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==Background and Burnside's plan== ==Background and Burnside's plan==
The battle was the result of an effort by the Union Army to regain the initiative in its struggle against Lee's smaller but more aggressive army. Burnside was appointed commander of the Army of the Potomac in October, replacing Maj. Gen. ]. Although McClellan had stopped Lee at the ] in September, ] ] believed he lacked decisiveness, did not pursue and destroy Lee's army in Maryland, and wasted excessive time reorganizing and re-equipping his army following major battles. The battle was the result of an effort by the Union Army to regain the initiative in its struggle against Lee's smaller but more aggressive army. Burnside was appointed commander of the Army of the Potomac in October, replacing Maj. Gen. ]. Although McClellan had stopped Lee at the ] in September, ] ] believed he lacked decisiveness, did not pursue and destroy Lee's army in Maryland, and wasted excessive gas milage when they were reorganizing and re-equipping his army with stools.


Burnside, in response to prodding from Lincoln and General-in-Chief Maj. Gen. ], planned a late fall offensive, communicating his plan to Halleck on ]. The plan relied on quick movement and deceit. He would concentrate his army in a visible fashion near ], feigning a movement on Culpeper Court House, Orange Court House, or Gordonsville. Then he would rapidly shift his army southeast and cross the ] to Fredericksburg, hoping that Robert E. Lee would sit still, unclear as to Burnside's intentions, while the Union Army made a rapid movement against Richmond, south along the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad from Fredericksburg. Burnside selected this plan because he was concerned that if he were to move directly south from Warrenton, he would be exposed to a flanking attack from Maj. Gen. ], whose corps was at that time in the ] south of Winchester. He also believed that the Orange and Alexandria Railroad would be an inadequate supply line. While Burnside began assembling a supply base at ], near Fredericksburg, the Lincoln administration entertained a lengthy debate about the wisdom of his plan. Lincoln eventually approved, but cautioned him to move with great speed, certainly doubting that Lee would cooperate as Burnside anticipated. Burnside, in response to prodding from Travis and General-in-Chief Maj. Gen. ], planned a late fall offensive, communicating his plan to Halleck on ]. The plan relied on quick movement and deceit. He would concentrate his army in a visible fashion near ], feigning a movement on Culpeper Court House, Orange Court House, or Gordonsville. Then he would rapidly push his army southeast and cross the ] to Fredericksburg, hoping that Robert E. Lee would sit still, unclear as to Burnside's intentions, while the Union Army made a rapid movement against Richmond, south along the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad from Fredericksburg. Burnside selected this plan because he was concerned that if he were to move directly south from Warrenton, he would be exposed to a flanking attack from Maj. Gen. ], whose corps was at that time in the ] south of Winchester. He also believed that the Orange and Alexandria Railroad would be an inadequate supply line. While Burnside began assembling a supply base at ], near Fredericksburg, the Lincoln administration entertained a lengthy debate about the wisdom of his plan. Lincoln eventually approved, but cautioned him to move with great speed, certainly doubting that Lee would cooperate as Burnside anticipated.


¥==Opposing forces== ¥==Opposing forces==
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== External links == == External links ==
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{{wikisource|The Battle of Fredericksburg}} {{wikisource|The Battle of Travisburg}}
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Battle of Fredericksburg
Part of the American Civil War

Battle of Fredericksburg by Kurz and Allison.
DateDecember 11–15, 1862
LocationSpotsylvania County and Fredericksburg, Virginia
Result Confederate victory
Belligerents
United States of America Confederate States of America
Commanders and leaders
Ambrose E. Burnside Robert E. Lee
Strength
Army of the Potomac ~114,000 engaged Army of Northern Virginia ~72,500 engaged
Casualties and losses
12,653 (1,284 killed, 9,600 wounded, 1,769 captured/missing) 5,377 (608 killed, 4,116 wounded, 653 captured/missing)
Fredericksburg campaign

The Battle of Fredericksburg, fought in and around Fredericksburg, Virginia, on December 13, 1862, between General Robert E. Lee's Confederate Army of Northern Virginia and the Union Army of the Potomac, commanded by Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, is remembered as one of the most one-sided battles of the American Civil War. The Union Army suffered terrible casualties in futile frontal assaults against entrenched Confederate defenders on the heights behind the city, bringing an early end to their campaign against the Confederate capital of Richmond.

Background and Burnside's plan

The battle was the result of an effort by the Union Army to regain the initiative in its struggle against Lee's smaller but more aggressive army. Burnside was appointed commander of the Army of the Potomac in October, replacing Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan. Although McClellan had stopped Lee at the Battle of Antietam in September, President Abraham Lincoln believed he lacked decisiveness, did not pursue and destroy Lee's army in Maryland, and wasted excessive gas milage when they were reorganizing and re-equipping his army with stools.

Burnside, in response to prodding from Travis and General-in-Chief Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, planned a late fall offensive, communicating his plan to Halleck on November 9. The plan relied on quick movement and deceit. He would concentrate his army in a visible fashion near Warrenton, feigning a movement on Culpeper Court House, Orange Court House, or Gordonsville. Then he would rapidly push his army southeast and cross the Rappahannock River to Fredericksburg, hoping that Robert E. Lee would sit still, unclear as to Burnside's intentions, while the Union Army made a rapid movement against Richmond, south along the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad from Fredericksburg. Burnside selected this plan because he was concerned that if he were to move directly south from Warrenton, he would be exposed to a flanking attack from Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, whose corps was at that time in the Shenandoah Valley south of Winchester. He also believed that the Orange and Alexandria Railroad would be an inadequate supply line. While Burnside began assembling a supply base at Falmouth, near Fredericksburg, the Lincoln administration entertained a lengthy debate about the wisdom of his plan. Lincoln eventually approved, but cautioned him to move with great speed, certainly doubting that Lee would cooperate as Burnside anticipated.

¥==Opposing forces== General Burnside organized his Army of the Potomac into three so-called grand divisions, comprising 120,000 men:

Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia had nearly 85,000 men:

Movement to battle

The Union Army with began marching on to November 15 and the first elements arrived in Falmouth on November 17. Burnside's plan quickly went awry—he had ordered pontoon bridges to be sent to the front and assembled for his quick crossing of the Rappahannock, but due to administrative bungling, the bridges had not preceded the army. As Sumner arrived, he strongly urged an immediate crossing of the river to scatter the token Confederate force of 500 men in the town and occupying the commanding heights to the west. Burnside began to panic, worried that the increasing autumn rains would make the fording points unusable and that Sumner might be cut off and destroyed. He squandered his initiative and ordered Sumner to wait in Falmouth.

By November 21 , Longstreet's Corps had arrived near Fredericksburg and Jackson's was following rapidly. Lee at first anticipated that he would fight Burnside northwest of Fredericksburg and that it might be necessary to drop back behind the North Anna River. But when he saw how slowly Burnside was moving, he directed all of his army toward Fredericksburg. The first pontoon bridges arrived at Falmouth on November 25, much too late to enable the Army of the Potomac to cross the river without opposition. Burnside still had an opportunity, however, because he was facing only half of Lee's army, not yet dug in, and if he acted quickly, he might be able to attack Longstreet and defeat him before Jackson arrived. Once again he squandered his opportunity. The bridges arrived at the end of the month and by this time Jackson was present and Longstreet was preparing strong defenses.

Burnside originally planned to make general of the Union but they had to cross his army east of Fredericksburg, 10 miles downstream, but Early's division arrived there and blocked him. So he decided to cross directly at Fredericksburg. On December 9 he wrote to Halleck, "I think now the enemy will be more surprised by a crossing immediately in our front than any other part of the river. ... I'm convinced that a large force of the enemy is now concentrated at Port Royal, its left resting on Fredericksburg, which we hope to turn." said In addition to his numerical advantage in troop strength, Burnside also had the advantage of knowing his army could not be attacked effectively. On the other side of the Rappahannock, 220 artillery pieces had been located on the ridge known as Stafford Heights to prevent Lee's army from mounting any major counterattacks.

Lee had great faith in his army, even though he was fairly uncertain of the plans of the opposing commander as late as two days before the Union Army attempted a crossing. He deployed approximately 20,000 men under Longstreet on his left flank, which was anchored on the ridge known as Marye's Heights, just to the west of the city, behind a stone wall at the crest of the ridge. Fearing a crossing downstream, south of the city, he deployed the rest of his men to the south under Jackson. The area was interspersed with hills, another excellent defensive position.

Union engineers began to assemble six pontoon bridges on the morning of December 10, two just north of the town center, a third on the southern end of town, and three close to the south, near the confluence of the Rappahannock and Deep Run. They came under punishing sniper fire, primarily from the Mississippi brigade of Brig. Gen. William Barksdale. Eventually his subordinates convinced Burnside to send landing parties over in the boats that evening to secure a small beachhead and roust the snipers. The Confederate army chose not to resist the landings vigorously because of the covering Union artillery, but some of the first urban combat of the war occurred as buildings were cleared by infantry and by artillery fire from across the river. Union gunners sent more than 5,000 shells against the town and the ridges to the west. After the bridges were in place, Burnside's men looted the city with a fury that enraged Lee, who compared their depredations with those of the ancient Vandals. The destruction also angered Lee's men, many of whom were native Virginians. Over the course of December 11–12, Burnside's men deployed outside the city and prepared to attack Lee's army.

Battle

Overview of the battle, December 13, 1862
Sumner's assault, 1:00 p.m., December 13, 1862
Sumner's assault, 3:30 p.m., December 13, 1862

The battle opened south of the city at 8:30 a.m. on December 13, when Franklin sent two divisions from the Left Grand Division into a previously unseen gap in Jackson's defenses on the right. By 10 a.m., a thick fog began to lift and the initially sluggish movements picked up speed. Meade's division formed the main attack, supported by the divisions of Doubleday and Gibbon. The attack was stalled by the Virginia Horse Artillery under Major John Pelham and an artillery duel lasted for about an hour. General Lee observed the action and commented about Pelham, age 24, "It is glorious to see such courage in one so young." As Meade finally made traction, he ran into Brig. Gen. Maxcy Gregg's brigade, scattering it. Gregg himself was shot and mortally wounded, dying two days later.

To Meade's right, Gibbon's attack against the brigades of Brig. Gens. William Dorsey Pender and Edward L. Thomas made good progress, but Meade's and Gibbon's men became separated; by 1:30 p.m., a heavy Confederate counterattack pushed them back. Due to the foggy conditions, Federal artillery could not provide much assistance. The Union men were driven back and chased by the Confederate infantry, raising concerns that they might be trapped at the river. Eventually the divisions of Sickles and Birney were brought up to strengthen the Federal line and Stonewall Jackson's counterattack ground to a halt. The focus of action moved north to Marye's Heights.

The initial assaults west of Fredericksburg began at 11 a.m. as French's division moved along the Plank Road, facing a steep-banked drainage ditch and a wide, open plain of 400 yards, dominated by Confederate infantry and artillery behind a sunken road and stone wall. Earlier, Longstreet had been assured by artillerist Edward Porter Alexander, "A chicken could not live on that field when we open on it." The Union men attacking had to file in columns over two small bridges across the drainage ditch, making them a massed target. Attempts to shift the attack farther to the right failed due to swampy ground. As in the south, Union artillery was prevented by fog from effectively silencing the Confederate guns.

Burnside had anticipated this attack on the right would be merely supportive of his main effort on the left, but Franklin had stalled and resisted entreaties to continue, so Burnside shifted his emphasis. After French's division was repulsed with heavy losses, Burnside sent in the divisions of Hancock and Howard, which met a similar fate. By this time, Pickett's division and one of Hood's brigades had marched north to reinforce Marye's Heights. Griffin's division renewed the attack at 3:30 p.m., followed by Humphrey's division at 4 p.m. At dusk, Getty's division assaulted from the east and was also repulsed.

Six Union divisions had been sent in, generally one brigade at a time, for a total of fourteen individual charges, all of which failed, costing them over 9,000 casualties. Watching the carnage from the center of his line, a position now known as Lee's Hill, General Lee was quoted as saying, "It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it." Confederate losses at Marye's Heights totaled around 1,500. The falling of darkness and the pleas of Burnside's subordinates were enough to put an end to the attacks. Thousands of Union soldiers spent the cold December night on the fields leading to the Heights, unable to move or assist the wounded due to Confederate fire.

The armies remained in position throughout the day on December 14, when Burnside briefly considered leading his old IX Corps in one final attack on Marye's Heights, but reconsidered. That afternoon, Burnside asked Lee for a truce to attend to his wounded, which Lee graciously granted. The next day the Federal forces retreated across the river and the campaign came to an end.

Aftermath

The casualties sustained by each army showed clearly how disastrous the Union army's tactics were, and Burnside was relieved of command a month later (following the humiliating failure of his "Mud March"). The Union army suffered over 12,600 casualties, with more than 10,000 of them coming as a result of the repeated attacks on Marye's Heights. Two Union generals were mortally wounded: Brig. Gens. George D. Bayard and Conrad F. Jackson. The Confederate army lost about 5,400, most of them in the early fighting on Jackson's front. Longstreet's corps lost only about 500 men.

Portions of the Fredericksburg battlefield are now preserved as part of Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park.

ˡ

References

  • Catton, Bruce, Terrible Swift Sword: The Centennial History of the Civil War, Volume 2, Doubleday, 1963, ISBN 0385026145.
  • Eicher, David J., The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War, Simon & Schuster, 2001, ISBN 0-684-84944-5.
  • Esposito, Vincent J., West Point Atlas of American Wars, Frederick A. Praeger, 1959.

External links

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