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===Canada=== | ===Canada=== | ||
Ressam entered ] on February 20, 1994, using a fake, illegally altered ] in the name of "Anjer Tahar Medjadi".<ref name="febninth"/><ref name="csisHarkat">] (CSIS), Security Intelligence Report concerning Mohamed Harkat, February 22, 2008</ref> When immigration officials at the ] confronted him |
Ressam entered ] on February 20, 1994, using a fake, illegally altered ] in the name of "Anjer Tahar Medjadi".<ref name="febninth"/><ref name="csisHarkat">] (CSIS), Security Intelligence Report concerning Mohamed Harkat, February 22, 2008</ref> When immigration officials at the ] confronted him about the altered passport, he divulged his real name and applied for ].<ref name="febninth"/> In his effort to obtain ], he gave the Canadian authorities a false story.<ref name="test">{{cite web|url=http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/trail/inside/testimony.html|title=Ressam Testimony in Mokhtar Haouari Trial|date=July 2001|publisher=Southern District of New York|accessdate=February 27, 2010}}</ref> His application for refugee status was denied on June 6, 1995, and his appeal was denied, and on May 4, 1998, a warrant was issued for his arrest by ].<ref name="febninth"/> At the time the warrant was issued, however, he was in Afghanistan, attending a terrorist training camp. He evaded deportation by obtaining a passport using a false name, "Benni Noris." | ||
Settling in Montreal, he supported himself by theft, stealing tourists' suitcases at hotels, and welfare.<ref name="test"/> He was arrested four times, but never jailed.<ref name="test"/> By 1999, he had a Canadian criminal history for theft under $5,000, an outstanding Canada-wide immigration ], and a ]-wide arrest warrant for theft under $5,000.<ref name="comp"/> | Settling in Montreal, he supported himself by theft, stealing tourists' suitcases at hotels, and welfare.<ref name="test"/> He was arrested four times, but never jailed.<ref name="test"/> By 1999, he had a Canadian criminal history for theft under $5,000, an outstanding Canada-wide immigration ], and a ]-wide arrest warrant for theft under $5,000.<ref name="comp"/> | ||
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==Terrorist training in Afghanistan== | ==Terrorist training in Afghanistan== | ||
Hannachi's apartment was ]ped by ], who dubbed his circle of friends BOG, ''Bunch of Guys'', and joked that they were like "terrorist tupperware parties" in their boastful talk and lack of any true threat.<ref name="kerry">Pither, Kerry. "Dark Days: The Story of Four Canadians Tortured in the Name of Fighting Terror", 2008.</ref> Ressam traveled, using a false passport, to Khalden with his roommate ].<ref name="join">{{cite news|last=Bell|first=Stewart|newspaper=]|title=Dozens of Canadians join Jihad Terror Camps|date=October 25, 2003}}</ref><ref name="kerry"/> | |||
Ressam became friends with ].<ref name="haqu"/> Hannachi returned from Afghanistan towards the end of the summer of 1997, where he had trained for '']'' at ]. He told Ressam about the experience and ''jihad'', encouraged him to train as well, and ultimately arranged a trip to the camp for Ressam.<ref name="haqu"/> | Ressam became friends with ], who served as the ] at ] in Montreal.<ref name="haqu"/> Hannachi returned from Afghanistan towards the end of the summer of 1997, where he had trained for '']'' at ]. He told Ressam about the experience and ''jihad'', encouraged him to train as well, and ultimately arranged a trip to the camp for Ressam.<ref name="haqu"/> | ||
On March 17, 1998, interested in joining ''jihad'' in Algeria, he traveled from Montreal to ], using the name "Benni Noris".<ref name="haqu"/><ref name="febninth"/> There, he contacted ], who was in charge of the Afghan terrorist training camps, who arranged for him to be transported into Afghanistan in April.<ref name="febninth"/><ref name="test"/> Using the alias "Nabil", he attended three camps for ]s between March 1998 and February 1999.<ref name="haqu"/><ref name="febninth"/> At Khalden Camp, which generally hosted 50-100 trainees at any time, he trained in light weapons, ]s, small ], ] launchers (RPGs), and explosives (including ], ] ]s, and black plastic explosives), poisons (including ]), ], sabotage, target selection, ], tactics (including assassinations), and security.<ref name="haqu"/><ref name="febninth"/><ref name="test"/> Trainees were from Jordan, Algeria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Chechnya, Turkey, Sweden, Germany, and France.<ref name="haqu"/> |
On March 17, 1998, interested in joining ''jihad'' in Algeria, he traveled from Montreal to ], using the name "Benni Noris".<ref name="haqu"/><ref name="febninth"/> There, he contacted ], who was in charge of the Afghan terrorist training camps, who arranged for him to be transported into Afghanistan in April.<ref name="febninth"/><ref name="test"/> Using the alias "Nabil", he attended three camps for ]s between March 1998 and February 1999.<ref name="haqu"/><ref name="febninth"/> At Khalden Camp, which generally hosted 50-100 trainees at any time, he trained in light weapons, ]s, small ], ] launchers (RPGs), and explosives (including ], ] ]s, and black plastic explosives), poisons (including ]), ], sabotage, target selection, ], tactics (including assassinations), and security.<ref name="haqu"/><ref name="febninth"/><ref name="test"/> Trainees were from Jordan, Algeria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Chechnya, Turkey, Sweden, Germany, and France.<ref name="haqu"/> During the five to six months he was there, he met ].<ref name="febninth"/><ref name="test"/> He then trained how to manufacture explosives and make electronic circuits for six weeks at ], outside ].<ref name="febninth"/><ref name="test"/> | ||
Abu Zubeida, in contrast, testified before his ] that Khalden only trained fighters for "]".<ref name=CsrtAbuZubaydahVerbatimTranscript> | Abu Zubeida, in contrast, testified before his ] that Khalden only trained fighters for "]".<ref name=CsrtAbuZubaydahVerbatimTranscript> | ||
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In September 1999 he purchased electronic equipment and components in order to build ]s, and made four timing devices.<ref name="test"/> He also recruited ], an old friend of his, to help him.<ref name="test"/> In November, with Dahoumane's assistance he bought ] and ] from ], and mixed it together with ] and ] he stole from fertilizer manufacturers to create a ]-like explosive substance.<ref name="kerry"/><ref name="test"/> | In September 1999 he purchased electronic equipment and components in order to build ]s, and made four timing devices.<ref name="test"/> He also recruited ], an old friend of his, to help him.<ref name="test"/> In November, with Dahoumane's assistance he bought ] and ] from ], and mixed it together with ] and ] he stole from fertilizer manufacturers to create a ]-like explosive substance.<ref name="kerry"/><ref name="test"/> | ||
He had met ] in early 1994, when he first arrived in Canada.<ref name="haqu"/> Haouari was involved in fraudulent activity that included the sale of stolen passports and creation of fraudulent credit cards, and Ressam sold him some stolen identity cards. In early November he recruited Haouari to assist him in what he described to Haouari as "some very important and dangerous business in the U.S." by providing continued funding for his project, a credit card, and false ID, and Haouari in turn recruited ] |
He had met ] in early 1994, when he first arrived in Canada.<ref name="haqu"/> Haouari was involved in fraudulent activity that included the sale of stolen passports and creation of fraudulent credit cards, and Ressam sold him some stolen identity cards. In early November he recruited Haouari to assist him in what he described to Haouari as "some very important and dangerous business in the U.S." by providing continued funding for his project, a credit card, and false ID, and Haouari in turn recruited New York-based ], who he said was involved in ], to assist Ressam.<ref name="kerry"/><ref name="febninth"/><ref name="test"/><ref name="a911">{{cite book|last= National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States |title=The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States|publisher=W. W. Norton & Company|date=2004|isbn=0393060411|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=fNqdmUnqTJUC&pg=PA501&dq=Hannachi+ressam&client=firefox-a&cd=1#v=onepage&q=ressam&f=false|accessdate=February 28, 2010}}</ref> | ||
On November 17, 1999, Ressam and Dahoumane traveled from Montreal to ], where in a rented cottage they prepared the explosives for LAX.<ref name="febninth"/> | On November 17, 1999, Ressam and Dahoumane traveled from Montreal to ], where in a rented cottage they prepared the explosives for LAX.<ref name="febninth"/> | ||
In December he called a facilitator in Afghanistan to inquire whether ] wanted to take credit for the attack, but did not get an answer.<ref name="a911"/> Ressam arranged for Meskini, who spoke English, to await him on the U.S. side of the border, to drive him and to give him money.<ref name="a911"/> | |||
==Capture== | ==Capture== | ||
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</ref><ref name="kerry"/> | </ref><ref name="kerry"/> | ||
After the ferry docked in Port Angeles, Ressam |
After the ferry docked in Port Angeles, Ressam saw to it that his car was the last one to leave the ferry.<ref name="comp"/><ref name="a911"/> Although there had not been any intelligence reports suggesting threats, ] inspector Diana Dean decided to have a secondary Customs search of Ressam's car performed, saying later that Ressam was acting "]", and asked him to get out of the car.<ref name="comp"/><ref name="febninth"/><ref>"The Terrorist Within, Chapter 12: The Crossing", by Hal Bernton, Mike Carter, David Heath, and James Neff, the ''Seattle Times'', July 2, 2002. and .</ref><ref>"Foiling millennium attack was mostly luck", Lisa Myers, NBC News Senior investigative correspondent, MSNBC, April 29, 2004. .</ref> | ||
At first, Ressam was not cooperative.<ref name="comp"/> Dean requested that he fill out a Customs declaration form, which he did listing himself as a Canadian citizen named Benni Noris.<ref name="sc"/> He also had a passport, Quebec driver license, and credit cards all in the Noris name, as well as another Quebec driver license with the same date of birth, but in the name "Mario Roig".<ref name="comp"/> ] later advised that the Mario Roig driver license was false, and did not exist on their records.<ref name="comp"/> | |||
Another Customs inspector searching his car found, hidden in the ] well in its trunk: | Another Customs inspector searching his car found, hidden in the ] well in its trunk: | ||
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;Cooperation and sentencing | ;Cooperation and sentencing | ||
His sentencing was delayed for four years, to give counter-terrorism analysts a chance to fully exploit him as an intelligence source. Ressam began cooperating with investigators after his conviction pursuant to a June 23, 2001, cooperation agreement that he entered into with the U.S. government.<ref name="febninth"/> He provided information to law enforcement officials of the U.S. and six other countries with regard to al-Qaeda's organization, recruitment, and training activities.<ref name="febninth"/> He revealed that al-Qaeda ]s existed within the U.S.<ref name="febninth"/> This information was included in the famous ] delivered to President ] on August 6, 2001, entitled '']''. He testified in July 2001 against his accomplice and co-conspirator Haouari, and Ressam's testimony was also used by the ] ] to decide that friends of his, such as fellow Algerian ], should continue to be held as ]s.<ref name="febninth"/> |
His sentencing was delayed for four years, to give counter-terrorism analysts a chance to fully exploit him as an intelligence source. Ressam began cooperating with investigators after his conviction pursuant to a June 23, 2001, cooperation agreement that he entered into with the U.S. government.<ref name="febninth"/> He provided information to law enforcement officials of the U.S. and six other countries with regard to al-Qaeda's organization, recruitment, and training activities.<ref name="febninth"/> He revealed that al-Qaeda ]s existed within the U.S.<ref name="febninth"/> This information was included in the famous ] delivered to President ] on August 6, 2001, entitled '']''. He testified in July 2001 against his accomplice and co-conspirator Haouari, and Ressam's testimony was also used by the ] ] to decide that friends of his, such as fellow Algerian ], should continue to be held as ]s.<ref name="febninth"/> | ||
]]] | |||
One person whom he was not asked about until after ], but whom he was able to identify when asked as having trained with him at the Khalden Camp, was Zacarias Moussaoui, an al-Qaeda member later implicated in the 9/11 plot.<ref name="a911"/> Moussaoui had been arrested by the FBI on August 16, 2001.<ref name="a911"/> But FBI agents were without success trying to convince their superiors that there was enough evidence to obtain a warrant to allow them to search Moussaoui's laptop and belongings.<ref name="a911"/> The ] opined that had Ressam been asked about Moussaoui, he would have broken that logjam.<ref name="a911"/> Had that happened, the Report opined, the U.S. might conceivably have disrupted or derailed the ] altogether.<ref name="a911"/> | |||
By November 28, 2001, Ressam began to express reluctance about discussing some matters.<ref name="febninth"/> By early 2003, after having provided 65 hours of trial and deposition testimony and names of 150 people involved in terrorism, he stopped cooperating and began to recant his prior testimony.<ref name="febninth"/> | |||
The '']'' described Ressam's sentencing hearing as the "gripping climax" to Ressam's journey through the U.S. court system.<ref name=SeattleTimes20050728/> U.S. Attorney ] argued Ressam should get a 35-year sentence, because he had declined to cooperate in two cases, which would now go unprosecuted.<ref name=SeattleTimes20050728/> Ressam's lawyer argued that Ressam should be given a shorter sentence, to reflect the value of his original cooperation, saying: "It is a flat fact that law enforcement, the public and public safety benefited in immeasurable ways from Ressam's decision to go to trial and (later) cooperate."<ref name=SeattleTimes20050728/> Ressam didn't say anything during his sentencing hearing, but did send the judge a note, in which he apologized for engaging in the bomb plot.<ref name=SeattleTimes20050728/> | The '']'' described Ressam's sentencing hearing as the "gripping climax" to Ressam's journey through the U.S. court system.<ref name=SeattleTimes20050728/> U.S. Attorney ] argued Ressam should get a 35-year sentence, because he had declined to cooperate in two cases, which would now go unprosecuted.<ref name=SeattleTimes20050728/> Ressam's lawyer argued that Ressam should be given a shorter sentence, to reflect the value of his original cooperation, saying: "It is a flat fact that law enforcement, the public and public safety benefited in immeasurable ways from Ressam's decision to go to trial and (later) cooperate."<ref name=SeattleTimes20050728/> Ressam didn't say anything during his sentencing hearing, but did send the judge a note, in which he apologized for engaging in the bomb plot.<ref name=SeattleTimes20050728/> |
Revision as of 06:33, 28 February 2010
Ahmed Ressam | |
---|---|
Nationality | Algerian |
Other names | Nassar Ressam; Anjer Tahar Medjadi; Nabil; Benni Antoine Noris; Mario Roig |
Occupation | Thief |
Conviction(s) | On all counts (April 6, 2001) |
Criminal charge | 1) an act of terrorism transcending a national boundary; 2) placing an explosive in proximity to a terminal; 3) false identification documents; 4) use of a fictitious name for admission to the U.S.; 5) false statement to U.S. Customs; 6) smuggling; 7) transportation of explosives; 8) possession of an unregistered firearm; and 9) carrying an explosive during the commission of a felony. |
Penalty | Initially sentenced to 22 years in prison (July 27, 2005), but an appellate court found his sentence to be too lenient and ordered that it be extended (February 2, 2010). |
Ahmed Ressam (Template:Lang-ar; also Benni Noris or the Millennium Bomber; born (1967-05-09)May 9, 1967, in Algeria) is a Muslim Algerian al-Qaeda member who lived in Canada.
He was convicted of attempting to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport on New Year's Eve 1999, as part of the foiled 2000 millennium attack plots. He was initially sentenced to 22 years in prison, but in February 2010 an appellate court found his sentence to be too lenient and ordered that it be extended.
Early life
Ressam graduated high school in Algeria in 1988, and over the next four years he worked with his father in a coffee shop.
He left Algeria in 1992, entering France on a false Moroccan passport in the name of "Nassar Ressam". France deported him to Morocco on November 8, 1993, and banned him from returning for three years. Morocco determined that he was not in fact Moroccan, however, and returned him to France.
Canada
Ressam entered Canada on February 20, 1994, using a fake, illegally altered French passport in the name of "Anjer Tahar Medjadi". When immigration officials at the Montréal-Mirabel International Airport confronted him about the altered passport, he divulged his real name and applied for refugee status. In his effort to obtain political asylum, he gave the Canadian authorities a false story. His application for refugee status was denied on June 6, 1995, and his appeal was denied, and on May 4, 1998, a warrant was issued for his arrest by Citizenship and Immigration Canada. At the time the warrant was issued, however, he was in Afghanistan, attending a terrorist training camp. He evaded deportation by obtaining a passport using a false name, "Benni Noris."
Settling in Montreal, he supported himself by theft, stealing tourists' suitcases at hotels, and welfare. He was arrested four times, but never jailed. By 1999, he had a Canadian criminal history for theft under $5,000, an outstanding Canada-wide immigration arrest warrant, and a British Columbia-wide arrest warrant for theft under $5,000.
In Montreal, he was recruited into al-Qaeda.
Terrorist training in Afghanistan
Hannachi's apartment was wiretapped by CSIS, who dubbed his circle of friends BOG, Bunch of Guys, and joked that they were like "terrorist tupperware parties" in their boastful talk and lack of any true threat. Ressam traveled, using a false passport, to Khalden with his roommate Mustapha Labsi.
Ressam became friends with Raouf Hannachi, who served as the muezzin at Assuna Mosque in Montreal. Hannachi returned from Afghanistan towards the end of the summer of 1997, where he had trained for jihad at Khalden Camp. He told Ressam about the experience and jihad, encouraged him to train as well, and ultimately arranged a trip to the camp for Ressam.
On March 17, 1998, interested in joining jihad in Algeria, he traveled from Montreal to Karachi, Pakistan, using the name "Benni Noris". There, he contacted Abu Zubeida, who was in charge of the Afghan terrorist training camps, who arranged for him to be transported into Afghanistan in April. Using the alias "Nabil", he attended three camps for Islamic terrorists between March 1998 and February 1999. At Khalden Camp, which generally hosted 50-100 trainees at any time, he trained in light weapons, handguns, small machine guns, Rocket-Propelled Grenade launchers (RPGs), and explosives (including TNT, C4 plastic explosives, and black plastic explosives), poisons (including cyanide), poison gas, sabotage, target selection, urban warfare, tactics (including assassinations), and security. Trainees were from Jordan, Algeria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Chechnya, Turkey, Sweden, Germany, and France. During the five to six months he was there, he met Zacarias Moussaoui. He then trained how to manufacture explosives and make electronic circuits for six weeks at Derunta training camp, outside Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
Abu Zubeida, in contrast, testified before his Combatant Status Review Tribunal that Khalden only trained fighters for "defensive jihad". He said trainees were explicitly instructed to only attack military targets, that it was an offense against Islam to kill or injure innocent civilians, and that Ressam would never have been sent to Khalden if he were thought to be someone who believed Islam justified attacking civilians.
Ressam was part of a six-person terrorist cell tasked with meeting in Canada, and then attacking a U.S. airport or consulate before the end of 1999. The cell was directed by Abu Jaffar in Pakistan and Abu Doha in Europe.
Plot to bomb LAX
He returned to Montreal, Canada, in February 1999 under the name "Benni Noris", bringing $12,000 in cash he had obtained in Afghanistan to fund the attack, as well as chemical substances known as hexamine (used as an explosive booster in the manufacture of explosives) and glycol, and a notebook with explosives concoction instructions. While in Montreal, he shared an apartment with Karim Said Atmani, an alleged forger for the Algerian Groupe Islamique Arme.
In the spring of 1999, French investigators asked Canadian authorities to locate him for questioning, but the Canadians were unable to locate him as he was living under the name Benni Noris. In the summer of 1999, informed by Abu Doha that the other members of his cell had been unable to make it to Canada due to immigration issues, he decided to continue without them, targeting an airport.
In August 1999 he decided that he would bomb Los Angeles International Airport, which he was familiar with because he had landed there in the past, and which he felt would be a politically and economically sensitive target. He planned to conduct a rehearsal using a luggage cart, put it in a place that was not suspicious, and observe how long it would take airport security to notice it. He then planned to execute his plan, using one or two suitcases filled with explosives.
In September 1999 he purchased electronic equipment and components in order to build detonators, and made four timing devices. He also recruited Abdelmajid Dahoumane, an old friend of his, to help him. In November, with Dahoumane's assistance he bought urea and aluminum sulfate from nurseries, and mixed it together with nitric and sulphuric acid he stole from fertilizer manufacturers to create a TNT-like explosive substance.
He had met Mokhtar Haouari in early 1994, when he first arrived in Canada. Haouari was involved in fraudulent activity that included the sale of stolen passports and creation of fraudulent credit cards, and Ressam sold him some stolen identity cards. In early November he recruited Haouari to assist him in what he described to Haouari as "some very important and dangerous business in the U.S." by providing continued funding for his project, a credit card, and false ID, and Haouari in turn recruited New York-based Abdelghani Meskini, who he said was involved in bank fraud, to assist Ressam.
On November 17, 1999, Ressam and Dahoumane traveled from Montreal to Vancouver, British Columbia, where in a rented cottage they prepared the explosives for LAX.
In December he called a facilitator in Afghanistan to inquire whether Osama bin Laden wanted to take credit for the attack, but did not get an answer. Ressam arranged for Meskini, who spoke English, to await him on the U.S. side of the border, to drive him and to give him money.
Capture
Ressam rented a green Chrysler 300 sedan, and on the evening of December 13, Ressam and Dahoumane hid the explosives and all the related components in the wheel well in the car's trunk. On December 14, they again traveled to Vancouver, and stayed in a hotel under the "Noris" name. They then traveled to Victoria, British Columbia, where Dahoumane left Ressam, to return to Vancouver.
Ressam then attempted to cross the border by taking the M/V Coho car ferry from Tswassen, British Columbia, to Port Angeles, Washington. He successfully passed through U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service checks in Victoria, and boarded the ferry.
After the ferry docked in Port Angeles, Ressam saw to it that his car was the last one to leave the ferry. Although there had not been any intelligence reports suggesting threats, U.S. Customs inspector Diana Dean decided to have a secondary Customs search of Ressam's car performed, saying later that Ressam was acting "hinky", and asked him to get out of the car.
At first, Ressam was not cooperative. Dean requested that he fill out a Customs declaration form, which he did listing himself as a Canadian citizen named Benni Noris. He also had a passport, Quebec driver license, and credit cards all in the Noris name, as well as another Quebec driver license with the same date of birth, but in the name "Mario Roig". Royal Canadian Mounted Police later advised that the Mario Roig driver license was false, and did not exist on their records.
Another Customs inspector searching his car found, hidden in the spare tire well in its trunk:
- 10 plastic bags with 118 pounds of a fine white powder (which tests later identified as urea, used to manufacture explosives and fertilizer),
- 2 lozenge bottles filled with primary explosives hexamethylene triperoxide diamine (HMTD) and cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (RDX),
- 2 plastic bags with 14 pounds of a crystalline powder (later shown to be aluminum sulfate, used primarily as a desiccant, to keep things dry),
- two 22-ounce olive jars with golden-brown liquid (later identified as ethylene glycol dinitrate, an extremely explosive and volatile nitroglycerin equivalent), and
- 4 operational timing devices, consisting of small black boxes containing circuit boards connected to Casio watches and 9-volt battery connectors.
As one of the Customs inspectors began to escort him from the car, Ressam broke free and attempted to flee. Inspectors chased him for five to six blocks, and after he unsuccessfully tried to force his way into a car at an intersection, inspectors tackled him in the street took him into custody. Customs officials also found the phone number of Abdel Ghani.
He was arrested by the U.S. Border Patrol on charges of misrepresentation on entry and failure to be inspected, booked into Clailam County Jail, and investigated by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. His fingerprints were analyzed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who determined that he was actually Algerian-born "Ahmed Ressam", rather than "Benni Antoine Noris".
An explosives expert concluded that the materials in his car would produce an explosive device that could have produced a blast 40x greater than that of a devastating car bomb. A suitcase in the room in which he had lived in Canada with Dahoumane tested positive for chemicals used to make bombs. It was ultimately determined that he had intended to detonate the explosives at the Los Angeles International Airport.
Trial, sentencing, and appeals
- Indictment and trial
Ressam was indicted by a superseding indictment on January 20, 2000, for nine counts of criminal activity in connection with his attempt to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport on December 31, 1999: 1) an act of terrorism transcending a national boundary; 2) placing an explosive in proximity to a terminal; 3) false identification documents; 4) use of a fictitious name for admission to the U.S.; 5) the felony of making a false statement to a U.S. Customs official; 6) smuggling; 7) transportation of explosives; 8) possession of an unregistered firearm; and 9) carrying an explosive during the commission of a felony.
Following a 19-day trial in Los Angeles, with approximately 120 witnesses, a jury found Ressam guilty on all counts of his indictment on April 6, 2001.
- Cooperation and sentencing
His sentencing was delayed for four years, to give counter-terrorism analysts a chance to fully exploit him as an intelligence source. Ressam began cooperating with investigators after his conviction pursuant to a June 23, 2001, cooperation agreement that he entered into with the U.S. government. He provided information to law enforcement officials of the U.S. and six other countries with regard to al-Qaeda's organization, recruitment, and training activities. He revealed that al-Qaeda sleeper cells existed within the U.S. This information was included in the famous President's Daily Brief delivered to President George W. Bush on August 6, 2001, entitled Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US. He testified in July 2001 against his accomplice and co-conspirator Haouari, and Ressam's testimony was also used by the Guantanamo Bay Combatant Status Review Tribunal to decide that friends of his, such as fellow Algerian Ahcene Zemiri, should continue to be held as unlawful combatants.
One person whom he was not asked about until after 9/11, but whom he was able to identify when asked as having trained with him at the Khalden Camp, was Zacarias Moussaoui, an al-Qaeda member later implicated in the 9/11 plot. Moussaoui had been arrested by the FBI on August 16, 2001. But FBI agents were without success trying to convince their superiors that there was enough evidence to obtain a warrant to allow them to search Moussaoui's laptop and belongings. The 9/11 Commission Report opined that had Ressam been asked about Moussaoui, he would have broken that logjam. Had that happened, the Report opined, the U.S. might conceivably have disrupted or derailed the September 11 attacks altogether.
By November 28, 2001, Ressam began to express reluctance about discussing some matters. By early 2003, after having provided 65 hours of trial and deposition testimony and names of 150 people involved in terrorism, he stopped cooperating and began to recant his prior testimony.
The Seattle Times described Ressam's sentencing hearing as the "gripping climax" to Ressam's journey through the U.S. court system. U.S. Attorney John McKay argued Ressam should get a 35-year sentence, because he had declined to cooperate in two cases, which would now go unprosecuted. Ressam's lawyer argued that Ressam should be given a shorter sentence, to reflect the value of his original cooperation, saying: "It is a flat fact that law enforcement, the public and public safety benefited in immeasurable ways from Ressam's decision to go to trial and (later) cooperate." Ressam didn't say anything during his sentencing hearing, but did send the judge a note, in which he apologized for engaging in the bomb plot.
On July 27, 2005, United States District Court Judge John Coughenour sentenced Ressam to 22 years in prison, plus 5 years of supervision after his release. According to the Seattle Times, the judge saw Ressam's sentencing as an "occasion to unleash a broadside against secret tribunals and other war on terrorism tactics that abandon 'the ideals that set our nation apart," adding: "The tragedy of Sept. 11 shook our sense of security and made us realize that we, too, are vulnerable to acts of terrorism, Unfortunately, some believe that this threat renders our Constitution obsolete ... If that view is allowed to prevail, the terrorists will have won."
- Appeals and sentencing guidelines
On January 16, 2007, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Seattle reversed his conviction on one of the charges due to the majority's reading of the applicable law, and sent the case back to the district court for re-sentencing. The Supreme Court of the United States, however, overturned the Ninth Circuit in an 8-1 decision on May 19, 2008, and restored the original convictions and sentence.
On February 2, 2010, the Ninth Circuit Court ruled that his 22-year sentence was too lenient, and did not fit in the then-mandatory sentencing guidelines which indicated he should have received at least 65 years, and up to 130 years, in prison. Finding that the trial court judge's "views appear too entrenched to allow for the appearance of fairness on remand," the appellate court ordered that Ressam be re-sentenced by a different district court judge than the one who had handed down the original sentence.
Abu Zubeida's Combatant Status Review Tribunal
On April 16, 2007, the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for Abu Zubeida's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, and the Verbatim Transcript from his Tribunal, were made public. Seven of the 12 unclassified allegations that Abu Zubeida faced were based on Ressam's confessions. The Globe and Mail opined that the intelligence analysts' heavy reliance on Ressam's confessions was due to a desire to have all the unclassified allegations against Abu Zubeida based on evidence that clearly didn't rely on torture.
References
- ^ "Superseding Indictment in U.S. v. Ressam" (PDF). January 20, 2000. Retrieved February 16, 2010.
- ^ "Complaint; U.S. v. Ressam" (PDF). NEFA Foundation. December 1999. Retrieved February 26, 2010.
- ^ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Summary of the Security Intelligence Report concerning Hassan Almrei, February 22, 2008.
- ^ "U.S. v. Haquari, Examination" (PDF). USDC SDNY. July 3, 2001. Retrieved February 27, 2010.
- Weiser, Benjamin, and Golden, Tim, "A NATION CHALLENGED: BIN LADEN'S NETWORK; Al Qaeda: Sprawling, Hard-to-Spot Web of Terrorists-in-Waiting", The New York Times, September 30, 2001, accessed February 15, 2010
- ^ Supreme Court of the United States (May 19, 2008). "U.S. v. Ressam" (PDF). Retrieved February 27, 2010.
- ^ U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (February 2, 2010). "U.S. v. Ressam" (PDF). Retrieved February 27, 2010.
- ^ http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/02/02/millennium.bomber/index.html?hpt=T2
- Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Security Intelligence Report concerning Mohamed Harkat, February 22, 2008
- ^ "Ressam Testimony in Mokhtar Haouari Trial". Southern District of New York. July 2001. Retrieved February 27, 2010.
- ^ Pither, Kerry. "Dark Days: The Story of Four Canadians Tortured in the Name of Fighting Terror", 2008.
- ^ Bell, Stewart (October 25, 2003). "Dozens of Canadians join Jihad Terror Camps". National Post.
- ^ OARDEC (March 27, 2007). "verbatim transcript of the unclassified session of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal of ISN 10016" (PDF). Department of Defense. Retrieved April 16, 2007.
- ^ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (2004). The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 0393060411. Retrieved February 28, 2010.
- U.S. Border Security: Looking North
- "The Terrorist Within, Chapter 12: The Crossing", by Hal Bernton, Mike Carter, David Heath, and James Neff, the Seattle Times, July 2, 2002. Eprint with publication date and Eprint with author credits.
- "Foiling millennium attack was mostly luck", Lisa Myers, NBC News Senior investigative correspondent, MSNBC, April 29, 2004. Eprint.
- Library of Congress, Federal Research Division. "Asian Criminal and Terrorist Activity in Canada", July 2003
- "Statement of Attorney General John Ashcroft; Conviction of Ahmed Ressam," U.S. Department of Justice, April 6, 2001, accessed February 15, 2010
- ^ Bernton, Hal; Green, Sara Jean (July 28, 2005). "Ressam judge decries U.S. tactics". Seattle Times. Retrieved April 21, 2007.
- "Supreme Court restores full prison term in LAX plot by 'millennium bomber'". Los Angeles Times. May 20, 2008.
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(help) - FREEZE, COLIN (April 17, 2007). "'High-value' detainee rejects al-Qaeda doctrine: Terror suspect tells Guantanamo hearing he 'disagreed' with targeting civilians". The Globe and Mail. Retrieved April 16, 2007.
External links
- "Superseding Indictment in U.S. v. Ressam", January 20, 2000
- Ahmed Ressam's Millennial plot, Frontline (PBS)
- The Terrorist Within, Seattle Times
Alleged militants in the war on terror who have lived in Algeria | |
---|---|
People listed in italics have died. | |
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat | |
Held at Guantanamo Bay | |
Alleged al-Qaeda members | |
Armed Islamic Group | |
Others | |
Currently imprisoned. Released after serving sentence. |