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Battle of The Lower Dnieper
Part of World War II
Soviet soldiers crossing the Dnieper on self-made rafts.
Date 24 August, 1943 — 23 December, 1943 Location Dnieper river, USSR Result Decisive Soviet Victory
Belligerents
Axis	Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Erich von Manstein	Konstantin Rokossovsky, Ivan Konev
Strength
1,250,000 men 12,600 guns 2,100 tanks 2,000 planes	2,650,000 men 51,000 guns 2,400 tanks 2,850 planes
Casualties and losses
Low est.: 500,000+ killed and wounded High est.: 1,250,000 killed and wounded	300,000+ killed, 900,000+ wounded

The World War II Battle of the Lower Dnieper of 1943 is considered to be one of the largest battles in world history, involving almost 4,000,000 men on both sides and stretching on a front 1400 kilometers wide. During a four-month campaign, Soviet troops liberated the left shore of the Dnieper, crossed it in force, and created several bridgeheads on the right shore, liberating Kiev as well.

It is also considered one of the bloodiest battles, with estimates ranging from 1,700,000 to 2,700,000 casualties on both sides. Since the area involved was huge, some historians do not consider it a discrete "battle," and grant the Battle of Stalingrad the title of the bloodiest battle in history.

Prelude

After the end of the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht lost all hope of regaining the initiative. Losses were considerable, and, worse, its army as a whole was less experienced than before, as many of its best men had fallen in the Battle of Stalingrad. Therefore, despite considerable numbers, the Wehrmacht could only react and defend.

By mid-August, Hitler understood that the Soviet offensive could not be contained - at least, not until some internal disagreement broke out within the Allies. He decided to buy time by constructing a series of fortifications to slow down the Red Army, and he demanded the Wehrmacht to defend its positions on the Dnieper at all costs.

On the Soviet side, Stalin was determined to pursue his liberation of occupied territories, started at the beginning of the year. The Ukrainian industrial region was the first priority, since it was a densely populated area and its coal mines and other ores would provide precious resource for the Soviet state. Therefore, the main axis of the attack was in a southernly direction; the northern regions would be neglected in this offensive.

The Start

German defense setup

The order to construct the Dnieper defense complex, known as "Eastern Wall", was issued on 11 August 1943 and immediately executed.

All over Dnieper, fortifications were erected. However, there was no hope to achieve such a huge defense setup in such a short time. Therefore, the "Eastern wall" was not uniform. In areas where Soviet force-crossing was most likely, such as near Kremenchug, Zaporizhzhia and Nikopol, the defense was the heaviest, whilst being lighter in other areas.

Additionally, on 7 September 1943, the SS forces and the Wehrmacht received an order to thoroughly pillage areas they had to retreat from to slow down the Red Army and to try and create supplies issues for Soviet forces.

Soviet offensive on the left shore

Main article: Battle of Ukraine (1943)

On 24 August 1943, the Soviet divisions started moving on a 1400 kilometer front stretching between Smolensk and the Azov Sea. The operation staged was huge, mobilizing 2,650,000 men, 51,000 guns, 2,400 tanks and 2,850 planes, and involving 5 fronts:

• Central Front (known as the Bielorussian Front after 20 October 1943)
• Voronezh Front (known as the 1st Ukrainian Front after 20 October 1943)
• Steppe Front (known as the 2nd Ukrainian Front after 20 October 1943)
• Southwest Front (known as the 3rd Ukrainian Front after 20 October 1943)
• South Front (known as the 4th Ukrainian Front after 20 October 1943)

Overall, the operation was executed by 36 rifle armies, 4 Tank and 5 Air armies.

Despite a great superiority in numbers, the offensive was by no means easy. German opposition was ferocious and fight raged for every town and city. One tactic widely used by the Wehrmacht was leaving some troops in each city and on each hill, slowing down the Soviet offensive.

Three weeks after the start of the offensive, and despite heavy losses on the Soviet side, it became all too clear that the Wehrmacht could not possibly hope to contain the Soviet offensive in the flat, open terrain of the steppes, where the Red Army's numerical strength would prevail. Manstein asked for as many as 12 new divisions in hopes of containing the Soviet offensive – but German reserves were perilously thin. Years later, Manstein wrote in his memoirs:

"After analysing this situation, I concluded that we can't keep the Donbass with the forces that we already possess, and that even a greater danger for the whole Eastern Front is being created on the north flank of the group. The 8th and 4th armies won't be able to contain the Soviet offensive for very long".

Therefore, on 15 September 1943, Hitler ordered the Army Group South to retreat to the Dnieper defense line.

The fight for city of Poltava was especially bitter. The city was heavily fortified and its garrison ready. After a few inconclusive days that greatly slowed down the Soviet offensive, Marshal Konev decided to bypass the city and rush towards the Dnieper. After two days of violent urban warfare, the Poltava garrison was overcome.

Towards the end of September 1943, Soviet forces reached the lower part of the Dnieper. The hardest part was still to come, though.

Dnieper airborne operation

In order to soften the defenses on Dnieper's right shore, the Soviet command decided to attempt a paradrop on the right shore. On 24 September 1943 the Dnieper airborne operation was launched. The Soviet paratroopers' objective was to secure a bridgehead until the reinforcements could arrive.

The operation turned out to be a complete failure. Because pilots were completely unfamiliar with the area, the first wave of paratroopers was dropped on Soviet lines or in the Dnieper, while the second wave of 5,000 troops got scattered over several dozen square kilometers. Moreover, because of a poorly performed reconnaissance that failed to spot German mechanized forces, most troops, lacking anti-tank weapons, were overwhelmed shortly after their landing. The others, having lost all radio link with their HQ, tried to attack German supply depots or joined the partisan forces.

Despite heavy losses, it is estimated that the Dnieper airborne operation, which attracted the attention of a significant number of German mechanized troops, allowed a force-crossing in better conditions. Nevertheless, after the failure of Vyazma and Dnieper paradrops, the STAVKA refused to use massive airborne operations again.

Force-crossing the Dnieper

Choosing the scenario

Dnieper is the third largest river in Europe, second only to Volga and Danube. In its lower part, its width can easily reach 3 kilometers, and the fact that it was dammed in several places made it even larger. Moreover its right shore —the one still to be retaken— was much higher and steeper than the left one, thus complicating the offensive even further. In addition, the opposite shore was transformed into a vast complex of defenses and fortifications held by the Wehrmacht.

In front of such a situation, the Soviet commanders had two options. The first would be to give themselves time to regroup their forces, find a weak point or two to exploit (not necessarily in the lower part of Dnieper), stage a breakthrough and encircle the German defenders, rendering the defense line next to useless (very much like German Panzers bypassed the Maginot line in 1940). This, however, would give Germans time to get more reserves and futhermore, would expose Soviet troops to flank mechanized attacks, every Soviet commander's nightmare since 1941.

The second option would be to stage a massive assault without waiting, and force the Dnieper on a large front. This option left no additional time for the German defenders, but would lead to much larger casualties. For political reasons (Stalin wanted Kiev to be retaken on 7 November), the second option was chosen.

The assault would be staged on a 300-kilometer front almost simultaneously. All available means of transport would be used to transport the attackers to the opposite shore, including small fishing boats and improvised rafts of barrels and trees (like the one on the photograph). The crucial issue would obviously be heavy equipment. Without it, the bridgeheads would not stand for long.

The crossing

The first bridgehead on Dnieper's right shore was established on 22 September 1943 at the confluence of Dnieper and Pripyat rivers, in the northern part of the front. On 24 September, another bridgehead was created near Dneprodzerzhinsk, another on 25 September near Dnepropetrovsk and yet another one on 28 September near Kremenchug. By the end of the month, 23 bridgeheads were created on the right shore, some of them 10 kilometers wide and 1-2 kilometers deep.

By all accounts, the crossing of the Dnieper can be described as an "attack rage". Soldiers used every available floating device to cross the river, under heavy German fire and taking heavy losses. After that, Soviet troops had to basically dig themselves into the clay ravines composing Dnieper's right shore.

Securing the bridgeheads

German troops soon launched heavy counterattacks on almost every bridgehead, hoping to annihilate them before heavy equipment could be transported across the river.

For instance, the Borodaevsk bridgehead, mentioned by Marshal Konev in his memoires, was under a heavy armored and air assualt. Bombers were everywhere, bombing both the bridgehead and the reinforcements crossing the river. Konev complained at once about a lack of organization of Soviet air support, set up air patrols to prevent bombers from approaching the bridgeheads and ordered forward more artillery to counter tank attacks from the opposite shore. When Soviet aviation became more organized and hundreds of guns and Katyushas started firing, the situation started to improve and the bridgehead was eventually preserved.

Such fights were commonplace on every bridgehead. Even if all bridgeheads were preserved, losses were terrific – at the beginning of October, most divisions were at only 25 to 50% of their nominal strength.

== Right shore campaign ==

Lower Dnieper offensive

By mid-October, the forces accumulated on the lower Dnieper bridgeheads were strong enough to stage a first massive attack to definitely secure Dnieper's right shore in the southern part of the front. Therefore, an vigorous attack was staged on Kremenchug-Dnepropetrovsk line. Simultaneously, a major diversion was conducted in the south to draw German forces away both from Lower Dnieper and from Kiev.

At the end of the offensive, Soviet forces controlled a bridgehead 300 kilometers wide and up to 80 kilometers deep in some places. In the south, the Crimea was now cut off from the rest of the German forces. Any hope of stopping the Red Army on Dnieper's left shore was lost.

Kiev liberation

Main article: Battle of Kiev (1943)

Criticisms

Stalin's will to retake Kiev before 7 November have raised quite a few criticisms among historians. It is commonly accepted now that bridgeheads on the Lower Dnieper were deliberately "left alone" in order to draw German forces from Kiev, resulting in heavy losses. While this hypothesis could be true to some extent, one must not forget that the action of establishing a bridgehead alone is dangerous enough and can (and usually does) lead to heavy losses.

Aftermath

The Battle of Dnieper was another stinging defeat for the Wehrmacht. The Red Army, which Hitler hoped to contain at the Dnieper, forced the Wehrmacht's defenses. Kiev was liberated and German troops lacked forces to annihilate Soviet troops on Lower Dnieper bridgeheads. The right shore was still in German possession for most part, but both sides knew that it would not last for long.

Additionally, the Battle of Dnieper demonstrated the strength of Soviet partisan movement. The "rail war" operation staged during September and October 1943 struck German logistics very hard, creating heavy supplies issues.

Incidentally, between 28 November and 1 December, 1943 the Teheran conference was held between Winston Churchill, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Stalin. The battle of Dnieper, along with other major offensives staged in 1943, certainly allowed Stalin to be in a dominant position to negotiate with his Allies.

Casualties debate

Casualties during the Battle of Dnieper are still a subject of a heavy debate. Some sources put very low figures (200,000 to 300,000 total casualties) which is much lower than the Battle of Kursk for instance. However, given the duration of the campaign and the huge area involved, more than one historian argues that the losses involved were huge, easily reaching or even surpassing those at the Battle of Stalingrad, but going "unnoticed" because of the big operation area (and of the aura of fame enveloping the latter). The death toll also depends on the time frame considered. It also depends whether the toll of the 1943 Smolensk battle, which was used as a kind of "deceptive manoeuver" for the Dnieper battle, is included in the Battle of Dnieper's statistics.

On the subject of Soviet casualties, Nikolaï Shefov in his Russian fights puts the figure of 373,000 KIA and more than 1,500,000 total Soviet casualties. British historian, John Erickson, in his Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies, puts a figure of 173,201 USSR KIA, during a time frame from 26 September to 20 December 1943, therefore not taking into account the period going from 24 August to 26 September. Given the heavy German resistance even before Dnieper force-crossing, this figure seems a low estimate (Soviet sources estimate casualties from the post-Kursk offensive alone at 250,000 killed, wounded and captured), the figure of 300,000+ KIA seems quite correct and acceptable, with the WIA number following the 3:1 empiric ratio.

German losses, however, are more difficult to evaluate. The simple rule of 3:1 losses during an offensive operation against a heavily defended enemy would lead to a 500,000 casualties toll, reaching the one of Kursk. Shefov and other Soviet/Russian historians quote casualties as high as 1,500,000. Indeed, if one considers the casualties per day ratio of Kursk battle, an operation twice as long under similar conditions would lead to a 1,000,000 toll.

References

• Nikolai Shefov, Russian fights, Lib. Military History, Moscow, 2002
• History of Great Patriotic War, 1941 — 1945. Мoscow, 1963
• John Erickson, Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies, Edinburgh University Press, 1994
• Marshal Konev, Notes of a front commander', Science, Moscow, 1972.
• Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, Мoscow, 1957.

• World War II operations and battles of Europe
• Battles of Germany
• Battles of the Soviet Union