
- I've responded at Talk:Italian participation in the Eastern Front and have reported you for incivility. Nick Dowling (talk) 06:19, 8 June 2008 (UTC)
Reputation of Italian fighting efficiency during World War II
This is a sensitive topic for some. From what I have learned, there are some that have essentially spammed and vandalised the page with unfounded bias and propaganda. There are some that have been battling the propaganda. Others have been constructive. Yet, there are some that are aware that this is a topic with a historical legacy of being incorrectly depicted and simply wish to get the facts out.
Further there are others who would not be aware that a ubiquitous number of books have dismissed the Italian involvement in the war. For them it may be difficult to believe as we inherently grew up to believe that non-fiction books are generally gospel. Well, even a technical text book or the most cutting–edge work is prone to mistakes. The whole premise of scientist/philosophical reporting is about constructive critique in order to build on what we currently know. There is plenty to warrant a reassessment of the reputation of Italian soldiers. Their memories are equally as worthy as those of the other participants. To not appraise their involvement based on facts is a disservice to them, and also denigrates those who fought bravely against them. It always cuts both ways.
I would hope that if anyone has any concerns regarding the content in this subsection that they present their arguments here. Lets work together, rather than against each other. Feel free to comment.
I will start with an excerpt to illustrate some of the relevant background, and provided justification for the subsection. This comes from relevant fragments form the first 3 pages of: Walker, Ian W. (2003). Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts; Mussolini's Elite Armoured Divisions in North Africa. Ramsbury: The Crowood Press. ISBN 1-86126-646-4.;
- In Britain and the wider English-speaking world almost everyone is familiar with the Desert War fought in North Africa between June 1940 and May 1943. They have all herd of the famous Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and his 8th Army. They are equally familiar with his legendary opponent Field Marshall Erwin Rommel and his Deutches Africa Korps (DAK). The epic encounter between these two rivals an their two forces that took place at El Alamein is viewed as one of the key battles of World War II. There are countless book on the North African campaign, ranging in scope from academic studies of the grand strategies through to personal memoirs. In their entirety these works manage to touch on almost every conceivable aspect of the conflict.
- In spite of this, I hope to offer an entirely different perspective on this familiar campaign of World War II. This will come form a focus on the hitherto neglected Italian involvement. In all previous accounts in English, the Italians have either been ignored completely or afforded little more than an acknowledgement of their presence – yet they made up the bulk of the axis forces involved in this campaign, a fact not yet reflected in existing accounts. They are sometimes allowed a place during the first phase of the campaign as Britain’s only opponents, but the arrival of Rommel in early 1941 quickly relegates them to obscurity thereafter.....In terms of their influence on fighting, however, they are usually dismissed in a few paragraphs that primarily concentrate on describing their many deficiencies. Thereafter, they are usually ignored.....In Britain pople are familiar with the war time propaganda images of endless lines of Italian prisoners...This strong visual image was reinforced by contemporary newsreel and newspaper accounts of Italian military incompetence and cowardice, often involving the use of racial stereotypes. This image was often deliberately contrasted with German military efficiency and ferocity. This produced a strong British prejudice against the Italians very early in the war, which has consistently been reinforced in most histories produced since its end....All this has left a powerful legacy in English-speaking accounts, in which the Italians are widely seen as a nation of dilettantes, devoid of military skills and entirely lacking courage. It high is time, however, that this view was re-examined to reveal what, if any, truth lies behind it. It is only by doing so that we will be able to assess what impact the Italians actually had on this campaign. ....The process really requires a complete re-evaluation of the Italian economy and the political and military systems......
I recommend this book as part of ones library to all who are interested in the North African campaign, in particular.
I’ll state now that I will reinsert verifiable statements that are deleted, within reason.
Romaioi (talk) 16:20, 4 July 2008 (UTC)
Categories:- B-Class military history articles
- B-Class European military history articles
- European military history task force articles
- B-Class Italian military history articles
- Italian military history task force articles
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- World War II task force articles
- B-Class Italy articles
- High-importance Italy articles
- All WikiProject Italy pages