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Khālistān (Template:Lang-pa) (lit. "The Land of the Pure") is the name given to the proposed nation-state, encompassing the present Indian state of Punjab and all Punjabi-speaking areas contiguous to its borders, the creation of which has been violently agitated for by separatist organisations.

A movement for Khalistan precipitated when the Indian Army attacked the Harmandir Sahib complex, along with 37 other gurduārās simultaneously, in June 1984. Mary Anne Weaver of the Christian Science Monitor reports that the army operation was followed by killings of Sikh males between the ages of 15 and 35 in Punjab’s villages. These violent events, together with pogroms against Sikhs in India’s major cities in November 1984, and daily terror families subsequently experienced in Punjab’s villages, gave rise to resistance.

A Sarbat Khalsa (general congregation of the Sikh people) was convened at the Akal Takht, the Sikh seat of temporal authority in Amritsar, on January 26, 1986. The gathering passed a resolution (gurmattā) favouring the creation of Khalistan. Khalistan is envisaged by its proponents as a secular state.

Causes of conflict

Sikh role against British colonialism in South Asia (1912-1947)

The status of the Sikhs as a legitimate third-party to the sovereignty of British India, along with Hindus and Muslims, and the role played by the Sikhs to end British colonialism are important factors that have contributed to the discourse on Khalistan. As erstwhile sovereigns of Punjab, the Sikhs—who constituted about 1.1 percent of the population of British-India—played a disproportionate role in the struggle to free the subcontinent of British colonialism. The table below summarises the Sikh contribution in the freedom movement. The data reflects Sikhs serving prison sentences, being deported to nearby islands in exile, facing capital punishment and enlisting themselves in the Indian National Army that was organised to oppose the British.

Table 1: Sikh mobilisation for India’s freedom struggle

Source:

Sikhs accepted as a legitimate third party to India's sovereignty, along with Hindus and Muslims

With the possibility of an end to British colonialism in sight, the Sikh leadership became concerned about the future of the Sikhs. The Sikhs and the Muslims had unsuccessfully claimed separate representation for their communities in the Minto-Morley Scheme of 1909. The Congress, led by predominantly a Hindu majority, denied Sikhs their separate identity and labelled them as a sect of Hinduism. Even though the Sikhs occupied 19.1 percent of the seats in the Punjab Legislature, in a document on the future of British-India in response to the Simon Commission in 1927, the Congress leader Motilal Nehru defined the future of the subcontinent in Hindu and Muslim terms. Nehru’s report evoked strong condemnation from Sikh leaders.

Diarchy was introduced in 1935, guaranteeing a majority for Muslims in Punjab, which changed Hindu attitudes towards the Sikh demand for reasons of political expediency. The Hindus aimed to reduce the Muslim majority in the Punjab Legislative Council. At this time, the Hindus not only accepted Sikhs as a distinct community, but also supported the Sikh demand for adequate political representation. In December 1929, Sikh leaders were also assured by Motilal Nehru and Mohandas Gandhi that Congress would accept no political situation for the future of British India unless it satisfied the Sikhs. Accordingly, the Congress passed a resolution during its Lahore session:

"...as the Sikhs in particular, and Muslims and other minorities in general have expressed dissatisfaction over the solution of communal questions proposed in the Nehru Report, this Congress assures the Sikhs, the Muslims and other minorities that no solution thereof in any future constitution will be acceptable to the Congress that does not give full satisfaction to the parties concerned.

Congress Assurances and Subsequent Repudiation

Jawaharlal Nehru reiterated Gandhi’s assurance to the Sikhs at the All India Congress Committee meeting in Calcutta in 1946. He declared:

The brave Sikhs of Punjab are entitled to special consideration. I see nothing wrong in an area and a set-up in the north wherein the Sikhs can experience the glow of freedom.

With the Muslims proposing the creation of Pakistan to safeguard their interests, some Sikhs put forth the idea of likewise carving out a Sikh state, Khalistan. In the 1940s, a prolonged negotiation transpired between the British and the three Indian groups seeking political power, namely, the Hindus, the Muslims and the Sikhs. During this period, the Congress Party continually extended assurances designed to prevent Sikhs from allying with the Muslim League. To win Sikh support, Jawaharlal Nehru again declared:

Redistribution of provincial boundaries was essential and inevitable. I stand for semi-autonomous units…if the Sikhs desire to function as such a unit, I would like them to have a semi-autonomous unit within the province so that they may have a sense of freedom.”

These pledges, made by Nehru and Gandhi on behalf of the Congress party, were formalised through a resolution passed by the Indian Constituent Assembly on 9 December, 1946. This resolution stated inter alia that:

Adequate safeguards would be provided for minorities in India…It was a declaration, pledge and an undertaking before the world, a contract with millions of Indians and, therefore, in the nature of an oath we must keep.

During a press conference on 10 July, 1946 in Bombay, Nehru made a controversial statement to the effect that the Congress may “change or modify” the federal arrangement agreed upon for independent India; this came “as a bombshell” to many. As a consequence, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League, declared himself impelled to seek the creation of a separate state, Pakistan, in order to safeguard the interests of his community.

After the departure of the British, the Congress Party would repudiate all pledges and Constituent Assembly resolutions promulgated to safeguard Sikh interests. Many Sikhs felt that they had been tricked into joining the Indian union. On 21 November, 1949, during the review of the draft of the Indian Constitution, Hukam Singh, a Sikh representative, declared to the Constituent Assembly:

Naturally, under these circumstances, as I have stated, the Sikhs feel utterly disappointed and frustrated. They feel that they have been discriminated against. Let it not be misunderstood that the Sikh community has agreed to this Constitution. I wish to record an emphatic protest here. My community cannot subscribe its assent to this historic document.

Growth of Sikh national consciousness (1947-1966)

The Sikhs, whose participation in India’s independence struggle was disproportionate to their small numbers (see Table 1), were labelled as a "criminal tribe" in postcolonial India. According to Kapur Singh, who was the Deputy Commissioner at Dalhousie and a member of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) at the time:

In 1947, the governor of Punjab, Mr. C.M. Trevedi, in deference to the wishes of the Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru and Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister, issued certain instructions to all the Deputy Commissioners of Indian Punjab…These were to the effect that, without reference to the law of the land, the Sikhs in general and Sikh migrants in particular must be treated as a “criminal tribe”. Harsh treatment must be meted out to them…to the extent of shooting them dead so that they wake up to the political realities and recognise “who are the rulers and who the subjects.”

Master Tara Singh summed up Sikh sentiments in his Presidential Address to the All India Sikh Conference on March 28, 1953:

English-man has gone, but our liberty has not come. For us the so-called liberty is simply a change of masters, black for white. Under the garb of democracy and secularism, our Panth, our liberty and our religion are being crushed.

Linguistic issues cause civil unrest in Punjab

In the 1950s and 1960s, linguistic issues in India caused civil disorder when the central government attempted to marginalise a select group of regional languages. Hindi was imposed as the national language on all Indians by the Hindu elite leading the Congress. “The nationwide movement of linguistic groups seeking statehood resulted in a massive reorganisation of states according to linguistic boundaries in 1956. However, Punjabi, Sindhi and Urdu were the only three languages not considered for statehood.” As a result, the Shiromani Akali Dal, the party representing the Sikhs in Punjab, initiated its first major movement in August 1950 that lasted two decades. The Akali Dal sought to create a Punjabi suba, a Punjabi-speaking state. This case was presented to the States Reorganisation Commission established in 1953. The Akali Dal’s manifesto declared:

The true test of democracy, in the opinion of the Shiromani Akali Dal, is that the minorities should feel that they are really free and equal partners in the destiny of their country...to bring home a sense of freedom to the Sikhs, it is vital that there should be a Punjabi speaking language and culture. This will not only be in fulfillment of the pre-partition Congress programme and pledges, but also in entire conformity with the universally recognised principles governing formation of provinces…The Shiromani Akali Dal has reason to believe that a Punjabi-speaking province may give the Sikhs the needful security. It believes in a Punjabi speaking province as an autonomous unit of India.”

Rejection of Punjabi as native language by Hindus

A communal response from the Hindus of Punjab further complicated the Sikh demand. There was a Hindu opposition to the adoption of Punjabi as an official language in the Punjabi-speaking areas. Accordingly, Punjabi-speaking Hindus declared Hindi as their mother tongue in the censuses of 1951 and 1961. Paul Brass notes, “There is a good reason to believe…that the 1961 census accurately reflects that language preference of the people of the Punjab, although certainly not the actual mother tongue spoken.” Why would Punjabi Hindus misrepresent and repudiate their linguistic heritage? According to Paul Brass, “The dominant Hindu majority, unable to assimilate the Sikhs, adopted the tactic of avoiding their language so that the Sikhs, a minority people by religion, might become a minority by language as well.”

The demand for adoption of Punjabi for Punjabi-speaking areas intensified the rift between Hindus and Sikhs of Punjab. As the Hindus raised the slogan of “Hindi, Hindu, Hindustan” (lit. “the Hindi language, Hindu religion and Hindu India”), relations between the Akali Dal and the Congress government suffered as well.

The States Reorganization Commission, not recognizing Punjabi as a language that was distinct grammatically from Hindi, rejected the demand for a Punjabi suba or state. Another reason that the Commission gave in its report was that the movement lacked general support of the people inhabiting the region, a reference to the Punjabi Hindus who were opposed to the creation of a Punjabi-speaking state. The Sikhs felt discriminated against by the commission. Hukam Singh of the Akali Dal wrote, “While others got States for their languages, we lost even our language.” The Akali Dal saw the refusal of the Commission to concede to the Sikh demands as a sign of intolerance against a religious community that spoke a distinct language, which was both linguistically and lexically distinct from Hindi. Fateh Singh, a leading Sikh representative, further noted, “No status is given to the Punjabi language, because Sikhs speak it. If non-Sikhs had owned Punjabi as mother tongue then the rulers of India would have seen no objection in establishing a Punjabi State.”

Akal Takht movement

The Akal Takht played a vital role in organizing Sikhs to campaign for the Punjabi suba. During the course of the campaign, twelve thousand Sikhs were arrested for their peaceful demonstrations in 1955 and twenty-six thousand in 1960-61. Finally, in September 1966, the Punjabi suba demand was accepted by the central government and Punjab was trifurcated under the Punjab State Reorganisation Bill. Areas in the south of Punjab that spoke a language that is a derivative of Braj formed a new state of Haryana and the Pahari- and Kangri-speaking districts north of Punjab were merged with Himachal Pradesh, while the remaining areas formed a new state of Punjab. As a result, the Sikhs became a majority in the newly created Punjabi suba with a population of a little over sixty percent.

The Nirankari-Sikh Clashes

Tensions had been escalating between the Sikhs and Nirankaris for some time. Finally, in April 1978, a convention of Nirankaris was attacked by a few hundred Sikhs, led by Bhindranwale and by Fauja Singh of the Akhand Kirtani Jatha. On the way, they hacked off the arm of a Hindu sweetmeats seller. This was regarded as probably the first act of terrorist violence in Punjab. On arriving at the convention, Fauja Singh tried to behead the Nirankari leader with his sword but was shot by the leader's bodyguard. The brawl that ensued thereafter, left 13 of the raiding party dead, including two of Bhindranwale’s followers. Another eleven of the Akhand Kirtani Jatha were killed. Three Nirankaris were also killed. Bhindranwale himself was reported to have fled the scene just as the violence broke out which damaged relations between him and the Akhand Kirtani Jatha. Fauja Singh’s widow often blamed him for her husband’s death. It was also alleged that the then ruling government in Punjab did little to avoid the violence despite having enough grounds to believe that such a violence would take place.

Sixty two Nirankaris, including the head of the sect, Baba Gurbachan Singh were charged in connection with the killing of the 13 Sikhs in the clash. They faced trial and were acquitted on the grounds that they had acted in self defence. This irked the sikhs and in April 1980 Baba Gurbachan Singh was shot dead in retaliation. Twenty persons, including Jarnail Singh Bhindrawale were charged with the murder. All of them were later set free upon a announcement by the then Home Minister of India, Giani Zail Singh, that Bhindrawale was not involved in the murder. Apparently, there was no trial or investigation.

River waters dispute

Before the creation of the Punjabi suba, Punjab was the master of its river waters. When the Punjabi suba was created, the central government—against the provisions of the Indian constitution—introduced sections 78 to 80 in the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966, under which the central government “assumed the powers of control, maintenance, distribution and development of the waters and the hydel power of the Punjab rivers.” With seventy-five percent of Punjab’s river water being diverted to non-riparian, Hindu-dominated states of Haryana and Rajasthan, the Sikhs have perceived the central government’s violation of the Indian constitution as a measure to break the Sikhs economically, since the vast majority of the people of Punjab are dependent on agriculture. Similar river water disputes in other parts of the country have been resolved according to the Indian constitution, reinforcing the perception of the Sikhs that they are being targeted because of their religion.

Helplessness of the judiciary in water disputes

The following anecdote describes the helplessness of the judiciary in India when it came to such disputes. According to the Institute of Sikh Studies, Chandigarh:

"An organisation of farmers had filed a petition in the High Court, Punjab and Haryana, regarding the unconstitutionality of the drain of the waters of the Punjab to the non-riparian states under the Reorganisation Act. The issue being of fundamental constitutional importance, the Chief Justice, S.S. Sandhawalia admitted the long pending petition and announced the constitution of a Full Bench, with himself as Chairman, for the hearing of the case on the following Monday, the 25th November, 1983. In the intervening two days before the hearing of the case could start, and these two days were holidays, two things happened. First, before Monday, the Chief Justice of the High Court was transferred to the High Court of Patna. Hence neither the Bench could sit, nor could the hearing of the case start. Second an oral application was given by the Attorney General in the Supreme Court requesting for the transfer of the writ petition from the file of the High Court to that of the Supreme Court on the ground that the issue involved was of great public importance. The request was granted; the case was transferred. And there this case of great public importance rests unheard for the last nearly twenty years."

Punjab's current water levels

According to the Earth Policy Institute, Punjab’s water table is falling by one metre per year, which could lead to disastrous consequences for the state and its farmers in the long-term.

Akali Dal's demands

The Akali Dal led a series of peaceful mass demonstrations to present its grievances to the central government. The demands of the Akali Dal were based on the Anandpur Sahib Resolution , which was adopted by the party in October 1973 to raise specific political, economic and social issues. The major motivation behind the resolution was the safeguarding of the Sikh identity by securing a state structure that was decentralised, with non-interference from the central government. The Resolution outlines seven objectives.

1. The transfer of the federally administered city of Chandigarh to Punjab.
2. The transfer of Punjabi speaking and contiguous areas to Punjab.
3. Decentralisation of states under the existing constitution, limiting the central government’s role.
4. The call for land reforms and industrialisation of Punjab, along with safeguarding the rights of the weaker sections of the population.
5. The enactment of an all-India gurdwara (Sikh house of worship) act.
6. Protection for minorities residing outside Punjab, but within India.
7. Revision of government’s recruitment quota restricting the number of Sikhs in armed forces.

Along with these demands, the issue concerning the unconstitutional diversion of Punjab’s river waters to non-riparian states has been of fundamental importance. Writing about the nature of these demands, The Wall Street Journal noted:

"The Akali Dal is in the hands of moderate and sensible leadership...but giving anyone a fair share of power is unthinkable politics of Mrs. Gandhi ...Many Hindus in Punjab privately concede that there isn't much wrong with these demands. But every time the ball goes to the Congress court, it is kicked out one way or another because Mrs. Gandhi considers it a good electoral calculation."

The assassination of Lala Jagat Narain

In a politically charged environment, Lala Jagat Narain, the owner of the Hind Samachar group of newspapers, was assassinated by Sikh militants in September 1981. He had been instrumental in persuading Punjabi Hindus to declare their mother tongue as Hindi. His editorials consistently attacked the Akali Dal’s leadership. His assassination led to mob violence by Hindus, who set Sikhs' shops on fire and burnt the offices of the Akali Patrika, a Punjabi newspaper that represented Sikh interests. In September 1981, Bhindranwale was arrested for his alleged role in the assassination. He was detained and interrogated for twenty-five days, but was released because of lack of evidence. After his release, Bhindranwale relocated himself from his headquarters at Mehta Chowk to Guru Nanak Niwas within the Harmindar Sahib precincts. Many Sikhs today criticise this move because they believe that it gave the state an excuse to attack the temple.

Dharam Yudh Morcha

In August 1982, the Akali Dal under the leadership of Harcharan Singh Longowal launched the Dharam Yudh Morcha, or the “battle for righteousness.” Bhindranwale and the Akali Dal united for the first time; their goal was the fulfillment of demands based upon the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. In two and a half months, security forces arrested thirty thousand Sikhs for their peaceful demonstrations to the point that protesting volunteers could not be accommodated in the existing jails.

In November 1982, Akali Dal announced the organisation of peaceful protests in Delhi during the Asian Games. To prevent Sikhs from reaching Delhi, the police were instructed to stop all buses, trains and vehicles that were headed for Delhi and interrogate Sikh passengers. The Sikhs as a community felt discriminated against by the Indian state. Later, the Akali Dal organised a convention at the Darbar Sahib attended by 5,000 Sikh ex-servicemen, 170 of whom were above the rank of colonel. These Sikhs claimed that there was discrimination against them in government service.

Religious confusion

During this turmoil, the Akali Dal began another agitation in February 1984 protesting against clause (2)(b) of Article 25 of the Indian constitution, which defines Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains as being Hindu. Several Akali leaders were arrested for burning the Indian constitution in protest.

From the point of view of religious affirmation, India’s defining of its Sikh, Buddhist and Jain citizens as being part of the Hindu community provides provided cause for discontent. For instance, a Sikh couple who marry in accordance to the rites of the Sikh religion must register their marriage either under the Special Marriages Act (1954) or the Hindu Marriage Act (1955), there being no separate marriage act dealing with Sikh marriages. Although the legal registration of weddings is not required, under Indian law, to establish in court that a marriage existed, this circumstance was viewed by some as being a coercive in often obtaining a tacit declaration from the couple to the effect that they were Hindu. According to one stream of opinion, the contents of clause (2)(b) of Article 25 of the Indian constitution and the laws based on its interpretation are arguably in violation of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) calling for free exercise of religion, because Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains have no way of asserting their religious identity in certain situations: they must choose between affirming themselves Hindu or making no statement at all on religion .

State Terror followed by Militant Response by Sikhs

Operation Bluestar

For over a year, the Indian army had been preparing for an attack on the Darbar Sahib. To legitimise the attack, according to Subramaniam Swami—-a member of the Indian Parliament—-the central government had created a disinformation campaign. In his words, the state sought to “make out that the Golden Temple was the haven of criminals, a store of armory and a citadel of the nation’s dismemberment conspiracy.”

The role of the Third Agency

The Surya magazine published a special report detailing how the Third Agency, a special intelligence outfit created by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s Secretariat, R. Shankaran Nair, was instrumental in smuggling most of the arms inside the Darbar Sahib. “One week before the Army action, Punjab police had intercepted two truck loads of weapons and ammunition in the Batala sub-division of Gurdaspur district. But the officer of the Third Agency, in-charge of Amritsar, persuaded the director-general of police (DGP) to release them and send them along safely to the Golden Temple.” There are claims that Sikh leaders such as Dr. Jagjit Singh Chohan, Harchand Singh Longowal, Didar Bains, Ganga Singh Dhillon, much of the Akali Dal leadership, and others were complicit in the attack on the Golden Temple.

Invasion takes place on a major Sikh holiday

According to plan, the Indian army invaded the temple in an assault that was code named “Operation Blue Star” on 5 June, 1984 to coincide with the martyrdom day of Guru Arjan. It is common knowledge that this gurpurab (commemoration of Guru Arjan’s martyrdom) attracts an unusually large number of Sikh visitors to the temple, just like a large number of Muslims visit Mecca during the month of Ramadan. Then, why did the Indian army attack the most important Sikh shrine on this particular day? Ram Narayan Kumar notes, “Operation Blue Star was not only envisioned and rehearsed in advance, meticulously and in total secrecy, it also aimed at obtaining the maximum number of Sikh victims, largely devout pilgrims unconnected with the political agitation.”

The scale of the attack

Cynthia Kepply Mahmood, describing the scale of the attack, writes:

"When it attacked the Golden Temple complex at Amritsar in 1984, containing the holiest shrine of the Sikhs, the ostensible aim was to rid the sacred buildings of the militants who had taken up shelter inside. But the level force used in the attack was utterly incommensurate with this limited and eminently attainable aim. Seventy thousand troops, in conjunction with the use of tanks and chemical gas, killed not only the few dozen militants who didn’t manage to escape the battleground but also hundreds (possibly thousands) of innocent pilgrims, the day of the attack being a Sikh holy day. The Akal Takht, the seat of temporal authority for the Sikhs, was reduced to rubble and the Sikh Reference Library, an irreplaceable collection of books, manuscripts, and artifacts bearing on all aspects of Sikh history, burned to ground. Thirty-seven other shrines were attacked across Punjab on the same day. The only possible reason for this appalling level of state force against its own citizens must be that the attempt was not merely to “flush out,” as they say, a handful of militants, but to destroy the fulcrum of a possible mass resistance against the state."

The targeting of civilians during the attack

The most disturbing aspect of the operation was the targeting of civilians by the Indian army. Contrary to the army Lt. General K. Sundarji’s statement—“We went inside with humility in our hearts and prayers on our lips”-—for the invading troops “every Sikh inside was a militant.” Mark Tully, in his famous account of the invasion, writes: “Karnail Kaur, a young mother of three children…said, ‘When people begged for water some jawans told them to drink the mixture of blood and urine on the ground.’” Tully records an eye-witness account by Bhan Singh, the then SGPC Secretary:

"I saw about thirty-five or thirty-six Sikhs lined up with their hands raised above their heads. And the major was about to order them to be shot. When I asked him for medical help, he got into rage, tore my turban off my head, and ordered his men to shoot me. I turned back and fled…Sardar Karnail Singh Nag, who had followed me, also narrated what he had seen, as well as the killing of thirty-five to thirty-six young Sikhs by cannon fire. All of them were villagers."

C.K.C. Reddy, while writing on the army action notes:

"The whole of Punjab and especially the Golden Temple Complex, was turned into a murderous mouse trap from where people could neither escape nor could they seek succor of any kind...The bodies of the victims of military operation in Punjab were unceremoniously destroyed without any attempt to identify them and hand them over to their relatives...The most disturbing thing about the entire operation was that a whole mass of men, women, and children were ordered to be killed merely on the suspicion that some terrorists were operating from the Golden Temple and other Gurdwaras. There had been no judicial verdict of guilt against definite individuals who had been taking shelter in the Golden Temple."

The Sikh rememberence of the attack as a holocaust

The Indian army’s invasion of the Golden Temple, which is remembered as a ghalughara (holocaust) by Sikhs, claimed as many as “7,000 to 8,000” lives according to some eyewitness accounts. While there is ample evidence to show that Bhindranwale was fighting for the demands articulated in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution and not for the separate state of Khalistan, the Indian army’s invasion was not seen by the Sikhs as “a security operation but a clash between two nations, the first ‘war for Khalistan’”. As Joyce Pettigrew puts it:

"The sacrifice of Bhindranwale’s life and that of his followers drew attention to the fact that Sikhs live by a model of society opposed to that for which India stood. They were slaughtered in defence of their conception of what society should be."

Lieutenant General Kuldip Singh Brar , then Major General who commanded Indian Army soldiers to enter the Golden Temple, defends the attack by saying:

"Apparently, the government had no other recourse. The events in Punjab had reached a complete breakdown. The Sikh militants were in total control of the state machinery. There was a strong feeling that Khalistan was going to be established at any time. Bhindranwale was being seen as a prophet; he was making very strong speeches against (the then Prime Minister of India) Indira Gandhi and non-Sikhs; and trying to send a message across to the rural areas that the Sikhs are being given second-grade treatment and that it is high time we formed our own independent state of Khalistan. There was a strong possibility of Pakistan helping them and I think there was the possibility of a Bangladesh being repeated."

Operation Woodrose

The army operation was followed by another government-sponsored initiative, code-named, “Operation Woodrose”, in which the Indian army sought to eliminate all Amritdharis (members of the Khalsa Panth) across the villages of Punjab. Baatcheet, the Indian Army’s bulletin, made an appeal to all soldiers in June 1984:

"Any knowledge of the "Amritdharis" who are dangerous people and pledged to committing murder, arson and acts of terrorism should be immediately brought to the notice of the authorities. These people may appear harmless from outside but they are basically committed to terrorism. In the interest of us all, their identity and whereabouts must always be disclosed."

Report by Christian Science Monitor

All initiated Sikhs were “terrorists” in the eyes of the Indian state and were to be killed extra-judicially. The Christian Science Monitor reported:

"The pattern in each village appears to be the same. The Army moves in during the early evening, cordons a village, and announces over loudspeakers that everyone must come out. All males between the ages of 15 and 35 are trussed and blindfolded, then taken away…Thousands have disappeared in the Punjab since the Army Operation began. The government has provided no lists of names; families don't know if sons and husbands are arrested, underground or dead."

Criticism of the attack

For over a year, the Indian army had been preparing for an attack on the Darbar Sahib. According to Subramaniam Swami, a member of the Indian Parliament, the central government had launched a disinformation campaign in order to legitimise the attack. In his words, the state sought to “make out that the Golden Temple was the haven of criminals, a store of armory and a citadel of the nation’s dismemberment conspiracy.”

The assassination of Indira Gandhi and subsequent anti-Sikh pogroms

On the morning of 31 October, 1984, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was shot-dead by two Sikh security guards in New Delhi. The assassination triggered organised violence against Sikhs across north India. In the words of Khushwant Singh, on the night of 31 October, “Politicians belonging to the ruling Congress party met to decide how to teach the Sikhs a lesson they would never forget.” Ram N. Kumar describes the nature of organisation of these state sponsored pogroms against Sikhs:

Early next morning, hordes of people from the suburbs of Delhi were transported to various localities in the city where the Sikh population was concentrated. The mobilisation suggested backing of an organisation with vast resources. The criminal hordes carried crude weapons…and combustible material, including kerosene, for arson. They were also supplied with lists of houses and business establishments belonging to the Sikhs in various localities. The government controlled television Doordarshan, and the All India Radio began broadcasting provocative slogans seeking bloody vengeance, "khoon ka badla khoon se lenge (Blood for blood!)". Murderous gangs of 200 or 300 people led by the leaders, with policemen looking on, began to swarm into Sikh houses, hacking the occupants to pieces, chopping off the heads of children, raping women, tying Sikh men to tires set aflame with kerosene, burning down houses and shops after ransacking them…In some areas, the Sikh families grouped together for self-defense. The police officials then arrived to disperse them, by force when persuasion did not work…Khushwant Singh realised "what Jews must have felt in Nazi Germany." He concluded: "The killing assumed the proportions of a genocide of the Sikh community."

State-operated national television was used by the state to incite violence against the Sikhs, in violation of the Article 20.2 of the ICCPR and the Article 7 of the UDHR. Encyclopedia of Genocide cites these events in its entry on “Genocide of Sikhs”.

Sixteen politicians named as organisers of the pogroms

Two major civil-liberties organisations issued a joint report on the anti-Sikh pogrom naming sixteen important politicians, thirteen police officers and one hundred and ninety-eight others, accused by survivors and eye-witnesses. In January 1985, journalist Rahul Bedi of the Indian Express and Smitu Kothari of the People’s Union for Civil Liberties “moved the High Court of Delhi to demand a judicial inquiry into the pogrom on the strength of the documentation carried out by human rights organisations. Justice Yogeshwar Dayal dismissed the petition after deprecating ‘those busybodies out for publicity, who poke their noses into all matters and waste the valuable time of the judiciary.’”

Denial of justice

A number of politicians who organised the pogrom were rewarded with electoral success by the Congress party and by their Hindu constituents. The Misra Commission was appointed to investigate the killings. According to Patwant Singh:

The Government received the Misra Commission’s report…and took six months to place it before parliament...a full 27 months after the killings. A weak and vapid report, it let key Congress figures off the hook and characteristically recommended the setting up of three more committees…The third committee spawned two more committees plus an enquiry by the Central bureau of Investigation (CBI). When one of these two, the Poti-Rosha Committee, recommended 30 cases for prosecution including one against Sajjan Kumar, Congress MP , and the CBI sent a team to arrest him on 11 September 1990, a mob held the team captive for more than four hours! According to the CBI’s subsequent affidavit filed in court, “the Delhi Police far from trying to disperse the mob sought an assurance from the CBI that he would not be arrested.” The CBI also “disclosed that file relating to the case was found in Sajjan Kumar’s house.” The MP was given “anticipatory bail while the CBI team was being held captive” by his henchmen.

Patwant Singh continues,

Justice Mirsa became the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and after retirement chairman of the National Human Rights Commission; the accused MPs, except one, were again given Congress tickets to stand for parliament; one of them, H.K.L. Bhagat, became a cabinet minister; three accused police officers were promoted and placed in high positions…The Sikhs, determined to see those they believe to be guilty punished, continue to press for justice although fully aware of the fact that in India too, as Solzhenitsyn wrote about his country, “the lie has become not just a moral category, but a pillar of the state.”

There was a collusion between India’s executive branch, its legislators, judiciary and law enforcement agencies. In May 2004, two senior Congress politicians, Sajjan Kumar and Jagdish Tytler, “widely cited as perpetrators of the 1984 pogroms against Sikhs by survivors and witnesses” were elected as Members of Parliament, in addition to Kamal Nath who had attacked Gurdwara Rakab Ganj in Delhi. Furthermore, Manmohan Singh, a Sikh who defended India’s human rights record during the UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993 and does not acknowledge his party’s role in the pogroms against Sikhs in November 1984, ascended to the position of Prime Minister of India in May 2004.

Sikh Militancy

During the late 1980s and the early 1990s, there was a dramatic rise in Sikh militancy in Punjab. Evidence suggests that the militants enjoyed some support within the Sikh masses in Punjab, atleast at the peaceful beginning of the Khalistan movement. The Times of India reported:

"Often and unwittingly…journalists fall prey to the government disinformation which suavely manages to plant stories…The confusion gets compounded when government agencies also resort to feeding disinformation on letterheads of militant organisations since there is no way of confirming or seeking clarifications on press notes supposedly issued by militants who are underground and remain inaccessible most of the time."

Peace Initiatives

It was alleged that there was reluctance on the part of the Central Government to recognise Sikh grievances. The Central government attempted to seek a political solution to the grievances of the Sikhs through the Rajiv-Longowal Accord, which took place between the late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Harchand Singh Longowal, the then President of the Akali Dal. who was later assassinated. The accord recognised the religious, territorial and economic demands of the Sikhs that were thought to be non-negotiable under Indira Gandhi’s tenure. While the agreement provided some basis for a return to normalcy, it was denounced by Sikh militants who claimed that the Indian state could not be trusted. Harchand Singh Longowal was later assassinated by terrorists. The transfer has allegedly been delayed pending an agreement on the districts of Punjab that should be transferred to Haryana in exchange. The table below provides the solutions outlined in the agreement and the status of their implementation.

Table 2: Rajiv-Longowal Accord

Source:

Failure of Central Govenment in Fulfilling Promises

The failure of the central government to implement the agreement led to further alienation of the Sikhs from the Indian state. On 29 April, 1986, an assembly of thousands of Sikhs at the Akal Takht made a declaration of an independent state of Khalistan. These events were followed by a decade of violence and conflict in Punjab.

A recent observation by Tapan Bose of the South Asia Forum for Human Rights provides a critique of the Indian claim that normalcy and peace have returned to Punjab and by implication no peace initiatives are needed:

"...the silence of graveyard that obtains in Punjab today is not a reflection of peace. The enquiry being conducted by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the disappearances and illegal cremations in Punjab, shows the deep social division that is endangering the prospects of justice and peace in the state...Although this matter or police abductions leading to illegal cremations was initiated six years ago before the NHRC, the commission unfortunately has failed to examine a single case of abuse. It has also not heard a single victim's testimony or deposition."

Recent developments

From recent events, it appears that a demand for Khalistan persists in some sections of the Sikh community. On April 14, 2004, Daljit Singh Bittu founded a new political party, the Shiromani Khalsa Dal, with “establishment of a free, sovereign, and separate Khalsa state” as its primary objective. On 29 April, 2004, the Dal Khalsa, a Sikh nationalist organisation, began a week long “Khalsa Freedom March” from the Akal Takht in Amritsar with an objective of gaining support for the idea of Khalistan by peaceful means. A large number of gurdwāras (the Sikh houses of worship), across Punjab and in the diaspora continue to celebrate the "martyrdom" anniveraries of Sikhs who died fighting in the Khalistan freedom struggle. While fear of human rights abuses keeps sloganing in Punjab to the minimum, the Sikh organisations in the diaspora (primarily Europe, North America and Australia) continue to lobby for the secession of Khalistan from the Indian union.

In 2005, Dal Khalsa led two marches in support of Khalistan in Punjab, one on Indian Republic Day and one on the anniversary of the Golden Temple attacks. Many people were arrested after these events because their actions were against Indian Constitution.

Creation of the Punjab Rights Forum

In June 2005 following the arrests of dozens of Babbar Khalsa (International) militants and sympathisers in Punjab and Delhi, a number of Punjab based pro-Khalistan political parties and organisations joined forces with a dozen odd human rights, religious and kīsān (argricultural) groups to form a loose coalition known as the Punjab Rights Forum.

References and notes

1. Mahmood, Cynthia Keppley, “Dynamics of Terror in Punjab and Kashmir,” Jeffrey A. Sluka, ed., Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000, p. 77.
2. Mary Anne Weaver, The Christian Science Monitor, 15 October, 1984. Also see Talk page, July 4, 2006, for full text of the article.
3. Joyce Pettigrew, "Parents and Their Children in Situation of Terror: Disappearances and Special Police Activity in Punjab," Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), p. 204.
4. Singh, Kapur, “Golden Temple and Its Theo-political Status,” (last accessed May 20, 2004). Historically, all Sikh states have been based on secular, non-theocratic laws because the Sikhs neither have a priestly class, which may rule in the name of an invisible God, nor do they have a corpus of civil law of divine origin and sanction.
5. Singh, Iqbal, Punjab Under Siege: A Critical Analysis, New York: Allen, McMillan and Enderson, 1986, p. 33
6. Singh, Iqbal, Punjab Under Siege: A Critical Analysis, New York: Allen, McMillan and Enderson, 1986, p. 33
7. Singh, Iqbal, Punjab Under Siege: A Critical Analysis, New York: Allen, McMillan and Enderson, 1986, p. 35
8. Singh, Iqbal, Punjab Under Siege: A Critical Analysis, New York: Allen, McMillan and Enderson, 1986, p. 36
9. Singh, Iqbal, Punjab Under Siege: A Critical Analysis, New York: Allen, McMillan and Enderson, 1986, p. 36
10. Singh, Iqbal, Punjab Under Siege: A Critical Analysis, New York: Allen, McMillan and Enderson, 1986, 1999, p. 36.
11. Quoted in Singh, Iqbal, Punjab Under Siege: A Critical Analysis, New York: Allen, McMillan and Enderson, 1986, 1999, p. 36.
12. The Statesman, Calcutta, 7 July, 1946 quoting Jawaharlal Nehru in Singh, Iqbal, Punjab Under Siege: A Critical Analysis, New York: Allen, McMillan and Enderson, 1986, p. 37.
13. For instance, in 1940, Dr. Vir Singh Bhatti demanded the formulation of the Sikh state of Khalistan as a buffer state between Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India.
14. Congress Records, quoted in Singh, Iqbal, Punjab Under Siege: A Critical Analysis, New York: Allen, McMillan and Enderson, 1986, p. 38.
15. Quoted in Singh, Iqbal, Punjab Under Siege: A Critical Analysis, New York: Allen, McMillan and Enderson, 1986, p. 38.
16. Singh, Iqbal, Punjab Under Siege: A Critical Analysis, New York: Allen, McMillan and Enderson, 1986, p. 38.
17. PSingh, Iqbal, Punjab Under Siege: A Critical Analysis, New York: Allen, McMillan and Enderson, 1986, p. 38-39.
18. Singh, Gurmit, History of Sikh Struggles, New Delhi: South Asia Books, 1989, p. 110-111
19. Singh, Kapur, Sachi Sakhi, Amritsar: SGPC, 1993, p. 4-5. Kapur Singh was one of the officials who received a copy of the memorandum and speaks as an insider.
20. Kapur, Anup Chand, The Punjab Crisis, New Delhi: S. Chand, 1985, p. 45.
21. Deol, Harnik, Religion and Nationalism in India: The Case of the Punjab, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 93.
22. Ibid, p. 93
23. Quoted in ibid, p. 94.
24. Quoted in ibid, p. 95.
25. Quoted in ibid, p. 95.
26. Ibid, p. 95.
27. Quoted in ibid, p. 95.
28. Ibid, p. 95.
29. Quoted in ibid, p. 95-96.
30. Ibid, p. 96.
31. States have full ownership and exclusive legislative and executive powers to their river waters under Articles 246(3) and 162 of the Indian Constitution.
32. Singh, Gurdev, “Punjab River Waters”, Chandigarh: Institute of Sikh Studies, 2002. http://www.sikhcoalition.org/Sikhism24.asp (last accessed, May 12, 2004).
33. In a judicial decision concerning the question whether the Narmada river—which passes through the territory of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat states, but not through the Rajasthan state—could be shared by Rajasthan, it was ruled: “(i) Rajasthan being a non-riparian state in regard to Narmada, cannot apply to the Tribunal, because under the Act only a co-riparian state can do so; and (ii) the state of Rajasthan is not entitled to any portion of the waters of Narmada basin on the ground that the state of Rajasthan is not a co-riparian state, or that no portion of its territory is situated in the basin of River Narmada.” See Government of India, The Report of the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal, vol. III, New Delhi, 1978, p. 30.
34. Singh, Gurdev, “Punjab River Waters”, Chandigarh: Institute of Sikh Studies, 2002. http://www.sikhcoalition.org/Sikhism24.asp (last accessed, May 12, 2004).
35. http://www.earth-policy.org/Indicators/indicator7_data2.htm (last accessed, May 12, 2004).
36. Anandpur Sahib Resolution
37. Deol, Harnik, Religion and Nationalism in India: The Case of the Punjab, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 101-102.
38. The Wall Street Journal, 26 September, 1983.
39. Ibid, p. 105.
40. Deol, Harnik, Religion and Nationalism in India: The Case of the Punjab, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 105.
41. Deol, Harnik, Religion and Nationalism in India: The Case of the Punjab, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 105.
42. Deol, Harnik, Religion and Nationalism in India: The Case of the Punjab, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 106.
43. See (last accessed May 12, 2004)
44. In the colonial period, Sikh marriages were registered under the Anand Marriage Act of 1909, which was named after the Sikh marriage ceremony, the Anand Karaj. The Anand Marriage Act was repealed in independent India.
45. Swami, Subramaniam, Imprint, July 1984, p. 7-8. Quoted in Kumar, Ram Narayan, et al, Reduced to Ashes: The Insurgency and Human Rights in Punjab, Kathmandu: South Asia Forum for Human Rights, 2003, p. 34. (Hereafter, Reduced to Ashes.)
46. Bajaj, Rajeev, K., “Dead Men Tell No Tales,” Surya, September 1984, p. 9-10.
47. Kumar, Ram Narayan, et. al., Reduced to Ashes, p. 34. For full details, see Surya cover story, ibid, p. 13.
48. Singh, Professor Gurtej, IAS, Chakravyuh: Web of Indian Secularism
49. Kumar, Ram Narayan, et. al., Reduced to Ashes, p. 34. For full details, see Surya cover story, ibid, p. 35.
50. Mahmood, Cynthia Keppley, “Dynamics of Terror in Punjab and Kashmir,” Jeffrey A. Sluka, ed., Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000, p. 77.
51. Quoted in Brar, K.S., Operation Blue Star: The True Story, New Delhi: UBSPD, 1993, p. 74.
52. Kumar, Ram Narayan, et. al., Reduced to Ashes, p. 38.
53. Tully, Mark and Jacob, Satish, Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi’s Last Battle, New Delhi: Rupa and Co., 1985, p. 170.
54. Reddy, C.K.C., et. al., Army Action in Punjab: Prelude & Aftermath, New Delhi: Samata Era Publication, 1984, p. 46-48
55. For a range of number estimates, see Kumar, Ram Narayan, et. al., Reduced to Ashes, p. 38.
56. Singh, Gurharpal, Ethnic Conflict in India: A Case-Study of Punjab, New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 2000, p. 114.
57. Quoted in Singh, Gurharpal, Ethnic Conflict in India: A Case-Study of Punjab, New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 2000, p. 114.
58. Baatcheet, Serial Number 153, June 1984. For full text, see
59. Mary Anne Weaver, The Christian Science Monitor, 15 October, 1984.
60. Swami, Subramaniam, Imprint, July 1984, p. 7-8. Quoted in Kumar, Ram Narayan, et al, Reduced to Ashes: The Insurgency and Human Rights in Punjab, Kathmandu: South Asia Forum for Human Rights, 2003, p. 34. (Hereafter, Reduced to Ashes.)
61. Kumar, Ram Narayan, et. al., Reduced to Ashes, p. 42.
62. Kumar, Ram Narayan, et. al., Reduced to Ashes, p. 42-3.
63. Charny, Israel W., ed., Encyclopedia of Genocide, vol 2, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1999, p. 516-517.
64. Kumar, Ram Narayan, et. al., Reduced to Ashes, p. 43.
65. Kumar, Ram Narayan, et. al., Reduced to Ashes, p. 43-4.
66. Singh, Patwant, The Sikhs, New York: Knopf, 2000, p. 223-224.
67. (last accessed May 20, 2004).
68. (last accessed May 20, 2004).
69. The Press Council of India, Crisis and Credibility, New Delhi: Lancer International, 1991, in Sandhu, Ranbir Singh, Struggle for Justice: Speeches and Conversations of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, Dublin: Sikh Educational and Religious Foundation, 1999, p. xlvi (Struggle for Justice, hereafter).
70. Kumar, Dinesh, “Dispatches from the Edge”, The Times of India, August, 11, 1991.
71. Singh, Gurharpal, Ethnic Conflict in India: A Case-Study of Punjab, New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 2000, p. 133 (adapted).
72. Kumar, Ram Narayan, et. al., Reduced to Ashes: The Insurgency and Human Rights in Punjab, p. IV.
73. Shiromani Khalsa Dal, “Daljit Singh Founds New Party on Idealism and Activism”, .
74. Sikhe News Bureau, “Khalsa March for Freedom”, .

See Also

• Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar)
• Dal Khalsa
• Shiromani Khalsa Dal
• Shiromani Akali Dal (International)
• Shiromani Khalsa Panchayat
• Sikh Students Federation
• Damdami Taksal
• Khalsa Raj Party
• Indira Gandhi

External links

• Ensaaf: Fighting Impunity in India
• The Sikh Genocide Project
• Human Rights Watch India Page
• Report by Committee for Information and Initiative on Punjab, led by Human Rights Activist Ram Narayam Kumar
• Human Rights in India -- Harvard Law School
• Website by the attorney defending November 1984 pogrom victims in Delhi. Contains important affidavits and other documentation.
• Self-Determination as a Human Right and its applicability to the Sikhs

Pro-Khalistan Organizations

• Official Site of the Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar)
• Official Site of the Dal Khalsa
• Official Site of the Shiromani Khalsa Dal
• Khalistan Affairs Center - A Washington based pro-Khalistan Institution
• Sikh Federation (UK)
• Sikh Students Federation

Further reading

• Jaskaran Kaur, Barbara Crossette. Twenty Years of Impunity: The November 1984 Pogroms of Sikhs in India. London: Nectar, 2004.
• Cynthia Keppley Mahmood. Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues With Sikh Militants. University of Pennsylvania Press, ISBN 0812215923.
• Cynthia Keppley Mahmood. A Sea Of Orange: Writings on the Sikhs and India. Xlibris Corporation, ISBN 1401028578
• Ram Narayan Kumar et al. Reduced to Ashes: The Insurgency and Human Rights in Punjab. South Asia Forum for Human Rights, 2003.
• Joyce Pettigrew. The Sikhs of the Punjab: Unheard Voices of State and Guerrilla Violence. Zed Books Ltd., 1995.
• Anurag Singh. Giani Kirpal Singh’s Eye-Witness Account of Operation Bluestar. 1999.
• Patwant Singh. The Sikhs. New York: Knopf, 2000.
• Harnik Deol. Religion and Nationalism in India: The Case of the Punjab. London: Routledge, 2000
• Jacob Tully. Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi's Last Battle. ISBN 0224023284.
• Ranbir Singh Sandhu. Struggle for Justice: Speeches and Conversations of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. Ohio: SERF, 1999.
• Iqbal Singh. Punjab Under Siege: A Critical Analysis. New York: Allen, McMillan and Enderson, 1986.
• Paul Brass. Language, Religion and Politics in North India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974.
• Julio Riberio. Bullet for Bullet: My Life as a Police Officer. New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1999.

• NPOV disputes
• Politics of India
• Proposed countries
• Punjab (India)
• Sikh politics
• Sovereignty movements