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Revision as of 10:34, 9 November 2008 editSineBot (talk | contribs)Bots2,555,318 editsm Signing comment by 79.221.68.11 - "polish rubbish"← Previous edit Revision as of 04:22, 14 November 2008 edit undoBotPuppet (talk | contribs)5,110 editsm BOT: substituting template per WP:SUBST, Replaced: {unsigned → {subst:unsigned (2)Next edit →
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::Although, as encircling neared completion, a breakdown in communications occurred which rendered these intercepts as strategically less important. ::Although, as encircling neared completion, a breakdown in communications occurred which rendered these intercepts as strategically less important.


::See Solzhenitsyn's description (using research from the Ukraine) of dispatches proving far more effective. {{unsigned|203.112.80.138|00:22, 12 April 2006 (UTC)}} ::See Solzhenitsyn's description (using research from the Ukraine) of dispatches proving far more effective. <small><span class="autosigned">—Preceding ] comment added by ] (] • ]) 00:22, 12 April 2006 (UTC)</span></small><!-- Template:Unsigned -->
:::While I'm not in a position to dispute Solzhenitsyn's research (not having read his book), I'm inclined to believe Kahn, who's usually very reliable. As well, on the same point, the article says, "Nevertheless they were eventually convinced they were indeed real". Beyond the bad grammar, I'd be interested to know '''how''' they were convinced, which leads me to believe it '''was''' from decrypts. I'm willing to bet (based on WW2 experience) Russian radio operators were panicky & sending poorly, giving the German intercept service an EZ time, perhaps even sending ''en clair'', but I'd like solid evidence from somebody with a specialty in crypto or intelligence. ] 10:13, 10 April 2007 (UTC) :::While I'm not in a position to dispute Solzhenitsyn's research (not having read his book), I'm inclined to believe Kahn, who's usually very reliable. As well, on the same point, the article says, "Nevertheless they were eventually convinced they were indeed real". Beyond the bad grammar, I'd be interested to know '''how''' they were convinced, which leads me to believe it '''was''' from decrypts. I'm willing to bet (based on WW2 experience) Russian radio operators were panicky & sending poorly, giving the German intercept service an EZ time, perhaps even sending ''en clair'', but I'd like solid evidence from somebody with a specialty in crypto or intelligence. ] 10:13, 10 April 2007 (UTC)
:::Haufler says sigs sent ''en clair''; I'd prefer a more reliable source... ] 17:22, 3 May 2008 (UTC) :::Haufler says sigs sent ''en clair''; I'd prefer a more reliable source... ] 17:22, 3 May 2008 (UTC)
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==The Conclusion== ==The Conclusion==
Excuse me... but the conclusion "this battle lost the war" lacks anything even remotely close to logic. Could you please explain? The diversion of the troops was not an effect of the battle itself but of that of the German High Command DECIDING TO TRANSFER THEM. They didn't even take part in the battle so their transfer to the Eastern front is irelevant for the battle, as is the battle irelevant for their transfer. The troops were transfered to stop the huge Russian advance into Eastern Poland which (NOT to win this battle specifically), without this great and surprising victory, might have ended the war in 1914 in favour of the Entente. The decision was logical anyway... what proffesional soldier could have thought 1 army could defeat 2 armies on such wide front without any geographical advantages? {{unsigned|Makidonu|11:01, 7 October 2006 (UTC)}} Excuse me... but the conclusion "this battle lost the war" lacks anything even remotely close to logic. Could you please explain? The diversion of the troops was not an effect of the battle itself but of that of the German High Command DECIDING TO TRANSFER THEM. They didn't even take part in the battle so their transfer to the Eastern front is irelevant for the battle, as is the battle irelevant for their transfer. The troops were transfered to stop the huge Russian advance into Eastern Poland which (NOT to win this battle specifically), without this great and surprising victory, might have ended the war in 1914 in favour of the Entente. The decision was logical anyway... what proffesional soldier could have thought 1 army could defeat 2 armies on such wide front without any geographical advantages? <small><span class="autosigned">—Preceding ] comment added by ] (] • ]) 11:01, 7 October 2006 (UTC)</span></small><!-- Template:Unsigned -->


== Britain: A factor in the Schlieffen Plan? == == Britain: A factor in the Schlieffen Plan? ==

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Numbers

Can someone check into the Russion numbers? My reading indicates that Samsonov had 150,000 troops and Rennenkampf had 200,000, but the box shows 150,000 for both Samsonov and Rennenkampf. I don't think this is correct, but I don't have any resources handy at the moment. Perhaps the box is referring to those troops that were actually present at Tannenberg, but in this case, then Rennenkampf should not be listed as a commander. CrackWilding 17:45, 30 November 2006 (UTC)

I corrected the numbers. cheers 141.13.8.14 16:29, 4 January 2007 (UTC)

Revenge

The Germans may have "redeemed" themselves by winning in the same location as the loss in 1410, but how exactly did they get revenge if they were fighting the Russians and not the Poles? Did Hindenburg really view this as "revenge", or is it just a poor choice of words? Appleseed 15:13, 2 September 2005 (UTC)

I've removed the following line from the end of the article:
Hindenburg saw this battle as a fitting revenge for the defeat of the Teutonic Knights.
Feel free to put it back in with an explanation or reference. Appleseed 16:59, 18 September 2005 (UTC)
There were Russians at Grunwald (from Smolensk and other cities within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) and there were Poles at Tannenberg (as Poland was part of the Russian Empire). Moreover, Hindenburg saw the battle as revenge against Slavs, not Russians specifically. In Russia, the PLC is often called "Litovskaja Rus'", or "Lithuanian Russia", since it contained huge tracts of Kievan Rus' lands and one of its official languages was "Russian" (Ruthenian). Kazak 05:03, 3 January 2006 (UTC)
Nevertheless, would you mind providing a reference? Appleseed (Talk) 02:21, 24 February 2006 (UTC)
AFAIK, there are no proofs of the presence of Smolensk units at Grunwald. Nevertheless, the Hindenburg's words seems logical. Teutons were defeted by the united forces of Grand Duchy of Lithuania (Lithuanians, Belorussians and Ukrainians) and the Kingdom of Poland (Poles). Possibly, there were also Russians from Smolensk in the army. In the 1914 none of those states existed any more, all of them were now provinces of the Russian Empire. The Empire stated itself as a rightful successor of those countries, so it was logical for Hindenburg to treat the defeat of Russia as a "revenge". User:AMartyn 11:10, 30 August 2006.

I also think it has something to do with Russia pretending to be the Pan-slavic country that all slavs should live in, and proclaimed itself protector of all Slavs, hence why they backed up Serbia.

--Jadger 03:51, 9 February 2007 (UTC)

Encrypted

Kahn's Codebreakers indicates the Russian signals were encrypted, & broken by the Germans, not sent en clair. Can someone settle the dispute? Trekphiler 05:24, 29 November 2005 (UTC)

The latter explanation is the one I have seen up to now. However it might be worth looking into this. PatGallacher 11:38, 15 February 2006 (UTC)
In the book August 1914 Solzhenitsyn cites the interception of "unencrypted signals" as of vital importance. As the battle progressed and lines of communication were breached- these interceptions became more frequent and disasterous for the trapped centre Corps.
Although, as encircling neared completion, a breakdown in communications occurred which rendered these intercepts as strategically less important.
See Solzhenitsyn's description (using research from the Ukraine) of dispatches proving far more effective. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 203.112.80.138 (talkcontribs) 00:22, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
While I'm not in a position to dispute Solzhenitsyn's research (not having read his book), I'm inclined to believe Kahn, who's usually very reliable. As well, on the same point, the article says, "Nevertheless they were eventually convinced they were indeed real". Beyond the bad grammar, I'd be interested to know how they were convinced, which leads me to believe it was from decrypts. I'm willing to bet (based on WW2 experience) Russian radio operators were panicky & sending poorly, giving the German intercept service an EZ time, perhaps even sending en clair, but I'd like solid evidence from somebody with a specialty in crypto or intelligence. Trekphiler 10:13, 10 April 2007 (UTC)
Haufler says sigs sent en clair; I'd prefer a more reliable source... Trekphiler 17:22, 3 May 2008 (UTC)

War Memorial

I cannot find the article on the Tannenberg war memorial, perhaps something could be added at the end of this article, or if I am missing it, a link to the war memorial article. thanks --Jadger 03:28, 14 April 2006 (UTC)

nevermind, I found it. --Jadger 03:38, 14 April 2006 (UTC)

The Conclusion

Excuse me... but the conclusion "this battle lost the war" lacks anything even remotely close to logic. Could you please explain? The diversion of the troops was not an effect of the battle itself but of that of the German High Command DECIDING TO TRANSFER THEM. They didn't even take part in the battle so their transfer to the Eastern front is irelevant for the battle, as is the battle irelevant for their transfer. The troops were transfered to stop the huge Russian advance into Eastern Poland which (NOT to win this battle specifically), without this great and surprising victory, might have ended the war in 1914 in favour of the Entente. The decision was logical anyway... what proffesional soldier could have thought 1 army could defeat 2 armies on such wide front without any geographical advantages? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Makidonu (talkcontribs) 11:01, 7 October 2006 (UTC)

Britain: A factor in the Schlieffen Plan?

Paragraph 3 contains the sentence, "The entire Schlieffen Plan was based on the idea of defeating France and England as quickly as possible, and then transporting their armies by train to the eastern front." I'm not sure that the entry of Britain was taken into consideration in the original Schlieffen Plan. Britain and France were not allies at the start of the German invasion and Britain only entered the war in response to Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality. Did von Schlieffen take British entry in consideration? --Beetfarm Louie 20:10, 17 December 2006 (UTC)

personally, I don't think so, everything I have heard on the matter is that Germany was reliant on UK remaining neutral, but you must remember the Schlieffen Plan was devised before Wilhelm II started the Naval Arms Race with Britain, which severely worsened the Anglo-German relations (and the Brits were itchin for a good fight just like everyone else in 1914). also I would like to point out in that sentence it says "The entire Schlieffen Plan was based on the idea of defeating France and England as quickly as possible, and then transporting their armies by train to the eastern front." this makes it seem as if the Germans were going to transport the Anglo-French forces to the eastern Front, a little misplaced subject in the sentence. should probably be "all German Forces" instead of "their armies"
--Jadger 20:22, 17 December 2006 (UTC)

Who was in command?

Were Hindenburg and Ludendorff really in command of the German army during the battle of tannenberg? In a history forum (http://forum.paradoxplaza.com/forum/showthread.php?t=282318) someone claimed that a certain Colonel Hoffman was actually in charge and reponsible for the victory, a wikipedia article (http://en.wikipedia.org/Max_Hoffmann) actually supports this. Has anyone more knowledge about this matter? thestor 10:41, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

Max Hoffman was a staff colonel who had already drawn up much of the planning for the German riposte at Tannenberg even before Ludendorff and Hindenburg arrived on the scene. In the German system, staff officers like Hoffman actually did much of the planning, not the commanders in the field. Hoffman was originally on the staff of General Prittwitz, who was fired after demanding to be allowed to retreat to the Vistula (abandoning a huge chunk of German territory), in the face of the Russian attack. To answer your question...yes, Hindenburg and Ludendorff were in command. But Hoffman, with an assist from Hermann von Francois' disobedience, was the architect of the victory. user:Jsc1973

Olzstyn or Olzstynek?

Shouldn't the location of the battle be Hohenstein (the modern town of Olsztynek), instead of Allenstein (modern Olsztyn) as currently stated in the article? Olsztyn is located much more to the north and, moreover, it is in fact Olsztynek the place near Grunwald. --83.49.214.110 (talk) 12:46, 25 January 2008 (UTC) (User Oersted from Catalan wiki)

Ok, I answered myself. Olsztyn is not much more to the north, just 30 km north of Olsztynek, but it is a much more important city, so in fact, it's perfectly correct to state "near Allenstein (modern Olsztyn)". Sorry for the misunderstanding. --83.49.214.110 (talk) 12:56, 25 January 2008 (UTC)

Destruction of the Tannenberg Monument

The Tannenberg Monument was destroyed by German army engineers and not by Russians (Soviets?) and poles. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 79.221.68.11 (talk) 10:33, 9 November 2008 (UTC)










Hey! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 162.127.134.27 (talk) 15:22, 30 January 2008 (UTC)

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