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| Smith was staunchly opposed to ]'s insistence (see ]) that the government of Rhodesia be transferred to the black majority control as an essential prerequisite for independence. Smith at one point stated that there would be no plans to bring Rhodesia under black majority rule in his lifetime, and he later added, "or children's." (though Smith maintained in his memoirs that he was referring to Majority Rule as it was in other African countries such as ], ], ], and ]). | Smith was staunchly opposed to ]'s insistence (see ]) that the government of Rhodesia be transferred to the black majority control as an essential prerequisite for independence. Smith at one point stated that there would be no plans to bring Rhodesia under black majority rule in his lifetime, and he later added, "or children's." (though Smith maintained in his memoirs that he was referring to Majority Rule as it was in other African countries such as ], ], ], and ]). | ||
| ⚫ | The origin of white minority rule in Rhodesia was property and education qualifications in the voters' roll at the time self-government was introduced in 1923. Such qualifications were unexceptional by the standards of the 1920s and (although slightly modified over the years) they ensured a situation up to 1979 in which whites had 95% of the votes in national elections while they were never more than 5% of the population. | ||
| ] | ] | ||
| ⚫ | The origin of white minority rule in Rhodesia was property and education qualifications in the voters' roll at the time self-government was introduced in 1923. Such qualifications were unexceptional by the standards of the 1920s and (although slightly modified over the years) they ensured a situation up to 1979 in which whites had 95% of the votes in national elections while they were never more than 5% of the population. | ||
| Smith and other white settler politicians argued that there was nothing fundamentally racist about the electoral system in Rhodesia. They stated that improvements in black education and wealth would, over time, ensure a gradual move to majority rule. However, critics argued that the whole political arrangement in Rhodesia was intended to entrench economic and political privilege for whites. It was evident from the mid 1950s that the white settlers would put up a fight to retain control of Rhodesia. Smith was the central figure in that fight. | Smith and other white settler politicians argued that there was nothing fundamentally racist about the electoral system in Rhodesia. They stated that improvements in black education and wealth would, over time, ensure a gradual move to majority rule. However, critics argued that the whole political arrangement in Rhodesia was intended to entrench economic and political privilege for whites. It was evident from the mid 1950s that the white settlers would put up a fight to retain control of Rhodesia. Smith was the central figure in that fight. | ||
Revision as of 02:35, 26 February 2006
For other people named Ian Smith, see Ian Smith (disambiguation).
The Rt. Hon. Ian Douglas Smith, GCLM, ID (born April 8, 1919) was the Premier of the British Crown Colony of Southern Rhodesia from April 13, 1964 to November 11, 1965 and the Prime Minister of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) from November 11, 1965 to June 1, 1979, when Rhodesia was ruled by its white minority. Smith will be forever associated with the colony's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain.
Family and early life
He was born in Selukwe (between 1963-68 Shurigannina, now Shurugwi); the youngest child with two older sisters, Phyllis and Joan; and educated in Gwelo (now Gweru) and at Rhodes University in South Africa. Following the outbreak of World War 2, Smith joined the Royal Rhodesian Air Force and after he had completed his flying training, he was seconded to the Royal Air Force in the rank of Pilot Officer. He served with distinction in the Royal Air Force at Pembrey. On October 4, 1943, his plane crashed on takeoff resulting in Smith losing an eye and suffering burn and facial injuries (he recieved plastic surgery and half of his face was to remain paralyzed). Following his recovery, Smith was sent to Italy where he flew missions over Corsica. On one such mission, Smith's Spitfire was hit by German anti-aircraft fire, and he parachuted safely behind enemy lines until reaching Allied territory, and eventually, the United Kingdom. After the war, Smith returned home to finish his degree and then bought a farm in Selukwe. His father committed suicide while he was 24. He married shortly after returning from the war and had one child (Alec) who he brought up with his wife's two children (one son and one daughter) by an earlier marriage. Smith enjoyed a happy marriage until the death of his wife Janet in 1994. He remained on close terms with his son Alec (who died on 19 January 2006) in spite of serious political differences. Alec left three children (one son and two daughters) by his Norwegian wife Elisabeth.
Political background
Ian Smith became active in politics from 1948 when he was elected to the Legislative Assembly as a Liberal for Selukwe district. He stood down after one term but remained active in politics, joining the United Federal Party. However his opposition to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in the early 1960s led him to form a breakaway party called the Rhodesia Reform Party. In 1962 this party merged with the Dominion Party to form the Rhodesian Front (RF).
Smith was re-elected to Parliament as RF member for Umzingwane in the 1962 general election, at which the RF won a slim majority and formed a government. He was appointed Minister of the Treasury under Prime Minister Winston Field. Field's failure to secure independence from Britain when the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved in 1963 left many dissatisfied with his leadership and in April 1964 Smith deposed him.
Smith was staunchly opposed to Britain's insistence (see NIBMAR) that the government of Rhodesia be transferred to the black majority control as an essential prerequisite for independence. Smith at one point stated that there would be no plans to bring Rhodesia under black majority rule in his lifetime, and he later added, "or children's." (though Smith maintained in his memoirs that he was referring to Majority Rule as it was in other African countries such as Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania, and Nigeria).
The origin of white minority rule in Rhodesia was property and education qualifications in the voters' roll at the time self-government was introduced in 1923. Such qualifications were unexceptional by the standards of the 1920s and (although slightly modified over the years) they ensured a situation up to 1979 in which whites had 95% of the votes in national elections while they were never more than 5% of the population.
Smith and other white settler politicians argued that there was nothing fundamentally racist about the electoral system in Rhodesia. They stated that improvements in black education and wealth would, over time, ensure a gradual move to majority rule. However, critics argued that the whole political arrangement in Rhodesia was intended to entrench economic and political privilege for whites. It was evident from the mid 1950s that the white settlers would put up a fight to retain control of Rhodesia. Smith was the central figure in that fight.
During the early 1960s a black nationalist movement emerged in Rhodesia. That movement consisted of two main parties, ZANU and ZAPU. ZANU was a radical party which came to be lead by Robert Mugabe. ZAPU was an ethnic party, catering to the country's Sindebele speaking minority, lead by Joshua Nkomo. The nationalist parties pressed for majority rule.
UDI and its aftermath
During the early 1960s most of Britain's African colonies were granted independence. Rhodesia also sought independence, but the British government would not agree to this unless and until a black majority government was installed. The alternative to independence was an indefinite continuation of the status-quo. Many Rhodesian whites and their British sympathisers considered the status-quo to be an attractive option, but Smith and his political associates decided on more radical action.
The Rhodesian cabinet issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence on November 11, 1965. The British colony of Southern Rhodesia thus became a sovereign state. UDI had dramatic effect, but it is difficult to see what could be gained from it. Rhodesia had previously been independent in everything but name and its nominal colonial status provided a screen against outside scrutiny. Not for the first or last time, Smith acted in a manner that may have shown poor judgement.
UDI attracted widespread international condemnation including the first economic sanctions in the history of the United Nations, led by Britain and the OAU, and even the European-dominated government in South Africa, although sympathetic and privately supportive, was anxious to avoid sharing in the international condemnation of Rhodesia and did not officially recognise the new state.
The UN sanctions involved severe restrictions on any form of trade or financial transaction with Rhodesia. They also made it difficult for Rhodesians to travel abroad - Smith himself was most indignant when the Norwegian government refused to allow him to attend the wedding in Norway of his son Alec. In the short term, Rhodesia was able to evade sanctions with the assistance of a few sympathetic governments and some 'sanction-busting' companies. However, sanctions began a slow strangulation of Rhodesia.
A significant number of white Rhodesians were uneasy about UDI. In the period immediately after UDI, Smith was therefore persuaded to meet British PM Harold Wilson to discuss terms for ending it. Two meetings took place, both on British warships (HMS Tiger and HMS Fearless) in Gibraltar. Smith was offered what looked to be generous terms including a continuation of white minority rule for a fixed period of time and the indefinite continuation of the economic advantages enjoyed by the white community.
The critical stalling point was that Smith would not concede an end to his government in order to 'return to legality'. The idea was that the 'rebel' government would resign and Governor Gibbs would reappoint it so that it would be regarded as internationally legal. But Smith claimed to fear that Gibbs - acting on orders from London - would not reappoint him and his white government, and that the government would be given to the Black Nationalists. Wilson’s impression, recorded in his memoirs, was that Smith had no intention of conceding majority rule. Wilson believed any undertakings Smith gave in this regard would be so hedged about with conditions that Smith could easily go back on them at a later date. The immediate problem was that Smith and Wilson appeared to both distrust and dislike one another.
Most observers now appreciate that Smith was engaged in the stubborn defence of a colonial system that the twentieth century had left behind. Even in the late 1960s, it only needed very limited vision to perceive this. The Tiger/Fearless terms for a phased transition to majority rule were offered by the British government again in 1971, and Smith accepted them on this occasion. However, by 1971 the world had moved on. Opposition to such a deal was so widespread (inside and outside Rhodesia), that it was no longer realistic. The offer was withdrawn. A few months later, scattered attacks by black insurgents on white owned farms marked the start of the Bush War
In 1974, B.J. Vorster, the Prime Minister of South Africa, began the process of arm-twisting Smith to accept in principle that European minority rule could not continue indefinitely, as part of Vorster's foreign policy with the rest of Africa. Vorster was pursuing detente with the African states, who had promised Vorster that they would tolerate white rule in South Africa if he would help bring Rhodesia to heel.
In 1976, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger formulated what came to be known as a six-step "Kissinger Plan" (or "Kissinger Initiative") with the concurrence of the British government and the participation of South Africa's Vorster. Kissinger flew to Southern Africa and met with Smith and Vorster in Pretoria. UK Prime Minister James Callaghan declared that the plan "...offers a real hope of bringing peace." Smith accepted the plan with reluctance, explaining:
- The proposals which were put to us do not represent what in our view would have been the best solution for the Rhodesian problem. Regretfully, however, we were not able to make our views prevail.... The American and British governments, together with major Western powers, have made up their minds as to the kind of solution they wish to see in Rhodesia, and they are determined to bring it about.
UDI always had a substantial British dimension. It took place at a time when the character of parts of the UK was changing as the result of immigration of large numbers of black and Asian people. Smith's concept of a white dominated society found a certain resonance with some sections of UK opinion. Throughout the 25 year period 1965 to 1990, Ian Smith was given complete support in London by various right-wing groups including the Conservative Monday Club who organised pro-Rhodesia demonstrations outside number 10 Downing Street several times during the late 1970s, and provided Smith with a platform at several receptions and major dinners. The Club had a Rhodesia sub-committee chaired by Tory M.P., Harold Soref. During the same period, groups from most other positions on the British political spectrum were opposed to Smith. Peter Hain (now Northern Ireland Secretary in the British Government) was active, as a leading Young Liberal, in organising demonstrations and campaigns against Smith. Some of these campaigns were highly personalised and included demands for Smith to be arrested and tried for treason.
Having conceded the principle of immediate majority rule in 1976, Smith appeared reluctant to actually take the steps necessary to implement it. By 1976 Smith was undisputed leader of the Rhodesian whites and was in a position to do what was necessary. However, he conducted endless discussions with the US, British and South African governments as well as conducting secret and open talks with almost all the black nationalist parties. At one stage the British appointed a Governor-designate of Rhodesia (Michael Carver) in anticipation of an end to UDI. But Smith was never quite prepared to strike a deal acceptable to the international community.
Smith's intention was to secure the position of the white community in a post-independence Rhodesia and to qualify the degree of majority rule in some way. The practical result of this delay was that the military balance in the Bush War began to tip decisively in the insurgents' favour. Well trained and heavily armed insurgents started to enter the country in large numbers. The Rhodesians began to take serious casualties. 80% of Rhodesian war casualties were incurred in the period January 1977 to December 1979.
Smith's ability to keep the war going as a long as he did must be seen as the mark of a charismatic leader of men. But charismatic leadership and good judgement do not always go together. White Rhodesian society as a whole went into a state of denial regarding their circumstances in 1976 and Smith lacked the vision to see beyond this.
The end of UDI
The isolation of Rhodesia intensified once Mozambique became independent of Portuguese rule in 1975 and after South Africa started to scale back its support. The measures required to evade UN sanctions meant that the Rhodesian economy as a whole had to buy at a premium and sell at a discount. Also, there had been almost nil inward investment during UDI. Meanwhile, the course of the Bush War was running increasingly in favour of the insurgents.
Eventually, Smith had to bow to the inevitable and concede some form of actual majority rule. However, he struggled to qualify the nature of majority rule. The ‘internal settlement’ negotiated with some fringe black parties in 1978 left the white minority with an entrenched position. Whites were guaranteed (1) near one third of the seats in parliament, (2) one quarter of the places in the cabinet, and (3) control of the police, army, civil service and judiciary.
In 1979 the first multi-racial parliamentary elections were held as part of this settlement. However, the main black nationalist parties (ZANU(PF) and ZAPU) did not participate. Both they and the international community viewed the internal settlement as a charade. Following the 1979 election, Rhodesia was re-named Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Bishop Abel Muzorewa (of the UANC party) became the country's first black Prime Minister in June 1979. Smith became 'minister without portfolio' in the new government after failing in a bid to be made minister of defence. Such a deal might have been viable 15 years earlier, but times had moved on.
War between the government and the insurgents continued. Sanctions continued and diplomatic recognition was not granted. The British Government persuaded all parties to come to Lancaster House under Lord Carrington in September 1979 to work out a lasting agreement. A critical element in arriving at that agreement was the defection of one of the members of the RF delegation, much to Smith's disgust. A peculiar feature of both the internal and Lancaster House settlements was the retention of a significant number of parliamentary seats "reserved" for an exclusively white electorate. This was an anachronistic feature even by the standards of the 1970s - but Ian Smith did not see it that way.
One thing Smith did secure at Lancaster House was an agreement that no form of compulsory land redistribution would take place for at least 10 years after independence. This secured the immediate position of the white farming community but would store up trouble for whites in Zimbabwe in later years.
UDI ended, sanctions were lifted and a British Governor (Lord Soames) took over the running of Rhodesia in December 1979.
The 1980 election and Independence
Elections were held again in 1980, under international supervision. Smith hoped to retain a measure of white control over the government after this election by forming a coalition between his RF MPs and those of Muzorewa’s UANC and Nkomo’s ZAPU. But ZANU (PF) (led by Robert Mugabe) won the election outright.
Smith initially demanded that the election be declared null and void because of widespread intimidation of voters and candidates during the election campaign. However, international observers considered that the election was fair, given the time and place in which it was conducted. It was widely considered that ZANU (PF) won the election because it had no credible opponent among the majority Shona speaking population. In his memoirs, Smith himself expressed contempt for Bishop Muzorewa. He should not have been surprised that the electorate shared his opinion.
The British Governor endorsed the result of the election and a date was set for the independence of the country as Zimbabwe. At this point, Robert Mugabe invited Smith to meet for a discussion over the future of the country. The meeting was friendly and afterwards Smith advised the white community to accept the verdict of the election and respond ‘pragmatically’ to events. Specifically, he told the white community to stay in the country and co-operate with the incoming ZANU (PF) government. A few weeks later this co-operation took the form of the Rhodesian army (with white officers) acting to maintain government control of Bulawayo in the face of an attack by ZIPRA dissidents. Later in 1980, Smith was a member of a delegation making presentations in Europe to international financial institutions regarding investment opportunities in Zimbabwe. Ultimately, Smith contributed to the orderly manner in which the country moved to independence.
Smith became Leader of the Opposition in the Zimbabwe parliament, as leader of the newly re-named Republican Front. But Smith insisted on keeping the RF effectively as a whites only party. During the next 5 years, Smith's support among the white elite began to erode and 11 out of the 20 sitting white MPs defected to ZANU or became independents. In the 1985 election, Smith's RF managed to recapture 15 of the 20 reserved white parliamentary seats. As allowed by the independence constitution, Mugabe then moved to abolish the reserved white seats. Whites in Zimbabwe now realised that they had no future in the country as an apartheid group.
Smith retired to his farm in Shurugwi, his political career of 39 years over. Even friendly observers concede that his career had been primarily as a leader of Rhodesian whites rather than as a wider advocate of democracy and the rule of law. His RF party re-branded itself in 1986 as the multi-racial Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe (CAZ), which eventually merged into the Movement for Democratic Change.
Retirement and legacy
Since his retirement, Smith has become an outspoken critic of the Mugabe regime. Mugabe himself often uses Smith's quiet retirement as validation of current policies. Now in his eighties, Ian Smith has re-entered the political fray by challenging Mugabe publicly. He has written an autobiography, The Great Betrayal, which is as much an attack on the Mugabe regime as a memoir of his own that preceded it. Smith is also the author of Bitter Harvest. Both books received mixed reviews. Long term admirers of Smith had their view of him as a man of integrity confirmed. His critics saw in the books a stubborn refusal to acknowledge the need for change. However Smith's bitterness at his government's isolation is a central theme. As of 2006, Smith is living in a nursing home in Cape Town, South Africa.
- Ian Smith was a formidable opponent, but he lacked any vision. We offered him much better terms at the Fearless and Tiger talks than anything he is going to get now. He held out too long, for too much, and is going to end up with nothing.
Harold Wilson (former British Prime Minister) quoted from a BBC interview in 1979. While passing through Heathrow airport, Wilson had a chance encounter with Ian Smith en-route to Lancaster House. The two had coffee together, and Wilson's comments were made after their meeting.
- If Smith was a black man, I would say that he was the best Prime Minister that Zimbabwe ever had.
Morgan Tsvangirai, Leader of the Movement for Democratic Change, 1999
- Smith had many fine qualities as a political leader. However, he was very much a creature of his background. His life revolved around the cricket team, the whites only school, the RAF, the country club and the company of other gentleman farmers. He never escaped from this or saw beyond it.
Peter Hain, Africa minister in Tony Blair's British government, The Observer, 1999
Smith was a charismatic leader and an iconic figure for the political right in the 1960s and 70s. He exercised considerable influence over a narrow constituency in Southern Africa and beyond. He created a nation in his own image – a maverick state, run in the interests of a small section of its population and which, while exhibiting the outward form of democracy and rule by law, defied the standards of the international community. This description applies equally to both Rhodesia and modern Zimbabwe.
External links
- Rhodesia: Mzilikaze to Smith (Africa Institute Bulletin, vol. 15, 1977)
- 24 Sept. 1976, BBC reports that Smith accepts majority rule
References
- Smith, Ian Douglas: Bitter Harvest: The Great Betrayal and the Dreadful Aftermath (Blake Publishing, London, 1981. ISBN 1-903402-05-0)
| Preceded byWinston Field | Prime Minister of Rhodesia 1964–1979 |
Succeeded byAbel Tendekayi Muzorewa (of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia) |