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The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is a multilateral treaty that regulates the international trade in conventional weapons. International weapons commerce has been estimated to reach US$70 billion a year. On 2 April 2013, the UN General Assembly adopted the ATT.

The treaty was negotiated at a global conference under the auspices of the United Nations from July 2–27, 2012 in New York. As it was not possible to reach an agreement on a final text at that time, a new meeting for the conference was scheduled for 18–28 March 2013.

Origins

The ATT is part of a larger global effort begun in 2001 with the adoption of a non-legally binding program of action at the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in 2001. This program was formally called the “Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects” (PoA).

Later put forward in 2003 by a group of Nobel Peace Laureates, the ATT was first addressed in the UN in December 2006 when the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 61/89 “Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms”.

The arms trade treaty, like the PoA, is predicated upon a hypothesis that the illicit trade in small arms is a large and serious problem requiring global action through the UN. This hypothesis was ultimately disproven through progressive improvements in scholarship in the 2000s (decade). The global size, scope, and impact of the entirely illicit international trade in small arms turned out to be much smaller and less of a concern to countries themselves than first hypothesized, with internal societal factors rising in relative importance.

According to a well regarded 2012 Routledge Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution publication, "the relative importance of diversion or misuse of officially authorised transfers, compared to international entirely illegal black market trafficking has been thoroughly confirmed." The authors go on to elaborate that..."For most developing or fragile states, a combination of weak domestic regulation of authorised firearms possession with theft, loss or corrupt sale from official holdings tends to be a bigger source of weapons concern than illicit trafficking across borders."

Development

Resolution 61/89 requested the UN Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the feasibility, scope and draft parameters for a comprehensive, legally binding instrument establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms, and to submit a report on the subject to the General Assembly at its sixty-second session. 94 States submitted their views, which are contained in the 2007 report A/62/278.

Initial vote of Member States

On October 18, 2006, UK Ambassador John Duncan formally introduced the resolution in First Committee , speaking on behalf of the co-authors (Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, and Kenya). On behalf of the European Union, Finland highlighted the support for the effort when it said, “everyday, everywhere, people are affected by the side effects of irresponsible arms transfers... As there is currently no comprehensive internationally binding instrument available to provide an agreed regulator framework for this activity, the EU welcomes the growing support, in all parts of the world, for an ATT.”

In December 2006, 153 Member States voted in favor of Resolution 61/89. Twenty-four countries abstained: Bahrain, Belarus, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Laos, Libya, Marshall Islands, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, UAE, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. The United States of America voted against the resolution.

Several countries provided explanations of vote: Jamaica, Cuba, Venezuela, China, India, Iran, Algeria, Libya, Russian Federation, Israel, Pakistan, and Costa Rica.

Responding to procedural concerns that were not resolved before the final draft of the resolution, the UK said the aim of the initiative was to start a discussion on the feasibility and draft parameters of an ATT and that “agnostic” states would have a clear opportunity to engage in the process. After the vote, Algeria indicated that the effort must receive broad-based support from states and be based on the principles of the UN Charter.

Group of Governmental Experts

Resolution 61/89 also requested the Secretary-General to establish a group of governmental experts, on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, to examine the feasibility, scope and draft parameters for such a legal instrument, and to transmit the report of the group of experts to the Assembly for consideration at its sixty-third session. On September 28, 2007, the Secretary General appointed a Group of Governmental Experts from the following 28 countries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States. The GGE met three times in 2008 and its final report has now been made public, to be submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly in Fall 2008.

Preparatory Committee

In 2009 an Open-ended Working Group—open to all States—held two meetings on an arms trade treaty. A total of six sessions of this Group were planned. However, at the end of 2009 the General Assembly decided by resolution A/RES/64/68 to convene a Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty in 2012 "to elaborate a legally binding instrument on the highest possible common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms". The General Assembly also indicated that the remaining four sessions of the Open-ended Working Group should be considered as sessions of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for this Conference. The first PrepCom took place in July 2010, the second was in February–March 2011, the third in July 2011 and the fourth in February 2012.

U.S. reverses earlier position

On October 14, 2009, the Obama administration announced in a statement released by Hillary Clinton and the State Department that it was overturning the position of former President George W. Bush's administration, which had opposed a proposed Arms Trade treaty on the grounds that national controls were better. The shift in position by the U.S., the world's biggest arms exporter with a $55-billion-a-year trade in conventional firearms (40% of the global total), led to the launching of formal negotiations at the United Nations in order to begin drafting the Arms Trade Treaty. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in a statement the U.S. would support the negotiations on condition they are “under the rule of consensus decision-making needed to ensure that all countries can be held to standards that will actually improve the global situation.” Clinton said the consensus, in which every nation has an effective veto on agreements, was needed “to avoid loopholes in the treaty that can be directly exploited by those wishing to export arms irresponsibly.”, in a possible reference to the Israeli sale of the US AWACS system to Chinese.

Opposition

Opposition to the ATT can be broken down into state opposition and civil society opposition. Over thirty states have objected to various parts of the ATT over the years, the majority of which held strong concerns about the implications for national sovereignty. According to armstreaty.org, the leading ATT negotiations tracking website, countries such as Cuba, Venezuela, Egypt, and Iran have objected to many more aspects of the ATT than has the United States.

From a civil society point of view, groups concerned about national sovereignty or individual rights to armed defense have been quite wary of the ATT. While not fundamentally opposed to an ATT, these groups are keenly sensitive to ensuring an ATT does not undermine national constitutional protections and individual rights. The most vocal and organized civil society groups opposing objectionable aspects to the ATT have tended to be from the United States. These groups include the International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (IAPCAR), the National Rifle Association (NRA), the National Shooting Sports Foundation (NSSF), and The Heritage Foundation. The NRA and the Gun Owners of America say that the treaty is an attempt to circumvent the Second Amendment and similar guarantees in state constitutions in order to impose domestic gun regulations.

Perhaps the largest source of civil society opposition to the ATT has come from the Institute for Legislative Action (ILA), which is the lobbying arm of the NRA. In July 2012 ILA wrote that:

"Anti-gun treaty proponents continue to mislead the public, claiming the treaty would have no impact on American gun owners. That's a bald-faced lie. For example, the most recent draft treaty includes export/import controls that would require officials in an importing country to collect information on the 'end user' of a firearm, keep the information for 20 years, and provide the information to the country from which the gun was exported. In other words, if you bought a Beretta shotgun, you would be an 'end user' and the U.S. government would have to keep a record of you and notify the Italian government about your purchase. That is gun registration. If the U.S. refuses to implement this data collection on law-abiding American gun owners, other nations might be required to ban the export of firearms to the U.S."

Advocates of the treaty say that it only pertains to international arms trade, and would have no effect on current domestic laws. These advocates point to the UN General Assembly resolution starting the process on the Arms Trade Treaty. The resolution explicitly states that it is “the exclusive right of States to regulate internal transfers of arms and national ownership, including through constitutional protections on private ownership.”

Obstacles to treaty approval

Given the predominant position of the United States as a global arms exporter, any such treaty would have limited relevance without its participation. U.S. ratification would require passage by a 2/3 majority of the U.S. Senate in addition to presidential approval.

As of September 14, 2011, 58 U.S. Senators (45 Republicans and 13 Democrats) had expressed their opposition to an ATT that would limit the Second Amendment rights of US citizens. As this group comprises far more than 1/3 of the Senate, it is sufficient to block ratification of the treaty by the United States if the treaty is interpreted as addressing civilian ownership of firearms. However, the strength of the opposition remains unclear because the treaty will not likely address the Second Amendment issue.

Adoption of the resolution

The UN General Assembly of April 2, 2013 (71st Plennary Meeting) adopted the resolution of ATT, in a 154-to-3 vote. North Korea, Iran, and Syria voted in opposition. China and Russia, among the world's leaders in weapon exports, were among the 23 nations that abstained. Cuba, India, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan also abstained. Armenia, Dominican Republic, Venezuela and Vietnam did not vote.

"According to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, the treaty will not do any of the following: interfere with domestic arms commerce or the right to bear arms in Member States; ban the export of any type of weapon; harm States' legitimate right to self-defence; or undermine national arms regulation standards already in place."

Advocated contents

International non-government and human rights organizations including Amnesty International, Oxfam, Saferworld and the International Action Network on Small Arms (who lead the Control Arms Campaign) have developed analysis on what an effective Arms Trade Treaty would look like.

It would ensure that no transfer is permitted if there is substantial risk that it is likely to:

• be used in serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law, or acts of genocide or crimes against humanity;
• facilitate terrorist attacks, a pattern of gender-based violence, violent crime or organized crime;
• violate United Nations Charter obligations, including UN arms embargoes;
• be diverted from its stated recipient;
• adversely affect regional security; or
• seriously impair poverty reduction or socioeconomic development.

Loopholes would be minimized. It would include:

• all weapons—including all military, security and police arms, related equipment and ammunition, components, expertise, and production equipment;
• all types of transfer—including import, export, re-export, temporary transfer and transshipment, in the state sanctioned and commercial trade, plus transfers of technology, loans, gifts and aid; and
• all transactions—including those by dealers and brokers, and those providing technical assistance, training, transport, storage, finance and security.

The Amnesty International website "loopholes" include shotguns marketed for deer hunting that are virtually the same as military/police shotguns and rifles marketed for long range target shooting that are virtually the same as military/police sniper rifles. AI advocates that the civilian guns must be included in any workable arms trade controls; otherwise, governments could authorize export/import of sporting guns virtually the same as military/police weapons in function.

It must be workable and enforceable. It must:

• provide guidelines for the treaty's full, clear implementation;
• ensure transparency—including full annual reports of national arms transfers;
• have an effective mechanism to monitor compliance;
• ensure accountability—with provisions for adjudication, dispute settlement and sanctions;
• include a comprehensive framework for international cooperation and assistance.

NGOs are also advocating that the Arms Trade Treaty must reinforce existing responsibilities to assist survivors of armed violence, as well as identify new avenues to address suffering and trauma.

The U.S. NGO Second Amendment Foundation has voiced concern that a multinational treaty limiting the firearms trade might infringe on the constitutional right of private firearm ownership for self-defense in some countries such as the U.S.

Criticism

On July 12, 2012, the United States issued a statement condemning the selection of Iran to serve as vice president of the conference. The statement called the move "outrageous" and noted that Iran is under Security Council sanctions for weapons proliferation.

The current debate within the gun-control lobby in Washington, DC in draft documents, has been critical of the proliferation of large-calibre handguns and "assault rifles" produced in disreputable Middle-Eastern countries, such as the Desert Eagle and the Uzi, which have been glamourised in Hollywood.

There has been criticism of Dimona-produced ] and cesium, which may have found its way outside of the middle-east, and has ostensibly been used in assassinations and the construction of dirty-bombs.

See also

• United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms
• Arms industry
• Arms trafficking
• Disarmament
• United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
• Mine action
• Prepcom
• National Rifle Association

References

1. ^ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2013-04/03/c_132280384.htm
2. UN General Assembly approves global arms trade treaty
3. UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty
4. "UN: Global Arms Trade Treaty a step closer after resounding vote". Amnesty International. Retrieved December 8, 2012.
5. http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/pdf/192.15%20(E).pdf
6. Edited by Greene and Marsh. Small Arms, Crime and Conflict: Global governance and the threat of armed violence. London: Routledge Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution. p. 90. {{cite book}}: |last= has generic name (help)
7. Ibid., p. 91. {{cite book}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
8. "Arms Trade Treaty". Un.org. 2007-06-21. Retrieved 2012-08-23.
9. “Statement by H.E. Mr. Kari Kahiluoto, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Finland to the Conference on Disarmament, on behalf of the European Union, UN 61st Session; First Committee, Thematic Discussion: Conventional Weapons, 12 October 2006, New York.”, retrieved October 3, 2008
10. United Nations General Assembly Session 61 Verbatim Report 67. A/61/PV.67 page 31. 6 December 2006. Retrieved 2012-11-05.
11. United Nations General Assembly Session 61 Verbatim Report 67. A/61/PV.67 page 32. Mr. Weisleder Costa Rica 6 December 2006. Retrieved 2012-11-05.
12. “The First Committee Monitor, 2006 Final Edition.”, Reaching Critical Will. Retrieved October 3, 2008
13. "Links to documents". Un.org. 2002-09-09. Retrieved 2012-08-23.
14. “Towards an Arms Trade Treaty”, UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, retrieved August 4, 2012
15. “Global week of action to support Arms Trade Treaty” Amnesty International retrieved September 12, 2008
16. "United Nations Official Document". Un.org. Retrieved 2012-08-23.
17. "U.S. reverses stance on treaty to regulate arms trade". Reuters. October 15, 2009.
18. ^ "U.S. Backs Arms Trade Treaty at UN, Abandoning Bush Opposition". Bloomberg. October 30, 2009.
19. "NRA to UN: don't regulate US arms ownership". SFgate.com. 2011-07-15. Retrieved 2011-07-21. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
20. "Disinformation Continues as U.N. Arms Treaty Takes Shape". NRAila.org. 2012-07-20. Retrieved 2012-07-21.
21. "Separating fact from fiction on the Arms Trade Treaty". oxfamamerica.org. 2011-07-21. Retrieved 2011-08-15.
22. "A big deal about small arms". birchbarkletter.com. 2012-04-25. Retrieved 2012-05-15.
23. "The Arms Trade Treaty: A Response to the 2nd Amendment Critique". law.marquette.edu. 2012-12-01. Retrieved 2013-03-24.
24. "Top List TIV Tables-SIPRI". Armstrade.sipri.org. Retrieved 2012-07-21.
25. "57 Senators Protest U.N. Small Arms Treaty". GeeksWithGuns.com. 2011-08-05. Retrieved 2011-11-22.
26. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-21998394
27. "UN General Assembly approves global arms trade treaty". UN News Centre. 2013-04-02. Retrieved 2013-04-02.
28. See http://www.controlarms.org/en
29. Loopholes "Can you spot the difference?" demonstrating virtual identity between military/police weapons and sporting arms.
30. "Saf Press Release :: Saf Report Live From The Un". Saf.org. Retrieved 2012-07-21.
31. Kornblau, Mark. "Statement by Mark Kornblau, Spokesman, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, on the Selection of Iran to Serve as a Vice President to the Arms Trade Treaty Conference". United States Mission to the United Nations. Retrieved July 12, 2012.

External links

• Official website of the United Nations conference on the Arms Trade Treaty
• Arms Trade Treaty information at the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs
• Arms availability, International Committee of the Red Cross website
• Arms Trade Treaty Monitor (NGO blog)
• Control Arms Campaign
• “Proposed Arms Trade Treaty now in the hands of 28 government experts” Oxfam International
• Blog site for John Duncan, Ambassador for Multilateral Arms Control & Disarmament
• Official website for the UK Mission on Arms Control and Disarmament in Geneva
• The Monitoring Mechanism Towards and Arms Trade Treaty (MMTATT)
• FILM : Regulating conventional arms transfers: A humanitarian imperative

• Arms control treaties
• Proposed treaties
• United Nations conventions and covenants