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Several scholars have accused the United States of conducting state terrorism. They have written about the liberal democracies' use of state terrorism, particularly in relation to the Cold War. According to them, state terrorism was used to protect the interest of capitalist elites, and the US organized a neo-colonial system of client states, co-operating with local elites to rule through terror. This work has proved controversial with mainstream scholars of both state and non-state terrorism.

Notable works include Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman's The political economy of human rights (1979), Herman's The real terror network (1985), Alexander L. George' Western state terrorism (1991), Frederick Gareau's State terrorism and the United States (2004) and Doug Stokes' America's other war (2005). Of these, Chomsky and Herman are considered the foremost writers on the United States and state terrorism.

Notable works

Beginning in the late 1970s, Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman wrote a series of books on the United States' involvement with state terrorism. Their writings coincided with reports by Amnesty International and other human rights organizations of a new global "epidemic" of state torture and murder. Chomsky and Herman argued that terror was concentrated in the US sphere of influence in developing countries, and documented human rights abuses carried out by US client states in Latin America. They argued that of ten Latin American countries that had death squads, all were US client states. Worldwide they claimed that 74% of regimes that used torture on an administrative basis were U.S. client states, receiving military and other support from the US to retain power. They concluded that the global rise in state terror was a result of US foreign policy.

In 1991, a book edited by Alexander L. George also argued that other Western powers sponsored terror in developing countries. It concluded that the US and its allies were the main supporters of terrorism throughout the world. Gareau states that the number of deaths caused by non-state terrorism (3668 deaths between 1968 and 1980, as estimated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)) is "dwarfed" by those resulting from state terrorism in US-backed regimes such as Guatemala (150,000 killed, 50,000 missing during the Guatemalan Civil War - 93% of whom Gareau classifies as "victims of state terrorism"). In Worse Than War, Daniel Goldhagen argues that during the last two decades of the Cold War, the number of American client states practicing mass murder outnumbered those of the Soviet Union. And according to Latin Americanist John H. Coatsworth, the number of victims of said state terror in Latin America alone far surpassed that of the U.S.S.R. and its East European satellites.

Chomsky concluded that all powers backed state terrorism in client states. At the top were the US and other powers, notably the United Kingdom and France, that provided financial, military and diplomatic support to Third World regimes kept in power through violence. These governments acted together with multinational corporations, particularly in the arms and security industries. In addition, other developing countries outside the Western sphere of influence carried out state terror supported by rival powers.

The alleged involvement of major powers in state terrorism in developing countries has led scholars to study it as a global phenomenon, rather than study individual countries in isolation.

Definition

The United States legal definition of terrorism excludes acts done by recognized states. According to U.S. law (22 U.S.C. 2656f(d)(2)) terrorism is defined as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience". There is no international consensus on a legal or academic definition of terrorism. United Nations conventions have failed to reach consensus on definitions of non-state or state terrorism.

According to professor Mark Selden, "American politicians and most social scientists definitionally exclude actions and policies of the United States and its allies" as terrorism. Historian Henry Commager wrote that "Even when definitions of terrorism allow for state terrorism, state actions in this area tend to be seen through the prism of war or national self-defense, not terror.” According to Dr Myra Williamson "The meaning of “terrorism” has undergone a transformation. During the reign of terror a regime or system of terrorism was used as an instrument of governance, wielded by a recently established revolutionary state against the enemies of the people. Now the term “terrorism" is commonly used to describe terrorist acts committed by non-state or subnational entities against a state.

In State terrorism and the United States Frederick F. Gareau writes that the intent of terrorism is to intimidate or coerce both targeted groups and larger sectors of society that share or could be led to share the values of targeted groups by causing them "intense fear, anxiety, apprehension, panic, dread and/or horror". The objective of terrorism against the state is to force governments to change their policies, to overthrow governments or even to destroy the state. The objective of state terrorism is to eliminate people who are considered to be actual or potential enemies, and to discourage those actual or potential enemies who are not eliminated.

El Salvador

The overthrow of Somoza in Nicaragua in 1979 stoked fears in Washington that it may further lose its grip on its proverbial "backyard". U.S. strategists saw El Salvador as the next domino to fall to "subversion", where there was an emergence of "popular organizations" in the 1970s: dissident labor unions, student and peasant groups under Church sponsorship and controlled by the leftist guerrilla-political front, the FMLN-FDR, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front and the Democratic Revolutionary Front. On the other side was a U.S.-run terror state with a rightward leaning civilian president, who won farcical elections, and served as a "fig leaf" for a rightist-controlled military regime, protecting the interests of agribusiness elites.

To protect itself from it's own population, Washington resorted to clandestine "low-intensity warfare", defined as "total war at the grassroots level", by former U.S. Military Advisory Group Commander, Colonel John D. Waghelstein in 1985. The U.S. administrations used the Cold War as cover for what was essentially an imperial project; an effort to establish imperial "credibility", reform a government, and leave behind a dependent U.S. client state with electoral plutocracy. The U.S. administrations "didn't know shit about the left" because "they were not interested" in the fact that the predominant guerrilla factions — with ERP Commander Joaquin Villalobos at the forefront — were not aligned with the Soviet Union and that they could not be presumed to aspire to Gulag society. Though one CIA memo did acknowledge that "the severe instabilities" that existed within U.S. domains would continue to exist "regardless of the U.S.S.R." According to the FMLN platform, their goal was to establish political and economic democracy, a mixed economy, a non-aligned foreign policy, and independence from U.S. tutelage.

In 1992, the United Nations brokered a peace agreement between the two sides. The 12 year war ended with more than 70,000 civilians killed and 1.5 million uprooted refugees. The U.N. Truth Commission report on El Salvador attributed 85% of the human rights abuses to the Armed Forces (ESAF), the security forces, and associated death squads. 5% to the FMLN. Moreover, "the success of U.S. policy in El Salvador -- preventing a guerrilla victory -- was based on 40,000 political murders" (Benjamin Schwarz, RAND Corp). In 1999, the U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA) claimed credit for helping to defeat liberation theology. But "history will be kind to the Reagan-Bush era", writes David Broder of the Washington Post. In El Salvador "the United States effectively supported the people whose values and aspirations came closest to our own and helped them prevail".

Running the war

Throughout the war, the United States, through the Military Advisory Group (MilGroup), provided planning and operational direction and assistance, material support, and training to all branches of the Armed Forces (ESAF). An official total of 55 U.S. military advisers and 150 CIA agents were involved. Unofficially, the number of U.S. military advisers was closer to 150. U.S. Army Operation and Planning Assistance Teams (OPATs) were attached to the army High Command and all six brigades, secretly "running the war" as strategists, tacticians and planners. U.S. Special Forces Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) provided infantry, artillery, and military intelligence instruction. Most brigade advisers regularly engaged in combat. U.S. "trainers" who accompanied Salvadoran pilots occasionally located, pinpointed, and bombed guerrilla positions. Select military personnel were trained at the U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA) in the Canal Zone, and later in Ft Benning Ga, after Panama's President Aristides Royo denounced the program was unethical, and intended to "repress a country" (El Salvador). U.S. Army human right training consisted of instructions to keep intelligence targets alive for interrogation, rather than killing them on the spot. For these reasons, Human Rights Watch argues that the United States bears a "special responsibility" for the Armed Forces' war crimes.

In 1977, the Salvadoran government enacted the Law for the Defense and Guarantee of the Public Order — known as the Ley de Orden — practically declaring war on labor and the like. The law legalized state violence against non-elite sectors of the society and restricted the right to organize, to strike, and to all forms of public dissent. U.S. Ambassador Frank Devine approved of it. "We believe any government has the full right and obligation to use all legal means at its disposal to combat terrorism," he said in a speech to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. In early 1981, the new Reagan administration outlined its approach to the counter-terror program. Where "human rights concerns conflict with other vital U.S. interests," we will not allow them "to paralyze or unduly delay decisions," the report said. And in Congressional testimony, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights nominee Ernest W. Lefever argued that economic and military aid should not be given or withheld "to reform domestic institutions and practices, however obnoxious". Lefever then lost his confirmation bid.

In reaction to a massive escalation in counter-terror killings in 1981, the U.S. Congress conditioned further military aid on bi-annual human rights "Certification", until 1983. The MilGroup was able to overcome this by reigning in the army's political murder program shortly before each deadline. Behind the scenes, Reagan administration officials were telling Salvadoran military leaders that they had to "be patient" with members of Congress, who were threatening to cut off aid if the abuses didn't end. "We learned our way of operating from you", complained one senior army officer. "I studied in the Canal Zone. I studied in North Carolina. You taught me how to kill communists and you taught me very well. And now you come along and persecute my companeros for doing their jobs, for doing what you trained them to do" - referring to Vice President George Bush's trip to El Salvador in December 1983 in which he told the Salvadoran government to put an end to death squad activities and remove officers involved in them. The purported "communists" were defined as persons who spoke against Yankee imperialism and the military-oligarchy. In any case, the Congress chose not to cut off aid because both parties agreed that they could not permit the "loss" of El Salvador. The Certification process was simply a way for Democrats to fund the war while reserving the right to call the administration "fascist".

Intelligence work

U.S. aid to the Salvadoran intelligence apparatus, the nerve center of the Army General Staff, and the heart of its covert death squad bureaucracy, was provided through the U.S. Military Advisory Group (MilGroup) and the Central America Joint Intelligence Team (CAJIT). Over the years, the MilGroup and the CAJIT directly supervised the National Intelligence Directorate (DNI - Operations and Counterintelligence), Departments 2 (Intelligence) and 5 (Civil Affairs) of the Army General Staff, and the intelligence sections (S-2) of the Armed Forces (ESAF) and the security forces - the National Guard, National Police, and Treasury Police. These specialized in abductions, extracting intelligence, and summary executions; or "pump and dump" for short: "Pumping suspects for information by torture and then dumping the bodies" (Alfred McCoy). The tortures often used included physical beatings, burnings, and electric shocks. Also "more sophisticated" techniques that didn't leave visible injuries, such as the capucha (hood to suffocate), immersion in filthy water, sleep deprivation, food deprivation, and threats to family members. The primary targets of the units were activists with popular organizations, that their U.S. overseers termed "FMLN fronts". Suspects were added to a "blacklist" and would be picked up soon afterward. The killers carried out their work while wearing civilian clothes and driving unmarked vans or trucks with dark tinted windows (for clandestine executions). All of their operating expenses were provided by the CIA.

And according to former death squad member Cesar Vielman Joya Martinez of the 1st Brigade's S-2, the two U.S. military advisers who "had control of the department" received "all the reports from our agents on clandestine captures, interrogations...but we did not provide them with reports on the executions. They did not want to hear of the actual killings." This is how they kept it off the record and thus hidden from Congressional oversight. Several analysts said the Bush administration treated Joya Martinez "like a smoking gun" when they deported him back to El Salvador to face certain death for his treachery (deserting and testifying to Congress about death squads).

Meanwhile, the CAJIT regularly shared strategic and tactical intelligence with their Salvadoran counterparts. CIA field agents infiltrated popular organizations and turned in members' names, photographs, and whereabouts. Many of them were later "neutralized" by "escuadrones de la muerte". The death squads were controlled by senior military officers of the army High Command (Amy General Staff). During a reformist-led coup in 1979, the CIA ensured that these same officers retained their command positions and employed them as informants until 1984. Known among them was Treasury Police chief Col. Nicholas Carranza, who was the former Vice Minister of Defense, from 1979-81. Not because he was a particularly important source of intelligence but because he served as a paid agent of influence who "promoted actions or policies favored by the CIA in that country" (Robert E. White). Carranza was the officer most directly involved with running the death squads.

Moreover, the political murder strategy itself was "made in the U.S.A". It was specifically designed to cripple the FMLN in the city. Death squad killing was not indiscriminate. U.S. military manuals explicitly identified FMLN-controlled labor, peasant, and student activists as targets for elimination. The Counterintelligence (CI) course dealt with "the techniques used in combating guerrilla forces and revolutionary movements" and taught how to prevent them from succeeding (U.S. Army Brig. Gen. William Yarborough). The CI targets in the early 80s were with the Revolutionary Coordinator of the Masses (CRM), an umbrella organization, representing the left's political base. The CRM was eliminated with upwards of 40,000 political murders by 1983. Their demise was a major strategic victory for Reagan & Co. Without an infrastructure in the city, the guerrillas were unable to set off an urban insurrection, through mass demonstrations and strikes, during their "final offensive" in 1981. Thereafter, the rate of political murders gradually declined as the army ran out of people to kill. The Reagan administration said this was progress in human rights. While secretly they shared the view of the army High Command that "the death squads worked" (RAND Corp). They "stabilized" the society, as one U.S. Embassy official put it.

Clandestine terror could then be carried out more selectively, as it was until 1987-88, when newly formed popular organizations were met with a resurgence of death squad killings and disappearances, reminiscent of the early 80s. The CIA classified these groups with the CRM as FMLN "front organizations". They ranged from the so called "umbrella front group", the National Unity of Salvadoran Workers (U.N.T.S.) to the Committee of Mothers and Families of Political Prisoners, Disappeared Persons, and Assassinated of El Salvador (COMADRES). The U.S. administration particularly aimed to "destroy" labor unions of the left. "The U.S. Embassy repeatedly justified repression of rank and file members of unions affiliated with the U.N.T.S. on the grounds that the individual victims were members of guerrilla front organizations" (Human Rights Watch). The State Department is also known to have aided the government's repression of church officials and human rights groups. The Nongovernmental Human Rights Commission (CDHES) was on the CIA's list of guerrilla "front groups".

"The Gang that Blew Vietnam Goes Latin" is how the Washington Post characterized President Reagan's pacification team. Naturally, all of the above was a faithful regurgitation of the CIA's Phoenix program in Vietnam, which targeted "VC-controlled officials" for "neutralization". "We learned from you", a death squad member once told a U.S. news reporter. "We learned from you the means, like blowtorches in the armpits, shots in the balls ... the same thing you did in Vietnam."

Clearance sweeps

Also a Vietnam import, the ESAF employed a strategy of forced relocation, i.e. aerial bombing, strafing, and infantry sweeps in villages to generate refugee flows to military-controlled hamlets, and thus deprive the guerrillas of support. The targets were pinpointed by U.S. surveillance flights and CIA-led reconnaissance patrols. The intelligence was relayed to the Army High Command or to a U.S. operations adviser, directing the campaign. In neighboring Honduras, a team of U.S. Green Berets operated at a refugee camp along the border, where they controlled the flow of uprooted peasants fleeing from Salvadoran government troops. They were tasked with preventing "masas" (civilian supporters of the guerrillas) from passing aid to guerrillas across the border. Discussing refugees, team Captain Michael Sheehan said, "They have no human rights".

The U.S. Embassy explicitly justified the operations on the grounds that the victims were "masas", who they defined as persons who resided in contested areas. The village of El Mozote was in a province controlled by the FMLN. "That was enough cause for the U.S.-trained Atlacatl battalion to kill it's residents, most of them young children" (Aryeh Neier, Human Rights Watch). Soldiers of "the Yankee's battalion", the army's crack unit and the pride of the U.S. MilGroup, consistently carried out the largest massacres in the war. They were "the best unit in the country", according to Colonel John D. Waghelstein, Commander of the MilGroup, 1982-83. Human rights constraints directly conflicted with the goal of winning the war. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Nestor Sanchez argued as much to Congress in reference to the ESAF's "clearance" operations. Accordingly, the Atlacatl battalion was purposed for turning a losing war around.

The Phoenix program

In South Vietnam, 1965-72, the CIA and the U.S. Special Forces administered Operation "Phoenix", providing planning and operational direction, and assistance, logistical support, and training to indigenous paramilitary forces, purposed for intelligence gathering, through identifying and "neutralizing" members of the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI); i.e. Viet Cong guerrillas (NLF - National Liberation Front) and persons under their influence. Originally, the squads were called "Counter-Terror Teams" (CTTs), then later "Provincial Reconnaissance Units" (PRU), after CIA officials became apprehensive of adverse public relations with the use of the word "terror". According to one U.S. military handbook, the PRUs were to be recruited from among young landowning elites.

VCI suspects identified by the PRUs were added to a "blacklist" for immediate "neutralization" - that is to kill, capture, or convince to surrender. Slain victims and the homes of potential victims were marked with the PRUs' "calling card", the "Eye of God" — a U.S.I.S. printed leaflet of a "grotesque" human eye — that came with the message "our terrorists" are playful, letting it be known that "big brother is watching you".

Suspects not killed outright were sent to the National Interrogation Center (NIC) in Saigon or at a Provincial Interrogation Center (PIC), jointly run by the CIA and it's South Vietnamese counterparts. The facilities were chiefly designed to extract intelligence from prisoners, in order to launch attacks on the Viet Cong underground. Interrogation methods commonly used included, force feeding water to prisoners until their stomachs swelled up, electric shocks applied to nipples and genitals, physical beatings with a truncheon, and demonstration executions. "Sometimes we have to kill one suspect to get another to talk", one U.S. PRU adviser remarked. The CIA had most prisoners "pump and dump" to avoid the formalities of prosecution. Summarizing this, Jeff Stein, former U.S. Army Intelligence officer in Vietnam:

"The CIA would direct the PRU teams to go out and take care of a particular target... either capture or assassination, or kidnapping. Kidnapping was a common thing that they liked to do. They’d put him in one of these garbage collection type bins — and the helicopter would pick up the bin and fly him off to a regional interrogation center. It was common knowledge that when someone was picked up their lives were about at an end because the Americans most likely felt that, if they were to turn someone like that back into the countryside it would just be like multiplying NLF followers."

U.S. counterinsurgents put it in the context of "protecting" the masses of the people from the insurgents, whom they were supporting. In practice, this meant "winning them over" in the course of their suppression. According to U.S. military and GVN statistics, the PRUs had killed between 26,369 and 40,994 "suspected enemy civilians" by 1972.

Iran

Iran 1953: the CIA orchestrates the overthrow of the parliamentary government of Mohammed Mossadeq and reinstates the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, leaving U.S. oil giants with 40% of the formerly British concession.

In the proceeding years, the CIA, through AID Public Safety (OPS), reorganized and equipped SAVAK, the Shah's secret police, "to deal with any likely foreseeable civil disturbance in Tehran", reported the State Department in 1964. SAVAK went on to murder thousands of government opponents. According to former CIA analyst, Jesse Leaf, senior agency officials trained SAVAK in interrogation methods based on torture techniques employed by Nazi Germany in World War II. Also, the regime's torture chambers, utilized by SAVAK interrogators, were all financed by the U.S. government, he said.

Iraq

18 March 2003: The United States invades Iraq to "shock and awe" the world into U.S. subservience and subsequently establish permanent garrisons in a dependent client state at the center of the world's major energy producing region. The latter objective failed due to mass non violent resistance from the country's Shi'ite population, lead by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.

In 2004, faced with a growing Sunni insurgency and an uncooperative people, the U.S. military, headed by General David Petraeus, drafted in Colonel James Steele, a former commander of the U.S. Military Advisory Group (MilGroup) in El Salvador's "dirty war", to help administer the "Salvador Option" and "scare the Iraqis into submission" (U.S. adviser to the civilian authority in Baghdad). The U.S. Special Forces organized, trained, armed, and directed sectarian police commandos (SPCs) to "pump and dump" insurgents and sympathizers at secret interrogation centers, known as "platforms". Sometimes in the presence of Col. Steele himself. The interrogation sessions included such methods as, electric shocks, pulling out nails, physical beatings, power drills to the body, and summary executions. The squads were organized from reactionary Shia militia groups, such as the Badr Brigades. The most feared was a unit known as the "Wolf Brigade". Although the SPCs succeeded in quelling the insurgency, they also enforced the repressive conditions that gave rise to the Islamic State.

See also

• Targeted killings by the United States government
• War crimes committed by the United States
• United States support of authoritarian regimes
• United States and state-sponsored terrorism
• Covert United States foreign regime change actions

Notes

1. Blakeley, pp. 20-21
2. Blakely, pp. 20-21
3. Sluka, p. 8
4. Sluka, pp. 8-9
5. Gareau, Frederick Henry (2002). The United Nations and other international institutions: a critical analysis. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 246. ISBN 978-0-8304-1578-6.
6. Daniel Goldhagen (2009). Worse Than War. PublicAffairs. ISBN 1586487698 p.537
   • "During the 1970s and 1980s, the number of American client states practicing mass-murderous politics exceeded those of the Soviets."
7. "The Cold War in Central America, 1975-1991" John H. Coatsworth, Ch 10
8. Sluka, p. 9
9. Sluka, p. 9
10. Gupta, Dipak K. (2008). Understanding terrorism and political violence: the life cycle of birth, growth, transformation, and demise. Taylor & Francis. p. 8. ISBN 978-0-415-77164-1.
11. Sinai, Joshua (2008). "How to Define Terrorism". Perspectives on Terrorism. 2 (4). Terrorism Research Institute.
12. U.S. Department of State (February 1, 2010). "Title 22 > Chapter 38 > § 2656f - Annual country reports on terrorism". Cornell University Law School, Legal Information Institute.
13. Gupta, p. 8
14. Sinai, Joshua (2008). "How to Define Terrorism". Perspectives on Terrorism. 2 (4). Terrorism Research Institute.
15. "Country Reports on Terrorism - Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism". National Counterterrorism Center: Annex of Statistical Information. U.S. State Department. April 30, 2007.
16. Williamson, Myra (2009). Terrorism, war and international law: the legality of the use of force against Afghanistan in 2001. Ashgate Publishing. p. 38. ISBN 978-0-7546-7403-0.
17. Rupérez, Javier (6 September 2006). "The UN's fight against terrorism: five years after 9/11". U.N. Action to Counter Terrorism (in Tr. from Spanish). Real Instituto Elcano of Spain.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: unrecognized language (link)
18. Selden p. 4
19. Hor, Michael Yew Meng (2005). Global anti-terrorism law and policy. Cambridge University Press. p. 20. ISBN 978-0-521-10870-6.
20. Williamson p. 43
21. Gareau, Frederick H. (2004). State terrorism and the United States : from counterinsurgency to the war on terrorism. Atlanta: Clarity Press. p. 14. ISBN 0-932863-39-6.
22. Wright, p. 11
23. Smith, Hedrick (7 February 1982). "Struggle In Salvador Pinches Washington's Vietnam Nerve". New York Times. NYT. Retrieved 1 June 2014.
24. ^ "Weakness and Deceit: U.S. Policy and El Salvador", Raymond Bonner, Times Books, 1984, pp. 243, 25, 290-303, 67-69, 88-92 Cite error: The named reference "Ray Bonner" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
25. ^ "Central America Inside Out: The Essential Guide to Its Societies, Politics, and Economies" Tom Barry, Grove Press, 1991, p. 145-147 Cite error: The named reference "Central America Inside Out" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
26. "Despite tattered economy and ongoing war, Salvador's Duarte rides high for now" Christian Science Monitor, May 29, 1985
27. "Salvador's Duarte backs down on peace talks, further weakening his influence" Christian Science Monitor, January 25, 1985
28. "Salvador rebels adapt to long war with new strategy. They focus on getting civilian support and exploiting Duarte's problems for political gains" Christian Science Monitor, November 26, 1986
29. "Torture on Rise in Salvador" Christian Science Monitor, November 1, 1989
30. ^ Gwertzman, Bernard (19 July 1983). "Kissinger On Central America: A Call For U.S. Firmness". New York Times. New York Times. Retrieved 1 June 2014.
31. "War Against the Poor: Low-intensity Conflict and Christian Faith", Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer, Orbis Books, 1989, p. 10
32. "Post-Vietnam Counterinsurgency Doctrine" Colonel John D. Waghelstein, U.S. Army, May 1985
33. "America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After", Thomas J. McCormick, JHU Press, Feb 1, 1995, p. 211
34. Kissinger, Henry (1998). Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. DIANE publishing. p. 93. ISBN 9780788143137. {{cite book}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help)
35. US-Funded Think Tank Sways New Government; US AID backing leads to Chicago-style economic policies" Christian Science Monitor, August 28, 1989
36. "The American connection: State terror and popular resistance in Guatemala, Volume 2", Michael MacClintock, Zed books, 1985, pp. 284-288
37. "The Purposes of American Power" Robert W. Tucker, Foreign Affairs, Winter 1980/81 Issue
38. "Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America", Abraham F. Lowenthal, Johns Hopkins University Press, Feb 1, 1991, p. 97
39. ^ "Monitoring Sweatshops: Workers, Consumers, and the Global Apparel Industry", Jill Louise Esbenshade, Temple University Press, 2009, p. 167
40. "Soviet posture in the Western Hemisphere" Carl G. Jacobsen, Feb 28, 1985, pp. 48, 52
41. "U.S. DELAYED REPORT ON SOVIETS IN NICARAGUA" Miami Herald, September 18, 1984
42. "Opposition" Washington Post, March 9, 1981
43. "Their Bible is the Bible; Religious Roots of Rebellion in El Salvador" Clifford Krauss, The Nation, July 3, 1982
44. "Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America", Walter LaFeber, W. W. Norton & Company, Jan 1, 1993, pp. 244-245, 314
45. "Americas: The Changing Face of Latin America and the Caribbean", Peter Winn, University of California Press, 1999, p. 533
46. ^ "Negotiations or Total War" Frank Smith, August 7, 1989
47. ^ "Ideal Illusions: How the U.S. Government Co-opted Human Rights", James Peck, Macmillan, Mar 15, 2011, p. 90 Cite error: The named reference "Ideal Illusions" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
48. "Insurgent Says He Supports 'Democratic' System" Associated Pres, Feb 11, 1989
49. "A Democratic Revolution for El Salvador" Joaquin Villalobos, 1989
50. "Comparison of U.S. administration testimony and reports with 1993 U.N. Truth Commission report on El Salvador : report / prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress" U.S. G.P.O. : 1993.
51. ^ "Dirty Hands" Benjamin Schwarz, The Atlantic, December 1998
52. "FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS" U.S. ARMY SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS (SOA), April 28, 1999
53. "Vital Interests" Committee of Santa Fe, 1981
54. "History Will Be Kind To The Reagan-bush Era" Washington Post, January 17, 1993
55. ^ "HOW U.S. ADVISERS RUN THE WAR IN EL SALVADOR" Philadelphia Inquirer, May 29, 1983
56. ^ "Expanding Roles and Missions in the War on Drugs and Terrorism: El Salvador and Colombia" Military Review, March–April 2004
57. ^ "Salvadoran Killings Cited;Deserter Links U.S. Advisers to Army Unit" Washington Post, Oct 27, 1989
58. "El Salvador Vets" Newsweek, 4/4/93
59. "Secret Warriors: U.S. Advisers Have Taken Up Arms in El Salvador" Frank Smyth, August 11, 1987
60. "COMBAT ROLE LAID TO U.S. ADVISERS" New York Times, April 12, 1984
61. "Report on human rights in El Salvador: a report to the Board of the American Civil Liberties Union", American Civil Liberties Union. Board, The Union, Jan 1, 1982, p. 191
62. ^ "The American Connection: State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador", Michael McClintock, Zed, 1985, p. 339 Cite error: The named reference "The American Connection, Vol. 1" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
63. "Nightmare Revisited, 1987-88: Tenth Supplement to the Report on Human Rights in El Salvador", Human Rights Watch, 1988, p. 81
64. ^ "Taking Liberties: Four Decades in the Struggle for Rights", Aryeh Neier, Public Affairs, 2003, p. 176 Cite error: The named reference "Taking Liberties" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
65. "Presidential certification on progress in El Salvador : hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations" United States Senate, Ninety-eighth Congress, first session, February 2, 1983, p. 18
66. "Sanctuary: The New Underground Railroad", Renny Golden, Michael MacConnell, Orbis Books, 1986 - Church work with refugees, p. 139
67. "NACLA Report on the Americas, Volume 18", North American Congress on Latin America, 1984, p. 48
68. "Latin American labor organizations", Gerald Michael Greenfield, Greenwood Press, 1987, p. 360
69. ^ "Behind the Death Squads: An exclusive report on the U.S. role in El Salvador's official terror" Allan Nairn, the Progressive, May 1984
70. "THE TRUTH OF EL MOZOTE" New Yorker, December 6, 1993
71. ^ "MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND THE YELLOW BOOK" National Security Archive, George Washington University, "The fingerprints of the United States"
72. ^ "Salvador death squads, a CIA connection?" Christian Science Monitor, May 8, 1984
73. ^ "Army's Project X Had Wider Audience" Washington Post, March 6, 1997
74. ^ "A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror", Alfred McCoy, Macmillan, Apr 1, 2007, pp. 119, 71 Cite error: The named reference "Alfred McCoy" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
75. "'This is War': How the CIA Justifies Torture" Frank Smith, December 10, 2014
76. ^ "Declassified Army and CIA Manuals" Latin American Working Group, "Terrorism and the Urban Guerrilla", U.S. Army, p. 69
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79. "Salvadoran Soldier Says U.S. Advisers Knew of Death Squad Activity" Associated Press, Oct. 27, 1989
80. "Blood Money: assassin says he slit throats while U.S. wrote checks" In These Times, Nov 15, 1989
81. "EXTRADITION SOUGHT FOR ALLEGED DEATH SQUAD PARTICIPANT" Human Rights Watch, August 14, 1991
82. "Deep-Sixed With All Due Dispatch : U.S. actions could silence one witness to Salvadoran death squads forever." Alexander Cockburn, L.A. Times, July 19, 1990
83. "Death From a Distance; Washington's Role in El Salvador's Death Squads" Jefferson Morley, Washington Post, March 28, 1993
84. ^ "Call Off The Spies" Washington Post, Feb. 7, 1996
85. "Death Squad Strategy Was Made In U.S.A." In These Times, January 13, 1988
86. "U.S. Instructed Latins on Executions, Torture" Washington Post, September 21, 1996
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91. "U.S. Knows Death Squad Chiefs but Cannot Stop Killings," Reuters, November 3, 1983.
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98. "PRISONERS IN EL SALVADOR SAY CHURCHES AID REBELS" New York Times, August 3, 1986
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102. "Crossfire El Salvador", Jessica Savitch, Judith Vecchione, WGBH Transcripts (Firm), WGBH Transcripts, 1983, p. 4
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105. "PREPARING THE BATTLEFIELD" Sara Miles, NACLA, 1986
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128. "Defeat: Why America and Britain Lost Iraq", Jonathan Steele, Counterpoint, 2008, p. 246
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130. "Bush asserts authority to bypass defense act" Boston Globe, January 30, 2008
131. "Bush Declares Exceptions to Sections of Two Bills He Signed Into Law" New York Times, October 14, 2008
132. "How Cleric Trumped U.S. Plan for Iraq; Ayatollah's Call for Vote Forced Occupation Leader to Rewrite Transition Strategy" Washington Post, Nov 26, 2003
133. "Pentagon civilians' lack of planning contributed to chaos in Iraq" Knight Ridder Newspapers, July 11, 2003
134. "Full U.S. Control Planned for Iraq" Washington Post, February 21, 2003
135. "Defeated by Democracy" FAIR, June 1, 2005
136. "Iraq war logs: 'The US was part of the Wolf Brigade operation against us'" Guardian, October 28, 2010
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References

• Blakeley, Ruth (2009). State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: the North in the South. Routledge. ISBN 0415686172
• Donahue, Laura K. "Terrorism and counter-terrorist discourse". In Hor, Michael Yew Meng, Ramraj, Victor Vridar and Roach, Kent (Eds.), Global anti-terrorism law and policy. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2005 ISBN 0-521-85125-4
• Sluka, Jeffrey A., editor (1999). Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror. University of Pennsylvania Press. ISBN 978-0-8122-1711-7. {{cite book}}: |first= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
• Taylor, Antony James William. Justice as a basic human need. Nova Science Publishers, 2006. ISBN 1-59454-915-X
• Wright, Thomas C. (February 28, 2007). State Terrorism in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and International Human Rights. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. ISBN 978-0-7425-3721-7.

Further reading

• Alexander, George (December 1991). Western State Terrorism. Polity Press. p. 276. ISBN 978-0-7456-0931-7.
• Blum, William (1995). Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II. Common Courage Press. p. 457. ISBN 1-56751-052-3.
• Campbell, Bruce B., and Brenner,Arthur D.,eds. 2000. Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability. New York: St. Martin's Press
• Chomsky, Noam (January 1988). The Culture of Terrorism. South End Press. p. 269. ISBN 978-0-89608-334-9.
• Churchill, Ward (2003). On The Justice of Roosting Chickens. AK Press. p. 309. ISBN 1-902593-79-0.
• Critical terrorism studies: a new research agenda. Taylor & Francis. 2009. ISBN 978-0-415-45507-7. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |editors= ignored (|editor= suggested) (help)
• Menjívar, Cecilia and Rodríguez,Néstor, editors, When States Kill:Latin America, the U.S., and Technologies of Terror, University of Texas Press 2005,isbn=978-0-292-70647-7
• Perdue, William D. (August 7, 1989). Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear. New York: Praeger Press. p. 240. ISBN 978-0-275-93140-7.
• Selden,, Mark, editor (November 28, 2003). War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. ISBN 978-0-7425-2391-3. {{cite book}}: |first= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

• Foreign relations of the United States
• Terrorism committed by the United States
• Terrorism in the United States