Misplaced Pages

Kiev offensive (1920): Difference between revisions

Article snapshot taken from Wikipedia with creative commons attribution-sharealike license. Give it a read and then ask your questions in the chat. We can research this topic together.
Browse history interactively← Previous editNext edit →Content deleted Content addedVisualWikitext
Revision as of 21:31, 1 April 2006 editIrpen (talk | contribs)32,604 edits pls don't weasalize. I can go around adding "Poles claim" to everything supported by only Polish sources, also we've discussed the "alliance" term in the past, didn't we?← Previous edit Revision as of 21:56, 1 April 2006 edit undoPiotrus (talk | contribs)Autopatrolled, Event coordinators, Extended confirmed users, File movers, Pending changes reviewers, Rollbackers285,769 edits Bolshevik counterattack: why not be specific? please point me to other (English, preferably) sources besides him and TrotskiNext edit →
Line 41: Line 41:
General Rydz organized a series of tactical counter-attacks which resulted in victories{{fact}} in the areas of ], where the Bolshevik 44th Rifle Division lost the entire staff and one of its brigades and the ], which routed the Bolshevik 4th Cavalry Division and made one of its ] regiments switch sides. Repeated attacks by the elite Budionny's ] cavalry eventually broke the Polish Ukrainian front on ] and on ] Polish armies were retreating along the entire front. Despite counter-attacks and high morale,{{fact}} the Polish-Ukrainian forces only succeeded in slowing down the Red Army. On ] Kiev was evacuated and left to the Soviets. General Rydz organized a series of tactical counter-attacks which resulted in victories{{fact}} in the areas of ], where the Bolshevik 44th Rifle Division lost the entire staff and one of its brigades and the ], which routed the Bolshevik 4th Cavalry Division and made one of its ] regiments switch sides. Repeated attacks by the elite Budionny's ] cavalry eventually broke the Polish Ukrainian front on ] and on ] Polish armies were retreating along the entire front. Despite counter-attacks and high morale,{{fact}} the Polish-Ukrainian forces only succeeded in slowing down the Red Army. On ] Kiev was evacuated and left to the Soviets.


Before their withdrawal from Kiev the Polish army have destroyed much of its infrastructure including the objects that served purely civilian needs thus making a city practically unlivable.<ref name="MeltVand">"The failures of the Polish army only whipped up its vengeful vanalism. The Polish troops leaving Kiev acted no less savagely. In the city, they damaged the electric power station, the sewerage system, both passenger and cargo railway stations." (Meltiukhov)</ref> Destroyed were the city electric power station, the sewerage system, both passenger and cargo railway stations and a unique for its time 770 metres long chain bridge across the ], one of the largest and most beautiful bridges in Europe and the source of pride for the city.<ref name="bridges"> {{cite news | url= http://www.ukraine-observer.com/articles/193/324 | title= Fording the Dnipro. The past, present and future of Kyiv's bridges | publisher= The Ukrainian observer, issue 193|}}</ref> The diplomatic note issued by the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Russia to the ] also blamed the Poles for heavily damaging the Kiev's ], one of three greatest ] cathedrals built in the 19th century decorated with priceless ]'s frescoes,<ref name="MeltVand"/> the latter charge turned out to be false. The Poles denied that they committed these acts of vandalism, claiming that the only deliberate damage they carried out during their evacuation was blowing up the bridges over the Dnieper, for strictly military reasons.<!---A note in Trotsky’s Works (in Russian), Vol.XVII, Book 2, p.620, admits that the report of the blowing-up of the Vladimir Cathedral turned out to be incorrect.---> In his recent article, Russian historian ] repeats ] claim that before their withdrawal from Kiev the Polish army have destroyed much of its infrastructure including the objects that served purely civilian needs thus making a city practically unlivable.<ref name="MeltVand">"The failures of the Polish army only whipped up its vengeful vanalism. The Polish troops leaving Kiev acted no less savagely. In the city, they damaged the electric power station, the sewerage system, both passenger and cargo railway stations." (Mikhail Meltyukhov)</ref> Destroyed were the city electric power station, the sewerage system, both passenger and cargo railway stations and a unique for its time 770 metres long ] across the ], one of the largest and most beautiful bridges in Europe and the source of pride for the city.<ref name="bridges"> {{cite news | url= http://www.ukraine-observer.com/articles/193/324 | title= Fording the Dnipro. The past, present and future of Kyiv's bridges | publisher= The Ukrainian observer, issue 193|}}</ref> The diplomatic note issued by the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Russia to the ] also blamed the Poles for heavily damaging the Kiev's ], one of three greatest ] cathedrals built in the 19th century decorated with priceless ]'s frescoes,<ref name="MeltVand"/> the latter charge turned out to be false. The Poles denied that they committed these acts of vandalism, claiming that the only deliberate damage they carried out during their evacuation was blowing up the bridges over the Dnieper, for strictly military reasons.<!---A note in Trotsky’s Works (in Russian), Vol.XVII, Book 2, p.620, admits that the report of the blowing-up of the Vladimir Cathedral turned out to be incorrect.--->


As the withdrawal was started too late, the forces of Rydz found themselves in extremely difficult situation. Russian Golikov's and Yakir's Groups, as well as the 1st Cavalry Army managed to capture several strategically important positions behind the Polish lines and the risk of the Polish armies being surrounded and defeated became high. However, mostly due to lack of reconnaissance, poor command and conflicts within the staff of the South-Western Front, the Polish-Ukrainian units managed to withdraw in order and relatively unscathed. Such an outcome of the operation was equally unexpected by both sides. Although the Poles withdrew to their initial positions, they remained tied down in Ukraine and lacked sufficient strength to support the Polish Northern Front and strengthen defenses at the ] during the decisive battle that was soon to take place there. On the other hand the Bolshevik objectives were not accomplished either and the Russian forces had to remain in Ukraine and got tied down with heavy fighting for the area of the city of ]. As the withdrawal was started too late, the forces of Rydz found themselves in extremely difficult situation. Russian Golikov's and Yakir's Groups, as well as the 1st Cavalry Army managed to capture several strategically important positions behind the Polish lines and the risk of the Polish armies being surrounded and defeated became high. However, mostly due to lack of reconnaissance, poor command and conflicts within the staff of the South-Western Front, the Polish-Ukrainian units managed to withdraw in order and relatively unscathed. Such an outcome of the operation was equally unexpected by both sides. Although the Poles withdrew to their initial positions, they remained tied down in Ukraine and lacked sufficient strength to support the Polish Northern Front and strengthen defenses at the ] during the decisive battle that was soon to take place there. On the other hand the Bolshevik objectives were not accomplished either and the Russian forces had to remain in Ukraine and got tied down with heavy fighting for the area of the city of ].

Revision as of 21:56, 1 April 2006

Kiev Offensive (1920)
Part of Polish-Soviet War
Polish bomber in Kiev
Polish Breguet 14 operating from Kiev airfield
DateApril-June, 1920
LocationUkraine
Result Russian victory
Belligerents
Poland Soviet Russia
Commanders and leaders
Józef Piłsudski,
Edward Rydz-Śmigły
Aleksandr Yegorov, Semyon Budionny
Strength
8 Infantry Divisions, 1 Cavalry Division, 2 understrength Ukrainian divisions 8 Infantry Divisions, 2 Cavalry Divisions, later also 1st Cavalry Army
Casualties and losses
? ?
Polish–Soviet War
List of battles
1919
1920

The Kiev Offensive (or Kiev Operation) was a Piłsudski-led attempt by the Second Polish Republic to wrest control of central and eastern Ukraine, or of a substantial part of it, from warring Ukrainian factions and Soviet Russia. The stated goal of the operation was to create an independent Ukraine allied with Poland, though many ethnic Ukrainians viewed it as a Polish effort to seize Ukraine and rallied to fight in the ranks of the Red Army. An initial major military operation in the Polish-Soviet War, this campaign was conducted from April to June 1920 by the Polish Army in alliance with Ukrainian People's Republic forces under the nationalist leader Symon Petliura, opposed by the Bolshevik-led Red Army, likewise with Ukrainian participation.

Initially successful for the Polish army, which captured Kiev in May, 1920, the campaign was dramatically reversed, due partly to the ambivalence of the Ukrainian population, but mainly due to mounting pressure from a Red Army counteroffensive. Polish forces and Petlyura's Ukrainians were forced into retreat.

Before the Battle

On April 21 Poland signed a treaty with the exiled Ukrainian government of Symon Petliura, who ended up in the Polish exile and had found asylum there after the multiple military defeats from the Bolshevik forces in central Ukraine. In exchange for agreeing to a border along the Zbruch river, recognizing the recent Polish territorial gains in western Ukraine obtained by the Poland's defeating the Ukrainian's attempt to create a Ukrainian state in largely Ukrainian populated Volhynia and Galicia, Petliura was promised the military help in regaining the control of Kiev for his government that was afterwards supposed to join the Polish-dominated Federation. The treaty thus defined the borders between Poland and Ukraine, as well as recognized each country's independence and guaranteed respecting cultural and ethnic minority rights within each country. It was followed by an "alliance" signed by Petliura and Piłsudski on April 24. On the same day Poland and Ukrainian People's Republic begun the Kiev Operation, aimed at securing Ukraine as a buffer between Poland and Russia.

The success of the joint Polish-Ukrainian political campaign depended on the creation of a strong Ukrainian army capable of defeating the Soviets in Ukraine. While initially successful, the campaign ultimately failed. The local population was tired of hostilities after several years of war and the Ukrainian Army never exceeded two divisions largely due to the ambivalent attitude of Ukrainians towards the "alliance".

The plan of Kiev Operation was to defeat the Soviet troops on the Polish southern flank and establish a friendly government in Ukraine. The main task of the advancing Polish armies was to outflank the Bolsheviks and destroy them in a single battle. After winning the battle in the South, the Polish General Staff planned a speedy withdrawal of the 3rd Army and strengthening of the northern front where Piłsudski expected the main battle with the Red Army to take place. As is often the case, the actual course of events was different than envisioned.

Polish assault

The 3rd Army easily won border clashes with the Soviets and the combined Polish-Ukrainian forces captured Kiev on May 7, encountering only token resistance. On the May 9th the Polish troops celebrated the capture of Kiev with the victory parade "of Victors-Liberators" on Kreschatyk, the city's main streat. However as the parading troops were Piłsudski's Poles instead of Petliura's Ukrainians, the Kievans watched with the great ambivalence this demostration of force which looked just like another occupants army.

However the Bolshevik army, although badly mauled, avoided total destruction. The Polish offensive stopped at Kiev and only a small bridgehead was established on the eastern bank of the Dnieper.

Bolshevik counterattack

The Polish-Ukrainian military thrust soon met with Red Army counterattack. On May 24, 1920, the Polish-Ukrainian forces were engaged for the first time by Semyon Budionny and his famous First Cavalry Army. Two days later, Budionny's cavalry, with two major units from the Russian 12th Army, opened an assault on the Polish forces centered around Kiev. After a week of heavy fighting south of the city, the Russian assault was repulsed and the front line restored. On June 3, 1920, another Russian assault began north of the city.

Meanwhile Polish military intelligence was aware of Russian preparations for a counteroffensive, and Polish commander-in-chief Józef Piłsudski ordered the commander of Polish forces on the Ukrainian Front, General Antoni Listowski, to prepare for a strategic withdrawal. From the perspective of staff maps in Warsaw, it was clear that the renascent Polish Army was too weak to withstand both the offensive in the southern, Ukrainian sector and the spring offensive being prepared by the Bolsheviks in Belarus and north of the Pripyat Marshes. However, the commander of the Polish 3rd Army in the vicinity of Kiev, General Edward Rydz-Śmigły, was seeking a way to repulse the upcoming Russian assault rather than withdraw, and even proposed to the General Staff regrouping all his forces at Kiev and defending there until relieved. His plan was turned down by Piłsudski, who knew that no relief force could be prepared any time soon. He repeated his order to withdraw the Polish 3rd and 6th Armies from the Kiev area.

General Rydz organized a series of tactical counter-attacks which resulted in victories in the areas of Bila Tserkva, where the Bolshevik 44th Rifle Division lost the entire staff and one of its brigades and the Battle of Wołodarka, which routed the Bolshevik 4th Cavalry Division and made one of its cossack regiments switch sides. Repeated attacks by the elite Budionny's cossack cavalry eventually broke the Polish Ukrainian front on June 5th and on June 10th Polish armies were retreating along the entire front. Despite counter-attacks and high morale, the Polish-Ukrainian forces only succeeded in slowing down the Red Army. On June 13 Kiev was evacuated and left to the Soviets.

In his recent article, Russian historian Mikhail Meltyukhov repeats Leon Trotsk claim that before their withdrawal from Kiev the Polish army have destroyed much of its infrastructure including the objects that served purely civilian needs thus making a city practically unlivable. Destroyed were the city electric power station, the sewerage system, both passenger and cargo railway stations and a unique for its time 770 metres long chain bridge across the Dnieper, one of the largest and most beautiful bridges in Europe and the source of pride for the city. The diplomatic note issued by the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Russia to the Antanta also blamed the Poles for heavily damaging the Kiev's St. Volodymyr's Cathedral, one of three greatest Orthodox cathedrals built in the 19th century decorated with priceless Vasnetsov's frescoes, the latter charge turned out to be false. The Poles denied that they committed these acts of vandalism, claiming that the only deliberate damage they carried out during their evacuation was blowing up the bridges over the Dnieper, for strictly military reasons.

As the withdrawal was started too late, the forces of Rydz found themselves in extremely difficult situation. Russian Golikov's and Yakir's Groups, as well as the 1st Cavalry Army managed to capture several strategically important positions behind the Polish lines and the risk of the Polish armies being surrounded and defeated became high. However, mostly due to lack of reconnaissance, poor command and conflicts within the staff of the South-Western Front, the Polish-Ukrainian units managed to withdraw in order and relatively unscathed. Such an outcome of the operation was equally unexpected by both sides. Although the Poles withdrew to their initial positions, they remained tied down in Ukraine and lacked sufficient strength to support the Polish Northern Front and strengthen defenses at the Auta River during the decisive battle that was soon to take place there. On the other hand the Bolshevik objectives were not accomplished either and the Russian forces had to remain in Ukraine and got tied down with heavy fighting for the area of the city of Lwów.

Opposing forces

The following is the Order of Battle of Polish and Bolshevik forces taking part in the struggles in Ukraine, as of April 25, 1920. It should be noted that the command structure of both sides changed during the operation. Also, the Russian forces were joined by Budennyi's 1st Cavalry Army in the latter part of the operation, while a large part of the Polish forces was withdrawn by then to Belarus.

Among Polish Airforce was the 7th Kościuszko Squadron.

Poles/Ukrainians

Polish Army Unit Polish name Commander Remarks
  General Command of the Polish Army - Gen. Józef Piłsudski
  supporting armies
6th Army
Wacław Iwaszkiewicz
5th Infantry Waclaw Jędrzejewski
12th Infantry Marian Żegota-Januszajtis
18th Infantry Franciszek Krajowski
2nd Army
Antoni Listowski
13th Infantry Franciszek Paulik
15th Infantry Antoni Jasieński
6th Ukrainian Marko Bezruchko
  Assault Group - Józef Piłsudski
Assault Group
Józef Piłsudski
4th Infantry Leonard Skierski
Cavalry Division Jan Romer
Rybak Operational Group
Józef Rybak
1st Mountain Bde Stanisław Wróblewski
7th Cavalry Bde Aleksander Romanowicz
Rydz-Śmigły Operational Group
Edward Rydz-Śmigły
1st Legions Edward Rydz-Śmigły
7th Infantry Eugeniusz Pogorzelski
3rd Cavalry Bde Jerzy Sawicki

Bolsheviks

Red Army Unit Russian name Commander Remarks
  South-Western Front - Gen. Aleksandr Yegorov
12th Army
Miezheninov
7th Rifle
44th Rifle
47th Rifle
58th Rifle
17th Cavalry Division
14th Army
Ieronim Petrovich Uborevich
21st Rifle
41st Rifle
45th Rifle
60th Rifle
8th Cavalry Division
13th Army
unknown composition

Notes

  1. The outcome of the Polish and Bolshevik operations in Ukraine is sometimes disputed. Neither the Poles nor the Russians forced their opponent to fight a major battle or outflanked his forces and destroyed them, which was the main military goal of operations for both sides. However, the Polish retreat from Kiev and Russian advance was a severe blow to Józef Piłsudski's political plans to create a pro-Polish government in Kiev, as part of the "Międzymorze federation.". As such, the operation may be viewed as a defeat for Piłsudski, as well as to Petliura.

See also

References

Inline
  1. Tadeusz Machalski, then a captain, (the future prominent Polish military leader) wrote in his diary: "Ukrainian people, who saw in their capital an alien general with the Polish army, instead of Petliura leading his own army, didn't view is as the act of liberation but as a variety of a new occupation. Therefore, the Ukrainians, instead of enthusiasm and joy, watched in gloomy silence and instead of rallying to arms to defend the freedom remained the passive speactators". Quoted from: "Figures of the 20th century. Józef Piłsudski: the Chief who Created a State for Himself," Zerkalo Nedeli (the Mirror Weekly), Feb. 3-9, 2001, available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
  2. ^ "The failures of the Polish army only whipped up its vengeful vanalism. The Polish troops leaving Kiev acted no less savagely. In the city, they damaged the electric power station, the sewerage system, both passenger and cargo railway stations." (Mikhail Meltyukhov)
  3. "Fording the Dnipro. The past, present and future of Kyiv's bridges". The Ukrainian observer, issue 193. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1= (help)
General
  • Lech Wyszczelski (1999). Kijów 1920. Warsaw: Bellona. ISBN 8311089639.
  • Norman Davies (2003). White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919–20. London: Pimlico. ISBN 0712606947.
  • Józef Piłsudski (1937–1991). Pisma zbiorowe (Collected Works). Warsaw: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza (reprint). ISBN 8303030590. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
  • Mikhail Tukhachevski (1989). Lectures at Military Academy in Moscow, February 7–10, 1923 in: Pochód za Wisłę. Łódź: Wydawnictwo Łódzkie. ISBN 8321807771.
  • Janusz Cisek (1990). Sąsiedzi wobec wojny 1920 roku. Wybór dokumentów. (Neighbours Attitude Towards the War of 1920. A collection of documents, English summary). London: Polish Cultural Foundation Ltd. ISBN 085065212X.

Online references

Categories: