| Revision as of 00:02, 18 August 2005 editUncle.bungle (talk | contribs)1,327 edits avoid redirect, link AIPAC scandal, charges laid now← Previous edit | Revision as of 11:00, 26 September 2005 edit undo38.118.73.78 (talk) Much of the reporting cited from 2003 and 2004 has since been found wrong by independent investigations. The Senate report discounted Kwiatkowski as a fabricator.Next edit → | ||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
| The '''Office of Special Plans''', which existed from September, 2002, to June, 2003, was a ] unit created by ] and led by ], |
The '''Office of Special Plans''', which existed from September, 2002, to June, 2003, was a ] unit created by ] and led by ], to handle Iraq and Iran policy. | ||
| The subject of many conspiracy theories and criticized heavily by some former members of the U.S. Intelligence community, the role of the Office of Special Plans was looked into by the ] ] published in July 2004. The review, which was highly critical of the CIA's Iraq intelligence generally, exculpated the Office of Special Plans. It found allegations by anonymous sources to be without merit. Some of the most vocal critics of the Office of Special Plans, ] for exmaple, had never visited the office and could not give any examples to back up her allegations. | |||
| In an interview with the Scottish ], former ] officer Larry Johnson said the OSP was "dangerous for US national security and a threat to world peace. lied and manipulated intelligence to further its agenda of removing ]. It's a group of ] with pre-determined notions of truth and reality. They take bits of intelligence to support their agenda and ignore anything contrary. They should be eliminated." (Mackay, 2003) | |||
| ⚫ | Some members of the OSP did argue that there was a relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda. In an "Iraqi intelligence cell" briefing to Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz in August 2002, some analysts condemned the CIA's intelligence assessment techniques and denounced the CIA's "consistent underestimation" of matters dealing with the alleged Iraq-al Qaeda co-operation. In September 2002, two days before the CIA's final assessment of the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship, Feith briefed senior advisers to ] and ], undercutting the CIA's credibility and alleging "fundamental problems" with CIA intelligence-gathering. | ||
| ] writes that, according to an unnamed Pentagon adviser, " was created in order to find evidence of what ] and his boss, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, believed to be true—that Saddam Hussein had close ties to ], and that ] had an enormous arsenal of chemical, biological, and possibly even nuclear ] that threatened the region and, potentially, the United States. 'The agency was out to ''disprove'' linkage between Iraq and ],' the Pentagon adviser told me. 'That’s what drove them. If you’ve ever worked with intelligence data, you can see the ingrained views at C.I.A. that color the way it sees data.' The goal of Special Plans, he said, was 'to put the data under the microscope to reveal what the intelligence community can’t see.'” (Hersh, 2003) | |||
| ⚫ | ], an analyst and ] expert in the Feith office, has been charged with mishandling classified material, as part of a larger ] investigation. (see ]) | ||
| These allegations are supported by an annexe to the first part of ] ] published in July 2004. The review, which was highly critical of the CIA's Iraq intelligence generally but found its judgments were right on the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship, suggests that the OSP, if connected to an "Iraqi intelligence cell" also headed by Douglas Feith which is described in the annexe, sought to discredit and cast doubt on CIA analysis in an effort to establish a connection between Saddam Hussein and terrorism. In one instance, in response to a cautious CIA report, "''Iraq and al-Qa'eda: A Murky Relationship''", the annexe relates that "one of the individuals working for the stated that the June report, '...should be read for content only - and CIA's interpretation ought to be ignored.'" (Report, 2004) | |||
| ⚫ | |||
| ⚫ | ], an analyst and ] expert in the Feith office, has been charged with |
||
| == See also == | == See also == | ||
| Line 23: | Line 19: | ||
| ==External links== | ==External links== | ||
| ⚫ | ** Disinfopedia. | ||
| * Kooper, Marc. ''LA Weekly'' reprinted at AlterNet (February 25, 2004). | |||
| * Kwiatkowski, Karen (March 10, 2004). ''salon.com''. | |||
| ⚫ | * Disinfopedia. | ||
| * | |||
| ] | |||
| * article by Robert Dreyfuss and Jason Vest in '']'' | * article by Robert Dreyfuss and Jason Vest in '']'' | ||
| * , by Robert Dreyfuss in '']'' (September 2004) | * , by Robert Dreyfuss in '']'' (September 2004) | ||
Revision as of 11:00, 26 September 2005
The Office of Special Plans, which existed from September, 2002, to June, 2003, was a Pentagon unit created by Donald Rumsfeld and led by William Luti, to handle Iraq and Iran policy.
The subject of many conspiracy theories and criticized heavily by some former members of the U.S. Intelligence community, the role of the Office of Special Plans was looked into by the Senate intelligence committee's Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq published in July 2004. The review, which was highly critical of the CIA's Iraq intelligence generally, exculpated the Office of Special Plans. It found allegations by anonymous sources to be without merit. Some of the most vocal critics of the Office of Special Plans, Karen Kwiatkowski for exmaple, had never visited the office and could not give any examples to back up her allegations.
Some members of the OSP did argue that there was a relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda. In an "Iraqi intelligence cell" briefing to Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz in August 2002, some analysts condemned the CIA's intelligence assessment techniques and denounced the CIA's "consistent underestimation" of matters dealing with the alleged Iraq-al Qaeda co-operation. In September 2002, two days before the CIA's final assessment of the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship, Feith briefed senior advisers to Dick Cheney and Condoleezza Rice, undercutting the CIA's credibility and alleging "fundamental problems" with CIA intelligence-gathering.
Larry Franklin, an analyst and Iran expert in the Feith office, has been charged with mishandling classified material, as part of a larger FBI investigation. (see AIPAC espionage scandal)
See also
References
- Coman, Julian (July 11, 2004). Fury over Pentagon cell that briefed White House on Iraq's 'imaginary' al-Qaeda links. news.telegraph.co.uk. (registration required for full article)
- Hersh, Seymour M. (May 5, 2003). Selective Intelligence. Newyorker.com.
- Mackay, Neil (June 8, 2003). Revealed: The secret cabal which spun for Blair. sundayherald online. (also about the British Operation Rockingham)
- Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. (July 9, 2004). United States Select Senate Committee on Intelligence.
External links
- Office of Special Plans. Disinfopedia.
- The Lie Factory article by Robert Dreyfuss and Jason Vest in Mother Jones
- Agents of Influence, by Robert Dreyfuss in The Nation (September 2004)
- Detailed timeline of the Office of Special Plans - Center for Cooperative Research