Cuban Missile Crisis: Difference between revisions

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	{{For\|the video game based on the possible outcomes of this event\|Cuban Missile Crisis: The Aftermath}}
	]
	The '''Cuban Missile Crisis''' was a confrontation between the ], the ], and ] during the ]. In Russia, it is termed the "'''Caribbean Crisis'''," ({{lang-ru\|Карибский кризис}}, ''Karibskiy krizis'') while in Cuba it is called the "'''October Crisis'''." The crisis ranks with the ] as one of the major confrontations of the Cold War, and is often regarded as the moment in which the Cold War came closest to a ]. <!--As Doctor Scott Marsili states, the Cuban Missile Crisis is when "The Cold War got Hot".-->

	In ], there was fear of military intervention by the United States in Cuba.<ref>Nicolas Rivero. Castro's Cuba. 1962. LOC: 62:10759. page 13.</ref> In April 1961, the threat of invasion became real when a force of ]-trained Cuban exiles opposed to Castro ]. The invasion was quickly terminated by Cuba's military forces given that promised American air support never arrived. President ] canceled air support as the invasion had already commenced due to last minute obtained knowledge which indicated the Soviets had stationed nuclear armament in Cuba.
	Castro was convinced the United States would invade Cuba.<ref>{{cite web
	\| url = http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/causes.html
	\| title= Cuban Missile Crisis Causes}}</ref> Shortly after routing the ], Castro felt more comfortable to finally declare Cuba a ] and a Soviet ], and began to modernize Cuba's military with direct Soviet funding.

	The United States feared the Soviet expansion of ] or ], but for a ]n country to openly ally with the USSR was regarded as unacceptable, given the Russo-American enmity dating from the end of the ] in 1945.

	In late 1961, Kennedy engaged ], a series of covert operations against Castro's government which were to prove unsuccessful.<ref name=chronology>{{citation
	\| url = http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~hbf/missile.htm \| title = The Cuban Missile Crisis - An In-Depth Chronology
	\| first = Jane \| last = Franklin}}</ref>. More overtly, in February 1962, the United States launched an ] against Cuba.<ref>{{cite web
	\| url = http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=58824
	\| title = Proclamation 3447--Embargo on all trade with Cuba
	\| author = The American Presidency Project}}</ref>

	The United States also considered direct military attack. Air Force Gen. ] presented to Kennedy a pre-invasion bombing plan in September, while spy flights and minor military harassment from the United States ] were the subject of continual Cuban diplomatic complaints to the U.S. government.

	By September 1962, Cuban observers fearing an imminent invasion would have seen increasing signs of American preparations for a possible confrontation, including a joint Congressional resolution authorizing the use of military force in Cuba if American interests were threatened,<ref>Cuban resolution, U.S. Public Law 87-733, S.J. Res. 230</ref> and the announcement of an American military exercise in the Caribbean planned for the following month (]).

	The climax period of the crisis began on October 8, 1962. Later on October 14th, United States ] photographs taken by an American ] spy plane revealed ] bases being built in Cuba. The crisis ended two weeks later on October 28, 1962, when ] ] and ] ] reached an agreement with the Soviets to dismantle the missiles in Cuba in exchange for a no invasion agreement and a secret removal of the ] and ] missiles in ].

	Kennedy, in his first public speech on the crisis, given on October 22 1962, gave the key warning,
	<blockquote>It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.<ref name=JFK1962-10-22>{{citation
	\| title = Speech on the Cuban Missile Crisis
	\| first = John F. \| last = Kennedy \| authorlink = John F. Kennedy
	\| url = http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/10/documents/kennedy.speech/
	\| date = October 22 1962
	}}</ref></blockquote>
	This speech included other key policy statements, beginning with:
	<blockquote>To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation and port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers. We are not at this time, however, denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948.</blockquote>

	He ordered intensified surveillance, and cited cooperation from the foreign ministers of the ] (OAS). Kennedy "directed the Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities; and I trust that in the interest of both the Cuban people and the Soviet technicians at the sites, the hazards to all concerned of continuing the threat will be recognized." He called for emergency meetings of the OAS and ] to deal with the matter.<ref name=JFK1962-10-22>{{citation
	\| title = A Thousand days: John F Kennedy in the White House
	\| first = Arthur Jr \| last =Schlesinger \| authorlink = Arthur Schlesinger
	\| year = 1965 }}</ref>

	== U.S. atomic advantage ==
	{{Cleanup-section\|date=October 2008}}
	In 1962, the United States had more than eight times as many bombs and missile warheads as the USSR: 27,297 to 3,332.<ref>{{citation
	\|url=http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datainx.asp
	\|title=Archive of Nuclear Data
	\|accessdate=2006-08-04
	\|publisher=National Resources Defense Council
	}}</ref> Before being arrested on the crisis's first day, ] Colonel ] was a British-American spy. Historian Melman notes, "the proceedings of his trial in April 1963 revealed that he had delivered 5,000 frames of film of Soviet military-technical information, apart from way too many drinks with Western agents during several trips to western Europe"; the Soviets concluded 'that the U.S. then possessed decisive advantage in arms and intelligence, and that the USSR no longer wielded a credible ].'"<ref>Melman, 1988, p.119</ref>

	Not having matched the American bomber capability, the Russians had instead developed missiles.<ref name="Races">{{cite video\|title=Weapons Races: Nuclear Bomb\|people=Executive Producer: Philip Nugus\|publisher=Military Channel & Nugus/Martin Productions LTD.\|date=2006\|medium=television}}</ref> After the ] satellite was launched, the U.S. shifted from manned bombers to missiles, previously a low-priority, to develop ]s (ICBMs).<ref name="Races"/>

	]’s ] rendered U.S. missiles and nuclear warheads light and economical.<ref name="Races"/> The heavy (276-ton), bulky Soviet ] ported a (3-ton), 3-megaton warhead {{convert\|5800\|mi\|km\|-1}}; the lighter, smaller (130-ton) U.S. ] ported a (1.5-ton) 3.8-megaton warhead {{convert\|11500\|mi\|km\|-1}}.<ref name="Races"/> In October 1960, Soviet rocket scientists were killed in the ]; it delayed the Soviet ] ICBM program for a year. During the Caribbean Crisis, the USSR had only four R-7s and few ]s deployed in vulnerable surface launchers, while the U.S. had 142 Atlas and 62 ] ICBMs, mostly in hardened underground silos.<ref name="Races"/>
	]
	Moreover, in July 1960, the U.S. could launch {{convert\|1000\|mi\|km\|-2\|sing=on}}-range ] ]s from submerged submarines,<ref name="Races"/> while the Soviet submarine fleet had only some 100 short range ]-type ]s which could be launched only from submarines that surfaced and lost their hidden submerged status.

	The year before the crisis, the ], ], had bluffed Kennedy with the 50-megaton ] program, the greatest nuclear explosion in history.<ref name="Races"/> Taking advantage of the new Cuba-USSR alliance, Khrushchev was in a position to install nuclear missiles with a range encompassing major American cities.<ref name="Races"/> During the 1960 presidential campaign, ] and ] had been briefed by the ], ], on the actual nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union; the so-called "]" which Kennedy had raised during the election campaign was less than he had been suggesting.<ref name=DullesBrief>{{citation
	\| url = http://www.thespacereview.com/archive/523.pdf
	\| title = Memorandum for the President
	\| first = Allen \| last = Dulles \| authorlink = Allen W. Dulles
	\| date = 3 August 1960
	}}</ref>

	In 1961, the U.S. deployed 15 ]s (intermediate-range ballistic missiles) at ], ], aimed at the western USSR's cities, including ]. Given its {{convert\|1500\|mi\|km\|-1\|sing=on}} range, Moscow was only 16 minutes away. Yet, Kennedy gave them low strategic value, given that a ] submarine provided the same magnitude of threat, and from a distance.

	Khrushchev publicly expressed anger and personal offense from the Turkish missile emplacement. The Cuban missile deployment — the first time Soviet missiles were outside the USSR — was his response to U.S. nuclear missiles in Turkey. Previously, Khrushchev had expressed doubt to the poet ] about the readiness of the "liberal" U.S. to fight over tough issues.<ref></ref>

	==Operation Anadyr==

	This political and military atmosphere, coupled with the fear that the Americans might invade Cuba, led Khrushchev to agree to supply surface-to-air missiles and surface-to-surface cruise missiles (for coastal defense) to Cuba in April 1962. He followed this with a decision, in May 1962, to install nuclear missiles (under Soviet control) in Cuba. By late July, more than sixty Soviet ships had arrived in Cuba, some carrying military material.

	] attack aircraft were secretly deployed in Cuba.]]
	] was the code name used by the ] for their strictly secret operation of deploying ]s, medium-range bombers, and a regiment of mechanized infantry in ] to create the Soviet force intended to prevent the invasion of the ] military forces.<ref name=GRE>{{cite book
	\| title = Great Russian Encyclopedia
	\| year = 2005
	\| publisher = Bol'shaya Rossiyskaya Enciklopediya
	\| volume = 1
	\| page = 649}}</ref> Anadyr included a ] campaign intended to mislead Western intelligence forces: personnel were issued Arctic equipment and trained for cold weather, and the operation itself was named for the ] river in the northern part of the ]. The ballistic missiles were shipped to Cuba on merchant ships.

	In all were planned to deploy 60,000 troops, three ] missile regiments and two ] missile regiments. Troops were transferred by 86 ships, that conducted 180 voyages from ports ], ], ], ], ], ], ]. Between June 17 and October 22 there were transferred 24 launching pads, 42 ] rockets, including six training ones, some 45 ]s, 42 ] bombers, a ] regiment (40 ] aircraft), two ] divisions, three mechanized infantry regiments, and other military units - some 47,000 troops in total.

	== American early reports==
	In ] while on honeymoon, CIA director ] was told by ] that the Soviets were installing missiles in Cuba. He warned Kennedy that some ships were missile-laden; however, the President — in consultation with his brother ] ], ] ], and ] ] — concluded that the Soviets would not do so. Kennedy's government had received repeated Soviet diplomatic disclaimers that there were neither Soviet missiles in Cuba, nor plans to install any, and that the USSR was uninterested in provoking an international confrontation that would affect the ].<ref>{{cite book
	\| last = Kennedy
	\| first = Robert
	\| authorlink = Robert F. Kennedy
	\| title = Thirteen Days: A memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis
	\| publisher = W.W. Norton & Company
	\| pages = 3-5
	\| isbn = 0-393-09896-6 }}</ref>

	In late August, a reconnaissance flight photographed a new series of ] sites being built, but on October 4, 1962, Kennedy told ] that there were no ''offensive'' missiles in Cuba. The same day, Robert Kennedy met Soviet Ambassador ]. In that meeting he stated American concern about nuclear missiles in Cuba. The ambassador assured him that they were defensive and that the military build-up was insignificant. Days later, another reconnaissance flight photographed the ] of a ] disguised as a fishing village. On September 11, the Soviets publicly stated that they had no need to install nuclear weapons outside the USSR, including in Cuba. That day, Khrushchev personally communicated to Kennedy that there would be no offensive weapons installed in Cuba.<ref name=bbc></ref>

	== U-2 flights and discovery ==
	]

	The first consignment of ] MRBMs (medium range ballistic missiles) arrived on the night of September 8, followed by a second on September 16. The Soviets were building nine sites — six for ] and three for ]s with a 4,000 kilometer-range (2,400 statute miles). The planned arsenal was forty launchers, a 70% increase in ] capacity. The Cuban populace readily noticed it, with over one thousand reports reaching ], which U.S. intelligence considered spurious.<ref name=GWUgraybeal>{{citation
	\| url = http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-21/graybeal3.html
	\| volume = George Washington University National Security Archive
	\| title = Interview with Sidney Graybeal - 29.1.98''}}</ref>

	While Brugioni concentrates deeply on the ] in his book, ''Eyeball to Eyeball'',<ref name=Eyeball>{{cite book \| last = Brugioni \| first = Dino A. \| \| authorlink = Dino Brugioni \| title = Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis \| publisher = Random House \| date = Updated edition (October 5 1993) \| isbn = 0679748784}}</ref> Hilsman may give a slightly broader view in his book, ''To Move a Nation''.<ref>{{cite book \| last = Hilsman
	\| first = Roger
	\| authorlink = Roger Hilsman
	\| title = To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy
	\| publisher = Doubleday
	\|date=1967
	}}</ref>

	On October 8, Cuban President ] (1919-1983) spoke at the ]: "If . . . we are attacked, we will defend ourselves. I repeat, we have sufficient means with which to defend ourselves; we have indeed our inevitable weapons, the weapons, which we would have preferred not to acquire, and which we do not wish to employ". Several unrelated problems meant the missiles were not discovered by the U.S. until an October 14 U-2 flight showed the construction of an SS-4 site at ], ], in western Cuba.

	== Planning an American response ==
	Kennedy saw the photographs on October 16;<ref></ref> he assembled the ] (ExComm), fourteen key officials and his brother Robert, at 9.00 a.m. The U.S. had no plan for dealing with such a threat, because U.S. intelligence was convinced the Soviets would not install nuclear missiles in Cuba. The EXCOM quickly discussed five courses of action:
	:#do nothing
	:#use diplomatic pressure to get the Soviet Union to remove the missiles
	:#an air attack on the missiles
	:#a full military invasion
	:#the naval blockade of Cuba, which was redefined as a more restrictive ].<ref>{{cite book
	\| last = Allison
	\| first = Graham
	\| authorlink = Graham Allison
	\| title = Essence of Decision
	\| publisher = Pearson Education
	\| pages = 111-116
	\| isbn = 0-321-01349-2 }}</ref></blockquote>

	Unanimously, the ] agreed that a full-scale attack and invasion was the only solution. They agreed that the Soviets would not act to stop the U.S. from conquering Cuba; Kennedy was skeptical, saying:

	<blockquote>They, no more than we, can let these things go by without doing something. They can't, after all their statements, permit us to take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians, and then do nothing. If they don't take action in Cuba, they certainly will in ].<ref>{{cite book
	\| last = Kennedy
	\| first = Robert
	\| authorlink = Robert F. Kennedy
	\| title = Thirteen Days: A memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis
	\| publisher = W.W. Norton & Company
	\| pages = 14
	\| isbn = 0-393-09896-6 }}</ref></blockquote>

	Kennedy concluded that attacking by air would signal the Soviets to presume "a clear line" to conquer Berlin. Adding that in taking such an action, the United States' allies would think of the U.S. as "trigger-happy cowboys" who lost Berlin because they could not peacefully resolve the Cuban situation.{{Fact\|date=January 2008}}

	]

	Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara supported the naval ] as a strong but limited military action that left the U.S. in control. Per ] a blockade is an act of war, but the Kennedy administration did not feel themselves limited, thinking the USSR would not be provoked to attack by a mere blockade.{{Fact\|date=March 2008}}

	On October 18 Kennedy met ], who emphasized that there were no offensive weapons in Cuba and that the ]'s involvement was in land reform and defense. Kennedy, however, had significant information on Soviet capabilities from the US-UK ], ].<ref name=NSAbulik>{{citation \| url = http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-21/bulik1.html
	\| title = Interview with Joe Bulik
	\| volume = George Washington University National Security Archive, oral histories
	}}</ref> Specifically, Kennedy knew that Soviet ]s were developing slowly, and that the Soviets would benefit by placing shorter-ranged ] (NATO reporting name; actual Soviet designation R-12 Dvina) and ] (NATO reporting name; actual Soviet designation R-15 Chusovaya) intermediate-range missiles in Cuba, much as the US had ] in ] and ] and ] IRBMs in the ]. US ICBM deployment was proceeding well enough that the US IRBMs were obsolete, and Kennedy could use them as bargaining chips.

	By October 19, frequent U-2 spy flights showed four operational sites. The ] was sent to ], and five army ] were alerted for maximal action. The ] (SAC) distributed its shorter-ranged ] ]s to civilian airports and sent aloft its ] ]s. While both types were on alert to be ready to attack, the key point of the B-52 airborne alert is that a bomber in the air is invulnerable to an attack on its base. Dispersing the B-47s presented the presumed enemy with a much harder mission of attacking every airfield containing bombers.

	Another ExComm war meeting showed that air attacks would kill 10,000 to 20,000 people. Another spy flight discovered bombers and cruise missiles on Cuba's north shore, and Kennedy authorized the blockade of Cuba.<ref></ref> When the press questioned him about Cuban offensive weapons, Kennedy told them to suppress their reports until after he addressed the nation; that evening he told ] and other allies.

	== Quarantine ==
	In customary international practice, a blockade stops all shipments into the blockaded area, and is considered an act of war. Quarantines are more selective, as, in this case, being limited to offensive weapons. While the original ] paper did use the term "blockade,"<blockquote>
	This initially was to involve a naval blockade against offensive weapons within the framework of the ] and the ]. Such a blockade might be expanded to cover all types of goods and air transport. The action was to be backed up by surveillance of Cuba. CNO's scenario was followed closely in later implementing the quarantine.<ref name=NHC-Intro>{{citation
	\| title = The Naval Quarantine of Cuba, 1962
	\| first = George Whelan Jr. (Chief of Naval Operations) \| last = Anderson
	\| chapter = Introduction
	\| authorlink = George Whelan Anderson, Jr.
	\| id = Report on the Naval Quarantine of Cuba, Operational Archives Branch, Post 46 Command File, Box 10, Washington, DC
	\| publisher = U.S. Naval Historical Center
	\| url = http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq90-5.htm
	}}</ref></blockquote>
	] ] paper, by differentiating between the quarantine of offensive weapons versus all materials, indicated that a classic blockade was not the original intention. Since it would take place in international waters, ] ] obtained the approval of the OAS for military action under the hemispheric defense provisions of the ] (i.e., the Rio Treaty). Latin American participation in the quarantine. <blockquote>Latin American participation in the quarantine now involved two Argentine destroyers which were to report to the U.S. Commander South Atlantic at Trinidad on November 9. An Argentine submarine and a Marine battalion with lift were available if required. In addition, two Venezuelan destroyers and one submarine had reported to COMSOLANT, ready for sea by 2 November. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago offered the use of Chaguaramas Naval Base to warships of any OAS nation for the duration of the quarantine. The Dominican Republic had made available one escort ship. Colombia was reported ready to furnish units and had sent military officers to the U.S. to discuss this assistance. The Argentine Air Force informally offered three SA-16 aircraft in addition to forces already committed to the quarantine operation.<ref name=NHC-Intro>{{citation
	\| title = The Naval Quarantine of Cuba, 1962
	\| first = George Whelan Jr. (Chief of Naval Operations) \| last = Anderson
	\| chapter = The Naval Quarantine of Cuba, 1962: Abeyance and Negotiation, 31 October -13 November
	\| authorlink = George Whelan Anderson, Jr.
	\| id = Report on the Naval Quarantine of Cuba, Operational Archives Branch, Post 46 Command File, Box 10, Washington, DC
	\| publisher = U.S. Naval Historical Center
	\| url = http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq90-5c.htm
	}}</ref></blockquote>
	] on October 23, 1962.]]

	At 7 p.m. October 22, President Kennedy delivered a televised radio address announcing the discovery of the missiles.

	== Crisis deepens ==
	Only an hour later, at 11:24 a.m. a cable drafted by ] to the U.S. Ambassador in Turkey and the U.S. Ambassador to ] notified them that they were considering making an offer to withdraw missiles from Turkey in exchange for a withdrawal from Cuba. Later, on the morning of October 25, journalist ] proposed the same thing in his syndicated column. For many years this has been interpreted as a ] floated by the Kennedy administration, although the historical record suggests this is not the case.{{Fact\|date=September 2007}}

	At the time the crisis continued unabated, and that evening ]{{Fact\|date=April 2008}} reported on an exchange of telegrams between Khrushchev and ], where Khrushchev warned that the United States' "pirate action" would lead to war. However this was followed at 9:24 p.m. by a telegram from Khrushchev to Kennedy which was received at 10:52 p.m., in which Khrushchev stated that "if you coolly weigh the situation which has developed, not giving way to passions, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot fail to reject the arbitrary demands of the United States", and that the Soviet Union views the blockade as "an act of aggression" and their ships will be instructed to ignore it.

	On the night of October 23, the ] instructed ] to go to ], for the only time in history. The message, and the response, were deliberately transmitted uncoded,{{Clarifyme\|date=March 2008}} in order to allow Soviet intelligence to capture them.<ref name=chronology/> ''Operation Falling Leaves'' quickly set up three radar bases to watch for missile launches from Cuba.{{Clarifyme\|date=March 2008}} The radars were experimental models ahead of their time. Each base was connected with a hotline to ] control.

	At 1:45 a.m. on October 25, Kennedy responded to Khrushchev's telegram, stating that the U.S. was forced into action after receiving repeated assurances that no offensive missiles were being placed in Cuba, and that when these assurances proved to be false, the deployment "required the responses I have announced... I hope that your government will take necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation."
	]

	At 7:15 a.m., the ] and ] attempted to intercept the ''Bucharest'' but failed to do so. Fairly certain the tanker did not contain any military material, it was allowed through the blockade. Later that day, at 5:43 p.m., the commander of the blockade effort ordered the ] to intercept and board the Lebanese freighter ''Marcula''. This took place the next day, and the ''Marcula'' was cleared through the blockade after its cargo was checked.

	At 5:00 p.m. Dean Rusk announced that the missiles in Cuba were still actively being worked on. This report was later verified by a CIA report that suggested there had been no slow-down at all. In response, Kennedy issued Security Action Memorandum 199, authorizing the loading of nuclear weapons onto aircraft under the command of ] (which had the duty of carrying out the first air strikes on the Soviet Union).

	The next morning, Kennedy informed the executive committee that he believed only an invasion would remove the missiles from Cuba. However, he was persuaded to give the matter time and continue with both military and diplomatic pressure. He agreed and ordered the low-level flights over the island to be increased from two per day to once every two hours. He also ordered a crash program to institute a new civil government in Cuba if an invasion went ahead.

	At this point the crisis was ostensibly at a stalemate. The USSR had shown no indication that they would back down and had made several comments to the contrary. The U.S. had no reason to believe otherwise and was in the early stages of preparing for an invasion, along with a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union in case they responded militarily, which was assumed.<ref name = GWUCubaAG>{{citation
	\| url = http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/620119%20Meeting%20with%20the%20Attorney%20Gen..pdf
	\| date = 19 January 1962
	\| title = Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence: Meeting with the Attorney General of the United States concerning Cuba
	\| author = Helms, Richard (Deputy Director for Plans, CIA)
	\| publisher = George Washington University National Security Archives
	}}</ref>

	== Secret negotiations==
	At 1:00 p.m., ] of ] had lunch with ] at Fomin's request. Fomin noted that "war seems about to break out" and asked Scali to use his contacts to talk to his "high-level friends" at the State Department to see if the U.S. would be interested in a diplomatic solution. He suggested that the language of the deal would contain an assurance from the Soviet Union to remove the weapons under UN supervision and that Castro would publicly announce not to accept such weapons in the future, in exchange for a public statement by the U.S. that they would never invade Cuba. The U.S. responded by asking the ]ian government to pass a message to Castro that the U.S. would be "unlikely to invade" if the missiles are removed.

	At 6:00 p.m. the State Department started receiving a message that appeared to be written personally by Khrushchev. Robert Kennedy described the letter as "very long and emotional". Khrushchev re-iterated the basic outline that had been stated to Scali earlier in the day, "I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships bound for Cuba are not carrying any armaments. You will declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any other forces which might intend to invade Cuba. Then the necessity of the presence of our military specialists in Cuba will disappear." At 6:45, news of Fomin's offer to Scali was finally heard and was interpreted as a "set up" for the arrival of Khrushchev's letter. The letter was then considered official and accurate, although it was later learned that Fomin was almost certainly operating of his own accord without official backing. Additional study of the letter was ordered and continued into the night.

	== Crisis continues ==
	] with V-750V 1D missile on a launcher. An installation similar to this one shot down Major Anderson's U-2 over Cuba.]]
	Castro, on the other hand, was convinced an invasion was soon at hand, and he dictated a letter to Khrushchev that appeared to call for a preemptive strike on the U.S. He also ordered all anti-aircraft weapons in Cuba to fire on any U.S. aircraft, whereas in the past they were ordered only to fire on groups of two or more. At 6:00 a.m. on October 27, the CIA delivered a memo reporting that three of the four missile sites at San Cristobal and the two sites at Sagua la Grande appeared to be fully operational. They also note that the Cuban military continued to organize for action, although they were under order not to initiate action unless attacked.

	At 9 a.m. ] began broadcasting a message from Khrushchev. Contrary to the letter of the night before, the message offered a new trade, that the missiles on Cuba would be removed in exchange for the removal of the Jupiters from Turkey. Throughout the crisis, Turkey had repeatedly stated they would be upset if the Jupiter missiles were removed. At 10 a.m. the executive committee met again to discuss the situation and came to the conclusion that the change in message was due to internal debate between Khrushchev and other party officials in the Kremlin<ref>For the Presidents Eyes Only, pg. 300</ref>. McNamara noted that another tanker, the ''Grozny'', was about {{convert\|600\|mi\|km\|-1}} out and should be intercepted. He also noted that they had not made the USSR aware of the quarantine line and suggested relaying this information to them via ] at the UN.
	]

	While the meeting progressed, at 11:03 a.m. a new message began to arrive from Khrushchev. The message stated, in part, "You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is ninety miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America. But... you have placed destructive missile weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey, literally next to us... I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive... Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States ... will remove its analogous means from Turkey ... and after that, persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges made." The executive committee continued to meet through the day.

	] shot down over ] on display at ] in ].]]
	That morning, a ] piloted by ] ], USAF had departed the U-2 forward operating location at ], Florida. At approximately 12:00pm Eastern Standard Time, the aircraft was shot down by an ] (NATO designation ]) SAM emplacement in Cuba, increasing the stress in negotiations between the USSR and the U.S. It was later learned that the decision to fire was made locally by an undetermined Soviet commander on his own authority. Later that day, at about 3:41 p.m., several U.S. Navy ] reconnaissance aircraft on low-level photoreconnaissance missions were fired upon, and one was hit by a 37 mm shell but managed to return to base.
	At 4 p.m. Kennedy recalled the executive committee to the ] and ordered that a message immediately be sent to U Thant asking if the Soviets would "suspend" work on the missiles while negotiations are carried out. During this meeting, Maxwell Taylor delivered the news that the U-2 had been shot down. Kennedy had earlier claimed he would order an attack on such sites if fired upon, but he decided to leave the matter unless another attack was made. In an interview 40 years later, McNamara remembers:<blockquote>
	We had to send a U-2 over to gain reconnaissance information on whether the Soviet missiles were becoming operational. We believed that if the U-2 was shot down that—the Cubans didn't have capabilities to shoot it down, the Soviets did—we believed if it was shot down, it would be shot down by a Soviet surface-to-air-missile unit, and that it would represent a decision by the Soviets to escalate the conflict. And therefore, before we sent the U-2 out, we agreed that if it was shot down we wouldn't meet, we'd simply attack. It was shot down on Friday . Fortunately, we changed our mind, we thought "Well, it might have been an accident, we won't attack." Later we learned Khrushchev reasoned just as we did: we send over the U-2, if it was shot down, he reasoned we would believe it was an intentional escalation. And therefore, he issued orders to Pliyev, the Soviet commander in Cuba, to instruct all of his batteries not to shoot down the U-2. </blockquote>

	== Drafting the response ==
	Throughout the meeting, Kennedy suggested they take up Khrushchev's offer to trade away the missiles. Unknown to most members of the EXCOMM, Robert Kennedy had been meeting with the USSR Ambassador in Washington to discover whether these intentions were genuine. The EXCOMM was generally against the proposal because it would undermine NATO, and the Turkish government had repeatedly stated they were against any such trade.

	As the meeting progressed, a new plan emerged and Kennedy was slowly won over. The new plan called for the President to ignore the latest message and return to Khrushchev's earlier one. Kennedy was initially hesitant, feeling that Khrushchev would no longer accept the deal because a new one had been offered, but ] argued that he might accept it anyway. White House Special Counsel and Advisor ] and Robert Kennedy left the meeting and returned 45 minutes later with a draft letter to this effect. The President made several changes, had it typed, and sent it.

	After the EXCOMM meeting, a smaller meeting continued in the ]. The group argued that the letter should be underscored with an oral message to Ambassador Dobrynin stating that if the missiles were not withdrawn, military action would be used to remove them. Dean Rusk added one proviso, that no part of the language of the deal would mention Turkey, but there would be an understanding that the missiles would be removed "voluntarily" in the immediate aftermath. The President agreed, and the message was sent.

	]

	At Juan Brito's request, Fomin and Scali met again. Scali asked why the two letters from Khrushchev were so different, and Fomin claimed it was because of "poor communications". Scali replied that the claim was not credible and shouted that he thought it was a "stinking double cross". He went on to claim that an invasion was only hours away, at which point Fomin stated that a response to the U.S. message was expected from Khrushchev shortly, and he urged Scali to tell the State Department no treachery was intended. Scali said that he did not think anyone would believe him, but he agreed to deliver the message. The two went their separate ways, and Scali immediately typed out a memo for the EXCOMM.

	Within the U.S. establishment it was well understood that ignoring the second offer and returning to the first put Khrushchev in a terrible position. Military preparations continued, and all active duty Air Force personnel were recalled to base for possible action. Robert Kennedy later recalled the mood, "We had not abandoned all hope, but what hope there was now rested with Khrushchev's revising his course within the next few hours. It was a hope, not an expectation. The expectation was military confrontation by Tuesday, and possibly tomorrow..."

	At 8:05 p.m. the letter drafted earlier in the day was delivered. The message read, "As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals—which seem generally acceptable as I understand them—are as follows: 1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safe-guards, to halt the further introduction of such weapon systems into Cuba. 2) We, on our part, would agree—upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations, to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against the invasion of Cuba." The letter was also released directly to the press to ensure it could not be "delayed."

	With the letter delivered a deal was on the table. However, as Robert Kennedy noted, there was little expectation it would be accepted. At 9 p.m. the EXCOMM met again to review the actions for the following day. Plans were drawn up for air strikes on the missile sites as well as other economic targets, notably petroleum storage. McNamara stated that they had to "have two things ready: a government for Cuba, because we're going to need one, and secondly, plans for how to respond to the Soviet Union in Europe, because sure as hell they're going to do something there".

	At 12:12 a.m.on October 27, the U.S. informed its NATO allies that "the situation is growing shorter... the United States may find it necessary within a very short time in its interest and that of its fellow nations in the Western Hemisphere to take whatever military action may be necessary." To add to the concern, at 6 a.m. the CIA reported that all missiles in Cuba were ready for action.

	== Ending the crisis of 1962 ==

	After much deliberation between the Soviet Union and Kennedy's cabinet, Kennedy agreed to remove all missiles set in Turkey on the border of the Soviet Union in exchange for Khrushchev removing all missiles in Cuba.

	At 9 a.m. on October 28, a new message from Khrushchev was broadcast on Radio Moscow. Khrushchev stated "the Soviet government, in addition to previously issued instructions on the cessation of further work at the building sites for the weapons, has issued a new order on the dismantling of the weapons which you describe as 'offensive' and their crating and return to the Soviet Union."

	Kennedy immediately responded, issuing a statement calling the letter "an important and constructive contribution to peace". He continued this with a formal letter: "I consider my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out... The U.S. will make a statement in the framework of the Security Council in reference to Cuba as follows: It will declare that the United States of America will respect the inviolability of Cuban borders, its sovereignty, that it take the pledge not to interfere in internal affairs, not to intrude themselves and not to permit our territory to be used as a bridgehead for the invasion of Cuba, and will restrain those who would plan to carry an aggression against Cuba, either from U.S. territory or from the territory of other countries neighboring to Cuba."<ref name=Faria>Faria p. 103</ref>

	The practical effect of this Kennedy-Khrushchev Pact was that it effectively strengthened Castro's position in Cuba in that he would not be invaded by the United States. It is possible that Khrushchev only placed the missiles in Cuba to get Kennedy to remove the missiles from Turkey and that the Soviets had no intention of resorting to nuclear war when they were out-gunned by the Americans. However because the withdrawals from Turkey were not made public at the time, Khrushchev appeared to have lost the conflict and become weakened. The perception was that Kennedy had won the contest between the superpowers and Khrushchev had been humiliated. However this is not entirely the case as both Kennedy and Khrushchev took every step to avoid full out conflict despite the pressures of people in their governments. Khrushchev would hold on to power for another two years.<ref name=Faria>Faria p. 102-105</ref>

	== Aftermath ==

	The compromise was a particularly sharp embarrassment for Khrushchev and the Soviet Union because the withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey was not made public—it was a secret deal between Kennedy and Khrushchev. The Russians were seen as retreating from circumstances that they had started — though if played well, it could have looked like just the opposite.
	Khrushchev's fall from power two years later can be partially linked to ] embarrassment at both Khrushchev's eventual concessions to the U.S. and his ineptitude in precipitating the crisis in the first place. However, the Cuban Missile Crisis was not solely responsible for the fall of Khrushchev. The main reason was that rival politicians such as ] believed that Khrushchev did not have enough "power" to handle international crises{{Fact\|date=August 2007}}.

	For Cuba, it was a partial betrayal by the Soviets, given that decisions on how to resolve the crisis had been made exclusively by Kennedy and Khrushchev, and certain issues of interest to Cuba, such as the status of Guantanamo, were not addressed. This caused deteriorated Cuban-Soviet relations for years afterward.<ref>Ramonet, Ignacio, ''Fidel Castro: My Life''. Penguin Books: 2007, p. 278. ISBN 978-0-1410-2626-8</ref> On the other hand, Cuba continued to be protected from invasion.

	One U.S. military commander was not happy with the result either. General LeMay told the President that it was "the greatest defeat in our history" and that the U.S. should invade immediately.

	The Cuban Missile Crisis spurred the creation of the ], a direct communications link between Moscow and Washington D.C. The purpose of this facility was to have a way the leaders of the two Cold War countries could communicate directly to better solve a crisis like the one in October 1962.

	Various commentators (Melman, 1988; Hersh, 1997) also suggest that the Cuban Missile Crisis encouraged US use of military means, such as in the ].

	This Russo-American confrontation was synchronous with the ], dating from the U.S.'s military quarantine of Cuba; historians speculate that the ] attack against ], for disputed land, was meant to coincide with the Cuban Missile Crisis.<ref> Note alleged connections to Cuban Missile Crisis</ref>

	== Historical notes ==
	] shows aerial photos of Cuban missiles to the United Nations in November 1962.]]
	], historian and adviser to John F. Kennedy, on ] on October 16, 2002, concluded that Castro had not wanted the missiles but that Khrushchev had forced them upon Cuba in a bit of political arm-twisting and "socialist solidarity." However, Castro has said that although he was not completely happy about the idea of the missiles in Cuba, the Cuban National Directorate of the Revolution accepted them to protect Cuba against U.S. attack, and to aid their ally, the Soviet Union.<ref>Ramonet, Ignacio, ''ibid'', p. 272</ref> Schlesinger believed that, having accepted the missiles, Castro was angrier with Khrushchev than he was at Kennedy when the missiles were withdrawn, because Khrushchev had not consulted Castro prior to deciding to remove them from Cuba.<ref>In his biography, Castro does not compare his feelings for either leader at that moment, however he makes it clear that he was angry with Khrushchev for lack of consultation. See Ramonet, Ignacio, ''Fidel Castro: My Life''. Penguin Books: 2007, pp. 284-5. ISBN 978-0-1410-2626-8</ref>

	In early 1992 it was confirmed that key Soviet forces in Cuba had, by the time the crisis broke, received tactical nuclear warheads for their ] and ],<ref name="aca"></ref> though ], part of the Soviet staff responsible for the operation, stated that the local Soviet commander, General ], had predelegated authority to use them if the U.S. had mounted a full-scale invasion of Cuba. Gribkov misspoke: the ]'s authorization remained unsigned and undelivered.<!--dead link<ref>http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2006/summer/pdfs/art6-su06.pdf</ref>-->{{Fact\|date=March 2008}} (Other accounts show that Pliyev was given permission to use tactical nuclear warheads but only in the most extreme case of an U.S. invasion during which contact with Moscow is lost. However when U.S. forces seemed to be readying for an attack (after the U-2 photos, but before Kennedy's television address), Khrushchev rescinded his earlier permission for Pliyev to use the tactical nuclear weapons, even under the most extreme conditions.)

	Castro has stated that he knew during the crisis that the warheads had indeed reached Cuba, and that he had recommended their use, despite being sure that Cuba would be completely destroyed should nuclear war break out.<ref name="aca"/>

	In October 1997, The John F. Kennedy Library released a set of tape recordings documenting the crisis for the period October 18 to October 29, 1962. These recordings were made in the Oval Office. They include President Kennedy's personal recollections of discussions, conversations with his advisors, meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and members of the president's executive committee.

	Arguably the most dangerous moment in the crisis was unrecognized until the ] in October 2002, attended by many of the veterans of the crisis, at which it was learned that on October 26, 1962 the ] had depth-charged an unidentified submarine which was in fact Soviet and armed with nuclear weapons. An argument broke out among the three commanders with ] being against their use. He is thus credited with averting the breakout of nuclear war at that moment.

	==In popular culture==
	]'s ] '']'' is set in ], ], during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It portrays a B-movie producer (played by ]) who brings to Key West a movie about a man turning into a giant ] due to exposure to ], hoping that the nuclear scare will heighten the mood.

	The movie '']'' portrays a family who hides in a ] during the Cuban Missile Crisis, emerging over thirty years later, unaccustomed to the modern world.

	The movie '']'' focuses on the career of John Kennedy's associate ] (played by ]) during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

	== See also ==
	{{portalpar\|Cuba\|Flag of Cuba.svg}}
	*]
	*]
	*]
	*]
	*]
	*]
	*]
	*]
	*'']'' - book written by ]
	*'']''
	*''] - 1974 ] about the crisis.
	*]
	*], which occurred at the same time as the Crisis.
	*], 1983 NATO training exercise seen by the USSR as start of a nuclear attack.
	*], 1995 scientific experiment initially seen as nuclear attack by Russia.
	*], a US Navy Task Force will challenge the Russian Black Sea Fleet blockade of Georgia.<ref>http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4526433.ece</ref>

	== Notes ==
	{{Reflist\|2}}

	== References ==
	The short time span of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the extensive documentation of the decision-making processes on both sides makes it an excellent case study for analysis of state decision-making. In the '']'', ] and ] use the crisis to illustrate multiple approaches to analyzing the actions of the state.

	It was also a substantial focus of the 2003 documentary '']'', which won an ].

	*Allison, Graham and Zelikow, P. ''Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis''; New York: Longman, 1999.
	*Blight, James G., and David A. Welch. ''On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis''; New York: Hill and Wang, 1989.
	*Chayes, Abram. ''The Cuban Missile Crisis, International Crisis and the Role of Law''; Oxford University Press, 1974; 2nd ed., 1987.
	*Diez Acosta, Tomás, ''October 1962: The 'Missile' Crisis As Seen From Cuba''; Pathfinder Press, New York, 2002.
	*Divine, Robert A. ''The Cuban Missile Crisis''; New York: M. Wiener Pub.,1988.
	*Faria, Miguel, ''Cuba in Revolution--Escape from a Lost Paradise''(2002); Hacienda Publishing, Macon, Georgia, ISBN 0-9641077-3-2. http://www.haciendapub.com
	*Frankel, Max, ''High Noon in the Cold War''; Ballantine Books, 2004; Presidio Press (reprint), 2005; ISBN 0-345-46671-3.
	*Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Naftali, Timothy; ''One Hell of a Gamble - Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy 1958-1964''; W.W. Norton (New York 1998)
	*Fursenko, Aleksandr; ''''; Naval War College Review, vol. 59, no. 3 (Summer 2006).
	*{{cite book\|last=George\|first=Alice L.\|title=Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis\|year=2006\|publisher=University of North Carolina Press\|id=ISBN 0807828289}}
	*Gonzalez, Servando ''The Nuclear Deception: Nikita Khrushchev and the Cuban Missile Crisis''; IntelliBooks, 2002; ISBN 0-
	9711391-5-6.
	*Kennedy, Robert F. ''Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis''; ISBN 0-393-31834-6.
	*Khrushchev, Sergei, ''How my father and President Kennedy saved the world''; American Heritage magazine, October 2002 issue.
	* May, Ernest R. (editor); Zelikow, Philip D. (editor), ''The Kennedy Tapes : Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis''; Belknap Press, 1997; ISBN 0-674-17926-9.
	*Polmar, Norman and Gresham, John D. (foreword by Clancy, Tom) ''DEFCON – 2: Standing on the Brink of Nuclear War During the Cuban Missile Crisis''; Wiley, 2006; ISBN 0-471-67022-7.
	*Pope, Ronald R., ''Soviet Views on the Cuban Missile Crisis: Myth and Reality in Foreign Policy Analysis''; University Press of America, 1982.
	*Stern, Sheldon M., ''Averting the Final Failure: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings''; Stanford University Press, 2003; ISBN 0804748462
	*{{cite book\|last=Stern\|first=Sheldon M.\|title=The Week The World Stood Still: Inside The Secret Cuban Missile Crisis (Stanford Nuclear Age Series)\|publisher=Stanford University Press\|year=2005\|id=ISBN 0804750777}}
	*The Cuban Missile Crisis: Declassified (Television Program)

	== External links ==
	*
	*(.pdf, 354 pgs.) U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, McAuliffe, M. ed., CIA History Staff, 1992.
	* of the ] in the series, ], Office of the Historian, Keefer, E., Sampson, C., & Smith, L., Eds., ], Washington, D.C., 1996. The official U.S. documentary historical record.
	* - Provided by the ] at ].
	*Declassified "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense" on "Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba," from the ], Washington, D.C., March 13, 1962, ], at ].
	* - Provided by the .
	*
	*
	*
	* - a site geared toward high-school students
	* Introduction, timeline and articles regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis
	* Bye Bye Havana is a documentary revealing what Cubans are thinking about today
	*
	*
	*
	* - '''Latin American Task Force'''
	* - '''Latin American Task Force''' {{es icon}}
	*
	* ] streaming audio programme on the British response
	----
	{{Cuba-United States relations}}
	{{Cold War}}

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