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Some ] who accept the existence of "middle-class squeeze" believe that it represents a societal crisis. Correlating socioeconomic status with the ], they equate middle-class social status with political moderation. This correlation has a valid logical basis— middle-class individuals have some capital and, thus, stake in a stable society, but also have aspirations that would prevent them from being resistant to change. According to this theory, continued economic stress on the ] would lead to a "collapse of the center" that could result in societal ], radical ], class warfare, or even violent revolution. | Some ] who accept the existence of "middle-class squeeze" believe that it represents a societal crisis. Correlating socioeconomic status with the ], they equate middle-class social status with political moderation. This correlation has a valid logical basis— middle-class individuals have some capital and, thus, stake in a stable society, but also have aspirations that would prevent them from being resistant to change. According to this theory, continued economic stress on the ] would lead to a "collapse of the center" that could result in societal ], radical ], class warfare, or even violent revolution. | ||
Furthermore, many middle-class people in the ] have high aspirations with regard to education, personal growth, financial success and accomplishment. (See: ].) Ambitious middle-class individuals are also, sometimes, the initators and leaders of ]s, revolting against society when their ambitions are frustrated by a constricting society. Some theorists believe that widespread frustration of middle-class ambitions may lead to massive societal upheaval in the ], though the probability of a violent revolution is |
Furthermore, many middle-class people in the ] have high aspirations with regard to education, personal growth, financial success and accomplishment. (See: ].) Ambitious middle-class individuals are also, sometimes, the initators and leaders of ]s, revolting against society when their ambitions are frustrated by a constricting society. Some theorists believe that widespread frustration of middle-class ambitions may lead to massive societal upheaval in the ], though the probability of a violent revolution is usually considered very low; a peaceful conflict is more likely. Furthermore, the individuals most likely to precipitate such a "conflict" tend to hold negative views of corporations, but neutral to positive views of ], especially at the ] level. More likely scenarios involve a "subtle conflict" wherein educated middle-class individuals, as well as wealthy leftists, infiltrate ] and the ] sector, then enact policies that place ], ], ], and ] and ] at higher priorities than ], resulting in dramatic changes in society. Some believe that this is already happening in ] and the ] nations. | ||
== Class ascendancy == | == Class ascendancy == |
Revision as of 02:02, 16 January 2006
It has been suggested that this article be merged with Social structure of the United States. (Discuss) |
The contemporary United States has no legally-recognized social classes. Elites exist, but are numerous and there is no universally recognized hierarchy of people. The absence of officially-recognized classes may reflect the desire of this society to become a market-oriented meritocracy, a reflection of belief in the "American dream" as well as traditional values of hard work, entrepreneurship, and individualism. It may also reflect the lack of a colonial peerage, the abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude, and the extension of universal suffrage. On the historical questions see Social Class in American History.
In practice, however, there are de facto social classes in the United States; this phenomenon is sometimes called " emergent elitism". Most likely, these social classes result from massive disparities in access to wealth, income, social access, and influence, as well as the tendency for people to associate with people of comparable social capital and financial means. Class is usually correlated strictly to ownership of productive, financial, cultural, social and human capital. For this reason, social class is often called socioeconomic status because of this inextricable connection. The connection is bidirectional, that is:
- Capital begets class, because people with unusual amounts of capital are often sought by others and can make transactions on terms that are favorable to them. Unlike in some European societies where "upper class" is tied to nobility, capital can usually buy access to some, but not all, of the "upper class" elites. Generational social mobility is also pronounced; the children and grandchildren of "self-made" wealthy people may have additional social access that the initial generators of wealth did not, due to the stigma some associate with nouveau riche status.
- Class begets capital, because individuals with social capital can often access other forms of capital more easily than others.
Class is reinforced by class traits, or characteristics of speech and behavior that signify a person's class. "Class ascendants", or social climbers, frequently attempt to emulate class traits of people in higher social classes. See snob for further discussion of this phenomenon.
Five-class model
Exact class lines are difficult, if not impossible, for outsiders to draw, and there is no agreement on precisely where they lie. Some argue that class is more of a continuum than a phenomenon of discrete categories. For many individuals, social class is more a matter of self-identification in terms of how the person views his or her relationship to society, particularly along the most fuzzy borders, like that between "middle class" and "upper-middle class". Sociological models depict society as having as few as two or as many as nine social classes, with the admission of "fuzziness" at the interfaces of classes. Most Americans, when asked, describe themselves as some variant of "middle class". Many sociologists, and popular sociology, use a five-class model, which includes:
- An upper class consisting of multiple elites. Membership in one elite may or may not connote membership in another. Extreme wealth, a notable name or accomplishment, or celebrity will usually bring an individual into this class, although most enjoy membership as a legacy of inherited wealth or familial prominence. Some allege that the American upper class sustains itself, and secures continued advantage, through social connections and networking rather than hard work. It is true that most Americans remain at roughly the same socioeconomic level into which they were born. While drastic upward mobility is possible, it is not necessarily common. Statistically, most mobility occurs in small degrees. For example, one born into the "middle-middle" class may become part of the "upper-middle" class in adulthood. Nonetheless, there are instances of Horatio Alger stories. For example, Andrew Carnegie exemplified a "rags-to-riches" existence.
- A middle class divided into three subcategories:
- A largely professional upper-middle class. Individuals within this class rarely have the elite social privileges lavished upon the upper-class, but normally have access to high-quality education. Individuals within this class typically make between $75,000 and $200,000 per year, though individuals with smaller incomes but valuable cultural capital (such as graduate and professional students) are sometimes included, as would be a well-to-do "stay-at-home" homemaker who declines occupational work by choice. Since class has as much to do with occupational prestige and lifestyle as with salary, highly-compensated blue collar workers are usually not considered "upper-middle class".
- A "middle-middle" class that, some evidence indicates, is decreasing in number. Corporate downsizing and the loss of manufacturing jobs has eliminated many of the skilled unionized jobs that provide membership within this class. As a result, many individuals within this group have drifted either into more skilled work, in the professional sectors (upper-middle class) or have fallen downward into the service sectors (lower-middle class). The state of the economy at a given time depends which trend is more prevalent; during strong economies, laid-off people are more likely to be better- than worse-off in subsequent jobs. During weak economies, the opposite is true.
- A lower-middle class, or "working poor". These individuals usually have very limited personal capital, and their occupational and educational skills are normally restricted to one type of work. Largely working in semi-skilled or unskilled service jobs, individuals within this social class often face varying hours, unpleasant occupational environments, and impersonal supervisors. Without higher education, they have very little social mobility— about 1/3 as much as those in Scandinavian social democracies like Sweden. By global standards, some of these individuals might be considered materially privileged, but they suffer from the same subjective ailments (low self-esteem, stress and high depression rates) experienced by the poor of other societies. The Paradox of Choice: Why More is Less, by Barry Schwartz, might explain this: material plenty has only a small effect of subjective happiness, while perceived low status leads frequently to a higher likelihood of depression, anxiety, poor self-image, and bad health. (However, these ailments affect some individuals in every social class, and therefore in many cases cannot be attributed to sociological causes.)
- A lower class of often comprises impoverished and desperate individuals. Crime and hunger are daily threats for them, and illiteracy, homelessness (most U.S. job applications require that the applicant provide a home address) and, in some cases, previous criminal records ensure that their chances of securing work remain low.
Class delineations are sometimes considered artificial—formal class membership does not exist, and people rarely think of themselves, in any meaningful way, as members of a specific class. Furthermore, a person's social class may change throughout his or her life. Social classes, therefore, are more often used in aggregate sociological depictions than they are applied to individual people. While people may maintain ties to specific families, social or ethnic groups, and institutions, it is rare for a person to have meaningful ties to a social class.
When asked to identify themselves with a social class, 90 to 95 percent identify as some shade of "middle class". Whether or not this is sociologically accurate is a matter of debate, since there are a number of models of America's class structure, each with a different definition of "middle class". But the very fact that so many people choose to identify with the middle class is nonetheless indicative of the extent to which Americans see themselves as living in a society in which liberty and equality are available to all.
Middle class divisions
Some dispute the divisions within the middle class as specifically class distinctions so much as lifestyle disparaties resulting from the large range of income levels classified as "middle class." It's true that "upper-middle" and "lower-middle" class individuals live dramatically different economic lives, but class requires a specific type of sociological barrier. Class barriers are usually considered almost impossible to cross, except by attaining the favor of people within higher classes, or losing the favor of those within one's social class. The barrier between the lower and lower-middle classes, as well as that between the upper-middle and upper classes, is generally considered more rigid than any barrier separating the middle classes.
Class and political leaning
The traditional assumption of 20th century political theorists (particularly those examining the United States) has been that upper-class individuals will tend to be more conservative while lower-class individuals are more liberal. In this paradigm, conservatism would tend toward opposing greater social mobility and distribution of wealth, while liberalism would support an expanded welfare state. By the late 20th century and early 21st century, there is evidence that this correlation has reversed: upper-class individuals may be more likely to be liberal or leftist in their politics. There are possible several theories for this reversal:
- Wealthier people may be more cosmopolitan, and therefore exposed to more liberal, urban environments.
- Wealthier people tend to be more able to afford formal education, which correlates with liberal-to-left politics.
- Some allege that this is due to systemic bias within academia: repeated polls of university professors show that, even in traditionally "conservative" disciplines like economics, members of "left" parties ( Democrats, Greens, etc.) outnumber members of "right" parties (Republicans, etc.) by anywhere between 3:1 and 25:1, depending on the discipline.
- Others attribute the correlation between education and liberal politics to a more global (as opposed to an ethnocentric) target of ethical concern among more cognitively advanced individuals (see: AQAL).
- Upper-middle class people have developed leftist tendencies out of a fear of "middle-class squeeze."
- The increased political salience of "culture war" issues has given social conservatism a populist appeal among many working-class and lower-middle-class Americans.
This reversal is probably less statistically significant than some may think, because conservatives on average are better paid than liberals. Also, there is evidence which shows that wealthy neighborhoods are more likely to vote conservatively than liberally. What may be evident, however, is the reality of the "limousine liberal," a grouping of extremely wealthy people who tend toward Left views, particularly, in the stereotype, among members of the Hollywood culture. Statistically, the reality seems to be a division among both the wealthy and the less wealthy. Portions of both groups are conservative, while portions are liberal. Many less-wealthy, and therefore less-educated, people are attracted to conservative politics because of their traditional cultural and social attitudes, while other less-wealthy and less-educated individuals are attracted to liberalism in the hope to achieving greater social equality. Among the more wealthy, some associate education and open-mindedness with the welfare state and social justice programs espoused by liberal political movements, while others among the wealthy tend to hold to a more traditionalist viewpoint, some in the attempt (consciously or unconsciously) to retain their high socio-economic position; the latter view paradigm of the attitudes of the wealthy is particularly stereotypical. Some correlations also exist in various wings of religious affiliations, either replacing class as a primary factor, or in addition to class.
"Middle-class squeeze": does it exist?
Some observers of American society have raised the issue of "middle-class squeeze", or downward mobility within the middle class, possibly into lower-class status. While this "squeeze" is a relatively new phrase, the issue is not unique to 21st century America— similar anxieties are discussed in Barbara Ehrenreich's Fear of Falling. "Middle-class squeeze" is, at least, a real anxiety among middle- and upper-middle class Americans, particularly in the so-called generation X. To what extent it is a reality remains debated. The progress of any society at any time is always multi-faceted and complex — in some ways, conditions will be improving, and in others, they will be worsening.
Cost of living
"Middle-class squeeze" refers to a multitude of related issues facing the middle-class. Some fear that these issues will constrict the middle-class, even to the extent that they knock people out of the upper-middle and middle-middle classes. Most prominent among these issues are cost-of-living issues (including healthcare and housing costs), unemployment, especially among the young, and quality-of-life issues ( work hours, mandated vacation).
The salary of the median American has increased during the 2000s, but healthcare, housing, and education costs have, by all measures, outpaced these salary increases. Low inflation as defined by the consumer price index has been offset by cultural inflation resulting from recent growth in technology. For example, Internet access, which few people had in 1983 (the base year of the CPI) now has the status of a virtual necessity for middle-class life: students need Internet access to complete schoolwork. The necessity of automobile ownership in most of non-urban America has made the actual cost of living greater in the past century, and this is what one might consider "real" cultural inflation.
At the same time, however, other cultural costs of the middle class have declined in recent years. The spread of cell phones has rendered the use of costlier landlines less necessary, to the extend that the number of residential landline telephones is actually declining in the United States. The widespread use of e-mail has greatly reduced the cost of communication with relations and the search for employment; job searches once conducted through the post can now be conducted online, at a greatly reduced cost. The automobile has likewise reduced the cultural costs of Americans, as it has facilitated long-distance travel to sites of cultural importance and to new economic opportunity. Indeed, sociologists studying America in the 1920s and 1930s often found that Americans were less willing to give up their automobiles than nearly any other possession they owned, and placed greater emphasis on purchasing an automobile than on other purchases. As one farmer's wife famously told Robert Staughton Lynd in the 1920s when asked why her family had purchased a car in preference to a bathtub, "you can't ride to town in a bathtub." Access to town no doubt vastly improved the cultural and economic resources available to this couple and thousands like them in the same period.
Moreover, it is difficult to determine when cultural inflation is a real structural problem, and when it is merely psychological (in that people feel poorer on account of others' comparative material success). On the other hand, the proliferation of new recreational electronic goods (game consoles, stereos, etc.) does not constitute the same sort of cultural inflation since these are not necessary goods. Rather, this is an aspect of the undebated "rising tide" in technology and technological access over the most recent decades.
In many other respects, aspects of "middle-class squeeze" can be attributed to the attitudes and values of the middle class themsleves as much as, if not more than, to fundamental changes in the economic landscape. While it has been widely noted that the cost of housing has been on the increase lately, it has been less widely noted that much of this increase is due to land-use policies in suburban areas that make it next to impossible to replace single-family detached houses with multi-family dwelling or apartment buildings. These policies, enacted in the 1950s when much more land near urban centers was undeveloped, were designed to produce rising property values and so ensure the economic well-being of the middle class families who came to populate suburbia in those years. Although many children of the original settlers of places like Levittown, New York have found themselves priced out of these communities, this housing crisis could be largely eliminated if suburban communities would allow for higher-density development. Such development would allow the supply of available housing to keep up with demand, thus lowering housing prices overall.
Education
Primary and secondary education, for twelve years, are free in the United States, funded locally via property taxes. In the United States, the free state-run schools are known as public schools (the term is not used to describe private academies, as in other English-speaking countries). These vary widely in quality: many public schools are excellent and exceed even the elite private academies in educational performance; others are terrible and fail even to teach basic literacy and numeracy. In some locations (for example, New Orleans) the public schools are considered so poor in quality that most middle-class residents send their children to private or religious schools. In other areas, public schools are of such high quality that few people even attend private schools. Because the public schools are funded by local property taxes, public schools tend to be better in wealthy suburban areas, but poor urban schools sometimes excel under exceptional leadership. The quality of a person's primary and secondary schooling has a major influence on future economic fortune, since a strong secondary program will also increase the likelihood of admission to a high-quality university.
"Higher education", or tertiary education, is required for almost all middle-class professions, especially as technological advances have made even most traditionally "mechanical" (such as automotive repair) or clerical trades require advanced knowledge. Tertiary education is rarely free, but the costs vary widely: tuition at elite private colleges often exceeds $120,000 for a four-year program. On the other hand, the University of California schools are almost free for state residents, and many rival the elite private schools in reputation and quality. Also, scholarships offered by universities and government do exist, and low-interest loans are available. Still, the average cost of education, by all accounts, is increasing. In addition, in terms of class-access, most academic degrees are considered to have devalued by about four years since the mid-20th century; this makes education, for the purpose of maintaining or acquiring social class, ennormously more expensive.
"Squeeze" as a crisis
Some political theorists who accept the existence of "middle-class squeeze" believe that it represents a societal crisis. Correlating socioeconomic status with the political spectrum, they equate middle-class social status with political moderation. This correlation has a valid logical basis— middle-class individuals have some capital and, thus, stake in a stable society, but also have aspirations that would prevent them from being resistant to change. According to this theory, continued economic stress on the middle class would lead to a "collapse of the center" that could result in societal schism, radical Producerism, class warfare, or even violent revolution.
Furthermore, many middle-class people in the United States have high aspirations with regard to education, personal growth, financial success and accomplishment. (See: American dream.) Ambitious middle-class individuals are also, sometimes, the initators and leaders of rebellions, revolting against society when their ambitions are frustrated by a constricting society. Some theorists believe that widespread frustration of middle-class ambitions may lead to massive societal upheaval in the United States, though the probability of a violent revolution is usually considered very low; a peaceful conflict is more likely. Furthermore, the individuals most likely to precipitate such a "conflict" tend to hold negative views of corporations, but neutral to positive views of government, especially at the grassroots level. More likely scenarios involve a "subtle conflict" wherein educated middle-class individuals, as well as wealthy leftists, infiltrate government and the NGO sector, then enact policies that place quality of life, equality, sustainability, and human and civil rights at higher priorities than property rights, resulting in dramatic changes in society. Some believe that this is already happening in Canada and the European Union nations.
Class ascendancy
Class ascendancy is a central theme in American literature and culture. This theme is not, however, unique to American culture; literary examples from other contexts include Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice and Stendhal's The Red and the Black. Some have posited that the dream of class ascendancy is the essence of the American dream. The more classic understanding of the American dream, however, is that each successive generation will have a higher standard of living than its predecessor. Such a definition has little to do with class ascendancy as such; if the standards of living of one's class improve, one's own standard of living will likely improve, as a rising tide raises all boats.
Because of its complete absence of officialized class distinctions, most Americans believe that anyone can reach the upper echelons of society. A large proportion of Americans expect to be wealthy in the future; if, however, American society maintains its current shape, it is likely that at least some of them will be disappointed.
Fussell's system
Paul Fussell, in Class: A Guide Through the American Status System lists nine classes:
- Top out-of-sight: the "Old Money" wealthy who avoid public exposure (in part, due to experiences during the 1930s, when it was not to one's advantage to be wealthy).
- Upper Class: a group of those who are not only wealthy, but usually born into the wealth, and who espouse a different set of values than wealthy middle-class people or "proles".
- Upper-Middle Class: wealthy, refined people.
- Middle Class: most "white collar" workers, including many of the self-employed, and a group most afflicted with status anxiety and confusion, envying the refinement of the upper-middle class and the leisure of the uppers.
- High Prole: skilled, often wealthy manufacturing or service workers, who may outearn middle and even upper-middle class people but maintain a distinctively "lowbrow" culture.
- Mid Prole: an intermediate level of often poor workers, but with stable employment and relative security.
- Low Prole: the working poor, with difficulty finding steady employment.
- Destitute: the homeless underclass.
- Bottom out-of-sight: those incarcerated in prisons, or otherwise outside the purview of sociology; like top-out-of-sights, they fall so low in society as to become effectively invisible.
Like most who have studied social class, Fussell is a determinist who considers it relatively difficult for anyone to achieve a significant move in social class. Fussell claims that most Americans exhibit some degree of class anxiety or insecurity.
Fussell also proposes the existence of a small subset of Americans who don't fit into any of the above social classes, known as "Category X". Recruited from all social classes, they are the intellectual, stylish misfits whom others try to emulate, but by no means qualify as an elite. Fussell claims "X" to be a category rather than class since one gains membership on account of personal qualities and values rather than social background or breeding.
Fussell argues social class to be determined more by culture, lifestyle, and values than income.
See Also
References
- Paul Fussell, Class: A Guide through the American Status System, ISBN 0671792253, ISBN 0671449915