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| Putnam also contributed to the resolution of ] in mathematics. | Putnam also contributed to the resolution of ] in mathematics. | ||
| Putnam also held the view that in mathematics, as in physics and other empirical sciences, we don't use only strict logical proofs, but rather, while not doing this explicitly, we use "quasi-empirical" methods. That is, methods like verifying by many calculations that for no ] ''n'' > 2 do there exist integer values of ''x'', ''y'', and ''z'' (except the trivial cases of 0,0,0; 0,1,1; 1,0,1) such that ''x''<sup>''n''</sup> + ''y''<sup>''n'' = ''z''<sup>''n'' (what was proved not long ago by ], and is known as ]). Even if we treat such knowledge as more conjectural than a strictly proven theorem, we still make use of it in developing mathematical ideas that are based on it. | Putnam also held the view that in mathematics, as in physics and other empirical sciences, we don't use only strict logical proofs, but rather, while not doing this explicitly, we use "quasi-empirical" methods. That is, methods like verifying by many calculations that for no ] ''n'' > 2 do there exist integer values of ''x'', ''y'', and ''z'' (except the trivial cases of 0,0,0; 0,1,1; 1,0,1) such that ''x''<sup>''n''</sup> + ''y''<sup>''n''</sup> = ''z''<sup>''n''</sup> (what was proved not long ago by ], and is known as ]). Even if we treat such knowledge as more conjectural than a strictly proven theorem, we still make use of it in developing mathematical ideas that are based on it. | ||
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Revision as of 21:41, 26 April 2004
Hilary Putnam (b. 1926) is a key figure in the philosophy of mind during the 20th century. After receiving his BA at Penn (where he was an undergraduate with Noam Chomsky) and PhD at UCLA (under Hans Reichenbach), he taught at Princeton, MIT, and Harvard, where he is now Cogan University Professor emeritus.
Putnam has earned a reputation for changing his mind frequently during the course of his career, and he has written on so many diverse topics that it is often difficult to sort out his views.
Philosophy of mind
Putnam is probably most famous for his contributions to the philosophy of mind. He was an early and influential advocate of functionalism (roughly, the view that the human mind is analogous to a digital computer) but in "Representation and Reality" he recanted his earlier views and set out to explain why functionalism, in his revised view, would not work.
Philosophy of language
One of Putnam's most significant results in the philosophy of language is his doctrine that "meaning just ain't in the head", which is most famously illustrated by his Twin Earth thought experiment. Concisely, he argues that if you see a liquid and call it "water" and some alien twin of yours (identical down to the last detail) on an alien planet sees what appears to be an identical liquid and calls it water AND if it turns out it was really XYZ and not H2O, then you and your double actually mean something different by water even though water has the same function for both of you (note that this relates to his abandoning functionalism as a feasible philosophy of mind).
Putnam and Saul Kripke both made important contributions to what is known as the causal theory of reference.
Putnam has also made an argument that is regarded by some as a refutation of skepticism known as the Brain in a Vat argument (I'm not sure if he was the first to use that terminology, though). Basically, he argues that you cannot coherently state that you are a Brain in a Vat. This is because, like in the Twin Earth case, if you are indeed a Brain in a Vat, whose every experience is received through wiring and other gadgetry created by the Mad Scientist (well, technically she may be sane, but this is off-topic), then your idea of a "Brain" would not refer to a "Real" Brain (since you never saw one - you only, perhaps, saw something that looks like a Brain, but it was only fed to you through the wiring - seen The Matrix?). Similarly, your idea of a "Vat" would not refer to a "Real" Vat. So, if, as a Brain in a Vat, you say "I'm a Brain in a Vat", you actually mean to say "I'm a vat-Brain in a vat-Vat", which is incoherent. If, on the other hand, you are not a Brain in a Vat, then saying you are is still incoherent, but this time because you actually mean the opposite. Basically, this is a form of Externalism: where the meaning of a word or concept resides outside of it, and is not inherent in the word/concept (as in Internalism).
Philosophy of mathematics
Putnam and Benacerraf are co-editors of Philosophy of Mathematics: Collected Essays, which contains a useful introduction to the subject.
Putnam also contributed to the resolution of Hilbert's tenth problem in mathematics.
Putnam also held the view that in mathematics, as in physics and other empirical sciences, we don't use only strict logical proofs, but rather, while not doing this explicitly, we use "quasi-empirical" methods. That is, methods like verifying by many calculations that for no integer n > 2 do there exist integer values of x, y, and z (except the trivial cases of 0,0,0; 0,1,1; 1,0,1) such that x + y = z (what was proved not long ago by Andrew Wiles, and is known as Fermat's last theorem). Even if we treat such knowledge as more conjectural than a strictly proven theorem, we still make use of it in developing mathematical ideas that are based on it.
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Metaphilosophy
Putnam, while not quite as famous as Richard Rorty, has nevertheless contributed to metaphilosophical questions, narrowly averting the total relativism associated with Rorty and postmodernism.
add more here on - pragmatism - metaphysical realism - internal realism