Revision as of 09:58, 18 July 2006 editZer0faults (talk | contribs)5,735 edits all my summaries are fully explained, you have not contested a single one. blindly reverting is frowned upon.← Previous edit | Revision as of 17:12, 18 July 2006 edit undoMorton devonshire (talk | contribs)6,576 edits Removed sources that don't qualify under WP:RSNext edit → | ||
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The program was primarily aimed at, but not limited to, the "Iraqi and Arab media" along with the "U.S. Home Audience," which was part of a "broader propaganda campaign." The article goes on to explain: ''That slide, created by Casey's subordinates, does not specifically state that U.S. citizens were being targeted by the effort, but other sections of the briefings indicate that there were direct military efforts to use the U.S. media to affect views of the war.'' Such efforts include selective leaking of factual information to reporters. <ref name="WaPo">, The Washington Post, 10 April 2006</ref> | The program was primarily aimed at, but not limited to, the "Iraqi and Arab media" along with the "U.S. Home Audience," which was part of a "broader propaganda campaign." The article goes on to explain: ''That slide, created by Casey's subordinates, does not specifically state that U.S. citizens were being targeted by the effort, but other sections of the briefings indicate that there were direct military efforts to use the U.S. media to affect views of the war.'' Such efforts include selective leaking of factual information to reporters. <ref name="WaPo">, The Washington Post, 10 April 2006</ref> | ||
<ref name="Salon">[http://www.salon.com/opinion/blumenthal/2006/06/15/zarqawi/ | |||
<ref name="Salon"> Ignoring U.S. intelligence, Bush inflated Zarqawi, then made a pointless trip to Iraq to pose as a heroic dragon slayer. It doesn't work anymore, By Sidney Blumenthal, ], June 15, 2006</ref><ref name="CounterPunch1"> by Jennifer van Bergen, ], June 12, 2006</ref><ref name="Global_Research"> by Michel Chossudovsky, Global Research, June 09, 2006,</ref><ref name="CounterPunch2">, Patrick Cockburn, Counterpunch, June 9, 2006</ref><ref name="GRca"> by Michel Chossudovsky, ], April 18, 2006</ref><ref name="RollingStone"> by Tim Dickinson, ], April 11, 2006</ref><ref name="Daily_Kos"> by DelicateMonster, ], June 10, 2006 </ref> | |||
One of the goals was to set up local citizens against him by portraying him as a foreigner and key actor in the insurgency. <ref name="WaPo"/> However, ] reported that, according to a "military source," this campaign ultimately revolved around "domestic political reasons."<ref name="Salon"/> | One of the goals was to set up local citizens against him by portraying him as a foreigner and key actor in the insurgency. <ref name="WaPo"/> However, ] reported that, according to a "military source," this campaign ultimately revolved around "domestic political reasons."<ref name="Salon"/> | ||
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Prior to the involvement of Zarqawi in the Iraqi insurgency, he was jailed in Jordan for attempting to overthrow the government. He was arrested while in possession of explosives and given a 5 year sentence. Upon release from the Jordanian prison in 1999, Zarqawi's involvement in an attempt to blow up the Radisson SAS hotel in Jordan was exposed and he fled the country. According to court testimony by Zarqwai followers he was able to secure funds from al-Qaeda to setup a training camp near Herat. <ref name="WPBio">{{cite news | title=Al-Zarqawi's Biography | date=], ] | publisher=] | url=http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/08/AR2006060800299.html?nav=rss_world/africa }}</ref> | Prior to the involvement of Zarqawi in the Iraqi insurgency, he was jailed in Jordan for attempting to overthrow the government. He was arrested while in possession of explosives and given a 5 year sentence. Upon release from the Jordanian prison in 1999, Zarqawi's involvement in an attempt to blow up the Radisson SAS hotel in Jordan was exposed and he fled the country. According to court testimony by Zarqwai followers he was able to secure funds from al-Qaeda to setup a training camp near Herat. <ref name="WPBio">{{cite news | title=Al-Zarqawi's Biography | date=], ] | publisher=] | url=http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/08/AR2006060800299.html?nav=rss_world/africa }}</ref> | ||
Several incidents turned him from an unknown and unimportant individual into the well-known voice of Al Qaeda in Iraq. |
Several incidents turned him from an unknown and unimportant individual into the well-known voice of Al Qaeda in Iraq. By ], ], June 30, 2006</ref> Following the allegation he was a link between ] and ] (used as ]<ref name="GRca2">, by ] before the ] in 2003, he became the embodiment of resistance against the US in the Muslim world. Another stimulus for his popularity was the ] by the Bush administration. After the capture of Saddam Hussein the Bush administration accused him of being behind the continuing mishaps in Iraq, or, as Patrick Cockburn commented in an editorial for Counterpunch Newsletter: | ||
:''"No sooner had Saddam Hussein been captured than the US spokesmen began to mention al-Zarqawi's name in every sentence." |
:''"No sooner had Saddam Hussein been captured than the US spokesmen began to mention al-Zarqawi's name in every sentence." | ||
⚫ | In the wake of his assasination, which had erroneously been reported several times before, |
||
:''The video portrays "Terror Mastermind" Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi acting in a "foolish" and "incompetent" fashion.''<ref name="GRca2"/> | |||
The article suggests that this might also be part of "successful propaganda." It continues with: | |||
:''What is rarely mentioned is that this outside enemy Al Qaeda is a CIA "intelligence asset", used in covert operations.'' | |||
⚫ | In the wake of his assasination, which had erroneously been reported several times before, the US produced a video showing him to be the opposite of what the media previously advocated him to be. | ||
==Quotes== | ==Quotes== | ||
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According to the same article: | According to the same article: | ||
:''A goal of the campaign was to drive a wedge into the insurgency by emphasizing Zarqawi's terrorist acts and foreign origin, said officers familiar with the program.''<ref name="WaPo"/><ref name="RollingStone"/> | :''A goal of the campaign was to drive a wedge into the insurgency by emphasizing Zarqawi's terrorist acts and foreign origin, said officers familiar with the program.''<ref name="WaPo"/><ref name="RollingStone"/> | ||
] in an editorial for the ] commented: | |||
:''The internal military documents leaked to Washington Post confirm that the Pentagon is involved in an ongoing propaganda campaign which seeks to provide a face to the enemy. The purpose is to portray the enemy as a terrorist, to mislead public opinion.''<ref name="GRca"/> | |||
and another quote states: | |||
:''"Without Zarqawi and bin Laden, the "war on terrorism" would loose its ]. The main ] is to wage a " war on terrorism."'' <ref name="GRca"/> | |||
==See also== | ==See also== |
Revision as of 17:12, 18 July 2006
It has been suggested that this article be merged into Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. (Discuss) |
The Zarqawi PSYOP program refers to a US Psychological operations program, or propaganda campaign, implemented as part of the War on Terror, exaggerating the importance of Al Zarqawi in Al Qaeda and the Iraq insurgency.
The program was primarily aimed at, but not limited to, the "Iraqi and Arab media" along with the "U.S. Home Audience," which was part of a "broader propaganda campaign." The article goes on to explain: That slide, created by Casey's subordinates, does not specifically state that U.S. citizens were being targeted by the effort, but other sections of the briefings indicate that there were direct military efforts to use the U.S. media to affect views of the war. Such efforts include selective leaking of factual information to reporters.
Cite error: A <ref>
tag is missing the closing </ref>
(see the help page).
Several incidents turned him from an unknown and unimportant individual into the well-known voice of Al Qaeda in Iraq.The Myth of Al Qaeda Before 9/11, Osama bin Laden’s group was small and fractious. How Washington helped to build it into a global threat By Michael Hirsh, Newsweek, June 30, 2006</ref> Following the allegation he was a link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda (used as casus belli<ref name="GRca2">, by Colin Powell before the UN Security Council in 2003, he became the embodiment of resistance against the US in the Muslim world. Another stimulus for his popularity was the invasion of Iraq by the Bush administration. After the capture of Saddam Hussein the Bush administration accused him of being behind the continuing mishaps in Iraq, or, as Patrick Cockburn commented in an editorial for Counterpunch Newsletter:
- "No sooner had Saddam Hussein been captured than the US spokesmen began to mention al-Zarqawi's name in every sentence."
In the wake of his assasination, which had erroneously been reported several times before, the US produced a video showing him to be the opposite of what the media previously advocated him to be.
Quotes
The Washington post cites Col. Derek Harvey who said at a meeting by the Army in Fort Leavenworth:
- "Our own focus on Zarqawi has enlarged his caricature, if you will - made him more important than he really is, in some ways."
Citing an internal memo by Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the senior commander in charge, the Washington Post states:
- "The Zarqawi PSYOP program is the most successful information campaign to date."
According to the same article:
- A goal of the campaign was to drive a wedge into the insurgency by emphasizing Zarqawi's terrorist acts and foreign origin, said officers familiar with the program.
See also
- Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
- Doublespeak
- Iraq war
- Newspeak
- Propaganda
- Psychological operations (United States)
- Psychological warfare
- PSYOP
References
- ^ Military Plays Up Role of Zarqawi By Thomas E. Ricks, The Washington Post, 10 April 2006
- ^ Cite error: The named reference
RollingStone
was invoked but never defined (see the help page).