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An earlier version of this page seems to have been lifted in large parts from his official government bio which can be seen at: http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/bios/mcnamara.htm . I have no idea if that material can be considered to be in the public domain or not. But at the very least it should be mentioned as the source.

His official bio is very POV on many controversial subjects and I'm almost sure it reflects his own input. That should be kept in mind as changes are made to give some sort of balance. 168.127.0.51 17:26, 19 April 2006 (UTC)

Chief Architect of Vietnam War?

He is considered the chief architect of the Vietnam War.

Oh? Who considers him this? This statement, cut from the introduction, is not substantiated anywhere further down in the article. Perhaps it's just the contributor's own POV.

Surely he helped escalate the US campaign at one point, perhaps that was what was meant. But "architect" implies more than this. AFAIK, the war predated both McNamara and the man who appointed him. --Uncle Ed 22:42, 14 Jan 2004 (UTC)

• I think that it is a fair assessment that he was the "architect" of the Vietnam War. The policy implemented by LBJ was the one forcefully advocated by McNamara. The disasterous troop rotation policy was McNamara's plan. He personally had to approve bombing targets. He was responsible for the formulation & micromanagement of the "stalemate" war policy. McNamara was more responsible for the way the US was involved in that war than any single individual. If he had a conscience, he would have eaten a bullet 30yrs ago.-- Achilles 22:16 30 May 2005

That would just emerge unscathed from the other end after 24-36 hours. Preisler 16:04, 3 Jun 2005 (UTC)

• Given McNamara's incompetence, probably so.-- Achilles 22:58 3 June 2005

The perspective that McNamara is the chief architect of the Vietnam War strikes me as just that, perspective or POV, and not a fact. Anyone interested in exploring this topic should consider viewing "The Fog of War" (Sony Picture Classics 2003).

Above unsigned comment by 165.123.153.235 on 14:34, 29 October 2005

Nobody should trust what he says in Fog of War to be the truth. He was the chief architect in that he overruled the JCS and senior military leadership repeatedly. He directed the military to implement his ideas like building the line of fortifications along the DMZ (which was cancelled immediately on him leaving office). If you want the full story, you will have to hunt up accounts by his critics of his Vietnam strategy from years ago. He will deny being the chief architect. But that leaves the question for him "if you were not the architect, who was?". He will not answer that question. It always ends up that the Vietnam War just kind of happened and nobody was responsible. That makes people who were around the DOD in that era really mad because McNamara's civilians were supposed to be about systems analysis, tracable decision making and perfect science-based decisions.

Not true, he says in FOW, and i quote "it's the presidents responsibility." Which is true, "architect" is perhaps a poor word choice, as he was certainly prominent in strategy, but nonetheless was not the final approval for anything he did. Listening to the actual white house recordings used in the movie, particularly the first one where he speaks to LBJ he felt ambivalent about the whole war but nonetheless did the job that the president asked him to do. If that makes him and him alone the "architect" so be it, but i'd disagree.--Cptbuck 06:46, 18 June 2006 (UTC)

Bombing of Tokyo

I have removed the statement about 100,000 civilians being killed in one night, with the loss of only one US airman. While factually correct according to McNamara himself in the Fog of War documentary, it is not directly relevant here, and should be noted in the Bombing_of_Tokyo_in_World_War_II article, which is linked to here. The reason I say this is that the statement is made without context or elaboration, and therefore constitues POV - the implication is that McNamara may have been personally responsible for this. The rightness or otherwise of that argument makes for a valid discussion, which can be mentioned in this article (preferably under a seperate heading), but it is only fair to to so if the discussion is complete and adheres to our NPOV principle. I'll be happy to help anyone wanting to elaborate on this part of McNamara's career. Amelia Hunt 01:06, Dec 20, 2004 (UTC)

I have rewritten the segment stating that RSM helped plan the Tokyo fire raid and influenced B-29 operations. He did neither--he was a statistiction reporting to DC on the growing effectiveness of LeMay's command. Similarly, I've inserted a transitional paragraph describing DoD's detiorating relationship with the joint chiefs in the 1962-65 period of Vietnam, and provided parenthetical sources for both. (It's easier than trying to insert footnote numbers in the text.) B Tillman 6-20-06.

Berlin and troops

The article said "The Berlin Blockade in 1961 demonstrated to McNamara the need for more troops." This is nonsense. The Berlin Blockade occurred in 1948-9; in 1961 the Berlin Wall was constructed. It's not clear how either of these demonstrated a need for more troops; some justification should be given if the statement is reinstated in an historically correct form. -- BenHutchings 22:18, Mar 1, 2004 (UTC)

Rather than calling it the "Berlin Blockade", the events of 1961 leading up to the construction of the Berlin Wall would be better called the "Berlin Crisis of 1961". There were a number of events surrounding the construction of the Berlin Wall that are not mentioned in the history books. There were some very tense military confrontations across the boundary between the two armies. There was real concern that minor fighting might break out. More troops were seen as needed after because US power in europe was seen as greatly inferior in conventional terms to the other side at the time.

South Vietnam

I reverted edits by 207.200.116.201, who had changed this--

In practical terms, this meant training and equipping U.S. military personnel, as well as such allies as South Vietnam, for counterinsurgency operations. Later in the decade, U.S. forces applied these counterinsurgency techniques with mixed success in Vietnam.

--to this:

In practical terms, this meant training and equipping U.S. military personnel, as well as such allies as our South Vietnam puppet dictatorship', for counterinsurgency operations. In South Vietnam, for instance, where America's puppet dictator enjoyed no support whats'oever, this meant fighting and terrorizing the vast majority of the population.

Personally I don't think this is an unfair characterization of what happened in South Vietnam, but really, it doesn't need to be in this article. The nature of the South Vietnamese government is already discussed in South Vietnam, and the brutality of "counterinsurgency operations" was already highlighted earlier in the same paragraph ("terror, extortion, and assassination"). And the language is clumsy (you don't mean "no support whatsoever", you mean "no popular support" - the regime was supported by factions of the South Vietnamese elite as well as by the U.S.) and sloppy in a way that is more soapbox than encyclopedic. ←Hob 16:06, 2005 May 23 (UTC)

Comments On Iraq War

I reverted edits by 70.48.206.243 who had added this section-

-Comments on the Iraq War

"McNamara has been critical of the Bush administration's 2003 invasion of Iraq.1"

This is pure political propaganda which does not conform to the NPOV.

Achilles 19:23 31 May 2005

I disagree completely. McNamara is a well-known figure in the sphere of international politics and his opinion about the Iraq war ought to be fair game in an article about him. The only POV is McNamara's, and that's a good thing. I'm adding that change back. I admit that it was added in a clumsy manner before, so I'll try to integrate it into the main body of the text. If anyone can edit it in better, please do so. Deleuze 12:09, 1 Jun 2005 (UTC)

• If his opinion on the Iraq War is relevent, then why not his opinion on the Reagan Adm defense/Cold War policies? He was wrong on that, as he has been on all such issues for the past 40yrs. After his disgraceful performance on Vietnam, the Kennedy clique reingratiated McNamara back into their circle by pretending that LBJ forced him to do all those things, & by McNamara's parroting the Ted Kennedy line (on defense/international affairs) ever since.

Asking for McNamara's opinion of the Iraq War is like asking Jack the Ripper for his opinion on proper etiquette when consorting with prostitutes.The man was the most dangerous fool ever to hold high office in the US. -- Achilles 02:00 2 June 2005

Encyclopedias are places for impartial and objective fact, not biased opinion. If you think that McNamara was the "most dangerous fool ever to hold high office in the US," then perhaps you should focus your efforts on contributing to other Misplaced Pages articles.
Above unsigned comment by 165.123.153.235, 14:40, 29 October 2005

Achilles (and Jerzy, who just reverted Deleuze's edit), you're missing the point. McNamara's opinion of the Iraq war is notable because it was noted: especially after the release of the Morris movie, most mentions of McNamara in the press included some variation on the theme of "Isn't it ironic that the guy who was certain we could win in Vietnam is currently against U.S. intervention; does he know something we don't?" McNamara's technocratic approach to the war was also frequently compared to Rumsfeld's. Even if one has no respect for his judgment, his opinion on current events is certainly something a reader of this article might be expected to wonder about. It would certainly be notable if Richard Nixon had become an ethics professor in his later years, even if he were bad at it.

But I think Achilles makes good points in the first paragraph above ("If his opinion..."), even if they were meant sarcastically. Changes in McNamara's public views and reputation over time are worth noting, particularly the shift toward the "LBJ made him do it" story which is represented in The Fog of War. ←Hob 05:26, 2005 Jun 2 (UTC)

• The evidence from (at the time) Undersecretary of State George Ball was that McNamara was THE voice, in the meetings, FORCEFULLY urging a continuous, gradual, escalation of the war. HE was the man LBJ listened to. McNamara also cleverly kept his lines open to the Kennedy brothers-probably, a continuation of his lifelong naked ambition. McNamara's arrogance, & godlike certainty in his own infallibility led to his belief that he could micromanage a war of the size & complexity of Vietnam-- everything from the disasterous troop rotation policy, to personally selecting the bombing targets. Victory was NEVER a goal of his, stalemate was. Why ANYONE would pay ANY attention to ANYTHING that man has to say is a mystery to me. -- Achilles 06:23 2 June 2005

• Achilles, I understand and even agree with you to a certain extent in regards to McNamara's performance, but what you're presenting is about as POV as it comes. McNamara has had a fairly clear position on certain subjects since the 80's and his position on the Iraq war is just another facet of that. It's bizarre to claim that a high profile figure's opinion on topics he has had involvement with is irrelevent in an article about him and the only reason I can see you giving is personal animus. The central purpose of this article shouldn't be a critical discussion of his statements, but rather presenting them as they are. First put the facts out there, then sort them out. I'm reverting Jerzy's edit. Deleuze 07:34, 2 Jun 2005 (UTC)

• Deleuze- Fine. I've added to your edit by pointing out the last time he was critical of an Administration (Rep, of course) was during the Reagan years. You're damn right about the personal animus though. That bastard was, IMO, MORE responsible for what happened in Vietnam than anyone, including LBJ. In many countries, the man would have been irredeemably disgraced, or, quite possibly, imprisoned/executed.-- Achilles 22:19 2 June 2005

• Works for me. Expanding his career post-68 is a good thing. Deleuze 06:23, 3 Jun 2005 (UTC)

World Bank tenure

RSM's time at the World Bank saw many changes under his supervision, arguably more important in effects than the V.War. I don't claim the ability to represent that period accurately, but would like to see that properly tackled. -- Wreford

Strange?

Is his middle name really Strange? He must have been teased at school because of it. =) This reminds me of a policy Amiga Power once took. If a reader signed his/her first or middle name with only an initial, they replaced it with a made-up name, like Cryogenics or Walfordsalad. — JIP | Talk 10:39, 25 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Yes, mother's name before marriage was Clara Nell Strange --81.86.232.91 09:25, 18 July 2005 (UTC)

Campaign contributions

I'm wondering about the encyclopedicness of the external link posted by anonymous user User:68.173.19.193 that links to a page showing the political contributions made by the subject of the article. The anon has evenhandedly posted the equivalent link on numerous biographical articles of persons both on the left and the right (e.g. Molly Ivins, Robert McNamara, Theodore Olson, Alex Kozinski, and several others), but despite saucing both the goose and the gander having these links in the articles doesn't seem right. Yes, it's factual; yes, it's verifiable; yes, it's interesting; but it still seems like a sly bit of POV, particularly for each individual article viewed in isolation. I haven't removed any of the links but I'm curious how others see this.

I've posted this question on the talk pages of all four articles mentioned above in hopes that a wider spectrum of editors will see and comment. -EDM 05:01, 18 July 2005 (UTC)

Current statements about nukes

• Apocalypse Soon, Foreign Policy, May/June 2005 - "I would characterize current U.S. nuclear weapons policy as immoral, illegal, militarily unnecessary, and dreadfully dangerous".

Status of This Article: A Note of Caution

Readers, treat this article with caution. A significant portion of the topical coverage presented below shows signs of bias, opinion, and unsubstantiated fact. Few if any ciations are offered for ideas presented below. This page is not of sufficient quality to be used in academic research of any kind, or even to guide academic research.
Above unsigned comment by 165.123.153.235, 14:47, 29 October 2005

Uhhh, that's kind of true of the entire Misplaced Pages in case you didn't notice. God help anyone who relies on the Misplaced Pages as a reliable first source.--Wiarthurhu 18:47, 28 June 2006 (UTC)

Evaluating McNamara - NPOV

This section is loaded with uncited, POV statements. --TrustTruth 05:43, 30 May 2006 (UTC)

If anything is to be done, the entire section should go. 168.127.0.51 21:52, 5 June 2006 (UTC)

IIIIII Like it. Keep it. The F-111 was just a disaster, not to mention the whole Vietnam mess. Might be written to be a little more self-contained like an "on the other hand" viewpoint section so that it doesn't clash so unnaturally. The piece is full of uncited statements, but some for this section would help. I threw in links to the F-111 article. --Wiarthurhu 18:46, 28 June 2006 (UTC)

I'll throw in a detailed edit summary later, but I couldn't resist. The shadow cast by the accountant's approach to fighter design was so thoroughly discredited. Um...yea...so that's why the F-16 and F/A-18 were designed to be multi-role, the F-14 and -15 picked up multi-roles. Every fighter in development is multi-role, and the JSF is essentially a modern version of the TFX project (attracting many of the same criticisms, too). Thoroughly discredited? Many people say he was ahead of his time. --Mmx1 19:09, 28 June 2006 (UTC)

Pet projects

The clearly POV characterization of the nuclear arms race and Vietnam as being among McNamara's "pet projects" is a) puerile b) unsupported and c) gone. Allenc28 12:16, 12 June 2006 (UTC) Dude, they were his pet projects--Wiarthurhu 19:38, 28 June 2006 (UTC)

TFX - time to fisk

Few will recall that it was McNamara who directed the Air Force to adopt the Navy's F-4 Phantom and A-7 fighters. But he is best remembered in aviation history as the father of the debacle that was the TFX / F-111 dual service fighter project. His experience in the corporate world led him to believe that adopting a single type for different missions and serivce would save money. He even insisted on the General Dynamics entry over the DOD's preference for Boeing because of commonality issues. The F-111 pioneered perhaps too many new technologies such as swinging wings and pylons, afterburning turbofans and even the only operational ejecting crew escape cabin. Popular media heralded the fighter than could fly slow and fast, fly farther with more payload, and shoot down planes from farther away from any other plane.

A product of the age of missles, the one item missing from the laundry list that was the TFX specification was the decisive factor in all previous air battles, maneuverability. Starting in 1965, US pilots in supersonic jets in Vietnam were shot down by post-Korean vintage Mig-17s in alarming numbers. Grumman dutifully reported that the F-111 would be "unable to cope" in a dogfight, and was much less maneuverable than the F-4 that was then tasked with downing MiGs. The Navy's F-111B would prove an utterly embarrasing and expensive failure, cancelled and replaced by the . The Air Force F-111 suffered extensive problems and accidents before it was effective in the single role of medium bomber. A lasting legacy of the F-111's lesson in how not to build a fighter would be that the US would ultimately develop not one, but 4 more new highly successful air superiority fighters essentially similar to the F-4 in payload and speed. The shadow cast by the accountant's approach to fighter design was so thoroughly discredited that planners stripped multiple roles from both the F-15 Eagle and F-14 Tomcat until the 1990s. The F-111 project is often remembered as one of the most spectacular failures in aviation history, at least in terms of its initial cost saving objectives. However, it is a somewhat fitting footnote that the Australian Air Force will proudly fly their F-111s long after the retirement of the naval TFX replacement, the F-14.

• well, first the florid use of language is amateurish and paints the wrong picture.
• "A product of the age of missles" true, but not the reason the TFX failed. "age of missiles" is not an encyclopedic term - it's colloquial and inaccurate.
• "decisive factor in all previous air battles, maneuverability". Um... no. Armament, speed, power. The Zero was more maneuverable than most U.S. fighters, but it could be defeated with boom and zoom tactics, with fighters that were better armed and more survivable. Ultimately, training trumps all machine aspects - U.S. pilots survived more shootdowns and were able to learn from their mistakes. The Zero, with its unprotected fuel tanks...didn't, and towards the end of the war more and more experienced Japanese pilots were dying and their fresh replacements of far less quality. But I digress.
• "utterly embarrasing and expensive failure" let's source this before introducing such florid language. I agree....but the encyclopedia should take more neutral stance on such issues
• "nimble F-14 Tomcat" nimbler than the F-111, yes. Was that the reason the F-111B was cancelled, not completely, nor was it even a large part of its opposition.
• "The shadow cast by the accountant's approach to fighter design was so thoroughly discredited that planners stripped multiple roles from both the F-15 Eagle and F-14 Tomcat until the 1990s." Utterly wrong depiction. Actually, it didn't do much for perceptions. Civilians still wanted combined programs, Generals still wanted their own projects. Fight continues today; seems like the civilians are gaining the upper hand. Shortly after the TFX was cancelled, the 1970's saw the development of the multi-role F-16 and F/A-18.

In short, the old version of this paints a largely inaccurate picture and is written and exudes a heavily anti-McNamara POV.