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Falun Gong
The Falun Dafa emblem
Traditional Chinese	法輪功
Simplified Chinese	法轮功
Literal meaning	Practice of the Wheel of Law
Transcriptions Standard Mandarin Hanyu Pinyin Fǎlún Gōng Yue: Cantonese Jyutping fat2 lun4 gung1
Falun Dafa
Traditional Chinese	法輪大法
Simplified Chinese	法轮大法
Literal meaning	Great Law of the Wheel of Law
Transcriptions Standard Mandarin Hanyu Pinyin Fǎlún Dàfǎ Yue: Cantonese Jyutping fat2 lun4 daai6 fat2

Falun Gong (alternatively Falun Dafa) is a system of beliefs and practices founded in China by Li Hongzhi in 1992. It emerged at the end of China's "qigong boom", a period of growth and popularity of similar practices. Falun Gong differs from other qigong schools in its absence of daily rituals of worship, its greater emphasis on morality, and the theological nature of its teachings. Western academics have described Falun Gong as a "spiritual movement" based on the teachings of its founder, a "cultivation system" in the tradition of Chinese antiquity, and sometimes a new religious movement (NRM). Falun Gong places a heavy emphasis on morality in its central tenets – Truthfulness, Compassion, and Forbearance (Chinese: 真、善、忍). Its teachings include concepts from qigong, Buddhist and Taoist traditions.

The movement grew rapidly in China between 1992 and 1999. Government sources indicated that there may have been as many as 70 million Falun Gong practitioners in the country by 1998. In the mid-1990s the proliferation of qigong practices generated attention from Chinese journalists, skeptics, and scientists; reports critical of qigong appeared in the Chinese media, some of which were aimed at Falun Gong. Falun Gong practitioners responded to critics through peaceful protests, attempting to address perceived unfair media treatment. In April 1999, after one such protest in Tianjin which ended with beatings and arrests, some 10,000 practitioners gathered at Zhongnanhai, the residence compound of China's leaders, in silent protest, while representatives reportedly negotiated with CCP officials. The principle request to authorities was "the assurance of a proper and lawful environment to pursue Falun Gong cultivation."

In July 1999, the Chinese government, under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) banned Falun Gong and began a nationwide crackdown and multifaceted propaganda campaign against the practice; in October 1999 it declared Falun Gong a "heretical organization." Human rights groups report that Falun Gong practitioners in China are subject to a wide range of human rights abuses. Falun Gong practitioners continue to levy charges against the CCP, lobbying Western governments and handing out information about the ill-treatment of practitioners, highlighting arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, organ harvesting, forced labor, and torture at the hands of the Chinese security forces. Falun Gong practitioners have founded media outlets (the Epoch Times and New Tang Dynasty Television) that publicize their cause and criticize the CCP, and the group has emerged as a prominent voice opposing the Party's rule in China.

Beliefs and teachings

Falun Gong emerged towards the end of the rapid proliferation of qigong practices in China, often called the "qigong boom." Qigong refers to a wide variety of traditional "cultivation" practices that involve slow movement and/or regulated breathing as in pranayama, a practice found in yoga. Practice may be for the purpose of healing or health maintenance, or in martial arts or spiritual pursuits. In contrast to attitudes in the West, where qigong may be construed as a subjective, New Age-style concept incapable of scientific proof, a segment of China's scientific establishment regarded qi as a scientific concept. Controlled experiments by the Chinese Academy of Sciences in the late 1970s and early 1980s "proved" that qi, when emitted by a qigong expert, "actually constitutes measurable infrared electromagnetic waves and causes chemical changes in static water through mental concentration."

Falun Gong was introduced to the public by Li Hongzhi (李洪志) in Changchun, China, in 1992. Its teachings cover spiritual and metaphysical topics, placing emphasis on morality and virtue (de). The practice espouses the belief that through moral rectitude and cultivation, supplemented with the practice of exercises and meditation, a person can be healed of illnesses. The three central tenets of the Falun Gong system are 'Truthfulness' (眞), 'Compassion' (善), and 'Forbearance' (忍). Together, these three principles are regarded as the fundamental characteristics of the cosmos, and are held to be the highest manifestation of the Dao, or Buddha Dharma. In the process of "cultivation," practitioners are supposed to assimilate themselves to these qualities by letting go of "attachments and notions," thus returning to the "original, true self." In Zhuan Falun (轉法輪), the foundational text published in late 1994, Li Hongzhi says that "As a practitioner, if you assimilate yourself to this characteristic , you are one that has attained the Tao."

Falun Gong is an introductory book that discusses qigong, introduces the aforementioned basis, and provides illustrations and explanations of the exercises and meditation. The main body of teachings is articulated in the core book Zhuan Falun. According to the texts, Falun Gong (or Falun Dafa) is a "complete system of mind-body cultivation practice" (修煉 xiulian).

Falun Gong is a multifaceted and totalizing discipline that means different things to different people, ranging from a set of physical exercises and a praxis of transformation to a moral philosophy and a new knowledge system, according to Zhao Yuezhi, a communications professor. It exhibits quasi-religious, fundamentalist, and conservative sensibilities, articulating a mixture of premodern, modern, and postmodern thought. Penny writes: "There are aspects of Falun Gong doctrine that could have been understood by a cultivator in China 1000 years ago, and there are parts of the doctrine that could not have appeared in China before the late 1980s." Falun Gong has also been described as a Buddhist revival movement "with all that entails: passion, talk of miracles... individualism, and a reflexive mistrust of establishments and outside agendas." Falun Gong practitioners have established a "resistance identity"—one that stands against prevailing pursuits of wealth, power, scientific rationality, and "the entire value system associated with the project of modernization."

At the same time, Falun Gong presents itself as a virtuous form of self-cultivation which draws on East Asian mysticism and traditional Chinese medicine, criticizes the purportedly self-imposed limits of modern science, and views traditional Chinese science as an entirely different, yet equally valid knowledge system. According to Richard Madsen, Chinese scientists with doctorates from prestigious American universities who practice Falun Gong claim that modern physics (for example, superstring theory) and biology (specifically the pineal gland’s function) provide a scientific basis for their beliefs. From their point of view, “Falun Dafa is knowledge rather than religion, a new form of science rather than faith.”

Traditional Chinese cultural thought and modernity are two focuses of Li Hongzhi's teachings, and Falun Gong echoes traditional Chinese beliefs that humans are connected to the universe through mind and body. Li seeks to challenge "conventional mentalities", attempting to unveil myths of the universe, time-space, and the human body. Falun Gong shares continuities with understandings of the universe present in folk Buddhism in the Chinese cultural tradition. Some of Li's conservative moral statements regarding homosexuality, race, and the afterlife have attracted controversy. (See controversies).

The Falun Gong teachings use numerous untranslated Chinese religious and philosophical terms, and make frequent allusion to characters and incidents in Chinese folk literature and concepts drawn from Chinese popular religion. Li's assumptions about the metaphysical structure of reality maintain some differences from the mindsets of multitudinous Westerners, and conflict with a wide range of scientific and materialist viewpoints. This, coupled with the literal translation style of the texts, which imitate the tone and cadences of Li’s colloquial Chinese speech, make Falun Gong scriptures difficult to approach for Westerners.

Falun Gong represents an indigenous spiritual, moral, and health movement opposite to "Marxism with Chinese characteristics," according to Sumner B. Twiss.

While Li discusses millennial themes, Falun Gong's organizational structure works against totalistic control, with no hierarchy in place to enforce orthodoxy and little or no emphasis on dogmatic discipline. There is no membership, and practitioners are free to participate as much or as little as they like; the only thing emphasized is the need for strict moral behavior, according to Craig Burgdoff, a professor of religious studies. He expresses concerns over Li Hongzhi's totalizing discourse, but says this is tempered by having found "practitioners to be engaged seriously in a highly disciplined spiritual and ethical practice."

History in China

Li Hongzhi introduced Falun Gong to the public in May 1992, in Changchun, Jilin Province. Early versions of Zhuan Falun stated that the system was tested extensively in the years prior to its introduction, and included a hagiographic spiritual biography of Li Hongzhi which was later withdrawn from circulation.

Li Hongzhi claims that he was taught ways of "cultivation practice" by several masters of the Dao and Buddhist traditions, including Quan Jue, the 10th Heir to the Great Law of the Buddha School, a Taoist master from age eight to twelve, and a master of the Great Way School with the Taoist alias of True Taoist from the Changbai Mountains. Falun Gong is the result of his reorganizing and writing down the teachings that were passed to him. In his religious biography, which draws on and is considered a contemporary rewriting of an ancient tradition, Li is claimed able to perform a variety of supernatural feats, including invisibility, levitation, and weather modification. For his day job Li worked as a grain clerk at the Changchun Cereals Company, and at one time played trumpet in the army.

Like many qigong masters at the time, Li toured major cities in China from 1992 to 1994 to teach the practice; he was granted a number of awards by Chinese governmental organizations. According to David Ownby, Professor of History and Director of the Center for East Asian Studies at the Université de Montréal, neither Li nor Falun Gong were particularly controversial in the beginning; Li became an "instant star of the qigong movement," and Falun Gong was embraced by the government as an effective means of lowering health care costs, promoting Chinese culture (because it was an indigenous Chinese practice), and “promoting the traditional crime-fighting virtues of the Chinese people, in safeguarding social order and security, and in promoting rectitude in society.” The movement enjoyed success and rapid growth.

Li made his lectures more widely accessible and affordable in later years, charging less than competing qigong systems for lectures, tapes, and books. On 4 January 1995, Zhuan Falun, the main book on Falun Gong, was published and became a best-seller in China. In the face of Falun Gong's rise in popularity, a large part of which was attributed to its low cost, competing qigong masters accused Li of unfair business practices. According to Schechter, the qigong society under which Li and other qigong masters belonged asked Li to hike his tuition, but Li refused. Li lived a life of deprivation in order to keep the costs low and let more people learn, and emphasised the need for the teachings to be free-of-charge, or as cheap as possible. By 1995, Falun Gong had differentiated itself from other qigong groups in its emphasis on morality, low cost, and health benefits; it rapidly spread via word-of-mouth. Its rapid growth within China was also related to family ties and community relationships, attracting a wide range of adherents from all walks of life – including numerous members of the Chinese Communist Party. In March, 1996, Falun Gong withdrew from the Qigong Association, after which time it operated outside the official sanction of the state. Li was then outside the circuit of personal relations and financial exchanges through which masters and their qigong organizations could find a place within the state system, and also the protections this afforded.

Criticism and response

The rapid rise and influence of Falun Gong received little journalistic attention until mid-1996. Chinese media were not supposed to report on qigong at all, but in 1994 and 1995, after some groups had grown very large, the tone began to shift in order to curb the growth of the groups deprivation . By 1996 attention turned to Falun Gong, a sign that China’s media and ideological establishment had begun considering Falun Gong’s influence on society. On 17 June 1996, a week after Zhuan Falun Volume II was listed the no.10 best selling at a Beijing book market, the Guangming Daily, an influential national newspaper, published a polemic against Falun Gong. The author wrote that the history of humanity is a "struggle between science and superstition," and called on Chinese publishers not to print "pseudo-scientific books of the swindlers." The article cited Zhuan Falun as an example of the rising number of publications ridden with "feudal superstition" (fengjian mixin) and "pseudoscience" (wei kexue). The article set off a wave of press criticism, with twenty major newspapers also issuing criticisms of Falun Gong. Soon after, on 24 July, the Central Propaganda Department banned all publication of Falun Gong books – though the ban was not enforced consistently. Li subsequently condoned the circulation of counterfeit and hand-copied versions of his books.

The events were an important challenge to Falun Gong, which practitioners did not take lightly. Thousands of Falun Gong followers wrote to Guangming Daily and to the CQRS to complain against the measures, claiming that they violated Hu Yaobang's 1982 'Triple No' directive. Li made statements that practitioners’ response to criticism showed their hearts and "would separate the false disciples from the true ones", also indicating that publicly defending the practice was a righteous act and an essential aspect of Dafa cultivation. Until this juncture, Falun Gong had successfully negotiated the space between science and native tradition in the public representation of its teachings, avoiding any suggestion of superstition.

Falun Gong was not the only target of the domestic media criticism, nor the only group to protest, but theirs was the most mobilised and steadfast response. Many of Falun Gong's attempts for positive, or non-negative media portrayal were successful, resulting in the retraction of several newspaper stories critical of Falun Gong. This contributed to practitioners' belief that the media claims against them were false or exaggerated, and that their stance was justified. Falun Gong books remained officially proscribed, however.

In June 1998, Tianjin professor He Zuoxiu, an outspoken critic of qigong, appeared on a talk show on Beijing Television and openly disparaged qigong groups, making particular mention of Falun Gong. Falun Gong practitioners responded with peaceful protests, which was considered audacious under the circumstances, and lobbying of the station. The reporter responsible for the program was reportedly fired, and a program favorable to Falun Gong was aired several days later. Falun Gong practitioners also mounted demonstrations at 14 other media outlets. The Beijing Television incident resulted in directives from authorities to cease publishing content critical of Falun Gong to "ensure stability" in the lead-up to the ten-year anniversary of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989.

Tianjin and Zhongnanhai protests

By the late 1990s, the Communist Party’s relationship to the growing Falun Gong movement had become increasingly tense. Reports of discrimination and surveillance by the Public Security Bureau were escalating, and Falun Gong adherents were routinely organizing sit-in demonstrations responding to media articles they deemed to be unfair.

In April 1999, physicist He Zuoxiu, published an article critical of Falun Gong in Tianjin Normal University's Youth Reader magazine. The article cast qigong, and Falun Gong in particular, as superstitious and potentially dangerous. Falun Gong practitioners responded by picketing the offices of the newspaper requesting a retraction of the article.

Unlike past instances in which Falun Gong protests were successful, on April 22 the Tianjin demonstration was broken up by the arrival of three hundred riot police. Some of the practitioners were beaten, and forty-five arrested. Other Falun Gong practitioners were told that if they wished to appeal further, they needed to take the issue up with the Public Security Bureau and go to Beijing to appeal

The Falun Gong community quickly mobilized a response, and on the morning of April 25, upwards of 10,000 practitioners gathered near the central appeals office to demand an end to the escalating harassment against the spiritual practice, and request the release of the Tianjin practitioners. It was Falun Gong practitioners' attempt to seek redress from the leadership of the country by going to them and, "albeit very quietly and politely, making it clear that they would not be treated so shabbily." Security officers had been expecting them, and corralled the practitioners onto Fuyou Street in front of the Zhongnanhai government compound. They sat or read quietly on the sidewalks surrounding the Zhongnanhai.

As the Falun Gong crowd grew outside Zhongnanhai, President Jiang Zemin received a phone call from Luo Gan informing him of Falun Gong’s presence outside the compound. Jiang was reportedly angered by the audacity of the demonstration—the largest since the Tiananmen Square protests ten years earlier.

Five Falun Gong representatives met with Premier Zhu Rongji to negotiate a resolution. The Falun Gong representatives were assured that the regime supported physical exercises for health improvements and did not consider the Falun Gong to be anti-government. Upon reaching this resolution, the crowd of Falun Gong protesters dispersed.

President Jiang Zemin reportedly criticized Premier Zhu for being “too soft” in his handling of the situation. That evening, Jiang composed a letter indicating his desire to see Falun Gong “defeated.” Jiang is held by Falun Gong to be personally responsible for this decision: Peerman cited reasons such as suspected personal jealousy of Li Hongzhi; Saich points to Jiang’s anger at Falun Gong's widespread appeal, and ideological struggle as causes for the crackdown that followed. Willy Wo-Lap Lam suggests Jiang’s decision to suppress Falun Gong was related to a desire to consolidate his power within the Politburo.

Porter writes that He Zuoxiu’s article in Tianjin may have been designed to provoke Falun Gong. Porter, along with Gutmann and Zhao, highlight the familial relationship between He and Luo Gan to suggest that the two may have been colluding to bait Falun Gong into protesting at Tianjin, and then at Zhongnanhai, in order to concoct a pretext for suppression: “Things could not have worked out better for the two if they had planned it — which, it appears, they just might have." Luo Gan had been a long-time opponent of Falun Gong, and a World Journal report suggested that certain high-level Party officials wanted to crack down on the practice for years, but lacked sufficient pretext until the protest at Zhongnanhai. After the Zhongnanhai demonstration, Luo Gan was appointed to lead the effort to suppress Falun Gong.

The ban

On 20 July 1999, the Chinese government declared the Research Society of Falun Dafa and the Falun Gong organization under its control to be outlawed for having been "engaged in illegal activities, advocating superstition and spreading fallacies, hoodwinking people, inciting and creating disturbances, and jeopardizing social stability." Xinhua further declared that Falun Gong was a highly organised political group "opposed to the Communist Party of China and the central government, preaches idealism, theism and feudal superstition." Xinhua also affirmed that "the so-called 'truth, kindness and forbearance' principle preached by Li has nothing in common with the socialist ethical and cultural progress we are striving to achieve." It was declared “illegal” to practice Falun Gong, possess books, or display slogans indicative of the teachings.

In response, Li Hongzhi declared that Falun Gong did not have any particular organization, nor any political objectives.

Yuezhi Zhao argues that a number of factors contributed to the souring of relations between Falun Gong and the Chinese state and media. These included infighting between China’s qigong establishment and Falun Gong, speculation over blackmailing and lobbying by Li’s qigong opponents and "scientists-cum-ideologues with political motives and affiliations with competing central Party leaders," which caused the shift in the state’s position, and the struggles from mid-1996 to mid-1999 between Falun Gong, the mainstream media, and the Chinese power elite over the status and treatment of the movement. While Falun Gong had some elite support, it was fundamentally at odds with official ideology, and there were individuals within the scientific, ideological, and political establishments predisposed to attacking Falun Gong in the media.

Statewide suppression

In October 1999, four months after the ban, legislation was created to outlaw "heterodox religions" and applied to Falun Gong retroactively. Leung remarked that the effort was driven by large-scale propaganda through television, newspapers, radio and internet. According to Johnson, the campaign against Falun Gong extended to many aspects of society, including the media apparatus, police force, military, education system, and workplaces. An extra-constitutional body, the "6-10 Office" was created to "oversee the terror campaign."

Within the first month of the crackdown, 300–400 articles attacking Falun Gong appeared in each of the main state-run papers, while primetime television replayed alleged exposés on the group, with no divergent views aired in the media. Human Rights Watch (2002) noted that families and workplaces were urged to cooperate with the government's position on Falun Gong, while practitioners themselves were subject to severe coercive measures to have them recant. Falun Gong practitioners were among those most harshly persecuted by the Chinese government in 2008, according to Amnesty International.

According to Human Rights Watch, China's leaders and ruling elite were far from unified in their support for the crackdown; though James Tong suggests there was no real resistance from the Politburo. In February 2001, in an attempt to show unity, the Communist Party held a Central Work Conference and discussed Falun Gong. President and party head Jiang Zemin insisted that all seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee "testify" on the need to eradicate Falun Gong in front of some 2,000 party cadres. Under Jiang's leadership, the crackdown on Falun Gong became part of the Chinese political ethos of "upholding stability" – much the same rhetoric employed by the party during Tiananmen in 1989. Jiang's message was echoed at the 2001 National People's Congress, where Premier Zhu Rongji made special mention of Falun Gong in his outline of China's tenth five-year plan, saying "we must continue our campaign against the Falun Gong cult," effectively tying Falun Gong's eradication to China's economic progress.

Media campaign

Since October 1999, three months after the Chinese government banned Falun Gong, it has repeatedly classified the movement as a xiejiao, (translated as 'evil religion' or 'evil cult') and anti-Falun Gong propaganda activities dominated the Chinese media during that time as the government justifed its actions, arguing that Falun Gong practice was dangerous, and damages people's physical and mental health like the Branch Davidians and Aum Shinrikyo. This strategy was vital in the government’s logic, because such reference to cults was supposed to justify the government's actions. According to China scholars Daniel Wright and Joseph Fewsmith, for several months after Falun Gong was outlawed, China Central Television's evening news contained little but anti-Falun Gong rhetoric in which academics, alleged former followers, and ordinary citizens spoke about how "the cult" cheats its followers, separates families, damages health, and hurts social stability. The government operation was "a study in all-out demonization," they write. Falun Gong was compared to "a rat crossing the street that everyone shouts out to squash" by Beijing Daily; other officials said it would be a "long-term, complex and serious" struggle to "eradicate" Falun Gong.

David Ownby and Ian Johnson have argued that the Chinese state gave the cultic appellation to Falun Gong by borrowing arguments from Margaret Singer and the West's anti-cult movement to blunt the appeal of Falun Gong. According to John Powers and Meg Y. M. Lee, because the Falun Gong was categorized in the popular perception as an "apolitical, qigong exercise club," it was not seen as a threat to the government. The most critical strategy in the Falun Gong suppression campaign, therefore, was to convince people to reclassify the Falun Gong into a number of "negatively charged religious labels," like “evil cult,” “sect,” or “superstition.” The group’s non-violent and relatively silent protests were reclassified as creating “social disturbances.” In this process of reclassification and relabelling, the government was attempting to tap into a "deep reservoir of negative feelings related to the historical role of quasi-religious cults as a destabilising force in Chinese political history."

Chinese media adopted three strands of rhetoric in attacking Falun Gong. The first adopted the language of past "anti" campaigns to argue that Falun Gong was a threat to order; the second adopted a rhetoric of science and modernity to argue that Falun Gong threatened progress; and a third used anti-Western rhetoric to argue that Li was a "dupe of the West." It was a "multipronged attack designed to appeal to a broad cross-section of Chinese society," according to Frank.

According to Lu Xing, associate professor of Communications at DePaul University, to simply label Falun Gong as "evil" was insufficient, because it only expressed opposition to Falun Gong without explaining why Falun Gong was "evil". State propaganda then used the appeal of scientific rationalism to argue that Falun Gong's worldview was in "complete opposition to science" and communism. The People's Daily asserted on 27 July 1999, that it "was a struggle between theism and atheism, superstition and science, idealism and materialism." A polarized depiction was created where the scientific worldview was legitimized as "moral and truthful," while the Falun Gong discourse was "evil and deceptive."

On the eve of Chinese New Year on 23 January 2001, seven people attempted to set themselves ablaze at Tiananmen Square. The official Chinese press agency, Xinhua News Agency, and other state media asserted that the self-immolators were practitioners while the Falun Dafa Information Center disputed this, on the grounds that the movement's teachings explicitly forbid suicide and killing, and further alleged that the event was a cruel but clever piece of stunt-work. The incident received international news coverage, and video footage of the burnings were broadcast later inside China by China Central Television (CCTV). Images of a 12 year old girl, Liu Siying, burning and interviews with the other participants in which they stated their belief that self-immolation would lead them to paradise were shown. Falun Gong-related commentators pointed out that the main participants' account of the incident and other aspects of the participants' behavior were inconsistent with the teachings of Falun Dafa. Washington Post journalist Phillip Pan wrote that the two self-immolators who died were not actually Falun Gong practitioners. Time reported that prior to the self-immolation incident, many Chinese had felt that Falun Gong posed no real threat, and that the state's crackdown had gone too far. After the event, however, China's media campaign against Falun Gong gained significant traction.

Conversion program

According to James Tong, Professor of Political Science at the University of California and Chief Editor of the journal Chinese Law and Government, the regime aimed at both coercive dissolution of the Falun Gong denomination and "transformation" of the practitioners. By 2000 the Party upped its campaign by sentencing "recidivist" practitioners to "re-education through labor", in an effort to have them renounce their beliefs and "transform" their thoughts. Terms were also arbitrarily extended by police, while some practitioners had ambiguous charges levied against them, such as "disrupting social order," "endangering national security," or "subverting the socialist system." According to Bejesky, the majority of long-term Falun Gong detainees were processed administratively through this system instead of the criminal justice system. Upon completion of their re-education sentences, those practitioners who refused to recant were then incarcerated in "legal education centers" set up by provincial authorities to "transform minds".

This was accomplished through four program initiatives: a mass campaign of electronic and print propaganda; intensive individualized reeducation; special programmes for true believers that emphasised "internal transformation" rather than "external conformity"; and for the still defiant, punitive and rehabilitative labor reform. Human rights organizations condemned this treatment of Falun Gong practitioners, with Amnesty International declaring it politically motivated, and Human Rights Watch reporting that access to the camps was heavily restricted, while the practitioners were subject to a wide range of human rights violations, including forced labor and a wide array of physical abuses.

A battery of propaganda techniques were applied, according to Tong, known in official parlance as "mobile and fixed-point propaganda," seminars, "on-the-spot education," "theory guidance," and special topic discussion, through which Falun Gong practitioners were organised to study the speeches of Jiang Zemin, central government documents, and articles in major newspapers. Special propaganda troupes to repudiate Falun Gong were formed and sent to residential committees and Falun Gong practice sites.

Much of the conversion program relied on Mao-style techniques of indoctrination and thought reform, where Falun Gong practitioners were organized to view anti-Falun Gong television programs and enroll in Marxism and materialism study sessions. Traditional Marxism and materialism were the core content of the sessions.

Sima Nan, a critic of perceived cults and supernaturalism, rose to prominence during the time of conversion program, being featured in newspapers and sent to state companies across the country to lecture and "smoke out members." He lectured provincial officials on the evils of superstition, and worked on a TV documentary on Falun Dafa. He was awarded a national "hero of atheism" award.

Coercive measures

The government-sponsored image of the conversion process emphasises psychological persuasion and a variety of "soft-sell" techniques; this is the "ideal norm" in regime reports, according to Tong. Falun Gong reports, on the other hand, depict "disturbing and sinister" forms of coercion against practitioners who fail to renounce their beliefs. 14,474 cases are classified by different methods of torture, according to Tong (Falun Gong agencies document over 63,000 individual cases of torture). Among them are cases of severe beatings; psychological torment, included forcing victims to curse Li Hongzhi, to destroy his portrait and the Falun Gong publications, or force the individual to drink alcohol and to smoke, which are contrary to Falun Gong injunctions; corporal punishment and forced intense, heavy-burden hard labor and stress positions; solitary confinement in squalid conditions; "heat treatment" including burning and freezing; electric shocks delivered to sensitive parts of the body that may result in nausea, convulsions, or fainting; "devastative" forced feeding; sticking bamboo strips into fingernails; deprivation of food, sleep, and use of toilet; rape and gang rape; asphyxiation; and threat, extortion, and termination of employment and student status.

Such coercive practices are seen as pervasive across the country, and condoned or promoted by the central authorities, according to those sources, Tong says. The cases "appear verifiable, as the great majority of them identify (1) the individual Falungong practitioner, often with age, occupation, and domicile; (2) the time and location that the alleged abuse took place, including not only urban districts and rural townships and villages but also specific penal institutions; and (3) the names and ranks of the alleged perpetrators. Many of these reports include lists of the names of human witnesses and descriptions of physical injuries." The publication of "persistent abusive, often brutal behavior by named individuals with their official title, place, and time of torture" for six years suggests that there is no official will to cease and desist such activities.

Falun Gong response

Amnesty International states that despite the crackdown many Falun Gong practitioners continued to hold exercise sessions in public, usually as a form of peaceful, silent protest against the crackdown and imprisonment; they were often attended by large numbers of people, including significant numbers of elderly and women. The Party declared the sessions to be "illegal assemblies;" practitioners or others who "spoke up" for the movement would be detained by officials, at the beginning for several days. This method was later seen as inadequate, because upon release, practitioners would resume protest activities. The authorities treated these practitioners as "recidivists" and saw them as particularly problematic.

Despite Beijing's heavy hand against practitioners, protests continued well into 2000. According to Time magazine, a Falun Gong website editorial instructed followers to "step up" demonstrations, "especially in Tiananmen Square". Founder Li Hongzhi urged followers to immobilize the police and other "evil scoundrels" through use of supernatural powers. Tiananmen Square thus became one of the prime locations where practitioners routinely demonstrated despite government deterrence. By 25 April 2000, within one year after the demonstration at Zhongnanhai, a total of more than 30,000 practitioners were arrested there, and seven hundred Falun Gong followers were arrested during a demonstration in the Square on 1 January 2001.

According to the Chinese government, Falun Gong activists have launched attacks against Sinosat's satellite-broadcast and jammed television signals, replacing regular state television broadcasts with their own material. For example, in March 2002, Liu Chengjun, a Falun Gong practitioner, managed to intercept eight cable television networks in Changchun City and Songyuan City, Jilin Province, and televised a program titled “Self-Immolation or a Staged Act?”. Liu was arrested and reportedly subjected to 21 months of torture that led directly to his death.

Response outside China

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Due to its ban in mainland China, Falun Gong practitioners have taken to their cause internationally, especially in Australia, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Since the ban in China, various reports has found that Falun Gong practitioners has been subject to arbitrary arrest and torture, and violations of freedom of religion. Falun Gong related cases comprise 66% of all reported torture cases in China, according to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, and at least half of the labor camp population. Amnesty International urged the government to "take seriously its commitment to prevent torture and take action immediately." Amnesty has since reported that nearly 100 Falun Gong practitioners have died due to mistreatment in detention in 2008 The United Nations asked the Chinese government to respond to the various allegations by Falun Gong and human rights groups.

Falun Gong practitioners in the United States routinely file cases in U.S. federal courts, and according to "Justice for Falun Gong", have filed the largest number of human rights lawsuits in the 21st century with crimes charged among the most severe according to international criminal law.

Practitioners engage in promotional activities by handing out flyers in busy intersections, in the subway or at the mall, leaving Falun Gong literature in stores, libraries, laundries etc. Although some of the literature deals with Falun Gong's situation in China, other publications also include the Nine Commentaries of the Communist Party, a critical editorial of the Communist Party of China, which are distributed by practitioners in both DVD and book form. Falun Gong practitioners also join marches, parades, and celebrations of Chinese culture. Response to these appeals has been mixed.

In 2006 Falun Gong practitioners' campaign began focusing on allegations of organ harvesting from living practitioners, after The Epoch Times published reports claiming that Sujiatun Thrombosis Hospital was used for such purposes. The Coalition to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong commissioned Canadian parliamentarian David Kilgour and human rights lawyer David Matas to investigate the allegations further. The Christian Science Monitor considered the evidence circumstantial, but persuasive, and criticized the Chinese government for a lack of openness in investigating the claims. Likewise, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Manfred Nowak said the report "shows a coherent picture that causes concern." In November 2008, the United Nations Committee Against Torture noted that an increase in organ transplant operations coincided with “the beginning of the persecution of ” and demanded an explanation. The Chinese government has repeatedly denied these allegations, saying that the report was based on "rumors and false allegations". The United States Congressional Research Service report by Dr. Thomas Lum stated that the Kilgour-Matas report relied largely on logical inference without bringing forth new or independently obtained testimony, and that the conclusions also rely heavily upon questionable evidence. Human rights activist Harry Wu also voiced doubts about the existance of mass organ harvesting in Sujiatun. David Ownby, a noted expert on Falun Gong, said that he saw "no evidence proving is aimed particularly at Falun Gong practitioners."

On 16 March 2010, the U.S. House of Representatives called for "an immediate end to the campaign to persecute, intimidate, imprison, and torture Falun Gong practitioners." House Resolution 605 argued that Chinese authorities have devoted extensive time and resources over the past decade distributing "false propaganda" worldwide, and expressed sympathy to persecuted Falun Gong practitioners and their families.

Organisation and media

The precise nature of Falun Gong's organization has been a subject of some controversy. Chinese authorities portray Falun Gong as a tight, well-structured and well-funded organization, able to mobilize millions of practitioners. Falun Gong denies having an organizational structure, and maintains that it is merely a spiritual group that practices a brand of qigong. It eschews the term 'membership' and doesn't keep figures. As a result, estimates vary over the number of people practicing Falun Gong. Before the ban, the government estimated 70 million, and later revised the figure to 2 million. The Department of State suggests “tens of millions” currently practicing inside China.

Inside China

After its withdrawal from the Scientific Qigong Association in 1994, the Falun Dafa Research Society (FDRS) applied to a number of government agencies, and was rejected by all of them. Unable to operate within a state-sponsored framework, Falun Gong pursued a more decentralized and loose organizational structure from 1997, according to Porter.

The Chinese government, in post-crackdown reports, claimed that Falun Gong was a highly organized group with 39 "main stations", 1,900 "guidance stations", and 28,263 practice sites nation-wide, overseeing a total of 2.1 million practitioners. Time also described Falun Gong as "hierarchically structured, with neighborhood groups, like cells, acting autonomously but in contact with higher levels." Teachings were meant to be propagated through tapes and essays, which followers studied, and no one was permitted to interpret or question the master's words. Anthropologist Noah Porter writes that Falun Gong's structure in China was not hierarchical, and that it was able to grow in a restrictive society like the PRC because of its relatively small size and flexible communication methods.

Finances

Opinions differ on whether or not Li made money from the practice in China, and if so, how much. Dai Qing (2000) states that by 1997, Li was receiving annual income in excess of ¥10 million, even arguing that "Li's income is more legitimate than those of corrupt government officials." Others dispute the theory that Li made any serious money from Falun Gong. Ian Johnson links the claim with the government’s campaign to portray Falun Gong as a highly organised group, or a cult, and rejects both, since “during the most dynamic period of the group's existence in China the books and videos were bootleg, so he hadn't received royalties.”

Outside China

Falun Gong practitioners have set up international media organizations to gain wider exposure for their cause and criticize the Communist Party of China. These include The Epoch Times newspaper, NTDTV, Sound of Hope radio station, Shen Yun Performing Arts, and Epoch Press Inc. According to Zhao, through Epoch Times it can be discerned how Falun Gong is building a "de facto media alliance" with China’s democracy movements in exile, as demonstrated by its frequent printing of articles by prominent overseas Chinese critics of the Chinese government.

From 1999–2001, Western media reports on Falun Gong—and in particular, the mistreatment of practitioners—were frequent, if mixed. By the latter half of 2001, however, the volume of media reports decline precipitously, and by 2002, major news organizations like the New York Times and Washington Post had almost completely ceased their coverage of Falun Gong from China. In a study of media discourse on Falun Gong, researcher Leeshai Lemish found that Western news organizations also became less balanced, and more likely to uncritically present the narratives of the Communist Party, rather than those of Falun Gong or human rights groups. Explaining the genesis of Epoch Times, David Ownby said that practitioners became "somewhat paranoid" of being ill-treated by journalists during the last decade, "so they decided to publish a newspaper by themselves" to publicize their cause

Ethan Gutmann, a journalist reporting on China since the early 1990s, has attempted to explain the apparent dearth of public sympathy for Falun Gong as stemming, in part, from the group’s shortcomings in public relations. “Unlike the Tiananmen student leaders and other Chinese prisoners of conscience who had settled into Western exile, Falun Gong marched to a distinctly Chinese drum,” writes Gutmann. “With its roots in a spiritual tradition from the Chinese heartland, Falun Gong would never have built a version of the Statue of Liberty and paraded it around for CNN. Indeed, to Western observers, Falun Gong public relations carried some of the uncouthness of Communist party culture: a perception that practitioners tended to exaggerate, to create torture tableaux straight out of a Cultural Revolution opera, to spout slogans rather than facts. For various reasons, some valid, some shameful, the credibility of persecuted refugees has often been doubted in the West.”

Professor Heather Kavan noted similarities between the media strategies of Falun Gong practitioners and those of the Chinese Communist Party. According to Kavan, such similarities include intolerance of criticism, blanket denials when accused, exaggerating and sensationalizing claims, and deflecting blame by charging the other of the same offence.

Maria H. Chang of the University of Nevada says Falun Gong's media and human rights initiatives seem like "front organisations" meant to influence public opinion via a "concerted information-PR-propaganda campaign"—which, she says, is understandable given the experiences of many adherents in the political environment of China, where such tactics are the norm.

In May 2006, the outspoken dissident and former Beijing University journalism professor Jiao Guobiao published an essay lauding what he considers unbalanced and highly partisan journalistic tactics of Falun Gong-related media like Radio Free Asia. Arguing that there is no attempt at balance on the mainland, Jiao proposed that even if Falun Gong outlets published only negative information highly critical of the CCP, the weight of their attacks could never begin to counterbalance the positive propaganda the party publishes about itself. "What the mainland Chinese public lacks is negative information about mainland China... Balance does not mean that all media entities have to achieve a God-like balance, but that the media can balance the principles of freedom, equality and legality together... Balance is the result of the collective imbalances of all," he wrote.

Patricia Thornton sees Falun Gong as an oppressed group whose bid to gain transnational support for its cause has sometimes backfired, leading to greater scrutiny of the affairs of participants and their public relations tactics. Generally, while new digital media have allowed repressed groups more access to international audiences, at the same time it has made their organization and beliefs more vulnerable to public exposure.

Informal networks called "Falun Dafa Associations" exist around the world, of which the Canadian and American chapters are the most prominent. Practice points are also staffed at a number of universities. Falun Gong has also established university chapters in the United States.

Falun Gong practitioners have considerable presence on the Internet, with websites such as clearwisdom.net, faluninfo.net, mingui, pureinsight that publish Li's teachings and testimonials about the persecution in China. Falun Gong practitioners have also set up groups like CIPFG, Falun Dafa Information Center, and "World Organisation to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong," which publish reports and attempt to deliver their message to Western media, governments, and NGOs.

Public debate

Zhao (2003) sees Falun Gong as a profound challenge to China's dominant "meaning system" for Falun Gong's insistence on the public nature of the practice, the imperative to gain positive representation and to make known their dissent. Such is made more difficult with the reception Falun Gong received by American journalists, who had a number of problems with Falun Gong. These include that its emergence in 1999 took them by surprise, and "journalists don't like feeling out of the loop"; foreign reporters depend on the CCP's cooperation for access and accreditation, and while Falun Gong is the party's enemy number one, stories about the persecution could lead to loss of journalists' ability to work; and because Falun Gong's insistence on traditional values like marriage and morality make it look like an enemy of the New China of progress and commercialisation.

Categorization

There is some degree of debate about how Falun Gong should be categorized, whether as a qigong practice, a spiritual discipline, or a New Religious Movement. The view that Falun Gong is a cult, widely used as part of Chinese state propaganda against the practice and adopted by some members of the anti-cult movement, is mostly rejected by mainstream scholarship. Adam Frank identifies five generalizable frames of discourse surrounding Falun Gong: the Western media, the Chinese media, an emerging scholarly tradition, the discourse of human rights groups, and a sympathetic practice-based discourse. Western journalists initially adopted what Frank regards as dubious historical referents, like the Taiping Rebellion and the Boxer Uprising to frame Falun Gong; the Chinese print media were "blanketed" with anti-Falun Gong propaganda; scholarly debate sought a place for the practice in a wider Chinese historical context without resorting to sensationalism; human rights groups took up a discourse of nonpractitioner opposition to Chinese government policy, focusing on legal mechanisms and specific cases; Falun Gong practitioners themselves attempted to emphasise the psycho-physiological foundation of their discipline, which is their basis for following Li Hongzhi's teachings and resisting state control.

The Chinese Buddhist Association, concerned with Buddhist apostates taking up Falun Gong practice, were the first to term Falun Gong xiejiao in 1996. A direct translation of that term is "heretical teaching," but during the anti-Falun Gong propaganda campaign was rendered as "evil cult" in English. Western media initially adopted this language after the Chinese government's media reports, but soon began using less loaded terms.

Richard Madsen writes that like most qigong practices, Falun Gong may appear religious because it does not make a clear distinction between physical and spiritual healing. Falun Dafa can be seen as part of a long tradition of Chinese folk Buddhism, he writes, which often had a millenarian element that "this world was hopelessly corrupt and would come to an end."

Cheris Shun-ching Chan consider cults to be new religious movements that focus on the individual experience of the encounter with the sacred rather than collective worship, and writes that Falun Gong is neither a cult nor a sect, but a new religious movement with cult-like characteristics. Some scholars avoid the term "cult" altogether because "of the confusion between the historic meaning of the term and current pejorative use" These scholars prefer terms like "spiritual movement","new religious syncretism" or "new religious movement" to avoid the negative connotations of "cult" or to avoid mis-categorizing those which do not fit mainstream definitions.

Harvey Hill et al conclude in a study of media reporting on new religious groups that the most influential reporting on religion fails the standards of an "evenhanded, non-judgmental and fair approach," at least in the language used to describe such groups. Since Falun Gong seems highly unlikely to commit acts of violence, and while the agent of violence has been the Chinese government, they write that "the characterization particularly of Falun Gong as "cult" would seem inaccurate and unjust." They attribute the reason for the adoption of such terms to uncritical acceptance of the views of the Chinese government by the media, an acceptance that is "rife with irony." Such negative portrayal of new religious movements is unfair and dangerous, they write, adding that "it would be preferable to use terms less likely to reinforce mutual mistrust and more conducive to real understanding."

Controversies

Some aspects of Falun Gong's teachings are considered implausible and peculiar by observers, and Falun Gong's conservative and moralistic views on subjects such as homosexuality have attracted controversy. In 2001, for example, a nomination of Li Hongzhi for the Nobel Peace Prize by San Francisco legislators was withdrawn after they were notified of the group's views. The Falun Dafa Information Center states that Falun Gong welcomes gays, lesbians, and bisexuals to the practice, that they are not accorded special treatment, and that while Falun Gong teaches that certain practices "generate more karma", this does not equate to a position statement, social stance, or regulation.

David Ownby writes that interpreting Li Hongzhi's teachings presents numerous challenges because many of the things he says appear "somewhat puzzling." Startling assertions found in Li's writings, according to Ownby, include that there is a "small fluorescent screen like a television" positioned in the forehead that permits the initiated to possess the power of total recall; that animals can possess human beings in order to exploit humans' greater spiritual and supernormal capacities; and that the spiritual salvation of children of interracial marriages is problematic because, in the afterlife, the paradises are divided by race.

Opinions among scholars differ as to whether Falun Gong contains an apocalyptic message, and if so what the consequences of that are. Li maintains that mankind has been destroyed 81 times, and, according to some interpretations, that another round of destruction may be imminent. At least one follower suggested there would be "some sudden change that will be good for good people, but bad for bad people." In Heather Kavan's opinion, Falun Gong members don't leave the group because they believe that it's the only way to save themselves. Richard Gunde, Assistant Director of the Center for Chinese Studies at UCLA, argues that Falun Gong is unlike western cults that fixate on death and Armageddon, but merely promises its followers a long and healthy life. "Falun Gong has a simple, innocuous ethical message," Gunde says, "and its leader, Li Hongzhi, despite his unusual, if not bizarre, statements, is in many ways simple and low key." At the local level Li's fantastic claims seem to be of little theological importance, since Falun Gong practice does not require unquestioning acceptance of all of Li's teachings, and there is no overt emphasis on dogmatically enforcing orthodoxy, according to Craig Burgdoff.

Adam Frank writes that in reporting on the Falun Gong, the Western tradition of casting the Chinese as "exotic" took dominance, and that "the facts were generally correct, but the normalcy that millions of Chinese practitioners associated with the practice had all but disappeared." Sinologist Benjamin Penny sees Falun Gong's apparent last days message as largely innocuous, with Buddhist roots, and suggests "the fact that are often difficult for Westerners to understand should not be any reason to relegate them to the anomalous or quirky or kooky."

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127. Tong, James (2002). "An Organizational Analysis of the Falun Gong: Structure, Communications, Financing". The China Quarterly. 171: 636–660. doi:10.1017/S0009443902000402. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
128. FAISON, SETH (27 April 1999). "In Beijing: A Roar of Silent Protesters". The New York Times. Retrieved 8 September 2009.
129. US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report 2009
130. Cheng Helin, Great Expose´, p. 154.
131. People's Daily, 23 July 1999, "Li Hongzhi qirenqishi"
132. Porter, Noah, "Professional Practitioners and Contact Persons Explicating Special Types of Falun Gong Practitioners", Nova Religio, November 2005, Vol. 9, No. 2, Pages 62–83
133. Dai Qing: Members of Falungong in an Autocratic Society. Asia Quarterly, Volume IV, No.3, Summer 2000
134. ^ The gospel truth: Falun Gong, Sunday Star Times, 2 March 2008
135. Mata Press Service, "Punjabi Publisher fights for press freedom in BC" South Asian Post, March 2009
136. Radio Canada ombudsman report, p. 10
137. Gutmann, Ethan. "China's Gruesome Organ Harvest" Weekly Standard, 24 November 2008, Vol. 14, No. 10
138. ^ Kavan, Heather (July 2008). "Falun Gong in the media: What can we believe?" (PDF). E. Tilley (Ed.) Power and Place: Refereed Proceedings of the Australian & New Zealand Communication Association Conference, Wellington.: 13. {{cite journal}}: More than one of |author= and |last= specified (help); More than one of |work= and |journal= specified (help)
139. ^ Thornton, Patricia M. Manufacturing Dissent in Transnational China pp. 179–204 in "Popular Protest in China," Kevin J. O'Brien (ed.), Harvard University Press 2008
140. Falun Gong clubs at universities:
     • Falun Dafa in Michigan, retrieved 25 Sept 2009
     • Falun Dafa at Columbia, retrieved 25 Sept 2009
     • Falun Dafa at UCLA, retrieved 25 Sept 2009
     • Falun Dafa at Caltech, retrieved 25 Sept 2009
141. Substantiation may be found in: Ownby 2008, p. vii and elsewhere; Madsen 2000; Chan 2004; Richardson & Edelman 2004; Hill et al 2001, pp. 34–35, etc.
142. ^ Frank, Adam. (2004) Falun Gong and the threat of history. in Gods, guns, and globalization: religious radicalism and international political economy edited by Mary Ann Tétreault, Robert Allen Denemark, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, ISBN 1588262537, pp. 233–263
143. Frank (2004), 240–254
144. Kipnis, Andrew B. 2001, The Flourishing of Religion in Post-Mao China and the Anthropological Category of Religion, THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY, 12:1, 32–46 Anthropology, Australian National University
145. Bainbridge, William Sims 1997 The sociology of religious movements, Routledge, 1997, page 24, ISBN 0415912024
146. Richardson, James T. (1993). "Definitions of Cult: From Sociological-Technical to Popular-Negative". Review of Religious Research. 34 (4): 348–356. doi:10.2307/3511972.
147. Kai-Ti Chou, Contemporary Religious Movements in Taiwan. Edwin Mellen Press, 2008. pp. 184–185. ISBN 978-0-7734-5241-1
148. Hill, Harvey, John Hickman, Joel McLendon. "Cults and Sects and Doomsday Groups, Oh My: Media Treatment of Religion on the Eve of the Millennium," Review of Religious Research, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Sep. 2001), pp. 24–38
149. Hill et al 2001, pp. 34–35
150. Ellis, David H. "Falun Gong tries to join Chinatown Independence parade". Downtown Eexpress.
151. Ontaria Consultants on Religious Tolerance. "INTRODUCTION TO FALUN GONG & FALUN DAFA Its terminology, symbol, texts, beliefs, web sites, & books". religioustolerance.org. Retrieved 6 January 2010.
152. Lubman, Sarah retrieved 14 June 2006
153. Falun Dafa Information Center, "Misconceptions: "Intolerant"?", 16 June 2008
154. Ownby 2008, p. 89
155. Smith, Craig S. (30 April 2000). "Rooting Out Falun Gong; China Makes War on Mysticism". New York Times.
156. Gunde, Richard. Culture and customs of China. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002, p. 215
157. Frank 2004, p. 241

Further reading

• David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China (Oxford University Press, 2008) ISBN 978-0-19-532905-6
• Kai-Ti Chou (2008), Contemporary Religious Movements in Taiwan: Rhetorics of Persuasion (Edwin Mellen Press) pp. 133–188. ISBN 0-7734-5241-9
• Maria Hsia Chang, Falun Gong: The End of Days (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2004) ISBN 0-300-10227-5
• Li Hongzhi, Falun Gong (Law Wheel qigong) (1993)
• Li Hongzhi, Zhuan Falun (English translation 2000)
• Danny Schechter, Falun Gong's Challenge to China (Akashic Books, 2000) hardback ISBN 1-888451-13-0, paperback ISBN 1-888451-27-0
• Palmer, David A. (2007). Qigong fever: body, science, and utopia in China. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 0231140665.

External links

Sites run by Falun Gong practitioners

• FalunDafa.org, introducing Falun Gong and the exercises.
• FalunInfo.net, with detailed reports and press releases.
• Falun Gong Human Rights Working Group, with UN reports.
• Clearwisdom.net, intended mainly for practitioners, but has daily reports and news.

Sites run by the Chinese government

• Chinese Health Qigong Association – Government Sponsored Health and Fitness Qigong
• Condemn Falun Gong Cult, a series of anti-Falun Gong articles of the state-run Xinhua news agency
• China Association For Cultic Studies, anti-FLG presentation and recent news articles

Other critical sites

• The Rick A. Ross Institute's archives, vast collection of articles criticizing Falun Gong (mainly Communist Party sources)
• Falungong Part 1: From Sport to Suicide, Francesco Sisci, Asia Times, 27 January 2001

Other sites on the issue

• Articles by Ian Johnson (Pulitzer Prize winner), Wall Street Journal (2001)
• Falun Gong: Cult or Culture?, Produced by Chris Bullock, Radio National, 22 April 2001
• press archives, Center for Studies on New Religions
• Spiritual Society or Evil Cult?
• Falun Gong portal, TIME
• Apologetics Index : Falun Gong, Falun Dafa, Falungong

• Use dmy dates from September 2010
• Falun Gong
• Culture of the People's Republic of China
• New religious movements
• Religion in the People's Republic of China
• Society of the People's Republic of China
• Meditation
• Qigong