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| ===Origins=== | ===Origins=== | ||
| With the German home fleet effectively bottled up by ]'s success at ], German Admiral ] decided to launch a raid upon three British East coast towns using the German Battlecruiser Squadron, comprising |
With the German home fleet effectively bottled up by ]'s success at ], German Admiral ] decided to launch a raid upon three British East coast towns using the German Battlecruiser Squadron, comprising three ]s and an ] supported by ]s and ]s. The raid took place on ] ] at 9am, and resulted in the death of 18 civilians at ], causing further damage at ] and ]. | ||
| British public and political reaction was outraged that the German Fleet could sail so close to the British coast and proceed to shell coastal towns. | British public and political reaction was outraged that the German Fleet could sail so close to the British coast and proceed to shell coastal towns. | ||
| Buoyed by the success of the raid, Admiral Hipper resolved to repeat the exercise the following month. He was however intercepted by the British on ] ] at the ], midway between Germany and Britain. | Buoyed by the success of the raid, Admiral Hipper resolved to repeat the exercise by attacking the British fishing fleet on the ] the following month. He was however intercepted by the British on ] ] at the ], midway between Germany and Britain. | ||
| Through intercepted German radio traffic |
Through intercepted German radio traffic analysed by ] of British Naval Intelligence, the British knew of Hipper's proposed sortie on ]. Acting Vice-Admiral Beatty set sail with five battlecruisers, supported by a further six light cruisers, to meet Hipper's three battlecruisers. Joined by additional cruisers and destroyers from Harwich, Beatty headed south before meeting Hipper's outlying vessels at 7.20am on the morning of ]. | ||
| ===Battle=== | ===Battle=== | ||
| Realising he was overpowered, Hipper attempted to escape, believing the British battlecruisers to be slower than his. Beatty's |
Realising he was overpowered, Hipper attempted to escape, believing the British battlecruisers to be slower than his. But Beatty's ships were distinctly faster than the German squadron, which was held back by the the slower ] ], and the British ships reached their extreme firing range by 9am. Battle started half an hour later. | ||
| The British fire was concentrated on Hipper's flagship |
The British fire was concentrated on two of the German ships, Hipper's flagship battlecruiser ] at the head of the line and the ] at the rear. With five big ships to the German four, Beatty intended that his two rear ships, ''New Zealand'' and ''Indomitable'', should engage the ], while his leading three engaged their opposite numbers. But Captain H.B. Pelly of the newly worked up battlecruiser ''Tiger'' assumed that two ships should concentrate on the leading German ship and engaged the ''Seydlitz'', leaving the ''Moltke'' unmolested to fire at the ''Lion''. Worse, ]’s fire was ineffective as she mistook the ]’s shell splashes for her own (when her shots were actually falling 3,000 yards clear of the ''Seydlitz''). | ||
| At 09:30 ] was hit by a 13.5-inch shell from the ''Lion'' which penetrated the working chamber of her after turret barbette. The resulting explosion knocked out the rear turret and worse, thanks to an open door to the adjacent, superimposed, turret knocked out that turret too with the loss of the 160 men of the two turrets’ crews. Only the prompt action of her executive officer in flooding the magazines saved the ''Seydlitz'' from a massive magazine explosion that would have destroyed the ship. | |||
| Nevertheless, a major British success appeared likely until Beatty, believing his ships had seen a submarine’s periscope, ordered a sharp turn to avoid it. (It seems probable that the periscope was surfacing torpedo launched by a German destroyer). Beatty then gave an order which, thanks to the destruction of Lion's electrics and the damage to her flag hoists, was both vague and hard to see. As a result of the misunderstaning, the remaining British battlecruisers broke off the pursuit of the German battlecruisers and rounded on the crippled ], which had fallen behind the rest of the German ships, sinking her with the loss of 782 men. In the meantime the damaged German battlecruisers were able to make good their escape. 15 British sailors were killed in the battle. | |||
| By 09:50, the ''Blücher'' was also badly damaged and began to fall further and further behind the faster German battlecruisers. ''Indomitable'' was ordered to intercept her. The British ships were still relatively unscathed until at 10:18 the ''Derfflinger'' hit Beatty's flagship ] with three 12-inch shells, damaging her engines so that the ''Lion'' began to lag behind and half an hour later came to a standstill when she had to stop her port engine, taking no further part in the battle after 11:00. By about 10:30, Hipper decided to leave the ''Blücher'' to her fate. | |||
| Nevertheless, the annihilation of the German squadron appeared likely until at 10:50 Beatty, believing he saw a submarine’s periscope on the ]’s starboard bow, ordered a sharp turn of 90 degrees to port to avoid a submarine trap. (It seems probable that the periscope was surfacing torpedo launched by a German destroyer). Realizing that so sharp a turn would open the range too much, he then ordered ‘Course NE’ to limit the turn to 45 degrees. He then added the order to ‘Engage the enemy’s rear’. With ] 's electrics destroyed thanks to further hits from the German ships, she was forced to signal using flag hoists. | |||
| ] rolls over onto her side]] | |||
| But the combination of the signal of ‘Course NE’ (which happened to the direction of the ''Blücher'', with the pointless signal to engage the rear was misunderstood by Beatty’s second-in-command, Rear-Admiral Moore, as an order for all the battlecruisers to finish off the cripple. The remaining British battlecruisers broke off the pursuit of the fleeing battlecruisers and rounded on the ], sinking her with the loss of 782 men. | |||
| Beatty had now lost control of the battle; his second-in-command, Rear-Admiral Moore, lacked the brilliance needed to disobey a stupid order; and so the opportunity of an overwhelming victory was lost. | |||
| ===Aftermath=== | ===Aftermath=== | ||
| Although a few Germans clung to the hope that one of the British battlecruisers had been sunk, it was clear that the battle was a serious reverse. ] issued an order that all further risks to surface vessels were to be avoided. ], commander of the High Seas Fleet, was replaced. The Germans took the lessons of the battle to heart, particularly the damage to the ''Seydlitz'' which revealed flaws in the protection of her magazines. The defect was corrected in all of Germany’s battleships and battlecruisers in time for the ] the following summer. Although the Germans realized that the appearance of the British squadron at dawn was a remarkable coincidence, they suspect an enemy agent near their base in Jade was responsible, rather than their wireless procedures. | |||
| Although the battle was not greatly consequential of itself, it boosted British morale and concerned the German Kaiser, ], enough to issue an order stating that all further risks to surface vessels were to be avoided. | |||
| Although the battle was not greatly consequential of itself, it boosted British morale. | |||
| But the Germans took the lessons of the battle to heart, particularly the damage to the ''Seydlitz'' which revealed flaws in the protection of her magazines. The British failed to do the same and signalling on board the ''Lion'' was equally shambolic in the early stages of the ] the following summer. | |||
| But while the Germans learnt their lessons, the British failed to do the same. The unfortunate Rear-Admiral Moore was quietly replaced, but Beatty’s flag lieutentant remained. Signalling on board the ''Lion'' was equally shambolic in the early stages of the ] the following summer. Nor did the battlecruisers learn their lesson about fire distribution. | |||
| ===The rival squadrons=== | ===The rival squadrons=== | ||
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| 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron: ] and ]. | 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron: ] and ]. | ||
| 1st Light Cruiser Squadron: six light cruisers. | |||
| Harwich Force: three light cruisers and thirty-five destroyers. | |||
| ====Germany==== | ====Germany==== | ||
| 1st Scouting Group: ], ], ] and ]. | 1st Scouting Group: ], ], ] and ]. | ||
| 2nd Scounting Group: Four light cruisers | |||
| ⚫ | ==External link== | ||
| Two flotillas of eighteen torpedo boats combined. | |||
| ===Sources=== | |||
| *Bennett, Geoffrey. Naval Battles of the First World War. (London, 1968). | |||
| *Gordon, Andrew. The Rules of the Game - Jutland and British Naval Command. ISBN 0719555426 | |||
| *Marder, Arthur J. From The Dreadnought To Scapa Flow, Volume II. (Oxford, 1965). | |||
| *Corbett, Sir Julian S. Official History of The War. Naval Operations, Volume II. (London, 1922). | |||
| ⚫ | ===External link=== | ||
| * | * | ||
Revision as of 11:41, 20 November 2005
Template:Battlebox The Battle of Dogger Bank was a naval battle fought near the Dogger Bank in the North Sea that took place on 24 January 1915, during the First World War, between squadrons of the British Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet.
Origins
With the German home fleet effectively bottled up by Admiral Beatty's success at Heligoland Bight, German Admiral Franz von Hipper decided to launch a raid upon three British East coast towns using the German Battlecruiser Squadron, comprising three battlecruisers and an armoured cruiser supported by light cruisers and destroyers. The raid took place on 16 December 1914 at 9am, and resulted in the death of 18 civilians at Scarborough, causing further damage at Whitby and Hartlepool.
British public and political reaction was outraged that the German Fleet could sail so close to the British coast and proceed to shell coastal towns.
Buoyed by the success of the raid, Admiral Hipper resolved to repeat the exercise by attacking the British fishing fleet on the Dogger Bank the following month. He was however intercepted by the British on 24 January 1915 at the Dogger Bank, midway between Germany and Britain.
Through intercepted German radio traffic analysed by Room 40 of British Naval Intelligence, the British knew of Hipper's proposed sortie on 23 January. Acting Vice-Admiral Beatty set sail with five battlecruisers, supported by a further six light cruisers, to meet Hipper's three battlecruisers. Joined by additional cruisers and destroyers from Harwich, Beatty headed south before meeting Hipper's outlying vessels at 7.20am on the morning of 24 January.
Battle
Realising he was overpowered, Hipper attempted to escape, believing the British battlecruisers to be slower than his. But Beatty's ships were distinctly faster than the German squadron, which was held back by the the slower armoured cruiser Blücher, and the British ships reached their extreme firing range by 9am. Battle started half an hour later.
The British fire was concentrated on two of the German ships, Hipper's flagship battlecruiser Seydlitz at the head of the line and the Blücher at the rear. With five big ships to the German four, Beatty intended that his two rear ships, New Zealand and Indomitable, should engage the Blücher, while his leading three engaged their opposite numbers. But Captain H.B. Pelly of the newly worked up battlecruiser Tiger assumed that two ships should concentrate on the leading German ship and engaged the Seydlitz, leaving the Moltke unmolested to fire at the Lion. Worse, Tiger’s fire was ineffective as she mistook the Lion’s shell splashes for her own (when her shots were actually falling 3,000 yards clear of the Seydlitz).
At 09:30 Seydlitz was hit by a 13.5-inch shell from the Lion which penetrated the working chamber of her after turret barbette. The resulting explosion knocked out the rear turret and worse, thanks to an open door to the adjacent, superimposed, turret knocked out that turret too with the loss of the 160 men of the two turrets’ crews. Only the prompt action of her executive officer in flooding the magazines saved the Seydlitz from a massive magazine explosion that would have destroyed the ship.
By 09:50, the Blücher was also badly damaged and began to fall further and further behind the faster German battlecruisers. Indomitable was ordered to intercept her. The British ships were still relatively unscathed until at 10:18 the Derfflinger hit Beatty's flagship Lion with three 12-inch shells, damaging her engines so that the Lion began to lag behind and half an hour later came to a standstill when she had to stop her port engine, taking no further part in the battle after 11:00. By about 10:30, Hipper decided to leave the Blücher to her fate.
Nevertheless, the annihilation of the German squadron appeared likely until at 10:50 Beatty, believing he saw a submarine’s periscope on the Lion’s starboard bow, ordered a sharp turn of 90 degrees to port to avoid a submarine trap. (It seems probable that the periscope was surfacing torpedo launched by a German destroyer). Realizing that so sharp a turn would open the range too much, he then ordered ‘Course NE’ to limit the turn to 45 degrees. He then added the order to ‘Engage the enemy’s rear’. With Lion 's electrics destroyed thanks to further hits from the German ships, she was forced to signal using flag hoists.
But the combination of the signal of ‘Course NE’ (which happened to the direction of the Blücher, with the pointless signal to engage the rear was misunderstood by Beatty’s second-in-command, Rear-Admiral Moore, as an order for all the battlecruisers to finish off the cripple. The remaining British battlecruisers broke off the pursuit of the fleeing battlecruisers and rounded on the Blücher, sinking her with the loss of 782 men.
Beatty had now lost control of the battle; his second-in-command, Rear-Admiral Moore, lacked the brilliance needed to disobey a stupid order; and so the opportunity of an overwhelming victory was lost.
Aftermath
Although a few Germans clung to the hope that one of the British battlecruisers had been sunk, it was clear that the battle was a serious reverse. Kaiser Wilhelm issued an order that all further risks to surface vessels were to be avoided. Admiral von Ingenohl, commander of the High Seas Fleet, was replaced. The Germans took the lessons of the battle to heart, particularly the damage to the Seydlitz which revealed flaws in the protection of her magazines. The defect was corrected in all of Germany’s battleships and battlecruisers in time for the Battle of Jutland the following summer. Although the Germans realized that the appearance of the British squadron at dawn was a remarkable coincidence, they suspect an enemy agent near their base in Jade was responsible, rather than their wireless procedures.
Although the battle was not greatly consequential of itself, it boosted British morale. But while the Germans learnt their lessons, the British failed to do the same. The unfortunate Rear-Admiral Moore was quietly replaced, but Beatty’s flag lieutentant remained. Signalling on board the Lion was equally shambolic in the early stages of the Battle of Jutland the following summer. Nor did the battlecruisers learn their lesson about fire distribution.
The rival squadrons
Britain
1st Battlecruiser Squadron: Lion, Tiger and Princess Royal.
2nd Battlecruiser Squadron: New Zealand and Indomitable.
1st Light Cruiser Squadron: six light cruisers.
Harwich Force: three light cruisers and thirty-five destroyers.
Germany
1st Scouting Group: Seydlitz, Moltke, Derfflinger and Blücher.
2nd Scounting Group: Four light cruisers
Two flotillas of eighteen torpedo boats combined.
Sources
- Bennett, Geoffrey. Naval Battles of the First World War. (London, 1968).
- Gordon, Andrew. The Rules of the Game - Jutland and British Naval Command. ISBN 0719555426
- Marder, Arthur J. From The Dreadnought To Scapa Flow, Volume II. (Oxford, 1965).
- Corbett, Sir Julian S. Official History of The War. Naval Operations, Volume II. (London, 1922).