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It has been suggested that this article be merged into Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. (Discuss)

The Zarqawi PSYOP program refers to a purported US Psychological operations program, or propaganda campaign exaggerating the importance of Al Zarqawi in Al Qaeda and the Iraq insurgency.

The program was allegedly primarily aimed at, but not limited to, the "Iraqi and Arab media" along with the "U.S. Home Audience," which was part of a "broader propaganda campaign."

One of the presented goals was to alienate local citizens from him by portraying him as a foreigner and key actor in the insurgency. However, Sidney Blumenthal reported that, according to a "military source," this campaign ultimately revolved around "domestic political reasons."

Program

On October 4, 2004, The Telegraph reported that, according to a U.S. military intelligence agent, the U.S. was paying $10,000 to individuals in order to pass for fact the fiction and suppositions regarding Zarqawi.

The Washington Post reported on April 10, 2006, that the role of Zarqawi was magnified by the Pentagon in a psychological operations campaign started in 2004. In the words of the Washington Post:

For the past two years, U.S. military leaders have been using Iraqi media and other outlets in Baghdad to publicize Zarqawi's role in the insurgency. The documents explicitly list the "U.S. Home Audience" as one of the targets of a broader propaganda campaign.

The article goes on to explain that a slide created for a briefing by Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr,

describes the "home audience" as one of six major targets of the American side of the war.

Nevertheless, the slide did not specifically assert the program targeted U.S. citizens. Although other parts of the briefing did suggest it was directed at the U.S. media to alter the view of the war.

Another slide in the briefing noted a "selective leak" to reporter Dexter Filkins, about a letter boasting of suicide attacks in Iraq and allegedly written by Zarqawi. He used that information for an article in the New York Times. Contacted by the Post Filkins commented he was skeptical at the time, and still is, about the document's authenticity.

According to Sidney Blumenthal, in an article for Salon, a military source told him that, for ultimately "domestic political reasons," Donald Rumsfeld and the White House resisted degrading the dramatically inflated image of Zarqawi.

Responding to the in the Post reported psychological operations aimed at Americans, Army Col. James A. Treadwell, commander of the U.S. military psyops unit in Iraq, but no longer present as the program was started, said that the US doesn't do that. Another officer commented in the Post that, although all material provided was in Arabic, the campaign probably influenced the view of the American press raising his profile. The Post continues that, according to an officer familiar with the case, this program was not related to another program which was linked to the Lincoln Group.

By focusing on his terrorist activities and status as a foreigner the US tried to inflame Iraqi citizens against him. Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the senior commander in charge, remarked, according to the Washington Post:

"The Zarqawi PSYOP program is the most successful information campaign to date."

Regarding the influence of this program on Al Qaeda Jennifer Schultz reports the comments by terrorism expert Loretta Napoleoni:

The myth of al-Zarqawi, Napoleoni believes, helped usher in al-Qaida's "transformation from a small elitist vanguard to a mass movement."

Rise to power

According to articles in Newsweek and Asia Times Online several incidents turned Abu Musab al-Zarqawi from an unknown and unimportant terrorist into the well-known voice of Al Qaeda in Iraq. The Asia Times contends that in February 2003 he was practically unknown outside Jordan. Loretta Napoleoni, a terrorism expert, also commented that prior to the invasion of Iraq his scope was limited to corrupt Arab regimes, most notably Jordan. Both Newsweek and the Asia Times continue by commenting that initially he was largely unconnected to Saddam Hussein, and not part of bin Laden's group. Eric Margolis, terrorism expert, concurs that he never was part of al Qaeda prior to the Iraq war. Following the allegation he was a link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda (used as casus belli, by Colin Powell before the UN Security Council in 2003, he became the embodiment of resistance against the US in the Muslim world. Then the invasion of Iraq by the Bush administration became another boost for his popularity, which Michael Hirsch in Newsweek describes as:

the Iraq invasion gave Zarqawi a chance to blossom on his own as a jihadi.

After the capture of Saddam Hussein the Bush administration accused him of being behind the continuing mishaps in Iraq, or, as Patrick Cockburn commented in an editorial for Counterpunch Newsletter:

Articles in the Columbia Journalism Review, the Washington Post, Rolling Stone, Newsweek suggest his increased notoriety, as illustrated above, was the result of an orchestrated effort involving psychological operations.

Jane Arraf, CNN’s former Baghdad bureau chief, observed that there are discrepancies between what journalist encounter in Iraq “and a lot of the comments we see coming out of the administration and the Pentagon.” Commenting on this Daniel Schulman for Columbia Journalism Review said:

... it has become, in part, a contest over the framing of reality, and thus a hall of mirrors for the press.

In the wake of his assasination, which had erroneously been reported several times before, the U.S. military produced a video showing him to be the opposite of what the media previously advocated him to be.

Effect of US PSYOP on domestic audiences

Or, in the words of Army Col. James A. Treadwell, who commanded the U.S. military psyops unit in Iraq in 2003, in the Washington Post:

There's always going to be a certain amount of bleed-over with the global information environment.

US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has approved that document, which is called "Information Operations Roadmap." The document acknowledges the Smith-Mundt Act, but fails to offer any way of limiting the effect PSYOP programs have on domestic audiences.

Quotes

The Washington post cites Col. Derek Harvey who said at a meeting by the Army in Fort Leavenworth:

"Our own focus on Zarqawi has enlarged his caricature, if you will - made him more important than he really is, in some ways."

See also

• Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
• Doublespeak
• Information Operations Roadmap
• Iraq war
• Lincoln Group
• Newspeak
• Propaganda
• Psychological operations (United States)
• Psychological warfare
• PSYOP
• Smith-Mundt Act

References

1. ^ Military Plays Up Role of Zarqawi - Jordanian Painted As Foreign Threat To Iraq's Stability By Thomas E. Ricks, The Washington Post, April 10, 2006
2. ^ "Mission Accomplished" in a business suit - Ignoring U.S. intelligence, Bush inflated Zarqawi, then made a pointless trip to Iraq to pose as a heroic dragon slayer. It doesn't work anymore by Sidney Blumenthal, Salon, June 15, 2006
3. ^ Hyping Zarqawi by Tim Dickinson, Rolling Stone, April 11, 2006
4. How US fuelled myth of Zarqawi the mastermind By Adrian Blomfield, Telegraph, October 4, 2004
5. U.S. Says Files Seek Qaeda Aid in Iraq Conflict By DEXTER FILKINS, New York Times, February 9, 2004
6. A 2003 Pentagon directive appears to bar a military program that pays Iraqi media to print favorable stories by Mark Mazzetti, Los Angeles Times, January 27th, 2006
7. Cite error: The named reference CounterPunch1 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
8. Cite error: The named reference Napoleoni was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
9. ^ The Myth of Al Qaeda Before 9/11, Osama bin Laden’s group was small and fractious. How Washington helped to build it into a global threat By Michael Hirsh, Newsweek, June 30, 2006
10. Zarqawi - Bush's man for all seasons By Pepe Escobar, Asia Times Online, October 15, 2005
11. Cite error: The named reference Schultz was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
12. Zarqawi: From street thug to symbol of holy war by Sarah Challands, CTV.ca, June 12, 2006
13. ^ Cite error: The named reference CJR was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
14. Cite error: The named reference AP was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
15. Cite error: The named reference NSA was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
16. Cite error: The named reference Lamb was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
17. US plans to 'fight the net' revealed By Adam Brookes, BBC, January 27, 2006

• Psychological warfare
• Propaganda
• Counter-terrorism
• Anti-terrorism policy of the United States
• George W. Bush administration controversies
• 2003 Iraq conflict
• Iraqi insurgency