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The administrative law of the United States encompasses a number of statutes and cases which define the extent of the powers and responsibilities held by administrative agencies in the United States.

Scope of administrative authority

The authority of administrative agencies stems from their organic statute, and must be consistent with constitutional constraints and legislative intent. Generally speaking, therefore, agencies do not have the power to enact a regulation where:

1. The regulation is an unconstitutional delegation of power;
2. Or the organic statute explicitly denies authority (Note that failure to grant authority in later legislative efforts is not dispositive);
3. Or Congress has enacted a separate regulatory scheme;
4. Or the regulation is not based on factual findings;
5. Or the regulation is not pursuant to serving the "public convenience, interest, or necessity;"
6. Or the regulation is outside the agency's statutory purpose as articulated in its organic statute.

Cases holding for agency authority:

• NBC v. US, holding that an agency may enact regulations in an area it is permitted to regulate, even if the regulations are not specifically authorized by statute, where the regulations are necessary to serve the agency's statutory purpose.
• US v. Southwestern Cable Co., holding that an agency may regulate technologies not contemplated in the statute where the technologies were unknown at the time of the enactment of the statute, and the regulations are necessary to serve the agency's statutory purpose.

Cases holding against agency authority:

• FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., holding that an agency may not regulate in areas in which Congress has enacted legislation independent of the agency, did not grant authority at the time of the enacting of the statute, and the agency has traditionally not regulated in that area.
• ICC v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Co. (superseded by later case law), holding that an agency may not enact regulations where the power to enact the regulations is not explicitly granted by the agency's organic statute.

Adjudicative versus rule-making acts

Agency acts are divided into two broad categories: rulemaking and adjudication. The scope of these two categories is defined in three ways:

Londoner/Bimetallic definition

Factors tending to make an act adjudicative in nature:

• Involving a small number of people
• Individuals involved are specially affected by the act
• Decision based on the facts of an individual case, rather than policy concerns

Cases in which an act was ruled to be adjudicative:

• Londoner v. City and County of Denver, involving a tax levied on residents of a particular street without affording them the opportunity to have their objections heard in person.

Cases in which an act was ruled to be rulemaking:

• Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, involving a tax levied on the entire city of Denver.

Administrative Procedure Act

According to section 551 of the Administrative Procedure Act,

• Rulemaking is "an agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule."
  • A rule in turn is "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy;"
• Adjudication is "an agency process for the formulation of an order;"
  • An order in turn is "the whole or part of a final disposition ... of an agency in a matter other than rule making but including licensing;"

Attorney General's Manual on the APA 14-15

• Rulemaking is legislative in nature because it operates in the future and is primarily concerned with policy considerations, while adjudication is judicial in nature, and primarily concerned with the conduct and rights of an individual relative to a rule;
• Rulemaking governs future conduct, while adjudications governs past and present rights and liabilities;
• Rulemaking issues relate primarily to policy, while adjudication issues relate primarily to evidence

Adjudication

Right to a hearing

There are three ways that an individual can attain the right to a hearing in an adjudicative hearing:

• The Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment, providing an absolute constitutional floor, as summarized in the Mathews v. Eldridge test.
• A State or Federal Administrative Procedure Act, which prescribes procedures only for formal adjudication;
• The agency's organic statute, which may exceed those required by the former two;

Right to a hearing based on Due process

There are three issues involved in the constitutional right to a hearing:

• Whether a hearing is required
• When the hearing must be held (pre-termination or post-termination)
• What the hearing must entail

Whether a hearing is required

Generally speaking, in order to gain the benefits of due process, a claimant must show that he had a property right in what he is being deprived of. Such a property right consists of a legal entitlement, or reasonable expectation of continued benefit from the government, whether in the context of government employment, welfare benefits, or licensing.

Government employment:

To maintain such a claim, the claimant must show that he has a legitimate expectation of continued employment. Such an expectation can be established by showing:

• • The terms of the statute or contract (for instance, if the statute or contract allows termination only for cause)
  • Organizational policies and understandings (such as tenure policies) which lead to a reasonable expectation of continued employment (Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)

However, employees are not entitled to employment simply by virtue of being employed.

If one is employed at will, the employer holds the right to terminate at any time, with or without cause. (Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir 1950))

Employees are not entitled to renewed employment when old employment expires (Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972))

Welfare benefits implicate due process.

Reputation alone does not implicate due process, but may implicate due process if some legal right is infringed.

• Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, holding that due process was not implicated where a man arrested but whose charge was outstanding complained about posters put up in stores which named him as an active shoplifter.
• Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), holding that due process was implicated where the state posted an individual's name, resulting in a prohibition on selling alcohol to that individual.
• Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, holding that the designation of an organization as a terrorist organization implicated due process, because it affected the right to hold bank accounts or receive material support in the United States.

Which procedures are required

In determining which procedures are required, the Court is to balance three factors (Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)):

1. The interests of the individual in retaining their property, and the injury threatened;
2. The costs of the process, and the interests of the government in efficient adjudication
3. The risk of error due to inadequate procedures

Social security benefits

Recipients are not entitled to a pre-termination hearing, but are entitled to a post-termination hearing (Mathews v. Eldridge)

Welfare benefits

Recipients are entitled to a pre-termination hearing

Employment

Where an employee has a property right in employment (as discussed above), he is entitled to a pre-termination hearing.

School suspension

Students are entitled to presuspension hearing barring special circumstances. (Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)

• • The right is grounded in statutory right and compulsory nature of education
  • Suspension affects opportunities for future education + employment

Only “an informal give and take between student + pupil” is necessary

'Corporal punishment in schools

No due process protections are implicated (Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).

• • Corporal punishment without a hearing is traditional – so the burden is on the proponents to show it is unreasonable.
  • Tort remedy is sufficient to deal with cases of excessive punishment.
  • Ex parte property confiscation hearings are inherently insufficient (United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993)

Applicability of APA

There are two broad approaches to determining formal adjudication under the APA: the Seacost Anti-Pollution League approach, and the Chemical Waste Management approach. As of March 2005, the Supreme Court has issued no definitive ruling on the issue.

Under the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League approach:

• The act is one of adjudication;
• and the adjudicative act is is required by statute to be determined on record after opportunity for agency hearing;
• Also, it will be under the APA if the it is subject to judicial review, unless otherwise provided by statute;

But:

• The precise words "on the record" are not required to be used to trigger the Administrative Procedure Act -- but it is an open question whether a public hearing requirement without "on the record" triggers the APA.
• Resolution of the issue turns on substantive nature of hearing Congress intended to provide.

Under the Chemical Waste Management approach, a statutory requirement for a public hearing does not automatically trigger formal adjudication procedures, but is merely one factor among several.

• Courts will generally defer to the agency's construction, based on legislative history, structural inferences, or exceptional circumstances
• Should the agency interpret the statute as not requiring formal adjudication, the burden will be on the proponent to show that it does

Third parties and intervention

Within the Federal APA, legal standing, or the right to to participate or intervene in an administrative hearing, is more liberally granted than legal standing in judicial hearings. To have standing in an administrative hearing, a party must:

• Submit a motion in writing with copies served to all parties named in agency’s pleading;
• Submit the motion as early as practicable before hearing
• Submit a motion stating specific facts demonstrating that applicant’s legal rights, duties, privileges, and/or immunities will be substantially affected by the proceeding or qualifies as intervenor under a statute or reg. (i.e “substantial affect by decision”)

However, in order to seek judicial review of the decision, a party must meet the requirements of legal standing according to article 3 of the U.S. Constitution.

Evidence and proof issues

Evidence and proof issues are slightly different in administrative hearings than in judicial hearings.

Rules of evidence

Hearsay may be admissible in informal administrative hearings, even where it would not be admissible in judicial hearings, as long as its admission is fundamentally fair. Specifically, hearsay in the form of medical reports may be admissible in Social Security review hearings, where the party adversely affected by the evidence has the right to subpoena the doctor, but does not exercise his right. Administrative hearings need not adhere to all the formalities of the judicial process, as long as they are fundamentally fair. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).

Burden and standard of proof

According to Section 7(c) of the Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d), the burden of proof is on the proponent of a rule or order. The standard of proof in adjudicative actions under the APA is preponderance of the evidence. Steadman v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 U.S. 91 (1981) (inferring the standard of proof from legislative history, although it was not explicit in the statute itself).

Combination of functions

It is not a violation of the constitutional requirement of separation of powers for an agency to undertake both investigative and adjudicative functions, so long as the process used by the agency does not create an acceptable risk of bias. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975).

However, prosecutorial and judicial functions may not vest within the same person. Specifically, Federal Administrative law judges are not permitted to:

• engage in prosecutorial functions, or
• engage in ex parte communications with persons performing such functions, or *to be supervised by someone engaged in prosecutorial functions,

Also, individuals involved in prosecution functions may not participate or advise in the decision, nor may they recommend agency review, except as witness or counsel in public proceedings.

Finally, Administrative law judges may only be fired for cause and after review, and receive pay according to statutory schedules, to protect them from undue influence within their agency.

Bias

• "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
• The Court has demanded not only a fair proceeding, but also that " 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.' Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
• When an administrative judge makes a public speech during the course of administrative proceedings which indicate a prejudgment of the case, that judge's continued involvement in the case after the speech is reversible error. Antoniu v. SEC, 877 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1989).

Ex parte contacts

• Unless otherwise required by law, an administrative officer in an adjudicative capacity may not engage communicate, directly or indirectly, in connection with any issue of fact or law with any agency, person, party, or their representatives, except on notice and opportunity for all parties to participate.
• This rules applies only during the pendancy of a case, not before.
• In order to overturn an order, the appellate court must find substantial prejudice.

Officers may, however, communicate with other agency employees about such matters.

Estoppel against the government

The government is not estopped from adhering to valid regulations, even when a government employee gives false information to an applicant in answer to an oral inquiry, except where the giving of that information explicitly violates a regulation. Schweiker v. Hanswen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981).

Document disclosure and open meetings

Under the Freedom of Information Act, federal agencies must disclose identifiable documents unless the documents fall under one of nine exemptions. The Government in the Sunshine Act provides that every portion of every meeting of an agency be open to public observation.

Administrative agencies do not have the power to issue retroactive regulations unless expressly granted that right in the organic statute. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 (1988).

Rulemaking

Scope and extent of rulemaking power

Federal administrative agencies have the power to promulgate rules that have the effect of substantive law. The power to do so stems from the agency's organic statute, and extends to all regulations necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act, rather than being limited to powers expressly granted by the statute. The power extends to substantive rules as well as procedural rules. National Petroleum Refiners Assn. v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). However, many states, such as Kentucky, have been less willing to allow their agencies to promulgate rules with the effect of substantive law.

Agencies may not promulgate retroactive rules unless expressly granted such power by the organic statute. Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 (1988)

The choice of whether to promulgate rules or proceed with ad hoc adjudicative decisions rests in the informed discretion of agencies. SEC v. Chenerty Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (Dissenting opinion arguing that the decision permitted agencies to rule arbitrarily, without law). Agencies may also announce new policies in the course of such adjudications.

Agencies are permitted to rely on rules in reaching their decisions rather than adjudicate, where the promulgation of the rules is within the agency's statutory authority, and the rules themselves are not arbitrary or capricious. Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983).

Agencies must abide by their own rules. Sameena, Inc. v. U.S. Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148)9th Cir. 1998).

Type of rulemaking

There are three types of rulemaking:

• Formal rulemaking, which is rulemaking for which the organic statute requires that rules be "made on the record after agency opportunity for hearing," and for which the APA prescribes particular procedures; the phrase is required for formal rulemaking; simply requiring that rules be made "after a hearing" does not trigger the requirements of formal rulemaking;
• Informal rulemaking, which is rulemaking for which no procedural requirements are prescribed in the organic statute, and for which the APA requires notice and comment;
• Hybrid rulemaking, which is rulemaking for which particular procedural requirements beyond notice and comment, but not rising to the level of formal rulemaking.

Informal rulemaking

Informal rulemaking is the process by which administrative agencies may promulgate substantive rules that have the force of law, provided the agency provides adequate notice and opportunity to comment on the proposed rules prior to their promulgation, and maintains an adequate record to allow for meaningful judicial review.

Notice

The issues involved in adequate notice are:

• The applicability of the notice requirement
• Where notice is required, the type of notice required under the circumstances

Applicability of the notice requirement

The notice requirement applies to all proposed rules, except

• Interpretive rules, general statements of policy, rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice, or where the agency finds that notice is impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.
• Interpretative rules are rules which interpret other rules, but do not change existing law. Thus, a rule that clarifies an existing rule would be interpretive, but a rule that changed the prior interpretive rule in such a way as to change the effect of the law would be substantive.
• Policy statements are tentative statements about future agency intent, but do not determinitively affect substantive rights. Agencies are not required to provide notice and opportunity to comment in these cases, but courts are less deferential in reviewing these rules than substantive rules;

Type of notice required

The proposed rule must be published in the Federal Register. Beyond this, there are two types of notice that are required in different circumstances:

• Notice that includes the terms and substance of the contemplated rule
• Notice that merely identifies the subjects and issues involved

The type of notice given is sufficient where:

• "Appraises interested parties of issues to be addressed in the rulemaking proceeding with sufficient clarity and specificity to allow them to participate in a meaningful and informed manner," and
• The final rule is a logical outgrowth of the original proposal. It need not be an exact replica of the proposed rule, but also may not deviate so sharply as to deprive the affected parties of notice and opportunity to respond by failing to fairly appraise them of the subjects and issues to be addressed

Comment

Generally speaking, agencies are required to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in r/m through submission of written data, views, with or without opportunity for oral argument.

In order for the opportunity to comment to be sufficient,

• Interested parties must be provided with the vital and central data on which the agency will rely in reaching its decision, to allow for meaningful comment;
• The agency must maintain sufficient record of the rulemaking proceedings to allow for meaningful judicial review. The record will be judged on the basis of what was available at the time the rule was promulgated, and must demonstrate through a concise general statement demonstrating to the Court that it took all relevant factors into account in its decision, answering all vital questions (although it need not respond to every item of opinion included in submission to the agency) and explaining why it made the rule as it did.
• the agency need not provide an opportunity to be heard orally or personally cross-examine agency officials.

Formal rulemaking

As noted above, the formal rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act apply where the organic statute called for "made on the record after agency opportunity for hearing.

Formal rulemaking procedures are determined by the APA. Agencies are required to abide by the terms of the statute, and may impose greater procedural requirements, but the Court may not require procedures in excess of those required by the APA. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NDRC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).

Agencies and article III

• The constitutionality of delegation of adjudicatory powers to a non-article III agency court is guided by the substantive purposes of article III, rather than mere formality.
• Congressionally-created rights can be adjudicated in a way Congress determines and are thus not subject to the jury requirement 285 U.S. 22 (1931);
• Broader Constitutional rights must be adjudicated by article III courts, or agency courts subject to Article III restricts and judicial review. {{ussc|458|50|[[1982}}
• Federal agencies are authorized to adjudicate state common-law counterclaims related to claims brought for adjudication 48 U.S. 833 (1986)

Non-delegation doctrine

• The non-delegation doctrine provides that Congress may not delegate its legislative responsibilities to administrative agencies without providing the agencies with an intelligible principle, guidelines and codes of permissible and impermissible conduct to provide the agency with guidance in rulemaking. 448 U.S. 607 (1979)
• Congress must make the fundamental policy decisions that determine the ends of the rulemaking. Where the mandate is too vague, it is invalid. 448 U.S. 607 (1979)

Legislative oversight

• Legislative veto: Provision that would have required agencies to transmit rules to Congress for final approval and they could veto with a resolution by either house. Struck down in INS v. Chadha 462 U.S. 919 (1983) because it effectively passed law without a vote of both houses + signature of president.

• Appointments clause: The appointments clause provides that all officers of the federal government are to be appointed by the President, and that those officers are to be confirmed by the House and Senate. "Inferior officers" need not be confirmed.

• Executive removal: The presidential power to remove executive officers is vested solely in the executive, and any law requiring legislative approval of the removal is invalid. {{ussc|272|52|[[1926}} However, Congress may legislate limit's on the president's exercise of removal powers over officers performing quasilegislative or quasijudicial functions, such as requiring removal for cause. 295 U.S. 605 (1935)

See also

• Article I and Article III tribunals

External links

• LII Law about... Administrative Law

• Administrative law
• United States law
• United States administrative law