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Allied bombing of France and Italy

Needs to be mentioned. 69.133.126.117 (talk) 20:27, 9 April 2010 (UTC)

Industrial capacity and production

See also the section above: #effect of the bombing campaign

The introduction of "Allied bombing of industrial cities significantly reduced German industrial capacity." in place "of had a limited effect on German industrial production", is misleading as it may have "significantly reduced German industrial capacity" it did not significantly reduced German industrial production, as pre-war capacity was underutilised. For example, just suppose that a factory producing armament widgets before the war was only used for one shift per-day, then by the simple expedient of doubling shifts and utilising the armament widget producing machines for twice a long each day it would roughly double production of widgets without any increase in industrial capacity. Altering a factory from none war essential production to producing weapons would increase military industrial capacity without any change in overall industrial capacity or production etc etc.

Something on this came up in Britain during a debate in Parliament during the war. A. V. Hill pointed out when the house was debating bombing Germany "The loss of production in the worst month of the Blitz was about equal to that due to the Easter holidays". In other words without any alteration in capacity the expedient of cancelling Easter would negate the loss of production caused in the most effective month of bombing by the Germans. Presumably there was loss of industrial capacity by the German bombing, but its effect on production was minimal.

So don't think that this edit changing

• Nevertheless, RAF Bomber Command had a limited effect on German industrial production, and was no more successful at breaking Germany's will to fight than the Luftwaffe was at breaking Britain's.

to

• The Allied bombing of industrial cities significantly reduced German industrial capacity.

improves the article as both statements are true and the difference between production and capacity needs to be explained.

Also it is not clear to me why the clause "and was no more successful at breaking Germany's will to fight than the Luftwaffe was at breaking Britain's" was removed.

--PBS (talk) 01:18, 9 July 2010 (UTC)

German production lost nearly one-third of production directly or indirectly owing to the bombing. The old line that production increased = failure of the bombing offensive is what is misleading. Given the German resurgence under Speer, which only realised the capacity they had in the firs place, it is not surprising that production peaked. It much easier to quantify results by examining how much the Germans recorded lost, plus actual production. Then you get cause and effect. It was one-third according to Speer and Buckley.

As for RAF BC, this is not true. See Impact of Allied aerial offensive in the DOR article. That is why it was removed, it doesn't deal in detail with any of it, other than to make some generalisation that is way off.

Industrial capacity and production are to all intents and purposes, the same thing. The Capaicty to produce weapons is reduced when you churn up rail networks, so that the materials can't reach the factories. If I remember rightly, the Dortmund-Hamm (I think it was Hamm) line was destroyed by November 1944 and could not be repaired until 1947. Dapi89 (talk) 09:34, 9 July 2010 (UTC)

I might have preempted any discourse by more inclusive changes. I think they will be more agreeable. Dapi89 (talk) 10:08, 9 July 2010 (UTC)

Production and capacity are not the same thing. If they were then German war production would not have peaked as late in the war as it did. You say as much when you write "Given the German resurgence under Speer, which only realised the capacity they had in the firs place, it is not surprising that production peaked." -- PBS (talk) 10:13, 9 July 2010 (UTC)

Yes they are and no I don't. You've taken what I said out of context. You can only produce as much as you have capacity for - as I said. That capacity/production increases and falls depending on the effectiveness of attacks and productive method - as I said. The amount of capacity determines production - as I said. What I didn't say was; German production was at capacity since 1933, it was just siphoned off to non-war related means, and not geared to military means. It was only when this was reversed by Speer did the Germans reach capacity in the military field. All Speer did was to realise the MILITARY potential, not OVERALL potential of what was already there. So there was an increase in military capacity, which = an increase in production.

Bottom line is; if you are denied the capacity (factories/comms/material) to produce, then your production and capacity is reduced. It is silly to try and make a distinction under the circumstances. Dapi89 (talk) 11:00, 9 July 2010 (UTC)

Bottom line is; if you are denied the capacity (factories/comms/material) to produce, then your production and capacity is reduced. This is not correct. The Capacity utilization is important. You can compensate reduced capacity relativly easy if your Capacity utilization isnt so high. Blablaaa (talk) 16:19, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

Oh, no, they aren't. The U.S. auto industry right now has the capacity to produce in excess of 15 million cars a year. It's not doing that, because they couldn't sell that many in Lee Iacocca's dreams. Production is not equal to capacity. QED. And substituting "capacity" for "production" is not only misleading, it's false. Bombing had extremely limited impact on capacity. In fact, the Germans repeatedly demonstrated survival of capacity, with factories resuming production shortly after attacks, with little or no repair, & even maintained production in damaged factories... Production = capacity? Not a chance. AFAI can tell, bombing had the most impact on production, & almost none on capacity (even in Japan, BTW), thanks in part to dispersal. TREKphiler 22:11, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

You seem to be talking at cross purposes, and sometimes contradicting even yourselves. Capacity is the maximimum output an industry is capable of, production is the amount it is actually producing. Capacity can be reduced without affecting production, until capacity falls under the production number required.

However, we should be reflecting what the sources actually say, not synthesising them. (Hohum ) 23:12, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

That was my point at the start of this thread "The introduction of "Allied bombing of industrial cities significantly reduced German industrial capacity." in place "of had a limited effect on German industrial production"", The sources are/were in the text instead of substituting one sentence for the other (as was done) just include both with sources. -- PBS (talk) 23:19, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

Yes, they are. German military industry was always operating at 100%. In 1942 it was given more muscle at others expense; + capacity = increase in production. Had the Germans been operating at 50% of military potential before hand then you have had a point. They weren't. QED Trekphiler, 'yes chance'. And the notion Allied bombing had limited effect on capacity is completely false. The communications networks in the Ruhr + damage to RM mines was so bad the factories did not receive the materials they needed to start production. And I have sources. So capacity is reduced, and so is and production (obviously). And Hohum, no. I could quite easily use the word capacity and or production to describe the restrictions imposed on production centres in the face of bombing. These simplistic responses are wrong, the two are so closely linked that, as I said, Industrial capacity and production are to all intents and purposes, the same thing. No contradictions. Sources will follow if need be. There is some good stuff in Hall, R. Cargill. Case Studies In Strategic Bombardment. Air Force History and Museums Program 1998. ISBN 0-16-049781-7 Dapi89 (talk) 17:45, 11 July 2010 (UTC)

I could have sworn you said elsepage (Blitzkrieg?) that German military production was operating well under capacity in the early years. (Hohum ) 17:56, 11 July 2010 (UTC)

The military industry was not, the overall economy was. The military sectors did the maximum they could with what they were given. More resources from non essential (and non military) sectors increased military production (after a lot of capacity/factory building - underground). It was the economic priorities that were lacking. This enormous effort managed to push military capacity up. Hence it is quite correct to say that the German military industry always operated to its fullest, but at the same time criticise the leadership for not stripping other areas for the sake of the military to push these limits even further much earlier. Dapi89 (talk) 19:30, 11 July 2010 (UTC)

dapi: "So capacity is reduced, and so is and production (obviously)." this is not necessarily correct. This are 2 different things.... I also would avoid to take single events as examples to describe the effects. Overall numbers are hard facts.... Single examples of a factory somewhere in germany are window dressing, i think. dapi: "German military industry was always operating at 100%" ---> impossible. Blablaaa (talk) 19:44, 11 July 2010 (UTC)

this is from the article: "Until late in the war, industry had not been geared for war and German factory workers only worked a single shift. (Incredibly, German apprenticeships for aircraft electrical fitters still lasted four years at the war's end.)", this heavly disputes your point. Blablaaa (talk) 19:48, 11 July 2010 (UTC)

Bla', you are not seeing the subtleties in the English language. Forgive the crude example; a factory produces 10,000 Ju 87s a day. It gets wiped out. You don't say, "damn, we've lost 10,000 per day production. But hey, the foundations of the factory are still there, so our capacity remains the same". It doesn't work for me. Dapi89 (talk) 20:23, 11 July 2010 (UTC)

I agree it is possible that i misunderstand the words. But iam not sure if i misunderstood them. Anyways you are correct with your concern regarding my ability to follow the discussion perfectly. Blablaaa (talk) 20:27, 11 July 2010 (UTC)

"+ capacity = increase in production" And I don't believe I ever disagreed with that proposition. However, production is extremely flexible within the existing capacity, which was true in Germany, & which is what I said. "German military industry was always operating at 100%." No, it wasn't, because "military industry" is part of the total productive capacity of Germany, which as late as 1942 was stll producing civilian goods. Clearly, the full available capacity (i.e., 100%) was not turned over to military output (production). Which also puts paid to your "capacity =production" argument, doesn't it? "So capacity is reduced, and so is and production (obviously)" Probably, but not necessarily. This doesn't take account of labor flexibility (more shifts) or increased output elsewhere. TREKphiler 23:32, 11 July 2010 (UTC)

Dapi, I was under the impression German military industrial production was initially lower than capacity for the simple reason that they weren't operating factories 24hr, using shifts, not so much because of lack of factories. Also, they didn't even press women into work? (Hohum ) 23:59, 11 July 2010 (UTC)

It is pointed out in many sources that unlike Britain Germany did not conscript women into production, but something I didn't know but read recently, (I think it was in Max Hastings' Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944-45) was that at the end of the European war the Germans still had 1.5 million working as domestic servants. The Germans -- or the Americans (they never had to) -- never mobilised their economy in the way that the British did. "So capacity is reduced, and so is and production (obviously)." I don't think it is obvious, as it depends on a number of factors: The utilisation of physical capital, the efficiency of the utilisation, and the ability to bypass, replace or repair damaged infrastructure.

For example one trick that can boot numbers in the short-term, is to use infrastructure that would usually be used in the long-term reinvestment cycle for immediate war production, the economic equivalent of eating the seed corn. This was a problem that Britiain suffered from for more than a decade after both world wars, particularly in the heavy industries and transportation sectors of the economy.

If the German economy had been on an efficient total war footing from the start of the war then yes there would have been a close correlation between capacity and production, but the fact that the Germans were producing record levels of materiel in late 44 early 45 despite the Allied Bomber Commands best efforts, suggests that capacity and production were not that tightly tied together. Which is why I think that both points should be made. -- PBS (talk) 02:54, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

Sorry, you've got things wrong. Richard Overy busted that myth about the lack of German women in the workforce in his article Guns or Butter: Living Standards, Finance and Labour in German 1939–42, reprinted in War and Economy in the Third Reich. On p. 312 he quotes the percentage of women in the workforce in Germany in 1939 as 37.3% and for Britain 26.4%. In 1940 it's 41.4% and 29.8% respectively. In 1941 it's 42.6% and 33.2% respectively. In 1942 it's 46.0% and 34.8% respectively. In 1943 it's 48.8% and 36.4% respectively. In 1944 it's 51.0% and 36.2% respectively. Earlier work like the USSBS, Klein, Milward, etc. focused on the change between the prewar levels of female employment and the wartime ones, but they didn't appreciate that there were significantly more women employed in Germany before the war than was the case in the UK. In fact the Germans had a severe labor shortage in the late '30s and women were used to make up some of the difference, despite the Party's doctrine of Kinder, Kirche, und Küche (children, church, and kitchen).

Overy believes that the problems in 39 to mid-41 with weapons outputs, etc. were not because the Germans weren't mobilized, but rather because they were struggling to finish building a lot of the basic industries started before the war, they had problems incorporating the conquered areas of Europe into their economy and lots of internal political confusion over priorities, resources and jurisdictions. The second stage ran from mid-41 to mid-44 and was the result of extensive efforts, under Fritz Todt, not that self-important, and lying, memoirist Speer, to rationalize and simplify the economy through administrative reforms and centralization of asset and labour resources. The last stage, from mid-44 to the end, saw them focus on producing the most essential and easily produced equipment, making weapons rather than spare parts and repairing as much as possible.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 05:25, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

He most certainly did. Had I had the wit, or room in the grey mush to retain that level of detail, I could have made that point earlier! Hence I am correct (or near enough) to say that the Germans operated as close to their potential as possible throughout the war - taking into account resources given at one time or another but also that German industry had higher potential. Thanks for clarifying those lack of economic priorities. A much more thorough and concise explanation, thanks. Dapi89 (talk) 11:58, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

Careful, I wouldn't say that the Germans operated at the full potential during the first stage. The main problem was that the Germans had a craft mentality, not a mass production one and many industrialists (and workers) resisted implementation of mass production techniques like the assembly line, use of unskilled workers, etc. In fact the Nazi Party doctrine was against dehumanizing assembly line-type techniques prewar, but they were pragmatic about it, just like with female labor. Many industrialists were not willing to invest in new or greater capacity for fear of being stuck with it postwar; that included physical plant as well as new employees, especially unskilled ones, who were seen as a threat by the older workers who were used to hand-fitting parts, etc. and were perfectly willing to get things just so. This last is one reason why many factories did not stand up a second shift until forced to do so. So, I'd say that the German war economy was mobilized during that period, but it was done very inefficiently as various groups resisted the necessary changes.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 14:41, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

German industry was doing relatively OK until the surrender (except for the transportation of coal to the factories being disrupted), it was after the surrender that the German industrial economy itself was really "bombed", and the effect spilled over into the rest of europe.

• THE UNDEFEATED
• Cost of Defeat
• Pas de Pagaille!

You should focus more on how the bombing of the transportation network influenced the economy during the later stages of the war, most factories had their own power-plants and were dependent on transport of coal from the Ruhr and from Silesia to them. --Stor stark7 18:42, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

Overy's War and economy in the Third Reich, mentioned above, Chapter 9: Guns or Butter: Living Standards, Finance and Labour in Germany 1939–42 - (p. 305 in this edition - regarding women in work). Very interesting and thorough - even though it's not a full preview.

However, this book is 1995 vintage, and Armageddon by Hastings is 2005 - and he seems to indicated the opposite again. How do we square this? (Hohum ) 19:14, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

Easy, Hastings is a journalist, not an economic historian, and he's using the older, discredited explanation because it's far more widely known. You can also reference Tooze, Wages of Destruction; Harrison, the Economics of World War 2; Aly, Hitler's Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War and the Nazi Welfare State as well as the two parts of Volume 5 of Germany and the Second World War, the semi-official history. Few of these guys agree on everything, but it's really eye-opening to see everything that was in play during this period and how simplistic the older explanation really was. Especially if you can wade through the 1000 pages apiece of each part of Volume 5. But to be fair some of the points that I've made should be summarized in a note to show that there's a fair amount of disagreement over the German war economy, although most of it is from older scholarship that keeps getting repeated. Otherwise edit wars are likely as people will persist in putting in what they know to be true, even if it's outdated.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 19:36, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

Fair enough. (Hohum ) 19:51, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

Totally right. I have the copy now - found it. To User:Stor stark7; no way pal. Journalism has no place here because it always wrong, even when it manages to get a few facts right. Overy is THE economic - air power historian worthy of mention. I have Tooze as well, his stuff is excellent. I guess you'd expect that from an Ec' hist' from the big C. Dapi89 (talk) 09:35, 13 July 2010 (UTC)

Overy is also a historian who still ( in the late 90's) published debunked soviet propagandamyths in his books about eastern front. Be carefull with hyping him. Regarding the women rate. People should note, that Germany had one of the biggest armies compared to their population, this means automaticly that they had to compensate this with higher rate of women. This does not mean german did mobilize the industry stronger than others. They simply compensate the million missing men with womens. In my opinion there is not much logic to compare this with GB or USA who had a far lower rate of soldiers. Perfect example for statistics which look much different with background informations.Blablaaa (talk) 09:06, 14 July 2010 (UTC)

Overy's book on the Eastern Front isn't worth much, I'll agree, but that has nothing to do with his status as an economic historian. And your argument above is meaningless. No nation "has" to do anything. The Germans could have compensated for the loss of workers by further mechanizing their production, drafting more foreign and slave workers, etc. They didn't "have" to further mobilize women at all. On a related note the Soviets were able to transfer much of their prewar agricultural and industrial labor into the military because they could rely on Lend-Lease to provide food, raw materials and industrial goods like locomotives, etc.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 18:46, 14 July 2010 (UTC)

If Overy is right, then there is a real problem with explaining any significant effect of the bombing campaign and capacity, as his figures implies that the bombing campaign was not successful for most of the war, doubly so if one considers production and capacity to be highly correlated. -- PBS (talk) 22:38, 14 July 2010 (UTC)

Until '44 I that that is true. As far as I can tell, the bombing campaign wasn't very effective in knocking down German production until then, with rare exceptions like Hamburg. It had other effects before then such as boosting British morale and harming German morale, much less so for the latter, though.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 23:24, 14 July 2010 (UTC)

Since more tonnage was dropped from mid 1944 to the end of the war, than all the time before that, after gaining air superiority, and with vastly improved comparative accuracy, it's not suprising that it could be more effective by the end, surely? (Hohum ) 00:27, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

@Sturmvogel. I only explained the higher german rate of women in the industry. Germany had the biggest army compared to their population, thats the direct reason for the high women percantage. Men were replaced with women. Not every job was in a factory where you could place a "slaveworker", the men were drafted into the wehrmacht and women replaced them. Regarding the topic: I raised my point some months before: What i know ( if iam wrong please correct me ) a big part of this "reduced production" were aircraft? Bur ironical the Wehrmacht was never short of aircraft, correct? Blablaaa (talk) 04:13, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

I'm not at all sure that the Germans had the biggest army compared to their population; I suspect that honor belongs to the Soviets, but I haven't looked to confirm it one way or another. And women could step into many male jobs, but not all. I'm fairly certain that there weren't a whole lot of female coal miners, steel workers, etc., but a slave or foreign worker could easily be used. And I'm not sure that the production of aircraft was the most reduced by the Allied bombing effort; I haven't done any detailed reading on this topic in 3-4 years. I think that trying to determine the most badly effected sector of the economy isn't really relevant to this article. The USSBS probably has general figures that could be easily used and referenced.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 04:30, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

If the most badly effected sector was a sector which produced more goods than needed then it would become relevant. But thats OR . THe last time when i read this article i missed a good analyses regarding the cost effectiness. Reducing german producation by XX% sounds meaningless without talking about the invested resources to achieve this. Blablaaa (talk) 04:41, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

"If Overy is right, then there is a real problem with explaining any significant effect of the bombing campaign and capacity, as his figures implies that the bombing campaign was not successful for most of the war, doubly so if one considers production and capacity to be highly correlated." AFAIK, there were trivial impacts on German morale (& the Brits had no way of measuring them, nor made any effort to do so anyhow) & small effect on Brit morale. The most direct effect was actually on the survival of Winston's government: by being able to demonstrate HMG was hitting back, he undercut domestic opposition. (This effect traces back to Nanking 1937.) There's also a grand strategic effect, in being able to tell the Sovs, "Look!" The biggest impact, IMO, was operational: the massive losses to little gain of manpower which could have improved the performance of the Army, in particular after 6/6/44, when there was a fair crisis. (Of course, that leaves unexplained why there were units from Normandie being disbanded, when the Army evidently had whole untouched divisions at home...) I also think the impact on German warmaking potential is overblown; not trivial, but way overstated. TREKphiler 04:14, 16 July 2010 (UTC)

Link to www.truth-hertz.net

Some time ago I provided an external link to the site www.truth-hertz, which was almost immediately removed by Binksternet who sent this message to my user page: "Please do not add non-neutral material such as links to essays at" www.truth-hertz.net "to Misplaced Pages articles, as you did to World War II and Strategic bombing during World War II. Doing so violates Misplaced Pages's neutral point of view policy. " Binksternet (talk) 20:53, 5 April 2010 (UTC) The "essays" to which Binksternet refers are in fact seven or eight downloadable CHAPTERS from the non-fiction book Between the Lies (2nd edition, London:2007), which include several hundred primary and secondary sources, footnotes and extensive bibliography. The book, which remedies some prevailing historical myths about WW2, was published by a reputable academic publisher. So it was presumably subjected to academic peer review prior to publication. I doubt if Binksternet actually took the trouble to read those chapters, the appropriateness of which might be a subject for discussion instead of arbitrary deletion. Wiki's rule is that external linking to a website is acceptable if and when the site provides "significant and reliable additional information on an article's topic", and certainly the link to www.truth-hertz.net meets that requirement. As for allegedly violating neutrality, I think that's a matter of Binksternet's own less than neutral personal point of view. As I understand it, Wiki's definition of neutrality does not mean the absence of a point of view, but rather a judicious and unbiased mix of sources cited. Between the Lies seems to do that rather well, but I could be wrong. Nobody's perfect. Communicat (talk) 23:34, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

You must be referring to this edit of mine three months ago, a removal of your book link that was then countered by you 2½ weeks later here, without the web URL, soon to be removed once again, this time by Edward321 in this edit unaccompanied by an edit summary. Your book is published by Gardners Books in the UK, a firm which caters to those who wish to publish their own books. The link, http://www.truth-hertz.net/part1.html, shows a wildly frothing fringe website, and looked to me like it crossed the line into WP:FRINGE. Stan Winer does not strike me as an author that is useful to this article, as he firmly takes a fringe stance. I stand by my deletion of the book and of the link. Binksternet (talk) 00:17, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Nice record keeping. But you got it wrong about publisher. Book was published by Southern University Press, London. I think we're digressing slightly, since we're supposed to be discussing a link to the free download version.

To answer the rest of Binksternet's comments: I think you should be referring to WP:EL and not WP:FRINGE as you've done. This discussion was meant to be about an external link, not an article, which is the function of WP:FRINGE. But since you've raised WP:FRINGE, I'm okay with broadening the discussion. Interestingly, WP:FRINGE with regard to real or perceived fringe / minority / alternative / revisionist / other (call it what you like) positions, states: NPOV requires that all majority and significant-minority positions be included in an article. Why is it that content of the main WW2 article and all its related sub-articles deal exclusively with majority i.e. Western positions? (Strikes me as a major flaw in an otherwise excellent and high-level article). WP:FRINGE also rules that In general, Misplaced Pages should always give prominence to established lines of research found in reliable sources and present neutral descriptions of other claims with respect to their historical ... prominence. And: ideas should not be excluded from the encyclopedia simply because they are widely held to be wrong. So, it follows that the existing WW2 article and sub-articles seem to have a serious NPOV problem in so far as they exclude all reference to "other"-type positions which deviate from those of dominant majority-position type editors. But to return to the question of reliable sources, WP:FRINGE further rules that "reliable sources on Misplaced Pages include ... books published by university presses (and)published by respected publishing houses. The download-linked book in question and under discussion is published by Southern Universities Press, London. Enough said.

By the way, it might be worth bearing in mind that today's "fringe" position can sometimes become tomorrow's majority position. Take the Battle of Britain for instance, which was once described by mainstream historians and others as "a heroic victory of the few against the many", when in fact, as latter-day historians have now established beyond doubt, RAF fighters at the time of that battle vastly outnumbered those available to the Luftwaffe (Sources available on request). It might also be worth bearing in mind that what is seen as a fringe / minority / "other"-type position in the West can also be a consensual mainstream / majority position outside of the Western cultural and political sphere of influence, i.e. in socialist countries. Communicat (talk) 19:58, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

I agree with Binksternet. If this is a credible book (which I doubt) it should be used as a source for the article. Adding it as an external link isn't a way to side-step the process of assessing the value and reliability of sources. Nick-D (talk) 00:34, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

See above response to Binksternet Communicat (talk) 19:58, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Not reliable. Fringe.radek (talk) 00:45, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

See above response to Binksternet Communicat (talk) 19:58, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

See WP:ELNO. "Any site that misleads the reader by use of factually inaccurate material or unverifiable research, except to a limited extent in articles about the viewpoints which such sites are presenting.". It looks factually inaccurate compared to reliable sources, prove otherwise. (Hohum ) 21:02, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

In addition, Southern Universities Press. 12 Mcleod Court. Dulwich Common. London SE22 8NS, per the details in the front of the book, is the address of a flat, and not likely a publishing house for an accredited university, unless it can be shown otherwise. (Hohum ) 21:25, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

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