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Ulster Defence Regiment CGC
Representation of the UDR BadgeRegimental badge
Active	1970–1992
Country	United Kingdom
Branch	British Army
Type	Infantry Regiment
Role	Internal Security
Size	11 battalions (at peak)
Motto(s)	"Quis Separabit" (Latin) "Who Shall Separate Us?"
March	(Quick) Garryowen & Sprig of Shillelagh. (Slow) Oft in the Stilly Night
Commanders
Colonel of the Regiment	General Sir John Anderson GBE, KCB, DSO
Colonel of the Regiment	Colonel Sir Dennis Faulkner CBE

The Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) was an infantry regiment of the British Army. It began duties in 1970. Raised through public appeals, newspaper and television advertisments, with the operational role of "defence of life or property in Northern Ireland against armed attack or sabotage" but significantly this did not include "crowd control or riot duties in cities". The UDR replaced the Ulster Special Constabulary ("B-Specials") along with a separate police reserve, to assist "regular forces" in the Province. It was the largest infantry regiment in the British Army, formed with seven battalions and an extra four added within two years.

It consisted mostly of part-time volunteers until 1976 when a full-time cadre was added.. Recruiting from the local community at a time of intercommunal strife, it was accused of sectarian attitudes and collusion with loyalist paramilitary organisations. The regiment was intended to be nonpartisan, and began with Catholic recruits accounting for 18% of membership, however due to various circumstances by the end of 1972 this dropped to around 3%.

Uniquely in the British Army the regiment was on continuous active service throughout its 22 years of service. It was also the first infantry regiment of the British Army to fully incorporate women into its structure.

In 1992, the UDR was amalgamated with the Royal Irish Rangers to form the Royal Irish Regiment. In 2006, the regiment was retrospectively awarded the Conspicuous Gallantry Cross, which entitled the UDR to be known as The Ulster Defence Regiment CGC.

Background

The UDR was raised in 1970, during the period of the Northern Ireland "Troubles". Before then, the existing forces were the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC or "B Specials"). The RUC was the police force whilst the USC was an auxiliary unit tasked with patrolling, protection of vulnerable points and acting as a personnel reserve. The USC was mistrusted by Catholics, especially since it was entirely Protestants at that time. Whilst not prohibited by regulation, it was very unlikely that a Catholic would have felt able to join. The IRA had contributed heavily to this dearth of Catholic recruits by calling them "traitors" and promising to "deal with them accordingly". In 1921 they killed their first Catholic B man on 4 December in Belfast.

Catholics had protested against the USC even before the events of 1968–9. Protestants, however, generally supported the force, which had previously played an important and effective role in combating the Irish Republican Army (1922–1969) (IRA) particularly in the recent Border Campaign of 1956 to 1962.

Large scale intercommunal rioting in 1969 raised concerns over policing in Northern Ireland and the British Army was deployed to assist the police. On 28 August 1969 security in Northern Ireland, including the USC, was put under the direct control of the General Officer Commanding in Northern Ireland, General Ian Freeland.

The USC, which had no training in riot control, was mobilised to assist the RUC in dealing with disorder. A catalogue of incidents ensued such as Specials opening fire and causing the the death of a rioter in Tynan on 14 August 1969. British Prime Minister Harold Wilson declared that, "the USC being used for crowd control has caused great concern" and that they would be progressively replaced by the British Army. Whilst the Northern Ireland cabinet remained supportive of the USC, it was put to them at a London meeting on 19 August that disbanding the USC was top of the British Government's agenda.

The Hunt Report commissioned by the Government of Northern Ireland examined RUC, the USC, their respective functions and recommended "what changes are required to provide for the efficient enforcement of law and order in Northern Ireland." The report, published on 3 October 1969, recommended that the RUC "should be relieved of all duties of a military nature as soon as possible". Further; a "locally recruited part-time force, under the control of the G.O.C., Northern Ireland, should be raised"... and that it "together with the police volunteer reserve, should replace the Ulster Special Constabulary" The new force was to be "impartial in every sense" and "remove the responsibility of military style operations from the police".

The British Government accepted the findings of the Hunt Report and published a Bill and white paper on 12 November 1969 to begin the process of establishing the UDR. Parliamentary debate in Westminster highlighted concerns that members of the USC were to be allowed to join the new force. "

The Belfast Telegraph declared in editorials: The establishment of this new force should be regarded as a turning point in the life of the community."

Formation and recruitment

The Ulster Defence Regiment Act 1969 received Royal Assent on 18 December 1969 and was brought into force on 1 January 1970.

General Sir John Anderson GCB, KCB DSO (5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards) was appointed as the first Colonel Commandant. He came to be known as the "Father of the Regiment". The first regimental commander was a WW2 veteran of some distinction, Brigadier Logan Scott-Bowden CBE DSO OBE MC & Bar.

Regimental Headquarters was set up in a small bungalow behind the NAAFI shop at Thiepval Barracks, Lisburn.

Recruitment also began on 1 January. Advertisements appeared in the local press informing the Northern Ireland public that: "There's a new regiment in the army. We want you to help us form it." A coupon was provided for applicants to fill in, alternatively those interested could pick up an information leaflet and application form from their local army barracks, TA Centre, Post Office, police station or library. The front of the original application form is shown in the illustration.

A press conference was also held on 1 January and a one minute television commercial was produced which included a personal appeal by Brigadier Scott-Bowden.

Vetting was carried out by a Regular Army team of mostly retired officers from outside Northern Ireland including a Vice Admiral and a number of Major Generals. Each applicant had to provide two references and the "referees" would be interviewed by a vetting officer. Applicants were divided into three categories: those who were immediately deemed acceptable, those who were to be immediately rejected and those whose applications threw up doubt about their suitability. All applications were to be submitted to the RUC's Criminal Investigation Department and Special Branch but in practice this didn't always happen because of the initially high number of applicants.

Seven battalions were formed initially: 1st (County Antrim); 2nd (County Armagh); 3rd (County Down); 4th (County Fermanagh); 5th (County Londonderry); 6th (County Tyrone) and 7th (City of Belfast). These had the notable distinction of carrying out their first operational duties on the day they were formed, 1 April 1970. On 13 January 1970 seven "Training Majors" from the regular army reported for duty. None had served in Northern Ireland previously. Their job was to raise each battalion and have it ready for duty on 1 April. These came to be known as TISOs (training, intelligence and security officers). Each was assisted by a regular army Quartermaster, a corporal clerk, a Civil Service Clerical Officer to act as Chief Clerk and a typist.

Premises were acquired from diverse sources including wooden huts in army training centres, USC huts or whatever accommodation could be found in regular army barracks or TA Centres.

On 1 April 1970 the regiment joined the British Army's Order of Battle and became operational.

Commanding officers were initially former County Commandants from the disbanded USC but these were all men of previous military experience such as Dublin born Desmond Woods who had at one time been the youngest winner of the Military Cross serving with the Royal Ulster Rifles and Michael Torrens-Spence DSO, DSC, AFC. All were appointed Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) on a one year contract. Some of these men were past retirement age however and after their year's contract was up were replaced by Lieutenant Colonels from the regular army, the first of these being Lt Col Dion Beard of the Royal Tank Regiment (RTR) who took over as commanding officer of the 3rd (County Down) Battalion (3 UDR) on 15 February 1971. The policy of appointing regular officers was not universally popular within the regiment, with the public or with some politicians but the army persisted replacing former USC commanding officers and by the time of disbandment in the region of 400 regular army officers had served in these posts, some of whom went on to achieve General officer rank.

To recruit company and platoon officers Scott-Bowden and his subordinates were obliged to award instant commissions to people deemed suitable. The ideal candidates were sought in the USC, Reserve Forces, university Officers' Training Corps and Army Cadet Force. In various battalions officers of company and platoon rank could be found who had served in the USC, the army or territorial army, the navy, the Royal Air Force, the Royal Marines, the Indian Army and even the United States Army.

The unusual balance this created often led to situations where employer and employee roles were reversed, such as the member of the peerage whose milkman arrived late one morning and was scolded by him for his tardiness. The same evening the earl arrived late for his UDR parade and was reprimanded by his company commander - his milkman.

The appointment of Non-commissioned officers (nco's) was carried out in a variety of ways too. In most cases men were selected who had previously held non commissioned rank in any of the armed forces or the USC. In at least one case (2 UDR) they were chosen by the men themselves. In some battalions men were appointed as Lance Corporals (L/cpl) on a duty by duty basis to assess their worth. In the Newry (C) company of 3 UDR many of the recruits had formerly been soldiers in the local territorial company of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, including the company commander. It was a simple matter to appoint men who had previously been his nco's and he supplemented these with former sergeants from the USC. The filling of senior nco posts in this manner did have a drawback in that many men of comparatively young ages who had considerable years of service before retirement or promotion created a "promotion block"

By 1 April 1970, only 1,606 of the desired 4,000 men had been enlisted, and the UDR began its duties much under strength.

USC recruitment

The response from the B Specials was mixed. Some felt betrayed and resigned immediately, while others made application to join the UDR as soon as forms were available. The B-Specials had another option open to them: to join the newly formed RUC Reserve. Many did so, especially in Belfast, where during the first month of recruiting, only 36 Specials applied to join the UDR compared to a national average of 29% – 2,424, one thousand of whom were rejected, mainly on the grounds of age and fitness. Around 75% of the men of the Tyrone B Specials applied and, as a result, the 6 UDR started life as the only battalion more or less up to strength and remained so during its history. Some border counties also followed this pattern which meant that former B Specials dominated those battalions. The story was different for Belfast, Londonderry, Down and Antrim, where the figures were more balanced with a higher proportion of Catholic recruits.

By March 1970, there had been 4791 applications to join, of which 946 were from Catholics and 2424 from current or former members of the B-Specials. 2440 had been accepted, including 1423 from current or former B-Specials.

A number of former members of the B Specials felt aggrieved at the loss of their force and were not prepared to join the UDR. Some even booed and jeered passing UDR patrols. Most resistance was in County Down where the USC District adjutant actively campaigned to persuade his men not to apply.

Catholic recruitment

The Belfast Telegraph stated on 18 February 1970 that the first two soldiers reported as signing up were a 19-year-old Catholic and a 47-year-old Protestant. The regiment was intended to be nonpartisan, and it began with Catholic recruits accounting for 18% of membership. Many were ex-regular soldiers, "eager to get back into uniform" As the Troubles worsened however suspicion and disenchantment amongst Catholics grew, especially after events such as Bloody Sunday. Some units suffered from tension between Catholic recruits and former B Specials, and the Provisional IRA waged a campaign of intimidation and targeted killings against Catholic UDR soldiers. In time a combination of these factors reduced Catholic soldiers to around 3% of the Regiment's strength.

In the wake of internment there was a general outcry by nationalist politicians because only Catholics suspected as members of the IRA were arrested - no Protestants. On 18 August 1971 SDLP MP Austin Currie (whose own brother was a member of the regiment) publicly withdrew his support, and noted that for some time the IRA had been discouraging Catholics from joining but following internment more serious intimidation began to emerge.

The Belfast Telegraph reported that, as a result of IRA pressure and disillusionment with the government's attitude towards the minority community over internment, 25% of Catholics in the regiment resigned in 1971, 50% of those in the months following internment.

Senior officers attempted to halt the exodus of Catholics, allowing battalion commanders to appear on television (not usually permitted for the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in those days), Appeals were made to religious and political leaders and extra personal-security measures were introduced. Brigadier Scott-Bowden's successor in 1972 was Brigadier Denis Ormerod, a Catholic whose mother's family came from the Republic of Ireland. His second-in-command (Deputy Commander UDR), Colonel Kevin Hill, was also Catholic, as was his successor Colonel Paddy Ryan, whose father lived in Donaghadee, Co Down. It was generally felt that these appointments were to appeal to Catholics. Ormerod admitted in his memoirs that his religion and appointment as the senior Catholic Army officer in Northern Ireland helped him considerably in his rapport with religious leaders of his own faith but that these appointments created unease with Protestants leading to meetings with concerned unionist politicians including notably, Ian Paisley.

Recruitment summary

Unless the percentage of recruits from both communities reflected the demographics of Northern Ireland, it would never become the model Lord Hunt intended. Catholics continued to join the regiment, but the numbers were enough, except in 3 UDR. The 3rd (Co. Down) Battalion had the highest percentage of Catholics throughout the Troubles, beginning with 30%. Some sections were staffed entirely by Catholics which led to protests from the B Specials Association that in 3 UDR "preference for promotion and allocation of appointments was being given to Catholics". This was partially explained by the fact that the local Newry Territorial Army company of Royal Irish Fusiliers (largely Catholic) had been disbanded in 1968 and the vast majority of its members had joined the UDR en-masse.

The company commander of C Company, (Newry), 3 UDR, was the former commander of the TA unit and was pleased to see that virtually all of his TA soldiers were on parade, in the TA Centre, in exactly the same drill hall as they had previously used, for the first night of the new regiment. He noted there were some former B Specials in the room and observed they did not initially associate with the others – not on the grounds of religion but because the former TA soldiers all knew each other socially and sat together on canteen breaks whereas the B Men kept to their group of comrades, but within a week both had melded together.

Structure

Command structure

See also: List of battalions and locations of the Ulster Defence Regiment

Unlike the B Specials, who were controlled by the Stormont administration in Belfast, the UDR would be under direct command of the General Officer Commanding (GOC), HQ Northern Ireland, the commander of the British Army in Northern Ireland. Policy was decided in conjunction with a six-man committee (three Protestant and three Catholic) chaired by the Colonel Commandant. Its brief was "to advise the G.O.C. General Officer Commanding, Northern Ireland, on general policy for the administration of the Ulster Defence Regiment, in particular on recruitment policy; and on such specific matters as the G.O.C. might refer to the Council."

A working committee was set up at Army Headquarters Northern Ireland (HQNI) under the chairmanship of Major General A. J. Dyball (Royal Ulster Rifles. The team included a staff officer from the Ministry of Defence (MOD), a member of the Ministry of Home Affairs (Stormont) and Lieutenant Colonel S Miskimmon, the USC staff officer to the RUC. After discussions they advocated a strength of 6,000 men (2,000 more than the Hunt recommendations), combat dress for duties, a dark green parade uniform, county shoulder titles and a "red hand of Ulster" cap badge. The rank of "volunteer" was suggested for private soldiers. They also recommended that each battalion should have a mobile force of two platoons carrying "manpack" radio sets, transported in Land Rovers fitted for radio

After presentation to the Ministry of Defence, a Government White Paper confirmed the agreed aspects of the new force and its task as:

to support the regular forces in Northern Ireland in protecting the border and the state against armed attack and sabotage. It will fulfill this task by undertaking guard duties at key points and installations, by carrying out patrols and by establishing check points and road blocks when required to do so. In practice such tasks are most likely to prove necessary in rural areas. It is not the intention to employ the new forces on crowd control or riot duties in cities.

The force would be commanded by a regular army brigadier. Battalions were to be commanded by "local members of the force".

Battalion structure

The seven battalions initially raised, made the UDR the largest infantry regiment in the British Army, at that time. Two years later, four more battalions were added, taking the total to eleven - 8th (County Tyrone); 9th (Country Antrim); 10th (City of Belfast) and 11th (Craigavon). Until 1976 the full-time cadre were "conrate's" (so called because they had a "consolidated rate of pay") whose duties consisted of guarding UDR bases and carrying out administrative tasks. The role of the regiment was further expanded by raising full-time platoons to perform duties on a twenty-four-hour basis. The first of these was raised at 2 UDR under the command of a sergeant. By the end of the 1970s the full-time cadre had been raised to sixteen platoons, known as "Operations Platoons". These were then raised to company strength with the conrate role being phased out and full-time UDR soldiers undertaking their own guard duties and administration.

The regiment was described in 1972 as:

Organised into 11 Battalions and 59 companies: there are two battalions in Belfast and the remainder cover county or sub-county areas. Seven of the eleven Battalions are commanded by Regular Commanding Officers. In addition the Training Majors, Quartermaster, Regimental Sergeant Majors, Chief Clerks, and Signaller NCOs are also Regulars. There are a number of 'conrate' (full-time UDR) posts in each unit, including Adjutants, Permanent Staff Instructors, Security Guards, etc. Many of the officer and senior rank conrates are ex-Regulars. The remainder are part-timers. Their main tasks are guarding key points, patrolling, and surveillance, and manning Vehicle Check Points. They do not operate in the 'hard' areas of Belfast, and are not permitted to become involved in crowd confrontations anywhere. Men are armed with self-loading rifles or sub-machine guns. The current strength of the Regiment is 7910.

The full-time element eventually increased to more than half the total personnel.

By 1990, the regiment's numbers stood at 3,000 part-time and 3,000 full-time soldiers, with 140 attached regular army personnel in key command and training positions. The standard of training of the permanent cadre made them suitable to be used in much the same way as regular soldiers and it was not uncommon for regular army units to then come under local command and control of a UDR Battalion Headquarters.

For each battalion there was a minimum requirement of:

• 1 Lt Col
• 6 Majors
• 7 Captains
• 25 Lieutenants
• 1 RSM
• 7 Warrant Officers 2nd Class (WO2)
• 25 Sergeants
• 25 Corporals
• 25 Lance Corporals

Battalion dispersals

The dispersal of UDR soldiers into their areas of responsibility was through sub-barracks holding platoons or companies. Battalion Headquarters would usually be located in the county town but not always as some counties had two Battalions). Guarded by permanent cadre soldiers these barracks would become doubly active after 6 p.m. as part-time soldiers arrived for evening duties. After Ulsterisation began in 1976 many battalion headquarters had full-sized permanent cadre companies and these would maintain a 24 hour presence in the Battalion's "Tactical Area of Responsibility" (TAOR). In each battalion area, sub headquarter units would maintain direct contact with their own patrols and Battalion HQ by radio. In some cases the radios were operated by Greenfinches (female soldiers) whose husbands or sons were out on patrol. This led to tense moments when mobile units or foot patrols came under attack and submitted a "contact report" (contact with the enemy) by radio.

An example of this structure can be seen in the make-up of 2 UDR based at Drummad Barracks in Armagh:

Personal accommodation

UDR soldiers lived in their own civilian homes, (except for attached personnel who were given "quarters".

Many lived in Protestant or Catholic enclaves which put them within easy reach of local paramilitary or community groups. The years 1972–73 saw paramilitary threats from loyalist and republican sources. Of the 288 incidents of intimidation reported, all but twelve were from Protestants who had been threatened from within their own community. Sometimes this was to gain information or to persuade soldiers to join (or remain within) loyalist organisations. The intimidation included: threatening letters and phone calls, abduction, shots fired from passing cars and off-duty soldiers being assaulted.

In the early days some even lived in what would later become known as "hard line areas" such as Private Sean Russell of 7 UDR who lived in the New Barnsley Estate in Belfast. This led to many UDR soldiers becoming targets for various paramilitary groups whilst off duty and indeed Sean Russell was subsequently targeted and killed whilst at home.

Uniform, armament & equipment

Uniform

The early image of the regiment, due to equipment and uniform shortages, was of a rag-tag bunch using World War II weaponry, old army uniforms and carrying pockets full of loose change in order to make reports from public telephone boxes. Many of the soldiers were veterans of earlier campaigns with the British Army or had been in the Special Constabulary and were middle-aged; this earned them the public nickname of "Dad's Army" after the sobriquet given to the Home Guard during World War II.

As the regiment matured, on operational duty male members of the regiment dressed in a similar fashion to regular army units. Camouflage jackets were worn and headgear was a distinctive green beret with a gold coloured "Maid of Erin" style harp, surmounted by St Edward's Crown crown (in later years this was dulled down by blackening), a common practice for units of the British army when wearing cap badges on operational duties. Female "Greenfinch" members wore rifle green skirts and combat jackets with the UDR beret and cap badge. For ceremonial occasions the men wore the standard British Army No.2 Dress uniform (Service Dress). The female "best dress" was a rifle green jacket and skirt. The beret was retained as headgear. The badge was a direct copy of the Royal Ulster Rifles cap badge with the motto removed from its base. On the formation of Operations Platoons, narrow coloured slides were adopted and worn on the shoulder straps in battalion colours. These indicated to the trained eye that the wearers were full-time soldiers. They were dispensed with as the Operations Platoons expanded into full-time rifle companies. Rank badges were identical to those for infantry NCOs and officers and worn in the same fashion.

Armaments

Initially the only weapons issued were of WW2 vintage such as the Enfield rifle and Sten sub machine gun. In early 1972 the rifles were replaced with the standard issue L1A1 Self-Loading Rifle (SLR). Other weaponry was available; the 9 mm Browning pistol (Browning 9mm), the Sterling sub machine gun (SMG), the L4A4 Light Machine Gun (LMG) and the L7A2 General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG). Small stocks of the Federal Riot Gun (FRG) were kept and used to fire plastic bullets to knock down doors and other obstacles during search operations. A number of Carl Gustav (Charlie G) 84 mm grenade launchers were stocked but rarely deployed as the weapon was unsuited to most operations. (see Boat Sections below). SLRs were replaced in 1988 by the SA80 and at the same time machine guns were superseded by the Light Support Weapon.

For personal protection off duty, some soldiers were issued with a Walther PPK. Major Ken Maginnis acquired permission for some to purchase Browning 9mm pistols at £200 each. These were deemed to be more effective. In the late 1980s PPKs were replaced by the Walther P5, which was considered a more practical weapon because of its size and ballistic capabilities. Where a soldier was considered to be at particularly high risk he would be permitted to hold his rifle at home in addition to a personal protection handgun. This policy was known as "weapons out" and was reduced by 75%, due to the high number of rifles stolen by paramilitaries, when SLRs replaced Lee Enfields in 1972.

The weapons out policy was eventually discontinued on the introduction of the SA80 rifle.

• No4 Lee Enfield Rifle.
• L1A1 Self Loading Rifle.
• SA-80 L85A1 rifle.
• Sterling submachine gun
• Carl Gustav anti-tank weapon used by UDR boat sections]]

Transport

The standard patrol vehicle was the 3/4 ton Land Rover used extensively throughout the British armed forces. Following withdrawal from police service a number of Shorland armoured cars were allocated to the regiment. Rarely used after initial service because the turret weapon was a GPMG and deemed unsuitable for urban use due to its rapid rate of fire. The Shorland was not generally popular due to its instability on the road due to the heavy turret but some battalions continued to use them into the 1980s in high risk area because of the increased protection plate armour gave over Makrolon polycarbonate armour fitted to Land Rovers. The tough Shorlands saved the lifes of a number of people on patrol. Three-ton and four-ton Bedford trucks were used for large troop movements. A range of unmarked civilian cars and vans was used for staff, administration and covert activities.

Units were sometimes deployed by helicopters supplied by either the Royal Air Force or Army Air Corps for rapid insertion or for duties in areas of greatest threat where it was unwise to use "green transport" (wheeled).

Communications

At first there were not enough radios to issue to each patrol and those available were of the PYE "Bantam" type used by the police, which did not have sufficient range. As a result UDR patrols were issued with pockets of small change to use in telephone boxes in order to effectively report back to base. When radios were issued they were of the type used by the regular army such as Larkspur A41 manpacks, B47 and C42 vehicle mounted sets. Over time these were replaced with Stornophones as vehicle sets with preselected frequencies which operated on the NINET rebroadcast system, working through masts strategically placed on various high points throughout Northern Ireland such as Slieve Croob. Pyephones continued to be used for foot patrols but the range of these sets gradually improved. Each battalion was able to communicate with other battalions using C42's and B47's installed in the battalion or company Operations room (Ops Room) or Communications Centre (Comcen) as well as the BID 150system of cryptic coding and scrambler telephone system.

Equipment

Fast boats

Several battalions were supplied with rigid Dory craft for patrolling waterways shared with the Republic of Ireland in an attempt to prevent gun running across these narrow channels (such as Carlingford Lough). Assisted by land based Decca Marine radar, these fast boats were armed with General Purpose Machine Guns and carried a Carl Gustav 84mm anti tank weapon in addition to the rifles and sub-machine guns normally carried by soldiers. After a report submitted by 3 UDR in 1972 HQ Northern Ireland requested a navy patrol vessel to be permanently stationed in the centre of Carlingford Lough to assist with suppression of gun-running. This suggestion was adopted and to the end of the security situation a small warship was on station off the coast off the Warrenpoint/Rostrevor shoreline. This intervention was called Operation Grenada. Gun-running across these coastal estuaries ceased as a result. The 4th Battalion also carried out waterway patrols on upper and lower Lough Erne.

Dogs

Search dogs were originally provided by the regular army but eventually a UDR dog section was formed to provide more immediate assistance in search operations. One of the dog handlers, Corporal Brian David Brown of 3 UDR together with his Labrador dog Oliver was killed in Kilkeel by an IRA bomb in 1986 Cpl Brown was posthumously awarded the Queen's Gallantry Medal.

Information cards

All members of the British Armed Forces, including the UDR, carried a number of small information cards to assist in the execution of their duties in Northern Ireland. These were generally referred to by their colour.

The Yellow Card was a list of the rules for opening fire.

The Blue Card was a detailed explanation of how arrests were to be made.

The White Card was to be given to next of kin or other appropriate person in the event of an arrest of a suspect.

The Green Card carried instructions on how to deal with accidental cross-border incursion into the Irish Republic and subsequent arrest by Irish security forces.

The Red Card contained instructions on how to summon helicopter support and the drills for entering and leaving helicopters.

The Yellow Card was seen as particularly important and all soldiers were taught to be entirely familiar with its content as it contained specific instructions to be followed when opening fire on a suspected enemy. Requiring, "total understanding and instantaneous recall of the provisions...." Warnings were to be issued to allow suspects to surrender. Soldiers could only shoot without warning "if there is no other way to protect themselves or those whom it is their duty to protect from the danger of being killed or seriously injured."

The card was amended in 1980 to carry the words. "Firearms must only be used as a last resort"

Personnel

Training

25% of the new recruits in 1970 had no previous military or special constabulary experience. Training was done by a team of regular soldiers attached to each unit headed up by a Training Major, assisted by former instructors from the armed forces who were recruits themselves.

The annual training commitment for each soldier was twelve days and twelve, two-hour training periods. Part of which included attendance at annual training camp. As an incentive, any soldier who fulfilled his training was given an annual bounty of £25-£35, later increased to £150 for the first year, £250 for the second and £350 for the third and subsequent years. Training days also attracted pay but this was on a lesser scale than that given for an operational duty.

As with all military recruits, training started with an introduction to basic battle skills and the book of the same name, which, where possible, was issued to each individual soldier. Instruction was also given on the Army marksmanship pamphlet Shoot to Kill.

Part-time (and later, permanent cadre) soldiers were required to attend an annual camp for a seven-day period. Camps were located at:

Rates of pay

Rank

For each battalion there was a minimum requirement of:

Operational role

Although an integral part of the British Army the UDR's duties did not require it to be called upon to serve outside Northern Ireland. This type of engagement was subsequently referred to as "Home Service" and was similar to the model adopted by the short lived Home Service Force raised in the UK in 1982.

The primary function of the regiment was to assist the Royal Ulster Constabulary by "guarding key points and installations, to carry out patrols and to establish check points and road blocks against armed guerrilla-type attacks". Patrols and vehicle checkpoints on public roads were designed to hinder the activities of paramilitary groups and to reassure the law-abiding general public.

As the force was initially part-time the presence of its soldiers was mostly felt during evenings and weekends. It was expected to answer to general call-outs, and was mobilised on a permanent basis on several occasions such as Operation Motorman to provide assistance to the police and army.

As the regiment acquired more full-time soldiers it assumed duties previously assigned to the police or Army in support of Operation Banner. By 1980, the full-time element had matched the numbers of part-timers and the regiment's role had expanded to include tactical responsibility for 85% of Northern Ireland supporting the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

Ulsterisation

Ulsterisation was the British Government's policy to reduce regular Army troop numbers in Northern Ireland and bring local forces into the front line. This was as a result of international opinion about British soldiers being used in what many viewed as a colonial occupation. It was also called normalisation, and police primacy. The term "Ulsterisation" was coined by the media. The then Assistant Chief Constable of the RUC, Jack Hermon, summed it up when he said, "Ulstermen need to learn to live together and be policed by Ulstermen. If they have to kill, let them kill each other, not English soldiers."

One major change was the return of internal security control to the Royal Ulster Constabulary, which had been under the command of the Army since the Scarman and Hunt reports—which called for restructuring the severely undermanned force in 1969. A report commissioned in 1976 recommended:

• An increase in the establishment of the RUC and RUC Reserve
• Creation of RUC "mobile support units"
• An increase in the conrate establishment of the UDR so it could take over from the regular Army
• A 24-hour military presence by the UDR

Despite the rapid induction of 300 extra recruits to the UDR and the raising of "Operations Platoons", the scheme was hampered by the shortfall of conrate officers in the UDR who could take on the role of operations officers. It also placed heavier demands upon senior NCO "watchkeepers" in the operations rooms, or and communication centres (comcens).

Women's UDR (Greenfinches)

In the early days of the regiment female members of the Royal Military Police accompanied patrols when available to enable female suspects to be searched. There were never enough of these RMP searchers so in 1973 an act was passed in Parliament to recruit women into the regiment. On 16 August 1973 a regular army officer from the Women's Royal Army Corps, Major Eileen Tye, took up the post of "Commander Women" at HQUDR. By September 352 women had been enrolled and the first enlistments were carried out at 2 UDR's HQ in Armagh on the 16th. This use of women as an integrated part of the regiment preceded similar usage in the regular army by 20 years, and paved the way for the disbandment of the Women's Royal Army Corps in 1992.

The only available clothing was mostly ATS surplus from WWII. Many women were unhappy with the semi-formal skirts and knee length boots they had to wear in all weathers. Eventually the regulations were relaxed and by the time of the merger women were wearing full combat uniform. The women soldiers also wore a silk cravat in their battalion colour.

WO2 Brooker from the WRAC was assigned to train the women in a one week course consisting of drill, army organisation, map reading, searching of women and vehicles, radio procedure and basic first aid.

The first recruits were largely from the executive and professional classes. Some were wives of serving UDR soldiers and others were married to soldiers on long-term (accompanied) posting to Northern Ireland.

The country and border battalions welcomed the use of women as essential in the searching of women suspects but the city based battalions were slower to see the advantages and to some extent resented the presence of women soldiers. In the short-term all came to appreciate the value of having females with patrols. Through time the role of women was expanded as it was realised that their higher pitched voices were more suited to radio transmission than men. Tasked to relieve RMP women at the Belfast city centre segment gates they soon learned how to accept abuse from the public and how to avoid traps that could be set for them while they searched other women; i.e., razor blades placed in pockets. Women had fewer problems with the male public who seemed more amenable when questioned by a female.

Some women were trained in the use of "Sea Watch" radar to assist seaborne patrols in those battalions with fast boats.

Initially a part-time female officer was appointed in each battalion to supervise the women soldiers but through time the women came under command of the Officer Commanding (OC) of the company they were assigned to. In later years some women became battalion adjutants or company commanders and a few were attached to brigade staffs throughout Northern Ireland.

Accommodation for changing and toilet facilities was another problem faced early on and it took several years for the all male environments of UDR bases to adapt to suit female needs.

The name Greenfinch applied to the women's UDR comes from the system of radio "appointment titles" (codewords) used by the army to identify certain people or branches of the service. Male soldiers in the regiment were identified as "Greentop" and women were given the codeword "Greenfinch" with female commaders being referred to as "Goldfinch". This became their working nickname. It is still applied today to women in the Royal Irish Regiment.

The recruitment of women soldiers peaked in 1986 with 286 permanent cadre and 530 part timers but the establishment never dropped below 700 from 1978 onwards.

Women's operational role

Women soldiers were used to deny terrorists the use of women in paramilitary activities. On patrol they were used to search women and adolescents for explosives, weapons, ammunition and documents, as well as driving patrol vehicles, operating radios and acting as interviewers.

The use of females in barracks included, clerical, catering and storekeeping duties in addition to staffing "Operations Rooms" and "Intelligence Cells", released male soldiers for operational duties.

Training

Women soldiers were required to maintain annual skills tests to qualify for grades and pay increments. If these tests were not passed the soldier concerned would be downgraded and suffer a drop in wages. The Greenfinches received regular "role specific" training which included: person and vehicle searching, map reading, first aid, signals, personal security and terrorist recognition; as well as Regimental History, military etiquette, rank structure and dress regulations. They also received fitness training and were advised to maintain a high degree of fitness.

Although not armed on duty all Greenfinches were trained to fire a full range of weapons and later were taught how to make a weapon "safe" as part of the training on dealing with casualties. HQUDR also ran a .22 shooting competition.

Some female soldiers were permitted to be issued (or purchased) personal protection pistols (PPW's) if they were considered to be at high risk.

Pregnancy, marriage and pay

The issues that affected other servicewomen also affected UDR Greenfinches—rules regarding pregnancy, marriage, and pay. To join, married women were required to submit written permission from their husbands and those with children were obliged to sign a declaration confirming childcare arrangements.

The Ministry of Defence regulations concerning all women soldiers meant that Greenfinches would be discharged from the regiment in the fourth month of pregnancy. If they returned to their unit after maternity leave they were required to retake the basic recruits course. Their previous service did not count towards medal entitlement or promotion.

Some sympathetic battalion commanders avoided putting their female soldiers through this rigmarole if they became pregnant by sending them on extended, long term, leave but keeping them "on strength".

The European Court ruled against the Ministry of Defence with regards to this in 1990 and awarded compensation to 78 former Women's UDR soldiers totaling £370,000. As a result of this regulations changed and all British servicewomen were subsequently allowed 48 weeks unpaid maternity leave, after which they could return to duty.

A study in 1988 showed that half the women serving were married and 42% were mothers, two thirds of which were infants or of school age.

Women casualties

Four Greenfinches were killed as a result of their service with the regiment between 1974 and 1992. The first of these was Private Eva Martin, age 28, fatally wounded by rocket fragments on 3 May 1974 during a PIRA attack on 6 UDR's outlying base at the Deanery, Clogher. She was not only the first Greenfinch to be killed in action but also the first female member of the security forces to die in the Troubles.

Opposition forces

During the concept stages of the UDR the major armed threat to the state was the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Following a split in this organisation the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was formed in December 1969, just days before recruiting was to begin for the regiment.

The "armed struggle" campaign pursued by PIRA became and remained the major priority for anti-terrorist action by the UDR. Threats to life and property also existed from other extremist organisations. The Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA) (the remnants of the "old IRA") continued to commit acts of violence as did the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), another offshoot from the "old IRA". Threats to the public peace also came from loyalist organisations such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) which used the nom de guerre Ulster Freedom Fighters when committing atrocities, and a selection of other organisations who emerged during the Troubles.

As the PIRA campaign continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s, it and other organisation increasingly targeted Ulster Defence Regiment personnel as well as other members of the forces of law and order. Provisioanl IRA veteran Tommy McKearney made a summation suggesting: "Very bitter criticism of the British state in Ireland, that it has used locals to police the situation."

The preferred methods of attack were sniping, IEDs and other tactics traditionally used by guerilla armies when facing an enemy with superior forces. There were however open actions between the regiment and the IRA, which varied in style and tactics between the urban setting of Belfast and rural areas.

There were few military style frontal attacks on UDR establishments, but some did occur. Notably, on 2 May 1974, up to forty IRA men attacked the isolated Deanery at Clogher, which a company from 6 UDR was using as a base. A sustained attack lasted for approximately twenty minutes, during which the base was hit by rockets, mortars, and small-arms fire. Private Eva Martin was fatally wounded during this attack, the first female UDR solider to be killed by enemy action.

The IRA developed home-made mortars. Referred to colloquially as barrack-busters. These were normally fixed to the back of a commercial vehicle such as a builder's lorry. The vehicle would be parked in a position near a barracks and the devices fired by timing device or remote controlled detonator sending missiles made from gas cylinders into the barracks compound. The largest of these devices used was twelve tubes fired at once at 3 UDR's Kilkeel base "The Abbey" in 1992. UDR bases were also attacked by other means such as the Glenanne barracks bombing which utilised a truck bomb leading to the deaths of three soldiers and the total destruction of the border outpost which housed two companies of the 2nd Battalion.

Mortars such as the Mk12 device could also be fired horizontally. The first recorded use of this weapon was against a mobile patrol from the 2nd Battalion on 1 March 1991. Two soldiers died as a result of the attack. The funeral of one, Private Paul Sutcliffe, an Englishman, was held in Barrowford, Lancashire - the only UDR funeral to be held outside Northern Ireland. The second casualty, Private Roger Love, from Portadown died after three days. His kidneys were donated to the NHS.

Because the UDR did not live in barracks like the soldiers of conventional regiments but lived at home - in many cases with families, they were more vulnerable to attack when off-duty. A number of UDR personnel applied for and were issued with personal weapons. Some of these were stolen without resistance from members homes. The part-time cadre tended to be most at risk as they had day jobs that often took them to unsafe areas. Most UDR soldiers killed in the Troubles were attacked off duty.

Commanders of the UDR

• Brigadier Logan Scott-Bowden CBE DSO MC and Bar (first Commander UDR)* (1970–1971)
• Brigadier Denis Ormerod CBE (First Roman Catholic Commander) (1971–1973)
• Brigadier Harry Baxter CBE GM (First Irish Commander – Kilkenny born, also 2nd Colonel Commandant) (1973–1976)
• Brigadier Mervyn McCord (1976–1978)
• Brigadier David Millar OBE (joint author of "The Way ahead" Ulsterisation document) (1978–1980)
• Brigadier Pat Hargrave (1980–1982)
• Lieutenant General Sir Peter Graham (1982–1984)
• Brigadier Roger Preston (1984–1986)
• Brigadier Michael Bray CBE (author of the Bray Reforms) (1986–1988)
• Brigadier Charles Ritchie (1988–1990)
• Brigadier Angus Ramsay (1990–1992)

Colonels Commandant

• General Sir John Anderson GCB, KCB DSO (1969–1977) (5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards) (1st Colonel Commandant)
• Brigadier Harry Baxter CBE GM (1977–1986)
• General Sir David Young (1986–1991)
• General Sir Charles Huxtable (1991–1992)

Regimental Colonel

Colonel Sir Dennis Faulkner CBE

Notable personnel

• Category:Ulster Defence Regiment soldiers
• Category:Ulster Defence Regiment officers

Casualties

Because the UDR did not live in barracks like the soldiers of conventional regiments but lived at home - in many cases with families, they were more vulnerable to attack when off-duty. A number of UDR personnel applied for and were issued with personal weapons. Some of these were stolen without resistance from members homes. The part-time cadre tended to be most at risk as they had day jobs that often took them to unsafe areas. Most UDR soldiers killed in the Troubles were attacked off duty.

The men, and women, of the Regiment were not safe anywhere, nor at any time: more personnel were murdered while off duty, either at home or in the course of their civilian employment, than lost their lives in uniform. Even those who had left the Regiment did not always find safety; forty-seven former soldiers have been murdered after ceasing to be UDR personnel. Others, especially in the Fermanagh border area, were forced to move to safer areas and had to sell their homes and, sometimes, their land as a result of imminent terrorist threat.

Between 1 April 1970 and 30 June 1992, a total of 197 soldiers were killed as active servicemen. Another 61 members were killed after they had left the UDR. Three members of the UVF and one of the UDA killed during the conflict were also soldiers of the regiment at the time of their deaths.

Two UDR soldiers were killed by the regular army, three by loyalist paramilitaries, and the remaining 192 by republican paramilitaries (mainly the Provisional IRA). Four Greenfinches were killed during the Troubles, Private Eva Martin, L/Cpl Jean Leggett, Cpl Heather Kerrigan and Pte Margaret A. Hearst.

During this time members of the UDR were responsible for the killing of six civilians and two members of the IRA.

The first UDR soldier to be killed was Private Winston Donnell, aged 22, from the Strabane Company of 6 UDR. Killed in action on 9 August 1971 at a vehicle checkpoint (as part of the internment call-out) close to the Clady Bridge border crossing.

The first serving Catholic to be killed was 32-year-old part-time Private Sean Russell of 7 UDR, who was shot dead on 8 December 1971, in front of his wife and children, by members of the Irish Republican Army who burst into his home in the predominantly Catholic area of New Barnsley, Belfast. The last was part-time Private William Megrath of 11 UDR who was shot dead in July 1987 as he drove through the Twinbrook area of west Belfast on his way home from his civilian job.

Attitudes to subversive elements within the regiment

Members of subversive, extremist groupings managed to join the UDR despite the vetting process. Their purpose in doing so was to obtain weapons, training and intelligence. Several stolen weapons were used in the commission of sectarian outrages or robberies.

The UDR did not want these people. The vetting procedures were carried out jointly by Army Intelligence and the RUC's Special Branch and if no intelligence was found to suggest unsuitability individuals were passed for recruitment and would remain as soldiers until such times as the commanding officer was provided with intelligence to remove soldiers with paramilitary links or sympathies.

When the regiment was formed the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) did not exist - arriving in September 1971. Dual membership was initially acceptable to the military authorities as the UDA was not seen as a threat to the state. This changed when on 29 November 1972, the GOCNI, on instructions from Westminster, announced that dual membership of UDR and paramilitary organisations would not be tolerated and began a purge which saw 171 members with links to the UDA discharged by the end of 1975. Lt Col Dion Beard (1RTR) commander of 3 UDR issued a battalion order:

I will not tolerate any active participation by members of this battalion in any organisation which encourages violence... you cannot play in both teams. Either you believe in law and order applied equally to all men, or you believe in violence as a means of achieving political ends. In this respect the UDA is no better than IRA. Not only should you take no part in UDA activities but you should discourage your fellow citizens .

During the regiment's 22 year existence loyalist raids were mounted against 3 UDR, 5 UDR, 7 UDR, 10 UDR, and 11 UDR. Subsequent to a raid against 11 UDR's "C" (Lurgan) company, the guard commander Sgt Billy Hanna MM was convicted of supplying information to loyalist paramilitaries. Most weapons were recovered in follow up operations by the security forces (including the UDR) but some missing weapons were later proven to have been used by loyalist organisations to carry out crime, including sectarian murders. Most of the stolen weapons were taken by loyalist organisations, but a number of soldiers were killed by members of the IRA who attacked their homes to steal rifles.

Two soldiers from the 11th Battalion's "C "Company in Lurgan, (also UVF members), were convicted of the 1975 killing of three musicians from the Irish showband, the Miami in a sectarian attack, led by Robin Jackson, a former UDR soldier who had been discharged for "undisclosed reasons". Two members of 11 UDR's "E" (Portadown) company (also UVF men), died in the premature explosion of the bomb they planted in the group's minibus.

See: Miami Showband killings.

In 1999 David Jordan, a former UDR soldier, allegedly broke down in a bar and admitted to being part of a patrol that killed nationalist councillor Patsy Kelly in 1974.

In 1989, twenty-eight UDR soldiers were arrested as part of The Stephens Inquiry into alleged collusion with loyalist paramilitaries. Twenty-six belonged to the same company of 7/10 UDR. Six were later awarded damages. One was charged with activities linked to loyalist paramilitaries. The Stephens team caused "intense anger" as three hundred police had been used to surround the homes of suspects. This had identified the men as UDR soldiers to their neighbours, potentially putting their lives at risk. Eleven soldiers moved house as a result and the homes of eighteen others were provided with "additional security measures" at a cost of £25,000.

At the start of June 1987 Three attacks were made against soldiers of the same company of 7/10 including Private Joe Tracey who had been shot dead as he started a new job on apartments off the Lisburn Road, Belfast. The Belfast Newsletter reported that 7/10 UDR had been infiltrated by the IRA. The commanding officer accepted that someone must have informed on him but denied that the IRA had been able to penetrate the battalion calling the allegation a "wild rumour".

Another incident involved William Bogle of 6 UDR who was ambushed and killed on 5 December 1972 at Killeter near the Tyrone/Donegal border. Killed by a former member of his own company "possessed of strong Republican views" who moved across the border after the killing and is not known to have returned to Northern Ireland.

• The Bray reforms

Brigadier Michael Bray adopted a zero-tolerance policy for any activity related to loyalism from the beginning of his tenure as Commander UDR. He instituted a number of safeguards including monitoring of entire battalions and six-month security reviews of all UDR personnel. An out of bounds list was produced which included pubs and clubs known to be frequented by loyalist paramilitaries. Members of the regiment were cautioned as to whom they should socialise with. All of this was a concerted effort to remove anyone with dual membership from the regiment and to prevent peer pressure being applied.

• The Stevens Enquiry

The Stevens Report resulted in a tightening of control on even the most low-rated intelligence documents and heightened accountability. For the first time the RUC were given access to UDR vetting procedures and many members of the regiment found themselves under police observation for extended periods of time, in some cases resulting in the discharge of soldiers. Stevens agreed that there had been collusion between a small number of UDR soldiers who had "gravely abused their positions of trust" but that the issue was not "widespread or institutionalised".

The 1973 "Subversion in the UDR" report

A draft document, entitled Subversion in the UDR, was amongst documents released in 2005 and discovered in the Public Record Office. Some of its content appeared in The Irish News on 2 and 3 May 2006. Believed to have been prepared by British military intelligence in August 1973, it examines the issue of overlapping membership between the UDR and subversive organisations in the first three years of recruiting.

Subversion was considered to be a "strong support for, or membership of, organisations whose aims are incompatible with those of the UDR" and attempts by soldiers to use their "UDR knowledge, skills, or equipment to further the aims of such organisations." It speculated that "perhaps" 5–15% of UDR soldiers were, or had been, directly linked to "Protestant extremist groups". That the "best single source of weapons, and the only significant source of modern weapons, for these groups was the UDR" and that the British Government knew UDR weapons were being used by loyalist paramilitaries, including the killing of a Roman Catholic civilian and other attacks.

The report illustrated how over 200 UDR weapons were lost or stolen by the end of 1972. The rate of loss had decreased to 56 by 1973 when the report was written. This was suggested to be partially due to increased security and also that "the reduced credibility of Protestant extremist groups in the eyes of the majority community, has made the subversion of UDR members more difficult." During 1973 the most successful Protestant extremist arms raids took place at the Department of Industrial and Forensic Science, and at firearms dealers in Belfast, Newtownards and Armagh, rather than on UDR locations.

The report suggested there was no substantial threat of subversion from republican extremists in the regiment as the number of Catholics had decreased to under 4%. There were isolated incidents where Catholic UDR soldiers 'lost' weapons in suspicious circumstances, but "neither the number of weapons nor the threat is thought to be great".

The report concluded that: Except in limited circumstances subversion in the UDR has not compromised its ability to carry out its duties.

Convictions against UDR soldiers

18 UDR members were convicted of murder and 11 for manslaughter. Between 1970 and 1985, 99 were convicted of assault, and others were convicted of armed robbery, weapons offences, bombing, intimidation and attacks on Catholics, kidnapping, and membership of the UVF. Only a small fraction of the 40,000 men and women who served with the regiment were involved in such criminal activities, but the proportion was higher than for the regular British Army or RUC.

Political comment

The Ulster Defence Regiment commanded "uncritically fierce" support from the Protestants of Northern Ireland but never gained the "full confidence" of Roman Catholics. This can be partially explained by the failure to attract and retain enough Roman Catholics but it does not entirely explain why political opinions are so diverse. It is however clear that opponents exploited events to discredit the regiment.

Initially constitutional Nationalist political parties encouraged Catholics to join. The first notable change to this attitude was through the decision by the Parliament of Northern Ireland to introduce internment. None of the original detainees were Protestant which led Catholics to believe that internment was a measure directed entirely against their community. For the UDR this meant an increase in Republican propaganda against the regiment

Following this was the Ballymurphy Massacre and Bloody Sunday in January 1972.

Following internment support for Catholics in the regiment decreased substantially whilst intimidation of Catholic members grew from withing their own communities. In 1971 25% of Catholic soldiers resigned. During 1972 another 108 resigned.

The SDLP's Ivan Cooper said in a 1972 statement that the regiment "should be disbanded". The Alliance Party's chairman Oliver Napier expressed concern about "undesirables" in the regiment in a statement in November 1972.

The Social Democratic and Labour Party called for the disbandment of the regiment as early as 1974 through the media and by applying pressure through the Irish government and became the major conduit for complaints against the UDR from Catholics. The SDLP remained opposed to the regiment and continually called for its disbandment "due to the failure of the GOC to address the issue of Catholic recruiting and the regimental image". Although no official support was evident from the party leaderships various members (for example Seamus Mallon), condemned the killing of UDR soldiers and attended funerals, such as in the case of James Cochrane, a Catholic soldier from 3 UDR in Downpatrick who was killed in a culvert bomb attack on 6 January 1980.

In the wake of the Hillsborough Agreement the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) began a campaign with the apparent motive of reducing morale in the regiment and causing mass resignations by "undermining the confidence of soldiers in their officers". During this period Ian Paisley announced to the press that soldiers in Ballymena had been requested to report to barracks to be disarmed prior to the part-time cadre being disbanded. The DUP press office claimed that the use of English officers and senior NCOs was "London and Dublin insisting the UDR could not be trusted". and Peter Robinson, the deputy DUP Leader, advised soldiers not to co-operate with policemen who were attached to their patrols as they were there on the "directions of the Anglo-Irish Council".

Non-constitutional politics

Those political groups which supported violence were referred to as "non-constitutional". Chief amongst them was Provisional Sinn Fein (now referred to as "Sinn Fein") - the political arm of the Provisional IRA. Their monthly newspaper "An Phoblacht" carried what they called news "highlighting what it saw as naked state oppression". In their editorials they referred to the UDR as, "not Dad’s Army but a sectarian militia". To help emphasis their message they produced posters which supporters pasted over walls in Republican areas such as "The Loyalist Murderers" and "Blood Money," referring to the redundancy payments received by former UDR soldiers still serving with the Royal Irish Regiment at the end of Operation Banner (The official army title for operations in Northern Ireland).

An Phoblacht insisted that the UDR had secret "death squads" sponsored by United Kingdom Special Forces and that the UDR (in collusion with British Intelligence) were behind the Dublin and Monaghan bombings.

In an ironic twist of fate when Gerry Adams (the Sinn Fein president) was wounded in an assassination attempt by three members of the UFF it was an off duty full-time Non-commissioned officer of 10 UDR who gave chase to their car and arrested them, assisted by an off duty policeman. Unsurprisingly this fact is not noted in Adams' Sinn Fein biography but remarkably the BBC insist the assailants were arrested by "plain clothes policemen". In fact the UDR NCO received the Queen's Gallantry Medal for arresting the shootists. In the long term however the soldier was intimidated out of his home and the UDR as a direct result of these arrests.

This action by an off duty soldier did not soften the opinion of Sinn Fein. Their newspaper continued to issue propaganda on the UDR, even after it was amalgamated, continuing to to refer to it as "The Murder Regiment".

Music

Each battalion had a number of pipers who also participated in a centralised pipe band formally called the Pipes & Drums of the Ulster Defence Regiment. Its uniform followed the traditional military dress for Irish pipers, consisting of a saffron kilt, bottle-green "Prince Charlie" jacket, bottle-green cape and bottle-green caubeen adorned with a double-size cap badge. Unlike other Irish regiments in the British Army, UDR pipers did not wear a hackle and the lining colour of the cloaks was unique to the regiment.

In June 1986, the regiment held its only tattoo for two days in good weather at Ravenhill rugby ground, Belfast. Some of the attractions for the 12,000 people who attended were:

• the Red Devils parachute team;
• Greenfinches abseiling from the top of one of the grandstands;
• UDR dogs;
• a mock ambush;
• beating the retreat with the Pipes & Drums of the UDR plus the bands of the Duke of Edinburgh's Royal Regiment and the RUC.

The crowd is reported to have created a "deeply moving" moment by humming the evening hymn "The Day Thou Givest".

Only one UDR Pipes & Drums recording was publicly released: the 5 UDR Pipes & Drums "Irish & Scottish Pipe Music", which includes recordings of the regimental and battalions marches as well as other popular tunes.

Options for Change and amalgamation

After the fall of the Berlin Wall the United Kingdom began to reduce the size of its armed forced under the working title of Options for Change. The strength of the army was to be reduced from 160,000 to 110,000; the infantry to reduce from 55 battalions to 38. The GOC saw this as a perfect opportunity to streamline the UDR and also remove some of the more "intractable problems" with regards to image and career prospects. In a revolutionary plan he decided to merge the UDR with the Royal Irish Rangers; in the opinion of one author for the first time in history incorporating part-time soldiers into the regular army. The hope among the top brass in British Army was that the process of amalgamation with the Rangers, coupled with the change of name, would be a fresh start for what he says was a "discredited UDR". The Rangers recruited from the South of Ireland, many Catholic, and this would aid the process.

"Project Infancy" would also ensure that the Royal Irish Rangers did not lose their training facilities and presence in Northern Ireland as the last Irish infantry battalion of "the line". The UDR, which was not regular "line" infantry was, in the words of one commander, "like a fish without feathers". Incorporation as infantry of the line might provide UDR officers with career prospects which mirrored those of the regular army and hopefully resolve the problem of recruiting junior officers. To the GOC the prospect of having a larger number of Catholic officers and NCO's in the UDR would dampen much of the political furore surrounding the regiment.

The plan was approved by early summer 1991 and proposed:

• The 2 battalions of the Royal Irish Rangers would amalgamate to create a single "General Service" battalion.
• The existing nine UDR battalions would be reduced to seven and designated "Home Service".
• The part-time element would remain in the Home Service element but the new structure provided for general reduction when the time was right.
• The new regiment would be called the Royal Irish Regiment, reusing a name which had been lost as part of the disbandment of many famous Irish infantry regiments on partition in 1922.

In return the UDR would receive:

• A "royal title".
• A direct line of succession through the regimental name to the Battle of the Boyne and other battles of the Williamite Wars.

The proposals were generally welcomed at senior level but there was predictable worry amongst the ranks that this was a precursor to disbandment. This led to protests from the Unionist political parties, particularly the DUP who immediately relaunched their 1989 "Hands Off the UDR" campaign. When it merged in 1992 the UDR had been on active service longer than any regiment since the Napoleonic Wars, having remained on operations from the moment it was created to the day it was amalgamated.

Awards, honours and decorations

The most notable award to the Ulster Defence Regiment was the Conspicuous Gallantry Cross made by HM The Queen on 6 October 2006. The unit citation confers the right of the regiment to be known as "The Ulster Defence Regiment CGC". During the award ceremony in Belfast the Queen paid tribute to the regiment:

"Your contribution to peace and stability in Northern Ireland is unique." "Serving and living within the community had required "uncommon courage and conviction". "The regiment had never flinched despite suffering extreme personal intimidation. Their successes had "come at a terrible price, many gave their lives. Today you have cause to reflect on the fine achievements, while remembering the suffering". "The Home Service Battalions of the RIR and the UDR which had preceded them won the deepest respect throughout the land." So that their actions would always be remembered, the CGC was awarded to the RIR/UDR "as a mark of the nation's esteem" with the citation, "This award is in recognition of the continuous operational service and sacrifice of the Ulster Defence Regiment and the Royal Irish Regiment in Northern Ireland during Operation Banner."

In total 953 individuals received awards through the British honours system including: 12 Queen's Gallantry Medals; 2 Military Medals; 88 BEMs; 108 OBEs and 276 Mentions in Despatches, however for most UDR soldiers the presentation of decorations assumed the form of "service" or campaign" medals including:

• The General Service Medal with "Northern Ireland" bar. (Awarded after 28 days service in the Operation Banner campaign)
• The Ulster Defence Regiment Medal
• Northern Ireland Home Service Medal
• The Accumulated Campaign Service Medal (Awarded after 1,000 operational (not training) days service in the campaign)
• The Medal for Long Service and Good Conduct (Ulster Defence Regiment)

The award of "UDR specific" long service medals had complex rules which meant that not very many were ever issued. The UDR medal was only issued to 1,254 members of the 40,000 who served. Only 1,416 Accumulated Campaign Service medals were issued.

Officers who are awarded the Ulster Defence Regiment medal may use the post-nominal letters UD.

The most decorated UDR soldier was Corporal Eric Glass of the 4th (Co Fermanagh) Battalion who received both the Queen's Gallantry Medal and Distinguished Conduct Medal for bravery. Despite being gravely injured in an IRA ambush Glass managed to survive, killing one of his attackers, Joseph McManus in the process. An account of this (second) attack on Corporal Glass was carried in the Belfast News Letter.

In 1987, the regiment submitted a request for the issuing of colours to the Queen which was given consent. This was granted in 1991, when the Queen decided to present the colours herself: an honour which is normally reserved only for those regiments of which she is Colonel in Chief.

• 29 June 1991 – The first colours were presented by the Queen to five battalions at Thiepval Barracks, Lisburn.
• November 1991 – 6 UDR was presented at St Lucia Barracks, Omagh by The Duke of Abercorn.
• April 1992 – The last colours were presented by HRH The Duke of York in a ceremony near Edinburgh in April 1992, to 2/11 UDR, 7/10 UDR and 8UDR.

Up to May 2010, 232 Elizabeth Crosses and Memorial Scrolls have been issued to the families of UDR personnel whose deaths are officially attributed to their military service.

Up to November 2010, 37 applications linked to UDR personnel for the Elizabeth Cross have failed due to the following reasons:

• 22 died of natural causes whilst 'off duty'
• 7 were killed on road accidents whilst 'off duty'
• 4 were accidental deaths whilst 'off duty'
• 2 died outside the Northern Ireland operational area
• 2 died after they were discharged from service.

• The Conspicuous Gallantry Cross
• General Service Medal with Northern Ireland clasp and Accumulated Service Medal (1000 days in campaign) General Service Medal with Northern Ireland clasp and Accumulated Service Medal (1000 days in campaign)
• UDR Medal ribbon
• UDR Long Service and Good Conduct Medal ribbon

Freedoms

The City of Belfast and a number of boroughs throughout Northern Ireland paid their own tribute to the regiment by granting freedoms including: North Down, Larne, and Newtownards.

Wilkinson sword of peace

The community relations work of 7th/10th (City of Belfast) Battalion was recognised by the award of the Wilkinson Sword of Peace for 1990.

UDR Memorials

The UDR Memorial, Lisburn

A memorial to the UDR was erected in Lisburn, to "recognise the self sacrifice of the soldiers, both men and women, from all traditions of the UK". The Memorial is "a 19-foot 'heroic scale' bronze sculpture" featuring "bronze figures of a male UDR soldier and a female ‘Greenfinch’ on operational duty...set upon an equally impressive Mourne granite plinth.".

Lisburn City Council leased the site to the UDR Memorial Trust at Market Square, Lisburn. Under the terms of the lease, the UDR Memorial Trust are permitted to use this for the erection of a memorial. The planning, erection and maintenance of the memorial is the responsibility of the UDR Memorial Trust.

The UDR Memorial is in addition to the UDR Roll of Honour situated beside Lisburn War Memorial, Castle Street, Lisburn that commemorates UDR personnel from the Lisburn area who died in the conflict.

The memorial group of statues was unveiled on 12 June 2011 by Viscount Brookeborough, one of the trustees of the UDR Memorial Trust. At the ceremony, Trust chairman Wesley Duncan said, "It was unfortunate that there were members who did bad things and we're not trying to hide that. But what we would say is that there's almost 50,000 people who didn't do bad things – who did good things, who were ordinary decent people who wanted to do the best they could for their country."

National Arboretum

On Saturday, 28 April 2012 a memorial to the UDR was unveiled at the National Memorial Arboretum by Colonel Sir Dennis Faulkner CBE (Patron of the Regimental Association) along with Memorial Trees in memory of those UDR Soldiers who were murdered after having left the Regiment. Memorial Trees in memory of all those members of the Regiment who were murdered while serving had already been planted some years ago. The memorial takes the form of a 6 foot Mourne granite monument. The event was attended by around 100 UDR families, joined by the Northern Ireland Minister of State, Hugo Swire, DUP Junior Minister Jonathan Bell and UUP deputy leader John McCallister. A parade to the monument was led by the band of the 1st Battalion Royal Irish Regiment.

• UDR Memorial Statue, Lisburn, June 2011
• Roll of Honour Memorial, War Memorial, Lisburn.
• UDR Memorial at the National Arboretum.
• Memorial seat - National Arboretum.

Notes

1. ^ Potter p25
2. ^ Potter p19
3. Ulster Defence Regiment Act 1969
4. "1969: Ulster's B Specials to be disbanded". BBC News. 10 October 1969. Retrieved 14 April 2008.
5. "Chequered history of Irish regiment". BBC News. 1 August 2005. Retrieved 14 April 2008.
6. ^ "History". Royalirishassociation.org. Retrieved 17 July 2013.
7. ^ CAIN Archive:Public Records: Subversion in the UDR Although initially written in 1973, the report was only opened to the public in 2004.
8. Potter, page 67
9. "Honours". Royalirishassociation.org. Retrieved 17 July 2013.
10. Disturbances in Northern Ireland Report of the Commission appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland (Cameron Report). Appendix V
11. Violence and Civil Disturbances in Northern Ireland in 1969. Report of Tribunal of Inquiry (Scarman Report) Section 3.11
12. Disturbances in Northern Ireland Report of the Commission appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland (Cameron Report). Chapter 14
13. Doherty p14
14. Ryder pp.20–21
15. Ryder p26
16. Bew, Paul (1993). Northern Ireland: A Chronology of the Troubles, 1968–1993. Gill & Macmillan. p. 18. ISBN 0-7171-2081-3. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
17. 'The B Specials' Sir Arthur Hezlet" pp 213–216
18. Hezlet p. 215
19. ^ "Hunt Report"
20. "Hunt Report" Conclusions and Recommendations
21. Hansard UDR Bill 1969
22. ^ "ULSTER DEFENCE REGIMENT (Hansard, 12 November 1969)". Hansard. 12 November 1969. Retrieved 26 October 2008.
23. Irish News (Belfast), 13 November 1969
24. Potter 2001, p. 20.
25. "No. 44996". The London Gazette. 29 December 1969.
26. Statutory Instrument, 1969 No. 1860 (C. 58), The Ulster Defence Regiment Act 1969 (Commencement) Order 1969
27. The New Law Journal, Volume 120, Part 1
28. ^ "No. 44971". The London Gazette (invalid |supp= (help)). 25 November 1969.
    "No. 48108". The London Gazette (invalid |supp= (help)). 25 February 1980.
29. Ryder p70
30. ^ British Army Officers 1939–1945
31. Potter pp25-26
32. ^ "The Ulster Defence Regiment - British Army Website". Army.mod.uk. Retrieved 17 July 2013.
33. Gamble p67
34. ^ Potter p26
35. Potter p27
36. Potter p 34
37. 12:01AM BST 04 Sep 2002 (4 September 2002). "Lt-Col Desmond Woods". Telegraph. Retrieved 17 July 2013.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
38. Potter p44
39. ^ Potter p45
40. Potter p30-31
41. Potter p30
42. Potter p34-35
43. ^ Potter 2001, p. 31.
44. Ellison 2000, pp. 66–67.
45. ^ Potter 2001, p. 29.
46. HC Deb 23 March 1970 vol 798 cc300-1W, Ulster Defence Regiment (applicants), Hansard, 23 March 1970. Retrieved on 15 October 2008.
47. Ryder 1991, p.35
48. Potter p29
49. Thomas G. Mitchell, Native Vs. Settler: Ethnic Conflict in Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland, p. 55
50. Brett Bowden, Michael T. Davis, eds, Terror: From Tyrannicide to Terrorism, p. 234
51. Ryder 1991, p. 46.
52. Potter 2001, p. 63.
53. ^ Potter 2001, p. 376.
54. Potter 2001, pp. 57–58.
55. ^ Potter 2001, p. 35.
56. Ryder, 1991. p.31
57. Ulster Defence Regiment (Hansard, 21 January 1970)
58. Potter 2001, p. 18
59. ^ Potter 2001, p. 19
60. Potter 2001.
61. ULSTER DEFENCE REGIMENT (Hansard, 3 February 1972)
62. "Security Forces (Hansard, 2 December 1976)". Hansard.millbanksystems.com. Retrieved 26 October 2008.
63. CAIN: Public Records: Subversion in the UDR
64. Ripley, Chappell, p. 46.
65. Ripley, Chappell, p. 47.
66. Testimony to Courage – the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969–1992, John Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0-85052-819-4
67. Chris Ryder, The UDR -An Instrument of Peace? ISBN 0-413-64800-1
68. Potter p311
69. Potter 2001, p. 94
70. Potter 2001, pp. 89–98
71. ^ Potter p60
72. ^ Potter p77
73. Potter p312
74. Ryder 1991, p352
75. Ryder 1991, p312
76. ^ Potter p48
77. ^ Potter p224
78. ^ Potter p37
79. "Storno Radio Communication Systems". Storno.co.uk. 3 November 2012. Retrieved 17 July 2013.
80. Northern Ireland News – Royal Navy weigh anchor in Carlingford Lough
81. – page 6-1
82. Potter 2001, p. 87
83. Ryder p191
84. Army News
85. Potter p287
86. CAIN: Glossary of Terms on Northern Ireland Conflict
87. "UK | Rules for a dangerous operation". BBC News. 1 July 1999. Retrieved 17 July 2013.
88. Human Rights in Northern Ireland p155
89. Potter 2001, pp. 26–7.
90. Potter p225
91. Potter 2001, p. 37.
92. Basic Battle Skills. Army Code No. 71090; HMSO ASIN: B0011BLJXE
93. Ryder p37
94. "The Royal Irish Regiment - British Army Website". Army.mod.uk. Retrieved 17 July 2013.
95. "MOD Army". Retrieved 25 April 2008.
96. Ellison, Smyth, 2000, p.82
97. Potter 2001, p.167
98. Ryder p66
99. ^ Potter p115
100. Gamble p149
101. ^ Potter p120
102. ^ Potter p119
103. Potter p116
104. Potter 2001, p. 116
105. Potter p166
106. ^ Potter 2001, p. 117
107. Potter 2001, p. 119
108. ^ Potter p117
109. Gamble p150
110. ^ Gamble p151
111. ^ Gamble p152
112. Gamble p155
113. ^ Gamble p153
114. Potter 120
115. Potter 2001, p. 115-121
116. "In Memorium - Private Eva Martin" (PDF). Retrieved 17 July 2013.
117. English p81
118. Potter p40
119. "This attachment is being virus checked. - Inside Government" (PDF). GOV.UK. Retrieved 17 July 2013.
120. English p174
121. Potter p126-128
122. Ryder 1991, p. 75
123. Davies, Roger (2001), "Improvised mortar systems: an evolving political weapon", Jane's Intelligence Review (May 2001), 12–15.
124. Potter p351-354
125. McKittrick p565
126. ^ Potter p350
127. ^ Ripley, Chappell p. 48
128. ^ Potter 2001, p. 79.
129. "Brigadier Harry Baxter". The Times. London. 14 March 2007. Retrieved 26 May 2010.
130. Ulster Defence Regiment (Hansard, 29 April 1971)
131. London Gazette
132. London Gazette
133. "Viewing Page 11975 of Issue 52623". London-gazette.co.uk. 5 August 1991. Retrieved 25 January 2012.
134. "Viewing Page 11412 of Issue 52983". London-gazette.co.uk. 6 July 1992. Retrieved 25 January 2012.
135. "The Ulster Defence Regiment - British Army Website". Army.mod.uk. Retrieved 17 July 2013.
136. UDR Association website; CAIN: Sutton index of deaths BBC
137. Sutton Chronology, 27 and 31 July 1975, CAIN website
138. Sutton Chronology, 17 October 1972
139. Ryder 1991,
140. "In Memorium - Private Winston Donnell" (PDF). Retrieved 17 July 2013.
141. Cain
142. Potter 2001, p. 60.
143. Potter 2001, p. 303.
144. ^ "CAIN: Public Records: Subversion in the UDR". Cain.ulst.ac.uk. Retrieved 17 July 2013.
145. CAIN Archive:Public Records: Subversion in the UDR
146. Potter p82
147. Wood, 2006,p.107-8
148. Dillon, 1999, p.200
149. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/publicrecords/1972/prem15-1016-3.jpg, the document description in the Catalogue of The National Archives is under Prem 15/1016
150. Potter p376
151. Potter 2001, p. 91
152. Potter 2001, pp. 78–9, 90, 92, 96–7, 151–2
153. Potter 2001, p. 293
154. Ryder 1991, pp. 73, 75, 77–80
155. UVF RULES OUT JACKAL LINK TO MURDER.(News) - The People (London, England) | HighBeam Research
156. "Collusion in the South Armagh/Mid Ulster area in the mid-1970s". Pat Finucane Centre
157. "Net is closing in on Dublin car bombers". Sunday Independent. Joe Tiernan. 2 November 2003. Retrieved 12 April 2012
158. 1976: UDR men jailed for Showband killings
159. See reference here
160. "A Chronology of the Conflict – 1989". CAIN. Retrieved 10 April 2008.
161. ^ Potter 2001, pp. 329–33
162. "Collusion – Chronology of Events in the Stevens Inquiries=". CAIN. Retrieved 12 April 2008.
163. Potter 2001, p. 302
164. Potter 2001, p. 77
165. ^ Ryder 1991 p. 215
166. Ryder 1991 pp. 215–216
167. The Independent Now it's time for Tony Blair to fulfil the promise he made to me 18 April 2003
168. 2 May 2006 edition of the Irish News available here.
169. Ryder 1991 p. 150
170. ^ Weitzer 1990, p. 208
171. Potter p383
172. ^ Ryder p.xvii
173. Ryder p32
174. ^ Potter p56
175. Potter p58
176. Potter p67
177. ^ Potter p91
178. Potter 2001, pp. 157, 269
179. Potter 2001, p. 223
180. Potter 2001, pp. 290–91
181. Potter 2001. p.290
182. ^ "The UDR — not Dad's Army but a sectarian militia". An Phoblacht. 18 August 2011. Retrieved 17 July 2013.
183. "SAOIRSE32 - Blood money". Saoirse32.dreamwidth.org. 10 March 2006. Retrieved 17 July 2013.
184. "UDR men acted as covert British death squad". An Phoblacht. Retrieved 17 July 2013.
185. "Dublin/Monaghan bombings cover-up". An Phoblacht. 29 April 1999. Retrieved 17 July 2013.
186. Ryder p197
187. Potter p267
188. "Profile of Sinn Fein's Gerry Adams". Sinnfein.org. Retrieved 17 July 2013.
189. "BBC ON THIS DAY | 14 | 1984: Sinn Fein leader shot in street attack". BBC News. 14 March 1991. Retrieved 17 July 2013.
190. Potter p268
191. "Disband the RIR". An Phoblacht. 12 June 2003. Retrieved 17 July 2013.
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193. Gamble p200
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195. Larkin, 2004, p. 179
196. BBC NEWS CHANNEL, 1 August 2005
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198. ^ Order of Wear
199. "Queen awards Conspicuous Gallantry Cross to the Royal Irish Regiment". Defence News. Ministry of Defence. Retrieved 14 October 2008.
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201. "MOD". Retrieved 16 September 2010.
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203. The Accumulated Campaign Service Medal
204. British Light Infantry Regiments
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211. Potter p365
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Bibliography

• The B-Specials: A History of the Ulster Special Constabulary (1972) Sir Arthur Hezlet ISBN 0-85468-272-4
• A Testimony to Courage – the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 – 1992, John Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0-85052-819-4
• The Ulster Defence Regiment: An Instrument of Peace?, Chris Ryder 1991 ISBN 0-413-64800-1
• Echo Company, The History of E Company 5th Battalion of the Ulster Defence Regiment, by Ronnie Gamble 2007. ISBN 978-0-9558069-0-2
• The Blackwell Companion to Modern Irish Culture, W. J. McCormack, Blackwell Publishing 1999
• The Dirty War,Martin Dillon, Arrow 1991, ISBN 0-09-984520-2
• Making Sense of the Troubles, David McKittrick & David McVea, Penguin Books 2001, ISBN 0-14-100305-7
• Big Boy's Rules: The SAS and the Secret Struggle Against the IRA, Mark Urban, Faber & Faber 1992, ISBN 0-571-16809-4
• The Crowned Harp: Policing Northern Ireland, Graham Ellison, Jim Smyth, Pluto Press, 2000, ISBN 0-7453-1393-0
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• The Irish Militia, 1793–1802: Ireland's Forgotten Army. Four Courts Press (15 April 2007) ISBN 1-84682-037-5
• The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conllict and Emancipation, Joseph Ruane & Jennifer Todd, Cambridge University Press (FP 1996) 2000, ISBN 0-521-56879-X,
• Arming the Protestants: The Formation of the Ulster Special Constabulary and the Royal Ulster Constabulary 1920–27, Michael Farrell, Pluto Press (London/Sydney 1983), ISBN 0-86104-705-2
• Red Hand:The Ulster Colony, Constantine Fitzgibbon, Michael Joseph Ltd (1971)ISBN 7181 0881 7
• Ireland: A History from the Twelfth Century to the Present Day, Paul Johnson, HarperCollins Ltd; New (1981), ISBN 0-586-05453-7
• Unionism and Orangeism in Northern Ireland Since 1945: The Decline of the Loyal Family, Henry Patterson and Eric P. Kaufmann, Manchester University Press (2007), ISBN 0-7190-7744-3
• Orange Parades: The Politics of Ritual, Tradition and Control, Dominic Bryan, Pluto Press, (2000), ISBN 0-7453-1413-9
• All In A Life, Garret FitzGerald, Macmillan (1991), ISBN 0-333-47034-6
• Transforming Settler States: Communal Conflict and Internal Security in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe, Ronald Weitzer, University of California Press, 1990, ISBN 978-0-520-06490-4
• A very British Jihad: Collusion, Conspiracy & Cover-up in Northern Ireland, Paul Larkin, Beyond the Pale Publications, Belfast 2004, ISBN 1-900960-25-7
• Northern Ireland: The Origins of the Troubles, Thomas Hennessey, Gill & Macmillan (Dublin 2005), ISBN 0-7171-3382-6
• Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, Paul Collier & Nicholas Sambanis, World Bank Publications (2005), ISBN 0-8213-6049-3
• Human Rights In Northern Ireland, Human Rights, Yale University Press, (1993), ISBN 0300056230
• The Thin Green Line:The History of the Royal Ulster Constabulary GC", Richard Doherty, Pen & Sword, 2004, ISBN 1 84415 058 5
• Armed Struggle;– A History of the IRA, Richard English, MacMillan, London 2003, ISBN 1-4050-0108-9
• Lost Lives, David McKittrick, Mainstream, 2004, ISBN 184018504X

External links

• Palace Barracks Memorial Garden – Roll of Honour
• Regimental Association of the Ulster Defence Regiment CGC
• Murder, Collusion & Lies: The murder of Seamus Ludlow
• Seamus Ludlow by Ed Moloney, Sunday Tribune
• Regimental Association of the Royal Irish Regiment
• UDR guns used in murder of Catholic workmen
• Long Kesh Documents – UDR

• Use dmy dates from January 2013
• Ulster Defence Regiment
• The Troubles (Northern Ireland)
• Infantry regiments of the British Army
• Military units and formations of the Cold War
• Military units and formations established in 1970
• Recipients of the Conspicuous Gallantry Cross
• Military history of Northern Ireland
• Military units and formations disestablished in 1992
• Defunct Irish regiments of the British Army
• Militias
• Militias in Europe