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The Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) was an infantry regiment of the British Army formed in 1970 to replace the B Specials in assisting with security duties within Northern Ireland. It was the largest regiment in the British Army, formed with an initial seven battalions. An extra four were added later. The regiment consisted overwhelmingly of part-time volunteers until 1976 when a full time cadre was added. Recruiting from the local community at a time of intercommunal strife, it was accused of sectarian attitudes and collusion with Loyalist paramilitary organisations through most of its term. Even though intended to be non-partisan, and beginning with up to 18% Catholic recruits, the regiment's image problems with nationalists, including sectarianism amongst some Protestant soldiers, as well as IRA attacks on Catholic UDR soldiers. resulted in the Catholic membership declining, with only 3% being Catholic when it amalgamated in 1992 with the Royal Irish Rangers, forming the Royal Irish Regiment. In 2007 the Conspicuous Gallantry Cross was awarded to the regiment for its service during Operation BANNER, and the regiment is now allowed to use the postnominal letters CGC as part of its name (The Ulster Defence Regiment CGC).

History

The regiment was formed in 1970 after recommendations from the Hunt Report (1969), which suggested replacing the part time B Specials, "seen by many as a Protestant army", with a force that would be "impartial in every sense and remove the responsibility of military style operations from the police force." The first regimental commander was Brigadier Logan Scott-Bowden. The first two soldiers reported as signing up were a 19 year old Catholic and a 47 year old Protestant. Seven battalions were initially raised, making it the largest infantry regiment in the British Army. Two years later, four more battalions were added, taking the total to eleven. Until 1976 the full time cadre consisted only of a conrate (so called because they had a "consolidated rate of pay")whose duties consisted of guarding UDR bases and carrying out administrative tasks. It was then decided to expand the role of the regiment by raising full time platoons to perform duties on a 24 hour basis. The first of these was raised at 2 UDR under the command of a sergeant. By the end of the 1970s the full time cadre had been raised to 16 platoons. As these "Operations Platoons" were expanded to company strength, eventually the conrate role was phased out with full time UDR soldiers undertaking their own guard duties and administration. The regiment was reduced to nine battalions in 1984, then to seven in 1991, at which point Tom King, the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, announced that as part of the restructuring of the armed forces the regiment would merge with the Royal Irish Rangers to form the Royal Irish Regiment. On 1 July 1992 the merger was officially complete. On 1 August 2007 the Conspicuous Gallantry Cross, the second highest British military honour, was awarded to the regiment for its service during Operation Banner.

The UDR was presented to the entire community of Northern Ireland as a replacement for the paramilitary police reserve, the Ulster Special Constabulary, known as the B Specials. An almost exclusively Protestant force, regarded as biased against the local catholic community. With the catholic population of Northern Ireland standing at just under a third in 1969 it was hoped that the recruitment figures for the regiment would reflect those numbers. Unlike the Special Constabulary which came under the control of the Stormont administration in Belfast the new regiment would be under the direct command of the Ministry of Defence in Whitehall. Beginning with up to 18% Catholic recruits, the vast majority who were former members of other British Army regiments, this rapidly declined, with only 3% being Catholic when it amalgamated in 1992 with the Royal Irish Rangers. Catholic members left due to intimidation from the IRA, their own community and hard line Protestants. Internment without trial also alienated the vast majority of Catholics and increased intimidation against them from within their own community. .

To date it is the only unit in the history of the British Army to have been on operational deployment for its entire history, from the moment it was created until it was amalgamated with the Royal Irish Rangers in 1992.

The regiment was described in 1972 as:

Organised into 11 Battalions and 59 companies: there are two battalions in Belfast and the remainder cover county or sub-county areas. Seven of the 11 Battalions are commanded by Regular Commanding Officers. In addition the Training Majors, Quartermaster, Regimental Sergeant Majors, Chief Clerks, and Signaller NCOs are also Regulars. There are a number of 'Conrate' (full time UDR) posts in each unit, including Adjutants, Permanent Staff Instructors, Security Guards, etc. Many of the officer and senior rank Conrates are ex-Regulars. The remainder are part-timers. Their main tasks are guarding key points, patrolling, and surveillance, and manning Vehicle Check Points. They do not operate in the 'hard' areas of Belfast, and are not permitted to become involved in crowd confrontations anywhere. Men are armed with self-loading rifles or sub-machine guns. The current strength of the Regiment is 7910.

• The UDR Advisory Council

Throughout the existence of the regiment, policy was decided in conjunction with a six man committee (three Protestant and three Catholic) chaired by the Colonel Commandant. They were: To advise the G.O.C., Northern Ireland, on general policy for the administration of the Ulster Defence Regiment, in particular on recruitment policy; and on such specific matters as the G.O.C. might refer to the Council.

• About 57,000 people served in the UDR and Royal Irish Regiment over their combined history 1970 to 2006 .. This equates to perhaps 30,000 to 35,000 people who enlisted into the UDR over their operational period of 1970 to 1992, although the regimental history gives the number as 40,000.

Firsts

The Regiment is seen as unique in the modern army because:

• It was the first to be raised as a paid citizens army.
• It was the first British Army unit to incorporate women into its regimental structure.
• It was the first to only serve its own locality.
• It was the first British Army regiment to have a dedicated "Aftercare" service.

The Role of ex B Specials in the UDR and the effect on Catholic recruitment

The regiment was condemned before its formation in the House of Commons in Westminster by Bernadette Devlin whose comments on the UDR White Paper were: "Do you really expect me or any other member or anybody in Northern Ireland to accept one solitary word of the whitewash and eyewash you have produced? Can you give me one concrete statement that it is not the USC under the guise of the British Army?" The Belfast Telegraph disagreed. In editorials several days apart its pages declared: In no sense can the new Regiment be regarded like the old USC, as a vigilante force and a law unto itself. Inevitably the members of the new force will be provided by present B Specials and just as inevitably it is already being smeared in some quarters as simply the old force in new uniform. Every effort must be made to ensure that this is not so. No-one must be able to put a denominational tag on the UDR and if one of the senior officers in the force happened to be a Roman Catholic, so much the better...The establishment of this new force should be regarded as a turning point in the life of the community. Several days later: The civil rights protest was for equal rights for all. With these rights go obligations, and we would appeal to all Catholics who want to demonstrate their full citizenship to respond to Mr Hume's appeal. If they do not they will fall into the trap which will prove to some people that there are responsibilities which Catholics are not prepared to shoulder.

In the event the response from the USC was mixed. Some felt betrayed and resigned immediately, others grasped the new opportunity and made application to join the UDR as soon as forms were available. There was another option open to the men of the USC, to join the newly formed RUC Reserve and many did so, especially in Belfast where it has been noted that the Specials had received more training as and were more akin with policemen, whereas the border districts had operated in a more military fashion. In Belfast, during the first month of recruiting only 36 Specials applied to join the UDR compared to a national average of 29% - 2,424, 1,000 of whom were rejected, mainly on the grounds of age and fitness. Around 75% of the men of the Tyrone Specials did apply and as a result the 6th Battalion started life as the only battalion more or less up to strength and remained so during its history. The border counties in general followed this pattern. It also meant that former USC members had domination of these battalions. The story was different for Belfast, Londonderry, Down and Antrim where the figures were markedly more balanced with a high proportion of Catholic recruits. The results at 3 UDR were best in this respect. The battalion commenced duty with 30% of its numbers as Catholic.

By 1st april 1970 only 1,606 of the desired 4,000 men had been enlisted and the regiment began its duties much under strength. Without the former B Specials these figures would have been far worse and it is unlikly that the new force would have ever got off the ground. Unfortunately for the Ulster Defence Regiment what gave it the strength to operate in its infancy would also leave it wide open to criticism for many years.

Duties

The primary function of the regiment was to assist the police by guarding key installations and providing patrols and vehicle checkpoints on public roads to hamper the activities of terrorist groups. The regiment was not permitted to engage in "crowd control" situations. Due to the fear of pitting neighbour against neighbour. This became more acute as Catholic numbers dwindled in the regiment as the use of the then predominantly Protestant force against Catholic rioters would have been singularly provocative. Additionally the regiment was forbidden from patrolling "hard-line Catholic" urban areas such as the Bogside in Derry or parts of West Belfast.

As the force was initially predominantly part-time the presence of its members was mostly felt during evenings and weekends. It was expected to answer to general call out and was indeed mobilised on a permanent basis on several occasions such as Operation Motorman to provide manpower assistance to the police or army. Or, as in the bombing campaign against Belfast City centre in January 1992, when 3 Battalions were called to full-time active duties. Full-time callouts were restricted however because problems arose with part-time soldiers when they were taken from their normal day jobs, as in the Ulster Workers' Council Strike in 1974 when the entire regiment was mobilised full time for five days. Many employers complained to local and Provincial UDR commanders about being deprived of the services of their employees for so long and in some cases refused to pay wages. Despite negotiations with the Northern Ireland Office no compensation package for part-time soldiers was ever agreed and on call-out they were reduced to the pay of a regular army soldier of equivalent rank.

As the regiment evolved into a predominantly full-time unit it assumed more duties previously assigned to the police or army in support of Operation Banner. By 1980 the full-time element had become the majority and the regiment's role had expanded to include tactical responsibility for 85% of Northern Ireland supporting the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

Because UDR soldiers lived within their own communities and not in barracks they were able to provide valuable intelligence to the army, particularly from the part time soldiers whose day jobs often took them into places which were hostile to police or army patrols. Unfortunately this also made many soldiers vulnerable to attack and the figures bear this out: 155 of all UDR personnel murdered by the IRA were killed off duty. A further 47 after leaving the regiment.

At vehicle checkpoints, patrols would use the Vengeful system to check the registration numbers of civilian vehicles and record the movements of these and their occupants.

Structure

By March 1970, when deputy Minister of Defence Roy Hattersley answered questions in the House of Commons, there had been 4791 applications to join, of which 946 were from Catholics and 2424 from current or former members of the B-Specials. 2440 had been accepted, including 1423 from current or former B-Specials.

Initially, seven battalions were raised, immediately making it the largest regiment in the British Army. Within two years, a further four battalions were added, taking the total to eleven. To begin with, the regiment consisted entirely of part-time volunteers, before a full time cadre was added in 1976.

The full-time element of the regiment eventually expanded to encompass more than half the total personnel. The UDR was also the first infantry regiment in the British Army to fully integrate women into its structure, when Greenfinches (so-called because of the code-name used to identify them by radio took over clerical and signals duties, which allowed male members of the regiment to return to patrol duties. Greenfinches also accompanied many patrols so that female suspects could be searched.

By 1990 the regiment had stablised its numbers at 3,000 part-time and 3,000 full-time soldiers, with 140 attached regular army personnel in key command and training positions. The standard of training of the permanent cadre soldiers by this time was so high that they were used in much the same way as regular soldiers and it was not uncommon for regular army units to then come under local command and control of a UDR Battalion Headquarters

Battalions

• 1st (County Antrim) Battalion
• 1st/9th (County Antrim) Battalion
• 2nd (County Armagh) Battalion
• 2nd/11th (Craigavon) Battalion
• 3rd (County Down) Battalion
• 4th (County Fermanagh) Battalion
• 4th/6th (County Fermanagh and County Tyrone) Battalion
• 5th (County Londonderry) Battalion
• 6th (County Tyrone) Battalion
• 7th (City of Belfast) Battalion
• 7th/10th (City of Belfast) Battalion
• 8th (County Tyrone) Battalion
• 9th (Country Antrim) Battalion
• 10th (City of Belfast) Battalion
• 11th (Craigavon) Battalion

The normal means of dispersing UDR soldiers into their areas of responsibility was to provide a sub-barracks which would hold an entire company or perhaps just a platoon of men. Battalion Headquarters would be located in a major town (usually the county town but not always as some counties had two Battalions). Guarded by permanent cadre soldiers these barracks would become doubly active after 6pm as part-time soldiers arrived for evening duties. After Ulsterisation began in 1976 many Battalion HQ's eventually had full-sized permanent cadre companies attached and these would maintain a 24 hour presence in the Battalion's area of responsibility on a 24 hour basis. In each battalion area, sub headquarter units would maintain direct contact with their own men and Battalion HQ by radio. In many cases the radios were operated by Greenfinches whose husbands were out on patrol. This did lead to some very tense moments when mobile units or foot patrols came under attack and submitted a "contact report" (contact with the enemy) by radio.

An example of this structure can be seen in the makeup of 2 UDR based at Drummad Barracks in Armagh:
Battalion HQ + A Company(permanent cadre), and B Company (part-time) in Armagh.
C Company (part-time) at Glennane UDR Barracks (10 miles away)
D Company (part-time) at Loughgall UDR Barracks (6 miles away)
Plus platoons of the part-time B Company at the villages of Newtownhamilton and Caledon
A Company would provide at least one platoon per day (approximately 35 men) from 6am for 24 hours to maintain a presence, along with regular army units throughout the Battalion area. The numbers would then be increased by three more platoons of part-time soldiers after 7pm. The part-time patrols would gradually retire to barracks again at 2am, or later if the tasking demanded.

Bases and Locations

This list is incomplete; you can help by adding missing items.

There were many UDR bases throughout Northern Ireland. Some were Regimental locations, Battalion locations, Company locations or Platoon locations. The list below illustrates those in use when the regiment had 11 Battalions c1977:

• Headquarters, Lisburn
• 1 UDR - Ballymena
• 2 UDR - Drumadd Barracks, Armagh (replaced Gough Barracks which was taken over by the RUC); Loughall UDR Barracks; Glenane Barracks (destroyed in an IRA attack); Newtownhamilton RUC Station
• 3 UDR - Ballykinlar; The Abbey, Kilkeel; Rathfriland UDR Barracks; Newry
• 4 UDR - Grosvenor Barracks, Enniskillen; Lisnaskea.
• 5 UDR - Ballykelly; Londonderry; Strabane, Magherafelt, Coleraine
• 6 UDR - Dungannon UDR Barracks; Cookstown UDR Barracks
• 7 UDR - Palace Barracks, Holywood; Grand Central Hotel, Royal Avenue, Belfast, Newtownards, Ladas Drive, Belfast;
• 8 UDR - St Lucia Barracks, Omagh; The Deanery, Clogher; Pomeroy; Caledon RUC Station; Aughnacloy
• 9 UDR - Steeple Hill, Antrim
• 10 UDR - Malone Road, Belfast; Carryduff
• 11 UDR - Mahon Barracks, Portadown; Kitchen Hill Barracks, Lurgan; Scarva Road Barracks, Banbridge

Annual Training Camps

This list is incomplete; you can help by adding missing items.

Part-time UDR soldiers were required to attend an annual camp for a 7 day period, usually somewhere in the United Kingdom e.g.:

• Warcop, Cumbria, England
• Lydd and Hythe, Cinque Ports, England

• Barry Buddon, Scotland

• Ballykinler, Northern Ireland
• Magilligan, Northern Ireland

Uniform, Armament & Equipment

• Uniform. On operational duty male members of the regiment dressed in a similar fashion to regular army units. Camouflage jackets were worn and headgear was a distinctive green beret with a gold coloured "Maid of Erin" style harp, surmounted by the Royal crown (in later years this was dulled down by blackening). Female "Greenfinch" members wore rifle green skirts and jackets with the UDR beret and cap badge. For ceremonial occasions the men wore the standard British Army No 2 Dress uniform (also called Service Dress). The female "best dress" was exactly the same as their patrol uniform. The beret was retained as headgear.

• Armaments. The most familiar weapon associated with the regiment was the standard issue L1A1 Self Loading Rifle, referred to as the "SLR". Other weaponry was available however such as; the 9 mm Browning pistol, the Sterling sub machine gun, the L4A4 Light Machine Gun and the L7A2 General Purpose Machine Gun. Small stocks of Riot Guns were also kept. These were used to fire plastic bullets to knock down doors and other obstacles during search operations. A small number of Carl Gustav 84mm grenade launchers were also kept but rarely deployed as the weapon was unsuited to most operations. (see Boat Sections below). The regiment later exchanged its SLRs (as did all infantry units in the army) for the SA80. For personal protection off duty most members were issued with a Walther PPK but Major Ken Maginnis acquired permission for UDR soldiers to purchase Browning 9mm pistols at £200 each. These were deemed to be more effective. Where a soldier was considered to be at high risk he would be permitted to hold his rifle at home in addition to his personal protection handgun. This policy was known as "weapons out" and was reduced by 75% when the more modern SLR replaced the No4 Lee Enfield in 1973 due to the high number of rifles stolen at gunpoint by paramilitaries. Most of the stolen weapons were taken by Loyalist gangs but a number of soldiers lost their lives when confronted by IRA terrorists who had entered their homes by force to steal rifles. The "weapons out" policy was eventually discontinued on the introduction of the SA80 rifle in 1986/7.

• Transport. The standard patrol vehicle was the 3/4 ton Land Rover used extensively throughout the British armed forces. Following withdrawal from police service a number of Shorland armoured cars were allocated to the regiment but these were rarely used after initial service because the turret was designed to hold a General Purpose Machine Gun which was deemed unsuitable for urban use due to its rapid rate of fire and tendency to be inaccurate. The Shorland was not popular with soldiers who used it due to its instability on the road because of the heavy turret although some battalions continued to use them into the 1980's in border areas because of the increased protection the plate armour gave over the Macrolan fitted to Land Rovers. 3 ton and 4 ton Bedford trucks were used for large troop movements. A range of unmarked civilian cars and vans was also used for staff, administration and covert activities.

• The Ulster Defence Regiment was also deployed by helicopters supplied by either the Royal Air Force or Army Air Corps for rapid insertion or for duties in border areas where it was unsafe or unwise to use wheeled transport.

• Equipment.

Fast Boats. Several battalions were supplied with rigid Dory craft for patrolling waterways shared with the Republic of Ireland in an attempt to prevent gun running across these narrow channels (such as Carlingford Lough). Assisted by land based radar, these fast boats were armed with General Purpose Machine Guns and carried a Carl Gustav 84mm anti tank weapon in addition to the rifles and sub-machine guns normally carried by soldiers. After a report submitted by 3 UDR in 1972 HQ Northern Ireland requested a navy patrol vessel to be permanently stationed in the centre of Carlingford Lough to assist with suppression of gun-running. This suggestion was adopted and to the end of the security situation a small warship was on station off the coast off the Warrenpoint/Rostrevor shoreline. This intervention was called Operation Grenada. Gun-running across these coastal estuaries ceased as a result.

All members of the British Armed Forces, including the UDR, carried a number of small information cards to assist in the execution of their duties in Northern Ireland. These were generally referred to by their colour.

• The Yellow Card was a list of the rules for opening fire.
• The Blue Card was a detailed explanation of how arrests were to be made.
• The White Card was to be given to next of kin or other appropriate person in the event of an arrest of a suspect.
• The Green Card carried instructions on how to deal with accidental cross-border incursion into the Irish Republic and subsequent arrest by Irish security forces.
• The Red Card contained instructions on how to summon helicopter support and the drills for entering and leaving helicopters.

The Yellow Card was seen as particularly important and all soldiers were taught to be entirely familiar with its content as it contained specific instructions to be followed when opening fire on a suspected enemy. Warnings were to be issued to allow suspects to surrender. Soldiers could only without warning when: if there is no other way to protect themselves or those whom it is their duty to protect from the danger of being killed or seriously injured.

Music

Each battalion had a number of pipers and these musicians participated in a centralised pipe band formally called the Pipes & Drums of the Ulster Defence Regiment. Their uniform followed the traditional military dress for Irish pipers, consisting of a saffron kilt, bottle green "Prince Charlie" jacket, bottle green cape and bottle green caubeen adorned with a double size cap badge. Unlike other Irish regiments in the British Army UDR pipers did not wear a hackle.

Attitudes and image

• After initial support from the Catholic minority the popular Catholic perception of the UDR changed and was viewed as a reincarnation of the B-Specials. This, plus IRA intimidation and intimidation from Loyalists within the regiment prevented them from joining.
• In a 1970 poll 60% of Catholics were in favour of the UDR whereas in a 1980s poll 89% were opposed to any extension of the regiment's role.
• In the mid-1980s the SDLP's Canavan Report said the UDR "has by far the worst record for serious sectarian crimes of any Regiment presently in service with the British Armed Forces in Northern Ireland". The SDLP remained opposed to the regiment and continually called for its disbandment due to the failure of the GOC to address the issue of Catholic recruiting and the regimental image.
• Between 1970 and 1990 seventeen UDR members were convicted of murder or manslaughter, 99 of assault, and "others" (no exact figure) were convicted of charged or convicted of armed robbery, weapons offences, bombing, intimidation and attacks on Catholics, kidnapping, and membership in the UVF.
• Only a small fraction were involved in such crime, but the proportion was higher than for the regular British Army or RUC. Although no other infantry unit in the British Armed Forces was on constant duty in the Province between 1970 and 1992.

Intimidation

Unlike soldiers from the regular army the UDR did not live in barracks. As a citizens army they returned to their own homes at the end of a duty. In the increasingly polarised world of intercommunal strife in Northern Ireland in the early 1970’s many found themselves living in Protestant or Catholic enclaves. This put them within easy reach of those who found UDR membership an obstacle to political agendas. The first people to dispense intimidation were a number of former members of the B Specials who felt aggrieved at the loss of their force and were not prepared to join the UDR. The targets for their intimidation were the members of their own (Protestant) community, and in particular other former B Men, who had joined up. In contrast to what transpired in later years, boo’s and jeer’s handed out to UDR patrols by former B Specials was mild however. Remarkably, where there was most resistance by the USC in the Belfast and Down areas is where the higher percentages of Roman Catholic recruits came from. The 3rd (Co Down) Battalion was, and remained, the unit with the highest percentage of Catholic members (beginning at 30%) throughout the troubles with entire sections being made up of Catholics. Which led to protests from the USC Association that in 3 UDR “preference for promotion and allocation of appointments was being given to Catholics” To join such a force was intimidating in itself especially when many Catholic recruits found themselves reporting for duty in B Specials accommodation units. In some cases the new Catholic recruits were cold-shouldered or ignored and generally made to feel unwelcome to the point where they resigned. Despite this many Catholics stayed in the regiment. Following Operation Demetrius there was a general outcry by Nationalist politicians because no Protestant paramilitaries were interned; only suspected members of the IRA. The general feeling was made clear by Austin Currie MP (whose own brother was a member of the regiment) on 18th August 1971 when he publicly withdrew his support for the regiment. For some time the IRA had been discouraging Catholics from joining but after these events more serious intimidation began to emerge. Such as:

• Homes daubed with painted slogans.
• Shotguns fired outside homes.
• Being handed bullets or having them delivered through the post.
• Threatening letters.
• Threatening phone calls.
• Arson attacks.
• Children of members bullied at school.
• Beatings and assault.
• Refusal to give service in shops.
• Being sent to Coventry in the local community.

The ultimate intimidation was death and in the 14 months following internment, although Catholic members of the UDR only totalled 7% of regimental strength they accounted for 28% of those murdered by the IRA. Of the remaining Catholic members, 25% resigned.

In an almost perverse reversal of roles the years 1972-73 saw the emergence of vile paramilitary threats from Loyalists. Of 288 incidents of intimidation reported, all but 12 of those were from Protestants who had been threatened from within their own community. Sometimes this was to gain information and on others it was to persuade members of the regiment to join (or remain within) Protestant organisations. In many ways the intimidation was similar with incidents being reported along the lines of:

• Threatening letters.
• Threatening phone calls.
• Shots fired from passing cars.
• Abduction.
• Intimidation of children.
• Off-duty soldiers being beaten up.

In one incident a UDR soldier opened fire on Loyalist thugs who were attempting to hijack his car, killing one of them outright. Ten days later a pipe-bomb was thrown into his home, damaging it so badly that he and his family had to be relocated. In Loyalist dominated areas it wasn’t uncommon to find an attitude amongst paramilitaries that the UDR would be sympathetic towards them. In the Lisburn Company of 9 UDR a patrol arrested some UDA members found in possession of a hand grenade and after the ringleader was sentenced to two years in prison the patrol commander was accosted in a local pub and had to fire shots from his pistol to save himself from a beating. Further reports from 1973 show a number of incidents of confrontation with Loyalist paramilitaries from 1 UDR, 3 UDR, 7 UDR, 9 UDR and 11 UDR.

Targetting by the IRA

As the IRA campaign continued through the 1970s and 1980s, the organisation increasingly targeted RUC officers and Ulster Defence Regiment servicemen—including when they were off duty. Because these men were largely Protestant, these killings were also perceived as a campaign of sectarian assassination.. Vincent McKenna, (later convicted of a paedophile offence) has claimed that Jim Lynagh's military tactics of creating "sanitised zones"—expelling members of the UDR from their farms to gain territory "a field at a time"—was "sectarian". the IRA have denied he was ever a member. Former Unionist MP and a major in the UDR, Ken Maginnis, compiled a record of IRA attacks on the UDR and claimed from this that the IRA's campaign was sectarian and genocidal in that the eldest sons and breadwinners were especially targeted in order to ethnically cleanse Protestants from their farms and jobs west of the River Bann.

The killing of UDR soldiers in Fermanagh has been described by Professor Henry Patterson (Professor of Irish Politics) as ethnic cleansing. In his address to the Sixth International Conference of The Spanish Association for Irish Studies at the University of Valladolid in Spain, entitled "War of National Liberation or Ethnic Cleansing: IRA violence in Fermanagh during the Troubles" – Professor Patterson examined in detail the IRA campaign in that county, but also acknowledged that “There remains a major research agenda for contemporary historians to try and provide a factual and more objective truth without which this dreadful period will largely remain the province of ethnic entrepreneurs ransacking it for their conflicting political projects”. In 1980 Unionists described the IRA killings in Fermanagh as “genocide against the Protestant people”.

This claim of ethnic cleansing is borne out by the observations of 4 UDR HQ in Enniskillen who were tasked with the ongoing security of their members in the border area. Each soldier along the border had a colured map pin representing his home on the Operations Room map. Over the years the opererations staff noted that the the line of pins moved back further from the border by twelve miles as the campaign against UDR members continued. At least one Catholic member of 4 UDR was also simultaneously a member of the IRA and was responsible for the murder of one of his colleagues.

Despite the fact that most of the IRA's security force victims by the late 1980s were locally recruited RUC or UDR personnel, the Provisional leadership maintained that the British Army was their preferred target. Gerry Adams in an interview given in 1988, said it was, "vastly preferable" to target the British Army as it "removes the worst of the agony from Ireland" and "diffuses the sectarian aspects of the conflict because loyalists do not see it as an attack on their community".

Open warfare

The regiment was created shortly after the formation of the Provisional IRA. The campaign pursued by the "Provos" became and remained the major target for anti-terrorist action by the UDR. Although most UDR casualties were ambushed off-duty there were open actions between the regiment and the Provisionals which varied in style and tactics between the urban setting of Belfast and the rural conditions of what has been referred to as the "Border War".

Belfast and other urban settings

Sniper action by the Provisionals resulted in casualties. These were hard to defeat as, when shots were fired, patrols would immediately take cover, report to battalion headquarters and wait for backup before engaging in search operations. In the short length of time this took the sniper team would quickly make their escape.

Rural ambushes and attacks

There were few military style frontal attacks on UDR establishments but some did occur. Most notably that of 2nd May 1974 when up to 40 IRA men attacked the isolated Deanery at Clogher which was being used as a base by a company from 8UDR. A sustained attack lasted for approximately 20 minutes during which the base was hit by rockets, mortars and small-arms fire. The engagement was broken off after intervention by Ferret armoured cars of the 1st Royal Tank Regiment who used their Browning.30 calibre heavy machine guns to suppress the attackers.

The most common method of attack was an ambush on rural roads. Commencing with the detonation of an IED which, if successful would knock out one of the two vehicles normally in a patrol (usually the Shorland armoured car because it housed the rapid firing General Purpose Machine Gun), the bomb would be followed up by small arms fire. In some cases the nearest available cover (such as hedgerows) would contain another IED which would be detonated if any soldiers were foolish enough to shelter there. During these actions it was not uncommon to have both side exchanging a high volume of small arms fire. UDR patrols reported expending up to several hundred rounds of ammunition from their rifles and machine guns.

Mortar attacks

The Provisional IRA developed a number of home-made mortars between 1972 and 2000. Referred to colloquially as Barrack busters. These were normally deployed by fixing them to the back of a commercial vehicle such as a builder's lorry. The vehicle would be parked in a position near a barracks and the devices fired by timing device or remote controlled detonator sending large missiles made from gas cylinders into the barracks compound. The largest of these devices used was 12 tubes fired at once at 3 UDR's Kilkeel base "The Abbey" in 1992

Members killed

Between 1 April 1970 and 30 June 1992, a total of 197 soldiers were killed as active servicemen. Another 61 members were killed after they had left the UDR. Many UDR soldiers were killed in the line of duty, or because of their association with the regiment.

Two UDR soldiers were killed by the regular army, three by loyalist paramilitaries, and the remaining 192 by republican paramilitaries (mainly the IRA). Four Greenfinches were killed during the Troubles, Private Eva Martin, L/Cpl Jean Leggett, Cpl Heather Kerrigan and Pte Margaret A. Hearst. Three members of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) killed during the conflict were also soldiers of the regiment.

During this time members of the UDR were responsible for the killing of six civilians and two members of the IRA.

Collusion with paramilitaries

Collusion was not a new aspect of the Irish Troubles. In the unsuccessful 1950's campaign which had ended in February 1962 (just 8 years before the formation of the UDR) the IRA's Seán Garland had joined the Royal Irish Fusiliers at Gough Barracks in Armagh. Using information supplied by him the IRA were able to raid the armoury and escape with a vast quantity of weaponry. According to the History Channel's "Secret History of the IRA" Garland was also implicated in a similar raid on St Lucia Barracks in Omagh which went disastrously wrong. In what could be described as "copycat" operations, Loyalist paramilitaries raided several UDR barracks in the early years of the regiment's history and were able to steal substantial quantities of modern weaponry. Many of these weapons were subsequently recovered by rapid follow up operations by the UDR but some were proven to have been used by Loyalist organisations to carry out murders. A number of UDR soldiers were convicted of assisting paramilitaries by providing information to enable these raids to take place. Raids (successful and unsuccessful) were mounted against; 2 UDR, 3 UDR, 5 UDR, 7 UDR, 10 UDR, & 11UDR. In a raid against 2 UDR's Lurgan company, the guard commander (a decorated war hero) was later charged and convicted of supplying information. He was killed in 1975 during an internal UVF feud. .

There are allegations of IRA men joining the UDR; one example involved William Bogle of 6 UDR who was ambushed and killed on 5th December 1972 at Killeter near the Tyrone/Donegal border. At least one book includes the allegation that he was killed by a former member of his own company possessed of strong Republican views. After the shooting the suspect moved across the border and is not known to have returned to Northern Ireland.

Throughout the UDR's history, allegations were made of members covertly aiding the loyalist paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland. In 2004 the British Government released a previously classified 1973 report titled "Subversion in the UDR" on 1 January 2004 which alleged overlapping membership between British Army units like the UDR and loyalist paramilitary groups was a wider problem than a "few bad apples" as was often claimed.

The 1972 report stated:

• an estimated 5-15% of UDR soldiers were directly linked to loyalist paramilitary groups,
• it was believed that the "best single source of weapons, and the only significant source of modern weapons, for Protestant extremist groups was the UDR",
• it was feared UDR troops were loyal to "Ulster" alone rather than to "Her Majesty's Government",
• the British Government knew that UDR weapons were being used by loyalist paramilitaries, including the killing of a Roman Catholic civilian and other attacks.

Despite knowing that the UDR had problems and that over 200 weapons had been passed from British Army hands to loyalist paramilitaries by 1973, the British Government went on to increase the role of the UDR in maintaining order in Northern Ireland. This was part of the wider "Normalisation, Ulsterisation, and Criminalisation" strategy to quell the violence of the IRA.

Two soldiers from the 11th Battalion's C Company in Lurgan, who were also members of the Ulster Volunteer Force, were convicted of the 1975 killing of three members of the pop group the Miami Showband in a UVF attack. In the same attack two members of the Portadown company who were also UVF men died in the premature explosion of their bomb; Harris Boyle (22) Protestant & Wesley Somerville (34) Protestant.

On 27 July 1975 William Hanna (46) Protestant, another soldier from the Lurgan company was murdered by the UVF as a result of an internal feud.

In 1989, 28 UDR soldiers were arrested by the Royal Ulster Constabulary as part of the Stevens Inquiry into security force collusion with paramilitaries. Six of those arrested were later awarded damages over their arrests.

In 1999 David Jordan, a former UDR soldier, allegedly broke down in a bar and admitted to being part of a patrol that killed nationalist councillor Patsy Kelly in 1974. Jordan also implicated former Democratic Unionist Party Northern Ireland Assembly member Oliver Gibson in the murder

It remains that the Provisional IRA was responsible for 48% deaths during the Troubles. The RUC 1.4%, the UDR 0.2%. If, as Nationalist politicians have tried to assert, that there was widespread collusion between the armed forces and Loyalist gangs and 50% of those deaths caused by loyalists was added to the security forces’ figure, it would still only amount to 17% of deaths during the Troubles.

Weeding out the paramilitaries

The official regimental history of the Ulster Defence Regiment records several attempts to remove anyone with paramilitary connections from the regiment. In the early 1970's this was made difficult by the fact that vetting was done by the regular army who had little or no knowledge of Northern Ireland paramilitary groupings. Protestant organisations were not prolific in the early 1970's and even the Provisional IRA was just emerging and did not have many recruits. More emphasis was therefore placed on getting as many recruits as possible into the under-strength force. The appearance of the UDA in particular heralded a new dawn of infiltration into the regiment and there is no doubt historically that many UDA members joined the UDR in order to acquire military training and intelligence. On 29th November 1972 the GOCNI on instructions from Westminster, announced that dual membership would not be tolerated and began a purge which saw 1,000 members forced to resign from the UDR as a result of their connections with Protestant paramilitary organisations. The SDLP pushed for this purge to be extended to members of the Orange Order but no action was ever taken in this direction.

• The Bray Reforms

Brigadier Michael Bray adopted a no-tolerance policy from the beginning of his tenure as Commander UDR. He instituted a number of safeguards including monitoring of entire battalions and six month security reviews of all UDR personnel. Anyone found with even the most tenuous links to Protestant organisations was dismissed from the regiment. An "Out-of-bounds" list was produced which included pubs and clubs known to be frequented by Protestant paramilitaries. Members of the regiment were cautioned as to whom they should socialise with. All of this was a concerted effort to remove anyone with dual membership from the regiment and to prevent peer pressure being applied.

• The Stevens Enquiry

Working under almost total isolation and secrecy from the police and other security forces in Northern Ireland, John Stevens produced what would be the most stinging criticisms of the security forces in Northern Ireland. The Stevens Report resulted in an extreme tightening of control on even the most low-rated intelligence documents and heightened accountability. For the first time the RUC were given access to UDR vetting procedures and many members of the regiment found themselves under police observation for extended periods of time, in some cases resulting in the expulsion of soldiers. Stevens agreed that there had been collusion between a small number of UDR soldiers who had "gravely abused their positions of trust" but that the issue was not "widespread or institutionalised"

• The Bennett Report

As working conditions and wages improved in the regiment many young people saw it as a career opportunity rather than just a means of expressing their wish to defend the Province. Professionalism expanded and there was less tolerance of members with dual membership from the rank and file. With the almost total absence of Catholics in the regiment however, and considering the damage which had already been done by collusion, the UDR was unlikely to ever be free of infiltration by Protestant Paramilitaries and to be unable to regain the confidence of the minority community. The Bennett Committee report of 1989 stressed this acutely and recommended that the regiment be disbanded. A view echoed by Lord Hunt who had made the original recommendation for the formation of the force. In Hunt's view the times had changed, the regiment's role was no longer required, and it was a time to return the duties of the UDR to the police.

Awards, honours & decorations

The most notable award to the Ulster Defence Regiment was the Conspicuous Gallantry Cross made by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second in 2007. This unit citation confers the right of the regiment to be known as The Ulster Defence Regiment CGC During the award ceremony in Belfast the Queen paid tribute to the regiment by saying "Your contribution to peace and stability in Northern Ireland is unique." "Serving and living within the community had required "uncommon courage and conviction". "The regiment had never flinched despite suffering extreme personal intimidation. Their successes had "come at a terrible price, many gave their lives. Today you have cause to reflect on the fine achievements, while remembering the suffering". "The Home Service Battalions of the RIR and the UDR which had preceded them won the deepest respect throughout the land." So that their actions would always be remembered, the CGC was awarded to the RIR/UDR "as a mark of the nation's esteem" with the citation, "This award is in recognition of the continuous operational service and sacrifice of the Ulster Defence Regiment and the Royal Irish Regiment in Northern Ireland during Operation Banner."

In total 953 individuals received awards through the British honours system including: 12 Queen's Gallantry Medals; 2 Military Medals; 88 BEM's; 108 OBE's and 276 Mentioned in Dispatches, however for most UDR soldiers the presentation of decorations assumed the form of "service" or campaign" medals including:

• The General Service Medal with "Northern Ireland" bar.
• The Ulster Defence Medal
• Northern Ireland Home Service Medal
• The Accumulated Campaign Service Medal
• The Long Service and Good Conduct Medal

Officers who are awarded the Ulster Defence medal (UD) may use the post-nominal letters UD .

The man credited by the Regimental History as "the most decorated UDR soldier" is Corporal Eric Glass of the 4th (Co Fermanagh) Battalion who received both the Queen's Gallantry Medal and Distinguished Conduct Medal for bravery.

A number of individual town councils in Northern Ireland honoured the regiment with "Freedom of the Borough" awards, most notably that given to the 7/10th (City of Belfast) Battalion where in addition to the Freedom of the City" the Wilkinson Sword of Peace was awarded for "community relations work". This prestigious award was also later given to the 8th (County Tyrone) Battalion of the Royal Irish Regiment, successor to the 6th & 8th (Co Tyrone) Battalions of the Ulster Defence Regiment.

Notable members

This list is incomplete; you can help by adding missing items.

Professional Soldiers (order by rank, where known)

• General Sir John Anderson GCB, KCB(1st Colonel Commandant)
• Brigadier Logan Scott-Bowden (first Commander UDR)
• Brigadier Harry Baxter CBE GM (First Irish Commander - Kilkenny born, also 2nd Colonel Commandant)
  
• Brigadier Michael Bray CBE(author of the Bray Reforms)
• Brigadier David Strudley (latterly chief of training for the PSNI)
• Brigadier David Millar OBE (joint author of "The Way ahead" document.)
• Brigadier Denis Ormerod CBE (First Roman Catholic Commander UDR)
• Brigadier Charles Ritchie CBE (first UDR Battalion commander to be promoted Commander UDR)
• Colonel Sir Dennis Faulkner CBE VRD UD DL (1st Regimental Colonel & brother of Brian Faulkner, last Prime Minister / 1st Chief Minister of Northern Ireland))

Politicians (order by rank, where known)

• Colonel (Reginald) Harvey Bicker OBE TD
• Colonel Alan Brooke
• Major Ken Maginnis
• Major Samuel (Sam) Foster CBE
• Captain Frederick Michael Alexander Torrens-Spence DSO, DSC, AFC
• Lieutenant Michael Copeland
• Danny O'Connor
• Oliver Gibson
• Jeffrey Donaldson
• Tom Elliott
• Willie Frazer

Others (order by rank, where known)

• Captain Colin Wallace

Aftercare

The Ulster Defence Regiment is the only regiment in the British Army to have its own "Aftercare" service. Like other British Army units the regimental association has a benevolent fund which exists to provide assistance to those who require it as a consequence of illness or hardship but thus far is the only regiment to have a dedicated website to guide its dependents. This is being seen as the model for other army units to adopt as the number of dependents rises as a result of actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The UDR soldiers who were injured during their service or suffer from service-related disabilities. are cared for through the British National Health Service. Additional resources are offered by a number of civilian and forces charities such as "Combat Stress" . The Aftercare site gives advice and offers assistance to soldiers and their families who have been affected by the death, physical or mental illness or who are in need of welfare or vocational assistance. Former members of the regiment are also entitled to seek assistance from the (British) Service Personnel and Veteran's Agency (SV&PA) who can provide pensions and other assistance to those who need it.

References

Notes

1. "BBC ON THIS DAY". news.bbc.co.uk. Retrieved 2008-04-14. {{cite web}}: Text "10" ignored (help); Text "1969: Ulster's B Specials to be disbanded" ignored (help)
2. "BBC NEWS". news.bbc.co.uk. Retrieved 2008-04-14. {{cite web}}: Text "Chequered history of Irish regiment" ignored (help); Text "Northern Ireland" ignored (help)
3. ^ CAIN Archive:Public Records: Subversion in the UDR Although initially written in 1973, the report was only declassified in 2004. Cite error: The named reference "caindoc" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
4. The Blackwell Companion to Modern Irish Culture, W. J. McCormack, Blackwell Publishing 1999, pp578
5. "The Regimental Association of The Ulster Defence Regiment". www.udrassociation.org. Retrieved 2008-04-13.
6. ^ "CAIN: HMSO: Hunt Report, 1969". cain.ulst.ac.uk. Retrieved 2008-04-16.
7. On This Day, BBC
8. ^ British Army Officers 1939-1945 - S
9. A Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, Major John Furniss Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194
10. ^ A Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, Major John Furniss Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194
11. ULSTER DEFENCE REGIMENT (Hansard, 3 February 1972)
12. Queen awards RIR gallantry cross, BBC, 6 October 2006
13. Northern Ireland: A comparative analysis, Frank Wright p154
14. Devolution in Britain today, Colin Pilkington, p86
15. Census figures by religion
16. The Ulster Defence Regiment: An Instrument of Peace ISBN-10: 0413648001
17. Newshound: Daily Northern Ireland news catalog – Irish News article
18. British army role in N.Ireland - USATODAY.com
19. The Blackwell Companion to Modern Irish Culture, W. J. McCormack, Blackwell Publishing 1999, p 578.
20. CAIN: Public Records: Subversion in the UDR
21. Ulster Defence Regiment (Hansard, 21 January 1970)
22. See
23. ^ Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, Major John Furniss Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194 - page 20
24. Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, Major John Furniss Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194 - page 29
25. Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, Major John Furniss Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194 - page 31
26. Chris Ryder, The UDR -An Instrument of Peace? ISBN-10: 0413648001
27. ^ "MOD Army". {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |accessdaymonth= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
28. ^ Security Forces in Northern Ireland 1969-92 By Tim Ripley, Mike Chappell - ISBN10:1855322781 - page 47
29. ^ Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, Major John Furniss Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194
30. Security Forces in Northern Ireland 1969-92 By Tim Ripley, Mike Chappell - ISBN10:1855322781 - page 48
31. Hansard, 23 March 1970, reproduced in millbanksystems.com
32. ^ Security Forces in Northern Ireland 1969-92 By Tim Ripley, Mike Chappell - ISBN10:1855322781 - page 48
33. Security Forces in Northern Ireland 1969-92 By Tim Ripley, Mike Chappell - ISBN10:1855322781 - page 46
34. Chris Ryder, The UDR -An Instrument of Peace? ISBN-10: 0413648001
35. The Ulster Defence Regiment - An Instrument of Peace? ISBN-10: 0413648001
36. Northern Ireland News - Royal Navy weigh anchor in Carlingford Lough
37. http://www.vilaweb.cat/media/attach/vwedts/docs/op_banner_analysis_released.pdf - page 6-1
38. A Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, Major John Furniss Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194 - page 87
39. CAIN: Glossary of Terms on Northern Ireland Conflict
40. British Army 'yellow card' not enforceable: ThePost.ie
41. British Irish Rights Watch
42. The Ulster Defence Regiment - An Instrument of Peace? ISBN-10: 0413648001
43. A Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, Major John Furniss Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194
44. A Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, Major John Furniss Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194
45. Transforming Settler States: Communal Conflict and Internal Security in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe, Ronald Weitzer, University of California Press, 1990. Page 208. ISBN 9780520064904.
46. A Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, Major John Furniss Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194 p57-58
47. ^ Chris Ryder, The UDR -An Instrument of Peace? ISBN-10: 0413648001 p46
48. A Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, Major John Furniss Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194 p58-60
49. A Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, Major John Furniss Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194 p60-61
50. A Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, Major John Furniss Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194 p94
51. A Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, Major John Furniss Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194 p95
52. A Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, Major John Furniss Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194 p96-97
53. Liam Clarke, IRA accused of 'ethnic cleansing', The Sunday Times, 29 March 1998
54. White, Robert W 'The Irish republican army: An assessment of sectarianism' in Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume 9, Issue 1 Spring 1997 , pages 20 - 55, pg 45. However white notes of the RUC:"The fact that the IRA killed Catholic members of the force at a slightly higher rate than their proportion of membership suggests that the IRA does not target Protestant members of the force."
55. Sunday Buisness Post
56. Liam Clarke, IRA accused of 'ethnic cleansing', The Sunday Times, 29 March 1998.
57. APRN
58. Bardon, Jonathan (2001). A History of Ulster. Blackstaff Press. pp. p. 807. ISBN 0856407038. {{cite book}}: |pages= has extra text (help)
59. ^ University Of Ulster News Release - Border Killings – Liberation Struggle or Ethnic Cleansing?
60. A Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, Major John Furniss Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194
61. Provisional IRA campaign 1969–1997
62. Davies, Roger (2001), "Improvised mortar systems: an evolving political weapon", Jane's Intelligence Review (May 2001), 12-15.
63. Five more were killed after amalgamation with the Royal Irish Rangers: UDR Association website; CAIN: Sutton index of deathsBBC
64. See Royal Irish Regiment webpage
65. See the following quotes of 1975's chapter of Sutton chronology:
    • Also off duty Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) member. Shot outside his home, Houston Park, Mourneview, Lurgan, County Armagh.
    Status: Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), Killed by: Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) Also Ulster Defence Regiment member. Killed in premature explosion while planting bomb on minibus belonging to Miami showband, Buskhill, near Newry, County Down.
    • 31 July 1975
    Status: Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), Killed by: Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) Also Ulster Defence Regiment member. Killed in premature explosion while planting bomb on minibus belonging to Miami showband, Buskhill, near Newry, County Down.
66. The Ulster Defence Regiment - An Instrument of Peace? ISBN-10: 0413648001
67. Biography
68. The Secret History of the IRA - showing on The History Channel
69. A Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, Major John Furniss Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194 p 78-9, 90, 92, 96-7, 151-2
70. A Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, Major John Furniss Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194 p77
71. ^ May 2, 2006 edition of the Irish News available here.
72. Paisley by Ed Moloney & Andy Pollak Poolbeg Press Ltd., 1986 P.363-402
73. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/15/newsid_2534000/2534941.stm 1976: UDR men jailed for Showband killings]
74. "A Chronology of the Conflict - 1989". CAIN. Retrieved 2008-04-10.
75. "Collusion - Chronology of Events in the Stevens Inquiries =". CAIN. Retrieved 2008-04-12.
76. See reference here
77. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/publicrecords/1972/prem15-1016-3.jpg
78. A Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, Major John Furniss Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194
79. ^ Order of Wear
80. Security Forces in Northern Ireland 1969-92 By Tim Ripley, Mike Chappell - ISBN10:1855322781 - page 49
81. "UDR Association". {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |accessdaymonth= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
82. The Northern Ireland Home Service Medal
83. The Accumulated Campaign Service Medal
84. British Light Infantry Regiments
85. A Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, Major John Furniss Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194 - page 90
86. House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 17 Jan 2000 (pt 10)
87. Welcome to the new British Army Website - British Army Website
88. Ulster Defence Regiment (Hansard, 29 April 1971)
89. Brigadier Harry Baxter | Times Online Obituary
90. Sinn Féin: UDR Commander's appointment to PSNI sends out entirely the wrong signal
91. The ULSTER DEFENCE REGIMENT Benevolent Fund
92. My Lords, it is daunting enough to...: 7 Nov 2007: House of Lords debates (TheyWorkForYou.com)
93. http://www.dwp.gov.uk/advisers/docs/lawvols/greenvol/pdf/g_2549.pdf
94. Medical Services
95. Welfare Services
96. Combat Stress - Ex-Services Mental Welfare Society Society
97. Veterans-UK.info

Bibliography

• A Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, Major John Furniss Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194

• The Ulster Defence Regiment - An Instrument of Peace? ISBN-10: 0413648001

External links

• Palace Barracks Memorial Garden
• Regimental Association of the Ulster Defence Regiment CGC
• Murder, Collusion & Lies: The murder of Seamus Ludlow
• Seamus Ludlow by Ed Moloney, Sunday Tribune

• History of Northern Ireland
• The Troubles in Northern Ireland
• Infantry regiments of the British Army