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{{Use mdy dates|date=February 2011}}
{{Infobox political party
|party_name = Communist Party of China</big><br />{{linktext|中|国|共|产|党}}<br />''Zhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎng''
|party_logo = ]<br>The emblem of the Communist Party of China.
|leader1_title = ]
|leader1_name = ]
|leader2_title = ]
|leader2_name = Hu Jintao,<br />],<br />]<br />],<br />]<br />],<br />]<br />],<br />]
|foundation = July, 1921 <small>(1st Party Congress)</small><br>August 1920 <small>(de facto)</small>
|position = ] to ]
|ideology = '''Traditional'''<br>]<br>]<br>]<br>'''Modern'''<br>]<br>]<br>]<br>]
|headquarters = ], ]
|youth_wing = ]<br>]
|membership = 80,269,000
|membership_year = 2010
|flag = ]
|website =
|country = the People's Republic of China
|colorcode = {{Communist Party of China/meta/color}}
}}
{{Chinese
|showflag=p
|title=Communist Party of China
|t={{linktext|中|國|共|產|黨}}
|s={{linktext|中|国|共|产|党}}
|p=Zhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎng
|j=zung<sup>1</sup>gwok<sup>3</sup> gung<sup>6</sup>caan<sup>2</sup>dong<sup>2</sup>
|poj=Tiong-kok Kiōng-sán-tóng
|altname=Abbreviated name
|c2=中共
|p2=Zhōng Gòng
|j2=zung<sup>1</sup> gung<sup>6</sup>
|poj2 =Tiong Kiōng
|order=st }}

{{Contains Chinese text}}

{{Communist Parties|expanded=Asia}}

The '''Communist Party of China''' ('''CPC'''), also known as the '''Chinese Communist Party''' ('''CCP'''), is the founding and ] political party of the ] (PRC). Although nominally it exists alongside the ],<ref>, by Donald Clarke, Modern China, 2009</ref> a coalition of governing political parties, in practice, the CPC is the ] in the PRC,<ref name="Cdecon">{{Cite book | last = Goodman | first = David S. G. | last2 = Segal | first2 = Gerald | authorlink = | coauthors = | title = China deconstructs: politics, trade, and regionalism | publisher = Psychology Press | date = | location = | pages = 48 | url = | doi = | isbn = 9780415118330}}</ref> maintaining a ] and centralizing the state, military, and media.<ref name="Ralph H. Folsom 1992 pp. 76">Ralph H. Folsom, John H. Minan, Lee Ann Otto, ''Law and Politics in the People's Republic of China'', ] (St. Paul 1992), pp. 76–77.</ref> The legal power of the ] is guaranteed by the ].<ref name="Ralph H. Folsom 1992 pp. 76"/> The current party leader is ], who holds the title of ].

The party was founded in July 1921 in ].<ref name="CT">{{Cite web |last = |first = |authorlink = |coauthors = |title = China Information: The Communist Party of China (CPC)|work=] |date = |url = http://www.chinatoday.com/org/cpc/ |doi = |accessdate = October 29, 2010|quote=The Communist Party of China (CPC) was founded on July 1, 1921 in Shanghai, China.}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Tatlow|first=Didi Kirsten|title=On Party Anniversary, China Rewrites History|url=http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/world/asia/21iht-letter21.html?_r=1&emc=tnt&tntemail1=y|work=New York Times|accessdate=21 July 2011|quote=The party’s true founding date is July 23, 1921, according to official documents.|date=July 20, 2011}}</ref><ref name=bbc20110701>{{cite news|title=Hu warns Chinese Communist Party|url=http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13985359|publisher=BBC|accessdate=21 July 2011|date=1 July 2011|quote=Although the Chinese are celebrating the anniversary on Friday, the party's first congress took place on 23 July.}}</ref> After a lengthy ], the CPC defeated its primary rival, the ] (KMT), and assumed full control of ] by 1949.<ref name="gk">Gay, Kathlyn. (2008). 21st Century Books. Mao Zedong's China. ISBN 0822572850. pg 7</ref> The Kuomintang retreated to the island of ], which it still retains to this day.

The party has fluctuated between periods of ] and political ] throughout its history. Both before and after the founding of the PRC, the CPC's history is defined by various power struggles and ideological battles, including destructive socio-political movements such as the ]. At first a conventional member of the international Communist movement, the CPC ] its ] over ideological differences in the 1960s. The Communist Party's ideology was redefined under ] to incorporate principles of ], and the ] enabled rapid and sustained economic growth.

The CPC is the world's largest ],<ref></ref> claiming over 80&nbsp;million members<ref></ref> at the end of 2010 which constitutes about 6.0% of the total population of mainland China. The vast majority of military and civil officials are members of the Party.<ref>{{cite web|title=CCP celebrates its 90th anniversary|url=http://china.usc.edu/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=2461|work=Talking Points, July 10–20, 2011|publisher=USC US-China Institute|accessdate=24 July 2011}}</ref> Since 1978, the Communist Party has attempted to institutionalize transitions of power and consolidate its internal structure. The modern party stresses unity and avoids public conflict while practicing a pragmatic and open ] within the party structure.

==Organization==
{{Refimprove section|date=January 2010}}
The party's organizational structure was destroyed during the ] and rebuilt afterwards by ], who subsequently initiated "]" and brought all state apparatuses back under the rule of the CPC.

Theoretically, the party's highest body is the ], which meets at least once every five years. The primary organs of power in the Communist Party which is detailed in the ] include:
* ], which includes:
** The ], which is the highest ranking official within the Party and usually the Chinese ].
** The ], presently consisting of 25 full members (including the members of the Politburo Standing Committee); see ] for a complete list.
** The ], which currently consists of nine members; see ] for a complete list.
** The ], the principal administrative mechanism of the CPC, headed by the ];
** The ] (a parallel organization of the government institution of the same name);
* The ], which is directly under the National Congress and on the same level with the Central Committee, charged with rooting out ] and malfeasance among party cadres.

===Organizations under the Central Committee===
Other central organizations directly under the Party Central Committee include:
* ]<ref></ref>
* ];
* ];
* ];
* Central ];
* ];
* ];
* ];
* ];
* ];
* '']'';
* '']'';
* Party History Research Centre;
* Party Research Centre;
* Central Compilation and Translation Bureau.

In addition, there are numerous commissions and leading groups. Usually those commissions and leading groups have jurisdiction on both Party and State apparatus, and include ranking leaders up to the ] and the ]. The most important of them are:
* ];
* ];
* ];
* ];
* ];
* ];
* ];
* ];
* ];
* ];
* ];
* ];
* ];
* ] (related to ]);
* ];
* ];
* ];
* ];
* ];
* ];
* ];
* ];
* ].

Every five years, the Communist Party of China holds a National Congress. The latest happened on October 19, 2007. Formally, the Congress serves two functions: to approve changes to the Party constitution regarding policy and to elect a ], about 300 strong. The Central Committee in turn elects the ]. In practice, positions within the Central Committee and Politburo are determined before a Party Congress, and the main purpose of the Congress is to announce the party policies and vision for the direction of China in the following few years.

The party's central focus of power is the Politburo Standing Committee. The process for selecting Standing Committee members, as well as Politburo members, occurs behind the scenes in a process parallel to the National Congress. The new power structure is announced obliquely through the positioning of portraits in the '']'', the official newspaper of the Party. The number of Standing Committee members varies and has tended to increase over time. The Committee was expanded to nine at the 16th Party National Congress in 2009.

There are two other key organs of political power in the People's Republic of China: the formal government and the ]. The Party's main bodies to oversee the PLA are the ] and the ].

There are, in addition to decision-making roles, advisory committees, including the ]. During the 1980s and 1990s there was a ] established by ] which consisted of senior retired leaders, but with their death this has been abolished since 1992.

===Factions===
]
Political theorists have identified two groupings within the Communist Party<ref></ref>
leading to a structure which has been called "one party, two ]".<ref></ref> The first is the "elitist coalition" or '']'' which contains mainly officials who have risen from the more prosperous provinces. The second is the "populist coalition", the core of which are the '']'', or the "Youth League faction" which consists mainly of officials who have risen from the rural interior, through the ]. Minor informal groupings include the reformist ], and the derogatorily-termed ] of officials benefiting from ]. The interaction between the two main factions is largely complementary with each faction possessing a particular expertise and both committed to the continued rule of the Communist Party and not allowing intra-party factional politics threaten party unity. It has been noted that party and government positions have been assigned to create a very careful balance between these two groupings.

Within his "one party, two factions" model, Li Chen has noted that one should avoid labelling these two groupings with simplistic ideological labels, and that these two groupings do not act in a zero-sum, winner take all fashion. Neither group has the ability or will to dominate the other completely.<ref></ref>

===Membership===
The party was small at first, but grew intermittently through the 1920s. Twelve voting delegates were seated at the 1st ] in 1921, as well as at the 2nd (in 1922), when they represented 195 party members. By 1923, the 420 members were represented by 30 delegates. The 1925 4th Congress had 20 delegates representing 994 members; then real growth kicked in. The 5th Congress (held in April–May 1927 as the ] was cracking down on communists) comprised 80 voting delegates representing 57,968 members.

It was on October 3, 1928 6th Congress that the now-familiar ‘full’ and ‘alternate’ structure originated, with 84 and 34 delegates, respectively. Membership was estimated at 40,000. In 1945, the 7th Congress had 547 full and 208 alternate delegates representing 1.21&nbsp;million members, a ratio of one representative per 1,600 members as compared to 1:725 in 1927.

After the Party defeated the Nationalists, participation at National Party Congresses became much less representative. Each of the 1026 full and 107 alternate members represented 9,470 party members (10.73&nbsp;million in total) at the 1956 8th Congress. Subsequent congresses held the number of participants down despite membership growing to more than 60&nbsp;million by 2000.<ref></ref>

==History==
], former ], ]. ].]]
{{Refimprove section|date=January 2010}}
{{Main|History of the Communist Party of China}}
The CPC has its origins in the ] of 1919, where radical political systems like ] and Communism gained traction among Chinese intellectuals.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution|first=Arif|last=Dirlik|publisher=]|year=1993|page=16}}</ref> Stalin opposed the Chinese Communist Party in Xinjiang because he wanted to expand Soviet influence in the province.<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=IAs9AAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=warlords+and+muslims#v=snippet&q=fascist%20trotskyite%20plotters&f=false|title=Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: a political history of Republican Sinkiang 1911-1949|author=Andrew D. W. Forbes|year=1986|publisher=CUP Archive|location=Cambridge, England|isbn=0521255147|pages=151|pages=376|accessdate=December 31, 2010}}</ref> The CPC's ideologies have significantly evolved since its founding and establishing political power in 1949. Mao's revolution that founded the PRC was nominally based on ] with a rural focus based on China's social situations at the time. During the 1960s and 1970s, the CPC experienced a significant ] with the ] under ], and later, ]. Since then Mao's peasant revolutionary vision and so-called "continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" stipulated that class enemies continued to exist even though the socialist revolution seemed to be complete, giving way to the '']''. This fusion of ideas became known officially as "]", or Maoism outside of China. It represented a powerful branch of communism that existed in opposition to the ]'s "]".

Following the death of ] in 1976, however, the CPC under the leadership of ] moved towards '']'' and instituted ]. In reversing some of Mao's "extreme-leftist" policies, Deng argued that a socialist country and the ] model were not mutually exclusive. While asserting the political power of the Party itself, the change in policy generated significant economic growth. The ideology itself, however, came into conflict on both sides of the spectrum with Maoists as well as progressive liberals, culminating with other social factors to cause the ]. Deng's vision for economic success and a new socialist market model became entrenched in the Party constitution in 1997 as '']''.
]
The "third generation" of leadership under ], ], and associates largely continued Deng's progressive economic vision while overseeing the re-emergence of ] in the 1990s. Nationalist sentiment has seemingly also evolved to become informally the part of the Party's guiding doctrine. As part of Jiang's nominal legacy, the CPC ratified the '']'' into the 2003 revision of the Party Constitution as a "guiding ideology", encouraging the Party to represent "advanced productive forces, the progressive course of China's culture, and the fundamental interests of the people." There are various interpretations of the ''Three Represents''. Most notably, the theory has legitimized the entry of private business owners and quasi-"]" elements into the party.

The insistent road of focusing almost exclusively on economic growth has led to a ]. The CPC's "fourth generation" of leadership under ] and ], after taking power in 2003, attempted reversing such a trend by bringing forth an integrated ideology that tackled both social and economic concerns. This new ideology was known as the creation of a ] using the ].

The degree of power the Party had on the state has gradually decreased as economic liberalizations progressed. The evolution of CPC ideology has gone through a number of defining changes that it no longer bears much resemblance to its founding principles. Some believe that the large amount of economic liberalization starting from the late 1970s to present, indicates that the CPC has transitioned to endorse economic ].<ref>Harvey, David. 2005. ''A Brief History of Neoliberalism.'' Oxford, England, UK: Oxford University Press. Pp. 120</ref><ref>Greenhalgh, Susan; Winckler, Edwin A. 2005. ''Governing China's Population: From Leninist to Neoliberal Biopolitics.'' Stanford, California, USA: Stanford University Press.</ref><ref>Zhang, Xudong. Whither China?: Intellectual Politics in Contemporary China. Duke University Press. Pp. 52</ref><ref>Wong, John; Lai, Hongyi; Hongyi, Lai. ''China Into the Hu-Wen Era: Policy Initiatives and Challenges.'' Pp. 99 "...influence of neoliberalism has spread rapidly in China", "...neoliberalism had influenced not only college students but also economists and leading party cadres"...</ref> The CPC's current policies are fiercely rejected as ] by most communists, especially ]s, and by adherents of the ] from within the PRC.

The Communist Party of China comprises a ] form of government; however, there are parties other than the CPC within China, which report to the ] and do not act as opposition or independent parties. Since the 1980s, as its commitment to ] ideology has appeared to wane, the party has begun to increasingly invoke ] as a legitimizing principle as opposed to the ] construction for which the party was originally created. The change from ] to ] has pleased the CPC's former enemy, the ] (KMT), which has warmed its relations with the CPC since 2003.<ref>See ].</ref>

==Political ideology and stances==
===Regional corruption and reform===
The leaders of the Communist Party of China realize that there are serious problems with political corruption within China and with maintaining the trust of the Chinese people because of it. However, attempts made in closed-door sessions at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 17th Communist Party of China's Central Committee in September 2009 to grapple with these problems produced inconclusive results, although a directive which requires disclosure of investments and property holdings by party and governmental officials was passed.<ref> article by Michael Wines in '']'' September 20, 2009</ref>

===Relationship with competing ideologies===
{{Refimprove section|date=January 2010}}
{{POV-section|date=October 2010}}
] argue that the party was doomed to its present character, that of petty-bourgeois nationalism in the 1920s, because of the near-annihilation of the workers' movement in the KMT betrayal of 1927, which was made possible by ] order that the Communists join with the KMT in a centrist coalition, effectively disarming it, which opportunity the KMT swiftly exploited to defeat the communist revolution.<ref></ref> This slaughter forced the tiny surviving Party to switch from a workers' union- to a peasant, guerilla-based organization, and to seek the aid of the most heterodox sources: from "patriotic capitalists" to the dreaded KMT itself, with which it openly sought to participate in a coalition government, even after the Japanese general surrender in 1945.<ref></ref> Chinese Trotskyists from ] onward have called for a ] against what they see as an opportunist, capitalist leadership of the CPC.
], 29 February 1972]]
]s also existed in the ] party. They viewed the Chinese revolution in different terms than the Communists, claiming that China already went past its feudal stage and in a stagnation period rather than in another mode of production. These Marxists in the Kuomintang opposed the Chinese communist party ideology.<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=usOMZjTWrJ0C&pg=PA207&dq=china+stagnated+feudalism+political#v=onepage&q=guomindang%20marxists&f=false|title=Feudalism and non-European societies|author=T. J. Byres, Harbans Mukhia|year=1985|publisher=Psychology Press|location=|page=207|isbn=0714632457|pages=|accessdate=November 28, 2010}}</ref>

] and other ']s' viciously attack ] after ]'s death, calling them the precise "capitalist road" Mao had pledged to fight during the early existence of the PRC. They do not hold any allegiance to the CPC. An example of a well-known group, until recently ], that looks to Mao's principles is the ] who the current CPC has publicly opposed. Also, some Maoist groupings attack even some of the shifts and changes that occurred while Mao was still alive and in leadership, like his 1972 welcoming of ] (see '']'' for more on this event). The ], which encompasses these Maoists and other ] is a current within China that seeks to "revert China to the ] road" – i.e., to return China to the socialist system that existed before Deng Xiaoping's reforms.

Some of the opponents of the Party within the ] have tended not to argue that a strong Chinese state is inherently bad, but rather that the Communist leadership is corrupt.{{Clarify|date=July 2011}} The ] represented a controversial point in criticism of the Chinese Communist Party by Chinese students within China.<ref>Zhang, L., Nathan, A. J., Link, P. & Schell O. The Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership's Decision to Use Force Against Their Own People – In Their Own Words. PublicAffairs, 2002. ISBN 978-1586481223.</ref>

Another school of thought argues that the worst of the abuses took place decades ago, and that the current leaders were not only unconnected with them, but were actually victims of that era. They have also argued that, while the modern Communist Party may be flawed, it is comparatively better than previous regimes, with respect to improving the general standard of living, than any other government that has governed China in the past century and can be seen in a more favourable light compared with most governments of the ]s. As a result, the CPC has recently taken sweeping measures to regain support from the countryside, with limited success.

In addition, some scholars contend that China has never operated under a decentralized democratic regime in its several thousand years of history, and therefore it can be argued that the present political structure, albeit not up to ] moral or political standards, is the best possible option when compared to the alternatives. A sudden transition to ], these experts contend, would result in the economic and political upheaval that occurred in the ] in the late 1980s, and that by focusing on economic growth, China is setting the stage for a more gradual but sustainable transition to a more politically liberal system. This group sees mainland China as being similar to Franco's ] in the 1960s, and ] during the 1970s when South Korea was run by corrupt, authoritarian regimes. This school of thought also brings together some unlikely political allies. Not only do most intellectuals within the Chinese government follow this school of thinking, but it is also the common belief held amongst pro-] liberals in the West.

Many observers from both within and outside of China have argued that the CPC has taken gradual steps towards democracy and transparency, hence arguing that it is best to give it time and room to evolve into a better government that is more responsive to its people rather than forcing an abrupt change with all the deleterious effects such a loss of stability might entail.<ref>Yang, Dali. Remaking the Chinese Leviathan. ], 2004.</ref> However, other observers (like ]) question whether these steps are genuine efforts towards democratic reform or disingenuous measures by the CPC to retain power.<ref>An, Alex and An, David, ''China Brief'', October 7, 2008. </ref>

====Religion====
{{see also|Freedom of religion in the People's Republic of China}}
The CPC is officially ], and prohibits party members from holding religious beliefs (though this ban is, in many cases, unenforceable).<ref>Xinhua News Agency, , 19 Dec 2011.</ref>

The Party's ] coordinates with the ] to manage the country's five officially sanctioned religions. Unregistered religious groups face varying degrees of suppression under the Communist Party.<ref>Congressional-Executive Commission on China, , Oct 20 2011.</ref>

==Current leadership==
]
The Members of the ] are:
# ''']''': ], ], ].
# ''']''': ]
# ''']''': ]
# ''']''': ]
# ''']''': Chairman of the ]
# ''']''': Top-ranked Secretary of ], ], Vice Chairman of the ]
# ''']''': First-ranked ] of the ]
# ''']''': Secretary of ]
# ''']''': Secretary of ]

Members of the ]:
], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ].

Alternate member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee: ]

Members of the ]: Zeng Qinghong, ], ], He Guoqiang, ], ], ].

===Historical leaders===
{{Main|List of leaders of the Communist Party of China}}
Between 1921 and 1943 the Communist Party of China was headed by the ]:
* ], General Secretary 1921–1922 and 1925–1927
* ], General Secretary 1927–1928
* ], General Secretary 1928–1931
* ], acting General Secretary 1929–1930
* ], acting General Secretary 1931
* ], a.k.a. Qin Bangxian, acting General Secretary 1932–1935
* ] a.k.a. Luo Fu, acting General Secretary 1935–1943

In 1943 the position of ] was created.
* ], Chairman 1943–1976
* ], Chairman 1976–1981
* ], Chairman 1981–1982

In 1982, the post of Chairman was abolished, and the General Secretary, at this time held by the same man as the post of Chairman, once again became the supreme office of the Party.
* ], General Secretary 1982–1987
* ], General Secretary 1987–1989
* ], General Secretary 1989–2002
* ], General Secretary since 2002

==Funding==
Though the CPC charges a limited due on its members for its expenditure, its total amount would be insignificant for the continued operation of this hegemony. The actual ratio of membership dues among the total amount is less than 1/11. While the budget constitutes of limited amount of donations and business operations owned by the party, its majority comes from the grant of national treasury,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=107807|title=建立规范的党务经费制度 |accessdate=2011-10-24 |author=孙国良|publisher=中国选举与治理 |language=Chinese}}</ref> the same way that supports the other 8 subordinative registered parties, which making a bizarre exception among modern political parties. However, unlike the governmental departments, there is not even a ''de jure'' procedure for legal supervision of such grants as for now. Proposals for reformation has since been put aside untouched.

==See also==
{{Col-begin}}
{{Col-break}}
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
{{Col-break}}
'''Factions'''
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
{{Col-break}}
'''General:'''
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
{{Col-end}}

==References==
{{Reflist}}

==External links==
{{commons|Communist Party of China}}
*
*
*
* - slideshow by '']''
* —]
* —'']'' article from May 2002
* — slideshow by '']''

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Revision as of 07:41, 25 February 2012

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