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The '''Office of Special Plans''', which existed from September, 2002, to June, 2003, was a ] unit created by ] and led by ], to handle Iraq and Iran policy. The '''Office of Special Plans''', which existed from September, 2002, to June, 2003, was a ] unit created by ] and led by ], dealing with intelligence on Iraq.


In an interview with the Scottish ], former ] officer Larry Johnson said the OSP was "dangerous for US national security and a threat to world peace. lied and manipulated intelligence to further its agenda of removing ]. It's a group of ] with pre-determined notions of truth and reality. They take bits of intelligence to support their agenda and ignore anything contrary. They should be eliminated." (Mackay, 2003)
The subject of many conspiracy theories and criticized heavily by some former members of the U.S. Intelligence community, the role of the Office of Special Plans was looked into by the ] ] published in July 2004. The review, which was highly critical of the CIA's Iraq intelligence generally, exculpated the Office of Special Plans. It found allegations by anonymous sources to be without merit. Some of the most vocal critics of the Office of Special Plans, ] for exmaple, had never visited the office and could not give any examples to back up her allegations.


] writes that, according to an unnamed Pentagon adviser, " was created in order to find evidence of what ] and his boss, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, believed to be true—that Saddam Hussein had close ties to ], and that ] had an enormous arsenal of chemical, biological, and possibly even nuclear ] that threatened the region and, potentially, the United States. 'The agency was out to ''disprove'' linkage between Iraq and ],' the Pentagon adviser told me. 'That’s what drove them. If you’ve ever worked with intelligence data, you can see the ingrained views at C.I.A. that color the way it sees data.' The goal of Special Plans, he said, was 'to put the data under the microscope to reveal what the intelligence community can’t see.'” (Hersh, 2003)
Some members of the OSP did argue that there was a relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda. In an "Iraqi intelligence cell" briefing to Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz in August 2002, some analysts condemned the CIA's intelligence assessment techniques and denounced the CIA's "consistent underestimation" of matters dealing with the alleged Iraq-al Qaeda co-operation. In September 2002, two days before the CIA's final assessment of the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship, Feith briefed senior advisers to ] and ], undercutting the CIA's credibility and alleging "fundamental problems" with CIA intelligence-gathering.


These allegations are supported by an annexe to the first part of ] ] published in July 2004. The review, which was highly critical of the CIA's Iraq intelligence generally but found its judgments were right on the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship, suggests that the OSP, if connected to an "Iraqi intelligence cell" also headed by Douglas Feith which is described in the annexe, sought to discredit and cast doubt on CIA analysis in an effort to establish a connection between Saddam Hussein and terrorism. In one instance, in response to a cautious CIA report, "''Iraq and al-Qa'eda: A Murky Relationship''", the annexe relates that "one of the individuals working for the stated that the June report, '...should be read for content only - and CIA's interpretation ought to be ignored.'" (Report, 2004)
], an analyst and ] expert in the Feith office, has been charged with mishandling classified material, as part of a larger ] investigation. (see ])

In another instance, an "Iraqi intelligence cell" briefing to Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz in August 2002 condemned the CIA's intelligence assessment techniques and denounced the CIA's "consistent underestimation" of matters dealing with the alleged Iraq-al Qaeda co-operation. In September 2002, two days before the CIA's final assessment of the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship, Feith briefed senior advisers to ] and ], undercutting the CIA's credibility and alleging "fundamental problems" with CIA intelligence-gathering. As reported in the conservative British newspaper ], "Senator ],...senior Democrat on the committee, said that Mr Feith's cell may even have undertaken 'unlawful' intelligence-gathering initiatives." (Coman, 2004)

], an analyst and ] expert in the Feith office, has been charged with espionage, as part of a larger ] investigation. (see ]) Allegations have also been made that Pentagon employees in the Feith office have been involved in plans for overthrowing the governments of Iran and Syria.


== See also == == See also ==
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==External links== ==External links==


* Kooper, Marc. ''LA Weekly'' reprinted at AlterNet (February 25, 2004).
** Disinfopedia.
* article by ] and Jason Vest in '']'' * Kwiatkowski, Karen (March 10, 2004). ''salon.com''.
* Disinfopedia.
*
]
* article by Robert Dreyfuss and Jason Vest in '']''
* , by Robert Dreyfuss in '']'' (September 2004) * , by Robert Dreyfuss in '']'' (September 2004)
* - Center for Cooperative Research * - Center for Cooperative Research

Revision as of 12:10, 26 September 2005

The Office of Special Plans, which existed from September, 2002, to June, 2003, was a Pentagon unit created by Donald Rumsfeld and led by Douglas Feith, dealing with intelligence on Iraq.

In an interview with the Scottish Sunday Herald, former CIA officer Larry Johnson said the OSP was "dangerous for US national security and a threat to world peace. lied and manipulated intelligence to further its agenda of removing Saddam. It's a group of ideologues with pre-determined notions of truth and reality. They take bits of intelligence to support their agenda and ignore anything contrary. They should be eliminated." (Mackay, 2003)

Seymour Hersh writes that, according to an unnamed Pentagon adviser, " was created in order to find evidence of what Wolfowitz and his boss, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, believed to be true—that Saddam Hussein had close ties to Al Qaeda, and that Iraq had an enormous arsenal of chemical, biological, and possibly even nuclear weapons that threatened the region and, potentially, the United States. 'The agency was out to disprove linkage between Iraq and terrorism,' the Pentagon adviser told me. 'That’s what drove them. If you’ve ever worked with intelligence data, you can see the ingrained views at C.I.A. that color the way it sees data.' The goal of Special Plans, he said, was 'to put the data under the microscope to reveal what the intelligence community can’t see.'” (Hersh, 2003)

These allegations are supported by an annexe to the first part of Senate intelligence committee's Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq published in July 2004. The review, which was highly critical of the CIA's Iraq intelligence generally but found its judgments were right on the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship, suggests that the OSP, if connected to an "Iraqi intelligence cell" also headed by Douglas Feith which is described in the annexe, sought to discredit and cast doubt on CIA analysis in an effort to establish a connection between Saddam Hussein and terrorism. In one instance, in response to a cautious CIA report, "Iraq and al-Qa'eda: A Murky Relationship", the annexe relates that "one of the individuals working for the stated that the June report, '...should be read for content only - and CIA's interpretation ought to be ignored.'" (Report, 2004)

In another instance, an "Iraqi intelligence cell" briefing to Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz in August 2002 condemned the CIA's intelligence assessment techniques and denounced the CIA's "consistent underestimation" of matters dealing with the alleged Iraq-al Qaeda co-operation. In September 2002, two days before the CIA's final assessment of the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship, Feith briefed senior advisers to Dick Cheney and Condoleezza Rice, undercutting the CIA's credibility and alleging "fundamental problems" with CIA intelligence-gathering. As reported in the conservative British newspaper The Daily Telegraph, "Senator Jay Rockefeller,...senior Democrat on the committee, said that Mr Feith's cell may even have undertaken 'unlawful' intelligence-gathering initiatives." (Coman, 2004)

Larry Franklin, an analyst and Iran expert in the Feith office, has been charged with espionage, as part of a larger FBI investigation. (see AIPAC espionage scandal) Allegations have also been made that Pentagon employees in the Feith office have been involved in plans for overthrowing the governments of Iran and Syria.

See also

References

External links

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