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There are some controversies involved in determining the result of the battle.{{Citation needed|date=October 2007}} From the Polish point of view, while the German defeat constitutes a Polish tactical victory, the ensuing destruction of the Polish units by the Soviets resulted in a strategic defeat, especially considering the goals of ]. From the Soviet point of view, the operation was a complete success, as both the Germans and the Poles loyal to the London government suffered a defeat. There are some controversies involved in determining the result of the battle.{{Citation needed|date=October 2007}} From the Polish point of view, while the German defeat constitutes a Polish tactical victory, the ensuing destruction of the Polish units by the Soviets resulted in a strategic defeat, especially considering the goals of ]. From the Soviet point of view, the operation was a complete success, as both the Germans and the Poles loyal to the London government suffered a defeat.


=== Assumptions === == Assumptions ==

Operation 'Ostra Brama' was meant to be carried out in a state of confusion spreading around German units in ] in a fear of upcoming, overwhelming Soviet forces. Polish commandment did not anticipate serious resistance and Polish soldiers were to breached German positions at the outskirts of city, flew into the center and hold it until Soviet army arrives. Notwithstanding Germans had fortified and occupied Vilnius with a strong garrison. Layout for reclaiming Vilnius resembles plans for ]. Operation 'Ostra Brama' was meant to be carried out in a state of confusion spreading around German units in ] in a fear of upcoming, overwhelming Soviet forces. Polish commandment did not anticipate serious resistance and Polish soldiers were to breached German positions at the outskirts of city, flew into the center and hold it until Soviet army arrives. Notwithstanding Germans had fortified and occupied Vilnius with a strong garrison. Layout for reclaiming Vilnius resembles plans for ].


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Germans defended house after house until eventually arrived at the conclusion that position had weakened so strongly they no longer can hold the city. In result, three thousand soldiers under general ] had eluded the besiegers under the cover of night in 13 July, but were beaten up in a fight, which took place in a battle of Krawczuny (district of Vilnius) with the Home Army soldiers of major "Węgielny". On 13 July Vilnius was in hands of Polish and Soviet soldiers. Germans defended house after house until eventually arrived at the conclusion that position had weakened so strongly they no longer can hold the city. In result, three thousand soldiers under general ] had eluded the besiegers under the cover of night in 13 July, but were beaten up in a fight, which took place in a battle of Krawczuny (district of Vilnius) with the Home Army soldiers of major "Węgielny". On 13 July Vilnius was in hands of Polish and Soviet soldiers.


===Epilog: the two temporal allies turned against each others===
===Epilog===
After victory at Vilnius, relationship between two temporal allies forces deterioted quickly. The reason originated from the anti-Soviet stance of the ''Armia Krajowa'' leaders and the exiled Polish government. Angered by the information about ], the exiled Polish government increased the anti-Soviet movements with the help of English intelligent agency ]. They believed that their existence would be more ensured if USSR power and influnce disminished, and one way to do it was maintaining some contacts with the Nazi Germany.<ref> (Original version: ''Sayers, Michael, Kahn Albert E. The Great Conspiracy. The Secret War against Soviet Russia. — Boston: Brown & Co, 1946.'')</ref>
When the battle was over, Soviet Command demanded immediate abandonment of Vilnius by Polish soldiers. The commander, colonel Krzyżanowski ordered Polish units to set off for ], while he went to the headquarters of general ], commander of the ]. Krzyżanowski took the promise from Soviets that they would supply Polish partisans with equipment without any political conditions. On 16 July, Krzyżanowski was once again invited into the headquarter of Czerniachowski to sign an agreement. It was soon found out, Soviet arrested him and the Chief of Staff major Teodor Cetys, as well as other Polish representatives at the same time in Bogusze. The wave of arrests did not also avoid delegates of Polish Government in London.


Early March 1944, general Anders Okulicki was secretely dropped by UK planes to Poland and he brought the direction of the exiled Polish government for general Tadeusz Bur-Komorowski, demanded that the ''Armia Krajowa'' had to gather more weapons and materials, eliminate anyone who posed to be a threat to the Armia Krajowa, including the Soviet officers. The direction also ordered that ''Armia Krajowa'' had to sabotage the Soviet army, conduct anti-Soviet propaganda and gather information about the USSR troops for the AK forces.<ref></ref> All these acts were discovered by the Soviet intelligence agents and, in addition, the Soviet STAVKA received numerous reports from the Soviet partisans about the sabotage, massacre and assassination of the Armia Krajowa against the Soviet partisan and the communist officers.<ref></ref> With all these information, Soviet ] conclued that Armia Krajowa was a serious threat and decided to eliminated it once and for all.<ref></ref> Right after the liberation of Vilnius, on 14th July 1944, the leader of Soviet ]. lieutenant-genral ] together with the inspectors of SMERCH and several NKVD arrived at the city to settle the situation.<ref></ref>
New commander of the Vilnius district lieutenant colonel Zygmunt Izydor Blumski and commander of the district Navahrudak lieutenant colonel Janusz Prawdzic Szlaski moved units into the Forest of Rudnicka under a constant fire of Soviet aircrafts. Then, the Home Army soldiers were commanded to make their way into ] and ] or dispersed in local terrain. Soviets, on the hand, made a real hunting for their still official ally, as Soviets had never denounced Polish soldiers that status. In process, over 5700 of Polish partisans were captured. Common soldiers were interned in ] (Polish Miedniki) whereas officers placed in ].
Few decided upon joining the 1st Polish Army (supported by communist puppet regime), while majority were forcibly enlisted into the Soviet Red Army. However they opposed to swear allegiance to the Soviet State, thus they were deported to Kaluga city in interior of Russia. There, they were turned into a part of slave labor system so widespread in the Soviet Union, until release in 1947.


However, right on 13th July, Army General I. D. Chernyakhovsky approached Polish lieutenant colonel Aleksander Krzyżanowski and tried to persuade him to join the Red Army. Krzyżanowski refused categorically, but Chernyakhovsky persuaded him again and promised to provide Krzyżanowski weapons and ammunition if Krzyżanowski sided with the Red Army. However Krzyżanowski decide that he would not change his mind, and the alliance broke away. On 17th June V. M. Abakumov and the NKVD troops arrested Krzyżanowski together with his colleagues. That event make Krzyżanowski's force disintegrate. Some Polish joined the Red Army, the other ones refused and escaped to the forests at Siauliai and Lida, conducting anti-Soviet movements. Aleksander Krzyżanowski was jailed at USSR but then on October 1947 was released and sent back to Poland. He was jailed again in Poland in 1950 and died in prison.
Stripped of officer's cadre and confused, Polish units occupied forests surrounding Vilnius. In compliance with current research, roughly six thousand soldiers and over five thousand volunteers stationed in that area on 18 July. They were gradually encircled and captured by the Soviets.


None of what happened in Vilnius was disclosed to a public opinion, as in example, British media were censored by decree of Minister of Information ]. Great allies of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States, were not interested in revealing any news that would contradict with the general notion of the Soviet Union as a liberator of Europe from Nazi evil. Poland had already lost its eastern territories to Stalin at the ], but no one of the Polish soldiers fighting in a battle of Vilnius knew about it. None of what happened in Vilnius was disclosed to the public. British media were censored by decree of the Minister of Information ]. The main allies of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States, were not interested in revealing any news that would contradict with the general notion of the Soviet Union as a liberator of Europe from Nazi evil. Poland had already lost its eastern territories to Stalin at the ], but none of the Polish soldiers fighting in a battle of Vilnius knew about it<ref name="Piotrowski">{{en icon}} {{cite book |author=Tadeusz Piotrowski |coauthors= |title=Poland's Holocaust |year=1997 |editor= |pages= |chapter= | chapterurl = |publisher=McFarland & Company |location= |isbn=0-7864-0371-3 |url=http://books.google.com/books?visbn=0786403713&id=A4FlatJCro4C&pg=PA99&lpg=PA99&q=Wilno+1944&vq=Wilno+1944&dq=Wilno+uprising+1944&sig=a4_dBoxddfKo3IA4RmY-CftNPlM |format= |accessdate=}}</ref>
<ref name="Piotrowski">{{en icon}} {{cite book |author=Tadeusz Piotrowski |coauthors= |title=Poland's Holocaust |year=1997 |editor= |pages= |chapter= | chapterurl = |publisher=McFarland & Company |location= |isbn=0-7864-0371-3 |url=http://books.google.com/books?visbn=0786403713&id=A4FlatJCro4C&pg=PA99&lpg=PA99&q=Wilno+1944&vq=Wilno+1944&dq=Wilno+uprising+1944&sig=a4_dBoxddfKo3IA4RmY-CftNPlM |format= |accessdate=}}</ref>


==See also== ==See also==

Revision as of 04:10, 26 November 2012

This article is about the 1944 battle for Vilnius (Polish: Wilno) between the Polish resistance movement organization - Armia Krajowa and the Wehrmacht. For combat between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, see Battle of Vilnius (1944). For resistance activities in the Vilna Ghetto (1941-1943), see that article.
Operacja Ostra Brama
Part of Operation Tempest, World War II

Dislocation of Polish and German units at the start of the fighting
Date6–15 July 1944
LocationVilnius, present-day Lithuania (pre-1939 Template:Lang-pl, pre-war Poland)
Result Soviet victory
Strategic Polish Home Army defeat
Belligerents
Polish Secret State (Armia Krajowa) Nazi Germany Germany  Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Aleksander Krzyżanowski
Antoni Olechnowicz
Czesław Dębicki
Rainer Stahel Ivan Chernyakhovsky
Strength
12,500 30,000 Unknown
Casualties and losses
~500 Unknown
Operation Tempest
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Parasol Regiment, Warsaw, 1944History of Poland 1939–1945
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Operation Ostra Brama (lit. Operation Gate of Dawn) was an armed conflict during World War II between the Polish Home Army and the Nazi German occupiers of Vilnius (Polish: Wilno). It began on 7 July 1944, as part of a Polish national uprising, Operation Tempest, and lasted until 14 July 1944. Though the Germans were defeated, the following day the Soviet Red Army entered the city and the Soviet NKVD proceeded to intern Polish soldiers and to arrest their officers. Several days later, the remains of the Polish Home Army retreated into the forests, and the Soviets were in control of the city.

There are some controversies involved in determining the result of the battle. From the Polish point of view, while the German defeat constitutes a Polish tactical victory, the ensuing destruction of the Polish units by the Soviets resulted in a strategic defeat, especially considering the goals of Operation Tempest. From the Soviet point of view, the operation was a complete success, as both the Germans and the Poles loyal to the London government suffered a defeat.

Assumptions

Operation 'Ostra Brama' was meant to be carried out in a state of confusion spreading around German units in Vilnius in a fear of upcoming, overwhelming Soviet forces. Polish commandment did not anticipate serious resistance and Polish soldiers were to breached German positions at the outskirts of city, flew into the center and hold it until Soviet army arrives. Notwithstanding Germans had fortified and occupied Vilnius with a strong garrison. Layout for reclaiming Vilnius resembles plans for Warsaw Uprising.

Plans for uprising

On 12 June 1944 General Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski, Commander-in-Chief of the Home Army, issued an order to prepare a plan of liberating Vilnius from German hands. The Home Army districts of Vilnius and Navahrudak planned to take control of the city before the Soviets could reach it. The Commander of the Home Army District in Vilnius, lieutenant colonel Aleksander Krzyżanowski "Wilk", decided to regroup all the partisan units in the northeastern part of Poland for the assault, both from inside and outside of the city.

On 26 June 1944 major Teodor Cetys (pseudonym "Sław") and lieutenant colonel Zygmunt Blumski ("Strychański") put forward a plan to lieutenant colonel "Wilk". Order number 1 "Ostra Brama" comprises overall outline for an assault on Vilnius. The Home Army forces of combined district Vilnius and Navahrudak were intended to strike from the outside under the lead of lieutenant colonel "Poleszczuk".

The Polish forces were organized into five groups, "East" under major Antoni Olechnowicz "Pohorecki", "North" - major "Węgielny", "Eastern South" - major "Jarema", "South" - major Stanisław Sędziak "Warta", and "West" - rittmeister (rotmistrz) Zygmunt Szendzielarz "Łupaszka". Units inside the city were under command of lieutenant colonel "Ludwik".

According to plan, main attack was prepared from eastern and south-east direction. Any actions were supposed to forestall the Soviets' ones to emphasize Polish sovereignty over Vilnius. The second Red Army crosses the front as it stand in 1916 (at sideline of Sół and Smorgoń), uprising begins.

Combat operations

On 2 July the Polish Government in London gave the order to begin operation "Burza" in whole district Vilnius and Navahrudak. It is believed to be a mistake, as Home Army units had been dispersed on a large terrain and took many objectives in parallel.

Autonomous actions of Polish partisans

In a face of the Soviet Army approaching to the city "Wilk" made decision to launch operation immediately on 7 July at dawn, one day before it had been originally scheduled. Hastiness did not go well with plans to be pulled off, as merely one of three battalions were in position when battle began. In spite of incomplete mobilization, around 4 thousand Polish partisans, supported by two anti-tank guns and few mortars attacked Germans' lines. The Home Army had to fight against heavily armored, few times stronger and protected by numerous strongholds German forces having had at the disposal tanks, anti-tanks, strong artillery and cover from air provided by air forces operated from nearby airfield in Porubanek.

The 1st Group formation "Pohoreckiego" included the 3,8 and 13 Brigade, the 3 and 5 Battalion of the 3 and 5 Infantry Regiment, ORKO "Groma" and OS "Wilczura". The 3rd Group formation "Jaremy" contained the 9 Brigade, the 1 and 6 Battalion of the 77 Infantry Regiment, OD "Promienia", OS "Gracza".

The line between cemetery at Rosa to Bielmont was designated as an approach line. Polish soldiers had no reconnaissance of German defense, however they pushed forward against all odds. 1st and 6th battalions reached first line of fortifications on the verge of village Lipówka and crossed railway line Vilnius-Podbrodzie. They were however repulsed by German counterattack to the initial positions. Accordingly, the 9th Brigade had been pined downed at blockhouses in Hrybiszek.

Partisans from the 3rd and 5th Battalions after bitter fighting captured Góry, but they could not proceed under heavy fire. 3rd and 8th Battalions had been neutralized by the menace from armored train in the vicinity of Kolonia Wileńska. The 3rd Brigade achieved highest success, after crossing Wileńka they reached Zarzecze i Trakt Batorego. They remained at positions till 8 July and took up offensive again with the approaching Soviet units, but having incurred heavy losses under bombardment from air and artillery, they had to withdraw to Szwajcar.

In the meantime, few hundred Home Army soldiers took actions inside the city, primarily from the district "A"-Kalwaryjska, but most of the units failed to mobilize on time and did not take part in actions.

Fights in cooperation with the Red Army

Soviet and Home Army soldiers on patrol together in the streets of Wilno on July 12th, 1944. While the Home Army and the Red Army cooperated in liberating the city from the Germans (July 7th - July 15th), after this was accomplished, on July 16th, the Soviets arrested and interned the Polish officers.

First units of the Red Army appeared at the battlefield in the middle of day (the 3rd Mechanized Corps) and engaged in frontal assault at 8 p.m. the same day without any success. The main forces arrived on 8 July, amounted for 100 thousand soldiers in total with the aid of few hundred tanks and air support. German garrison was reinforced on 10 July with few hundred paratroopers dropped in a vicinity of the city. Fierce fight that unleashed on the streets between Nazis and combined forces of the Red Army and the Home Army lasted for a few days.

First contacts with Soviet units took place on 7 July, when a group formation "Pohoreckiego" met with the eastern ally. The commander of the 35th Tank Brigade made a first of many hostile moves from the Soviets (many were yet to come), ordering The Home Army to disband the unit. "Pohorecki" issued a word of getting back to a conspiracy. The 8th Brigade that had followed the order had been struggling for few days to regain an operational capacity. "Wilk" released "Pohorecki" from leadership and appointed major Antoni Wasilewski "Olesiński" in his place.

The 2nd Battalion of 85th Infantry Regiment under "Jan" operated in district Kalwaryjska and succeeded in bringing the district under control. As of 8 July "Jan" started to fight Germans side by side with the Soviet 97th of Witebsk Infantry Division. In a charge at the hill Szeszkinie they were able to capture two enemies tanks. On 10 July, the 2nd Polish Battalion crossed the river Wilia and engaged in operations inside the city. The 1st Company of that Battalion were led by lieutenant Wacław Pietkiewicz "Mocny" to assault at streets Zamkowa i Wielka, and experienced particular heavy fighting by the Orthodox Church. The 2nd Company under orders of lieutenant Wacław Korzeniowski "Andrzej" fought at the foot of the hill Zamkowa, at streets Święta Anna, Sofianka, Baszta. The balance of assault titled in favor of Polish troops when German soldiers defending communication bunker surrendered it to the Polish. In the meantime, the 3rd Company of lieutenant Wacław Roszkowski "Biały" supported by Soviet tanks were assaulting at Mostowa Street, and then Zygmuntowska, Wileńska and Hills of Zakręt. The units in the center of city did not follow the way of other companies, as their failed to seize strategic points in 'Sródmieście' of Vilnius. It was 10 July when they achieved first successes.

Germans defended house after house until eventually arrived at the conclusion that position had weakened so strongly they no longer can hold the city. In result, three thousand soldiers under general Reiner Stahel had eluded the besiegers under the cover of night in 13 July, but were beaten up in a fight, which took place in a battle of Krawczuny (district of Vilnius) with the Home Army soldiers of major "Węgielny". On 13 July Vilnius was in hands of Polish and Soviet soldiers.

Epilog: the two temporal allies turned against each others

After victory at Vilnius, relationship between two temporal allies forces deterioted quickly. The reason originated from the anti-Soviet stance of the Armia Krajowa leaders and the exiled Polish government. Angered by the information about Katyn massacre, the exiled Polish government increased the anti-Soviet movements with the help of English intelligent agency MI6. They believed that their existence would be more ensured if USSR power and influnce disminished, and one way to do it was maintaining some contacts with the Nazi Germany.

Early March 1944, general Anders Okulicki was secretely dropped by UK planes to Poland and he brought the direction of the exiled Polish government for general Tadeusz Bur-Komorowski, demanded that the Armia Krajowa had to gather more weapons and materials, eliminate anyone who posed to be a threat to the Armia Krajowa, including the Soviet officers. The direction also ordered that Armia Krajowa had to sabotage the Soviet army, conduct anti-Soviet propaganda and gather information about the USSR troops for the AK forces. All these acts were discovered by the Soviet intelligence agents and, in addition, the Soviet STAVKA received numerous reports from the Soviet partisans about the sabotage, massacre and assassination of the Armia Krajowa against the Soviet partisan and the communist officers. With all these information, Soviet STAVKA conclued that Armia Krajowa was a serious threat and decided to eliminated it once and for all. Right after the liberation of Vilnius, on 14th July 1944, the leader of Soviet SMERCH. lieutenant-genral Victor Semyonovich Abakumov together with the inspectors of SMERCH and several NKVD arrived at the city to settle the situation.

However, right on 13th July, Army General I. D. Chernyakhovsky approached Polish lieutenant colonel Aleksander Krzyżanowski and tried to persuade him to join the Red Army. Krzyżanowski refused categorically, but Chernyakhovsky persuaded him again and promised to provide Krzyżanowski weapons and ammunition if Krzyżanowski sided with the Red Army. However Krzyżanowski decide that he would not change his mind, and the alliance broke away. On 17th June V. M. Abakumov and the NKVD troops arrested Krzyżanowski together with his colleagues. That event make Krzyżanowski's force disintegrate. Some Polish joined the Red Army, the other ones refused and escaped to the forests at Siauliai and Lida, conducting anti-Soviet movements. Aleksander Krzyżanowski was jailed at USSR but then on October 1947 was released and sent back to Poland. He was jailed again in Poland in 1950 and died in prison.

None of what happened in Vilnius was disclosed to the public. British media were censored by decree of the Minister of Information Brendan Bracken. The main allies of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States, were not interested in revealing any news that would contradict with the general notion of the Soviet Union as a liberator of Europe from Nazi evil. Poland had already lost its eastern territories to Stalin at the Tehran Conference, but none of the Polish soldiers fighting in a battle of Vilnius knew about it

See also

References

  1. Сейерс, Майкл, Кан Альберт. Тайная война против Советской России. — М.: ГИИЛ, 1947. (Original version: Sayers, Michael, Kahn Albert E. The Great Conspiracy. The Secret War against Soviet Russia. — Boston: Brown & Co, 1946.)
  2. Сейерс, Майкл, Кан Альберт. Тайная война против Советской России. — М.: ГИИЛ, 1947.) Original version: Sayers, Michael, Kahn Albert E. The Great Conspiracy. The Secret War against Soviet Russia. — Boston: Brown & Co, 1946. Vol 4: From Munich to San Fransisco. Chapter 24: Operation of M16
  3. Соколов, Борис Вадимович. Оккупация. Правда и мифы. — М.: АСТ, 2002. (Boris Vadimovich Sokolov. Occupation - Myths and Truth. AST Publisher. Moskva. 2002. Chapter 15: Question for Poland)
  4. Волков, Федор Дмитриевич, За кулисами второй мировой войны. — М.: Мысль, 1985. (Fyodor Dmitryevich Volkov. The backstage of World War II. Politics Publisher. Moskva. 1985. Chapter 6: From "cricker" to "otopus")
  5. Кисловский, Юрий Григорьевич. От первого дня до последнего. — М.: Политиздат, 1988. (Yuri Grigoyevich Kislovsky. From the first day to the last day. Politics Publisher. Moskva. 1988. Chapter 3: Come back)
  6. Template:En icon Tadeusz Piotrowski (1997). Poland's Holocaust. McFarland & Company. ISBN 0-7864-0371-3. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |chapterurl= and |coauthors= (help)

Further reading

  • Korab-Żebryk R., Operacja wileńska AK, Warszawa 1988.

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