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<table align=right><tr><td>]<br><center><b>Slobodan Milo&#353;evic</b></center></td></tr></table> <table align=right><tr><td>]<br><center><b>Slobodan Milo&#353;evi&#263;</b></center></td></tr></table>
'''Slobodan Milo&#353;evic''' (born ], ]) is a former president of ]. During the ] he was indicted for ]s, and he is currently standing trial at ]. '''Slobodan Milo&#353;evi&#263;''' (born ], ]) is a former president of ]. During the ] he was indicted for ]s, and he is currently standing trial at ].


He was born in ], ]. He was born in ], ].


Milo&#353;evic emerged in April 1987 as the leading force in the revival of Serbian ], replacing ] as party leader in the Serbian section of the ruling League of Communists of Yugoslavia in September. Milo&#353;evi&#263; emerged in April 1987 as the leading force in the revival of Serbian ], replacing ] as party leader in the Serbian section of the ruling League of Communists of Yugoslavia in September.


He was elected president of Serbia by the national assembly in May 1989, and presided over the transformation of the League of Communists of Serbia into the Socialist Party of Serbia (July 1990) and the adoption of a new Serbian constitution (September 1990) providing for a direct election of a president with increased powers. Milo&#353;evic won direct election as president of Serbia in December 1990 and December 1992. He was elected president of Serbia by the national assembly in May 1989, and presided over the transformation of the League of Communists of Serbia into the Socialist Party of Serbia (July 1990) and the adoption of a new Serbian constitution (September 1990) providing for a direct election of a president with increased powers. Milo&#353;evi&#263; won direct election as president of Serbia in December 1990 and December 1992.


Milo&#353;evic's rise to power coincided with the growth of nationalism among all of ]'s republics following the collapse of ] governments throughout ]. In June 1991 ] and ] seceded from the federation, followed by the republics of Macedonia (subsequently styled the ]) in September 1991 and ] in March 1992. The presence of large Serb minorities in Croatia (540,000) and Bosnia (1.6 million) led to wars in each, in which Serb secessionists seeking union with Serbia proper were supported by the Yugoslav government and army. Milo&#353;evi&#263;'s rise to power coincided with the growth of nationalism among all of ]'s republics following the collapse of ] governments throughout ]. In June 1991 ] and ] seceded from the federation, followed by the republics of Macedonia (subsequently styled the ]) in September 1991 and ] in March 1992. The presence of large Serb minorities in Croatia (540,000) and Bosnia (1.6 million) led to wars in each, in which Serb secessionists seeking union with Serbia proper were supported by the Yugoslav government and army.


In ] the ] brought an end to Bosnian civil war, and Milo&#353;evic was credited in the West as one of the pillars of Balkan peace. The government of president ] supported his rule during this period, until the beginning of the uprising in ] and start of Albanian terrorist actions and a consequent brutal Serbian crackdown in ]. In the winter of ], after a fraud in local elections, there were student demonstrations which lasted 3 months, filling the streets of ] daily, and protesting Milo&#353;evic's rule. But the West failed to support Serbian people, opting for Milo&#353;evic instead, and he managed to stay in power. His image was badly damaged though, and despite a substantial rise in popularity after the ] in ], this led to his eventual downfall. In ] the ] brought an end to Bosnian civil war, and Milo&#353;evi&#263; was credited in the West as one of the pillars of Balkan peace. The government of president ] supported his rule during this period, until the beginning of the uprising in ] and start of Albanian terrorist actions and a consequent brutal Serbian crackdown in ]. In the winter of ], after a fraud in local elections, there were student demonstrations which lasted 3 months, filling the streets of ] daily, and protesting Milo&#353;evi&#263;'s rule. But the West failed to support Serbian people, opting for Milo&#353;evi&#263; instead, and he managed to stay in power. His image was badly damaged though, and despite a substantial rise in popularity after the ] in ], this led to his eventual downfall.


Constitutionally limited to two terms as Serbian president, in July 1997 Milo&#353;evic assumed the presidency of the Yugoslav Federation, now reduced to Serbia and her smaller neighbour ]. Armed actions by ] separatist groups and Serbian military counter-action in Serbia's autonomous (and mostly Albanian-populated) province of Kosovo culminated in escalating warfare in 1998, ] against Serbia and her armed forces in March-June 1999, and Serbia's subsequent military withdrawal from the province. Constitutionally limited to two terms as Serbian president, in July 1997 Milo&#353;evi&#263; assumed the presidency of the Yugoslav Federation, now reduced to Serbia and her smaller neighbour ]. Armed actions by ] separatist groups and Serbian military counter-action in Serbia's autonomous (and mostly Albanian-populated) province of Kosovo culminated in escalating warfare in 1998, ] against Serbia and her armed forces in March-June 1999, and Serbia's subsequent military withdrawal from the province.


Milo&#353;evic's rejection of claims of a first-round opposition victory in new elections for the Federal presidency in September 2000 led to mass demonstrations in Belgrade on October 5 and the collapse of the regime's authority. Opposition leader ] took office as Yugoslav president on October 6. Milo&#353;evi&#263;'s rejection of claims of a first-round opposition victory in new elections for the Federal presidency in September 2000 led to mass demonstrations in Belgrade on October 5 and the collapse of the regime's authority. Opposition leader ] took office as Yugoslav president on October 6.


Arrested on April 1, 2001 on charges of abuse of power and corruption, Milo&#353;evic was handed over by the Serbian government on June 28 to the ] International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The transfer was illegal under Yugoslav law at the time, and president Kostunica was opposed to it. After Milo&#353;evic's transfer, original charges of war crimes in Kosovo were upgraded by adding charges of ] in Bosnia and war crimes in Croatia. The trial began at ] on February 12, 2002 with Milo&#353;evic defending himself though refusing to recognise the court's jurisdiction. Some observers found his popularity among Serbs rising sharply since the beginning of the trial, with even those who were always opposing him admitting he makes his case. Most people who have observed the trial say it is a travesty of justice, and that it appears designed to justify NATO bombing actions and sponsorship of Albanian terrorist groups during the 1990s. The trial in ] does not examine the possible issue of crimes committed by ] during the war. Arrested on April 1, 2001 on charges of abuse of power and corruption, Milo&#353;evi&#263; was handed over by the Serbian government on June 28 to the ] International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The transfer was illegal under Yugoslav law at the time, and president Kostunica was opposed to it. After Milo&#353;evi&#263;'s transfer, original charges of war crimes in Kosovo were upgraded by adding charges of ] in Bosnia and war crimes in Croatia. The trial began at ] on February 12, 2002 with Milo&#353;evi&#263; defending himself though refusing to recognise the court's jurisdiction. Some observers found his popularity among Serbs rising sharply since the beginning of the trial, with even those who were always opposing him admitting he makes his case. Most people who have observed the trial say it is a travesty of justice, and that it appears designed to justify NATO bombing actions and sponsorship of Albanian terrorist groups during the 1990s. The trial in ] does not examine the possible issue of crimes committed by ] during the war.


In private, Milo&#353;evic is patriarchal and conservative, devoted to his family and wife, who was his high-school sweetheart. His personality is marked by stubbornness (of which he is proud) and rigid adherence to personal moral beliefs, and belongs to obsessive-compulsive personality type. Modest and unassuming during his years in power, he was often opposed to appearing on state TV, and his presence in the media was consequently rare and discreet. His most devoted followers are older people, pensioners who spent most of their lives in another era, whose moral code Milo&#353;evic followed flawlessly. His stubbornness and unwillingness to compromise or betray his principles is at least partly to be credited for the political problems and wars which marked his years in power. His confident defense in the trial has also to do with this stubborn personality, as it appears that he firmly believes in the truthfulness of his defense, and the conspiracy of the ]. In politics, he has always been a strict legalist, taking great care that all his decisions are covered by law. His influence went beyond his formal duties, but there is little to no record of this, as he always preferred to deal with his subordinates confidentially and in person. Unlike Croatian president ] who often made blunders like saying how happy he is that his wife is neither Serbian nor Jewish (for which he apologised to Jews, but not to Serbs), Milo&#353;evic never said anything which could be classified as hate speech, and the fear of him in former Yugoslavia during the rise of Serbian nationalism was more a reaction to the actions of his followers than to any of his explicitly expressed views. He is not considered to a be nationalist himself, and had a bitter dispute with the Bosnian Serb government from ] to ]&mdash;during this period the boundary on the ], separating Bosnia from Serbia, was closed, and support for Bosnian Serbs was severely restricted. After the Dayton Agreement in 1995 Serbian nationalists became his sturdy opponents, up until 1998. The trial in The Hague marks a new period in his career and presents everyone interested with an unprecedented opportunity to get an insight into Milo&#353;evic, as an archive of video footage from the trial is available online. While opinions about Milo&#353;evic and his trial are far from being unanimous, people at least agree that the proceedings have plenty of bizarre and amusing moments. In private, Milo&#353;evi&#263; is patriarchal and conservative, devoted to his family and wife, who was his high-school sweetheart. His personality is marked by stubbornness (of which he is proud) and rigid adherence to personal moral beliefs, and belongs to obsessive-compulsive personality type. Modest and unassuming during his years in power, he was often opposed to appearing on state TV, and his presence in the media was consequently rare and discreet. His most devoted followers are older people, pensioners who spent most of their lives in another era, whose moral code Milo&#353;evi&#263; followed flawlessly. His stubbornness and unwillingness to compromise or betray his principles is at least partly to be credited for the political problems and wars which marked his years in power. His confident defense in the trial has also to do with this stubborn personality, as it appears that he firmly believes in the truthfulness of his defense, and the conspiracy of the ]. In politics, he has always been a strict legalist, taking great care that all his decisions are covered by law. His influence went beyond his formal duties, but there is little to no record of this, as he always preferred to deal with his subordinates confidentially and in person. Unlike Croatian president ] who often made blunders like saying how happy he is that his wife is neither Serbian nor Jewish (for which he apologised to Jews, but not to Serbs), Milo&#353;evi&#263; never said anything which could be classified as hate speech, and the fear of him in former Yugoslavia during the rise of Serbian nationalism was more a reaction to the actions of his followers than to any of his explicitly expressed views. He is not considered to a be nationalist himself, and had a bitter dispute with the Bosnian Serb government from ] to ]&mdash; during this period the boundary on the ], separating Bosnia from Serbia, was closed, and support for Bosnian Serbs was severely restricted. After the Dayton Agreement in 1995 Serbian nationalists became his sturdy opponents, up until 1998. The trial in The Hague marks a new period in his career and presents everyone interested with an unprecedented opportunity to get an insight into Milo&#353;evi&#263;, as an archive of video footage from the trial is available online. While opinions about Milo&#353;evi&#263; and his trial are far from being unanimous, people at least agree that the proceedings have plenty of bizarre and amusing moments.


== External links == == External links ==
*http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/issue_milosevic.htm * http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/issue_milosevic.htm

Revision as of 03:54, 8 January 2003

File:Smilosevic1.jpg
Slobodan Milošević

Slobodan Milošević (born August 29, 1941) is a former president of Serbia. During the Kosovo War he was indicted for war crimes, and he is currently standing trial at International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

He was born in Pozarevac, Serbia.

Milošević emerged in April 1987 as the leading force in the revival of Serbian nationalism, replacing Ivan Stambolić as party leader in the Serbian section of the ruling League of Communists of Yugoslavia in September.

He was elected president of Serbia by the national assembly in May 1989, and presided over the transformation of the League of Communists of Serbia into the Socialist Party of Serbia (July 1990) and the adoption of a new Serbian constitution (September 1990) providing for a direct election of a president with increased powers. Milošević won direct election as president of Serbia in December 1990 and December 1992.

Milošević's rise to power coincided with the growth of nationalism among all of Yugoslavia's republics following the collapse of communist governments throughout eastern Europe. In June 1991 Slovenia and Croatia seceded from the federation, followed by the republics of Macedonia (subsequently styled the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) in September 1991 and Bosnia and Herzegovina in March 1992. The presence of large Serb minorities in Croatia (540,000) and Bosnia (1.6 million) led to wars in each, in which Serb secessionists seeking union with Serbia proper were supported by the Yugoslav government and army.

In 1995 the Dayton Agreement brought an end to Bosnian civil war, and Milošević was credited in the West as one of the pillars of Balkan peace. The government of president Clinton supported his rule during this period, until the beginning of the uprising in Kosovo and start of Albanian terrorist actions and a consequent brutal Serbian crackdown in 1998. In the winter of 1996, after a fraud in local elections, there were student demonstrations which lasted 3 months, filling the streets of Belgrade daily, and protesting Milošević's rule. But the West failed to support Serbian people, opting for Milošević instead, and he managed to stay in power. His image was badly damaged though, and despite a substantial rise in popularity after the NATO bombing in 1999, this led to his eventual downfall.

Constitutionally limited to two terms as Serbian president, in July 1997 Milošević assumed the presidency of the Yugoslav Federation, now reduced to Serbia and her smaller neighbour Montenegro. Armed actions by Albanian separatist groups and Serbian military counter-action in Serbia's autonomous (and mostly Albanian-populated) province of Kosovo culminated in escalating warfare in 1998, NATO air strikes against Serbia and her armed forces in March-June 1999, and Serbia's subsequent military withdrawal from the province.

Milošević's rejection of claims of a first-round opposition victory in new elections for the Federal presidency in September 2000 led to mass demonstrations in Belgrade on October 5 and the collapse of the regime's authority. Opposition leader Vojislav Kostunica took office as Yugoslav president on October 6.

Arrested on April 1, 2001 on charges of abuse of power and corruption, Milošević was handed over by the Serbian government on June 28 to the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The transfer was illegal under Yugoslav law at the time, and president Kostunica was opposed to it. After Milošević's transfer, original charges of war crimes in Kosovo were upgraded by adding charges of genocide in Bosnia and war crimes in Croatia. The trial began at The Hague on February 12, 2002 with Milošević defending himself though refusing to recognise the court's jurisdiction. Some observers found his popularity among Serbs rising sharply since the beginning of the trial, with even those who were always opposing him admitting he makes his case. Most people who have observed the trial say it is a travesty of justice, and that it appears designed to justify NATO bombing actions and sponsorship of Albanian terrorist groups during the 1990s. The trial in The Hague does not examine the possible issue of crimes committed by NATO during the war.

In private, Milošević is patriarchal and conservative, devoted to his family and wife, who was his high-school sweetheart. His personality is marked by stubbornness (of which he is proud) and rigid adherence to personal moral beliefs, and belongs to obsessive-compulsive personality type. Modest and unassuming during his years in power, he was often opposed to appearing on state TV, and his presence in the media was consequently rare and discreet. His most devoted followers are older people, pensioners who spent most of their lives in another era, whose moral code Milošević followed flawlessly. His stubbornness and unwillingness to compromise or betray his principles is at least partly to be credited for the political problems and wars which marked his years in power. His confident defense in the trial has also to do with this stubborn personality, as it appears that he firmly believes in the truthfulness of his defense, and the conspiracy of the New World Order. In politics, he has always been a strict legalist, taking great care that all his decisions are covered by law. His influence went beyond his formal duties, but there is little to no record of this, as he always preferred to deal with his subordinates confidentially and in person. Unlike Croatian president Franjo Tudjman who often made blunders like saying how happy he is that his wife is neither Serbian nor Jewish (for which he apologised to Jews, but not to Serbs), Milošević never said anything which could be classified as hate speech, and the fear of him in former Yugoslavia during the rise of Serbian nationalism was more a reaction to the actions of his followers than to any of his explicitly expressed views. He is not considered to a be nationalist himself, and had a bitter dispute with the Bosnian Serb government from 1993 to 1995— during this period the boundary on the Drina river, separating Bosnia from Serbia, was closed, and support for Bosnian Serbs was severely restricted. After the Dayton Agreement in 1995 Serbian nationalists became his sturdy opponents, up until 1998. The trial in The Hague marks a new period in his career and presents everyone interested with an unprecedented opportunity to get an insight into Milošević, as an archive of video footage from the trial is available online. While opinions about Milošević and his trial are far from being unanimous, people at least agree that the proceedings have plenty of bizarre and amusing moments.

External links