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Spanish Armada
Part of the Anglo-Spanish War (1585–1604) and the Eighty Years' War
The Spanish Armada and English ships in August 1588, by unknown painter (English School, 16th century)
Date 8 August 1588 Location North-west Europe Result Decisive Spanish defeat Militarily indecisive Spanish invasion failure Protestant propaganda victory
Belligerents
Kingdom of England  Dutch Republic	Iberian Union (Habsburg Spain)
Commanders and leaders
Lord Howard of Effingham Francis Drake John Hawkins Justinus van Nassau	Duke of Medina Sidonia
Strength
34 warships 163 armed merchant vessels (30 over 200 tons) 30 flyboats	22 galleons of Portugal and Castile, 108 armed merchant vessels (including 4 war galleasses of Naples)
Casualties and losses
Battle of Gravelines: 50–100 dead 400 wounded 8 fireships burnt Disease: 6,000–8,000 dead	Battle of Gravelines: Over 600 dead 800 wounded 397 captured 5 ships sunk or captured Overall: ~35 ships lost (10 scuttled) 20,000 dead

The Spanish Armada (Template:Lang-es, literally "Great and Most Fortunate Navy") was a Spanish fleet of 130 ships that sailed from A Coruña in August 1588, under the command of the Duke of Medina Sidonia with the purpose of escorting an army from Flanders to invade England. The strategic aim was to overthrow Queen Elizabeth I of England and the Tudor establishment of Protestantism in England, with the expectation that this would put a stop to English interference in the Spanish Netherlands and to the harm caused to Spanish interests by English and Dutch privateering.

The Armada chose not to attack the English fleet at Plymouth, then failed to establish a temporary anchorage in the Solent, after one Spanish ship had been captured by Francis Drake in the English Channel. The Armada finally dropped anchor off Calais. While awaiting communications from the Duke of Parma's army the Armada was scattered by an English fireship attack. In the ensuing Battle of Gravelines the Spanish fleet was damaged and forced to abandon its rendezvous with Parma's army, who were blockaded in harbour by Dutch flyboats. The Armada managed to regroup and, driven by southwest winds, withdrew north, with the English fleet harrying it up the east coast of England. The commander ordered a return to Spain, but the Armada was disrupted during severe storms in the North Atlantic and a large number of the vessels were wrecked on the coasts of Scotland and Ireland. Of the initial 130 ships over a third failed to return. As Martin and Parker explain, "Philip II attempted to invade England, but his plans miscarried, partly because of his own mismanagement, and partly because the defensive efforts of the English and their Dutch allies prevailed."

The expedition was the largest engagement of the undeclared Anglo-Spanish War (1585–1604). The following year, England organised a similar large-scale campaign against Spain, the Drake–Norris Expedition, also known as the "Counter-Armada of 1589", which was also unsuccessful.

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History

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Tilbury speech

On the day after the battle of Gravelines, the wind had backed southerly, enabling Medina Sidonia to move his fleet northward away from the French coast. Although their shot lockers were almost empty, the English pursued in an attempt to prevent the enemy from returning to escort Parma. On 2 August Old Style (12 August New Style) Howard called a halt to the pursuit in the latitude of the Firth of Forth off Scotland. By that point, the Spanish were suffering from thirst and exhaustion, and the only option left to Medina Sidonia was to chart a course home to Spain, by a very hazardous route.

The threat of invasion from the Netherlands had not yet been discounted by the English, and Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester maintained a force of 4,000 soldiers at West Tilbury, Essex, to defend the Thames Estuary against any incursion up-river towards London.

On 8 August (18 August New Style) Queen Elizabeth went to Tilbury to encourage her forces, and the next day gave to them what is probably her most famous speech:

My loving people, we have been persuaded by some that are careful of our safety, to take heed how we commit ourselves to armed multitudes for fear of treachery; but, I do assure you, I do not desire to live to distrust my faithful and loving people. Let tyrants fear, I have always so behaved myself, that under God I have placed my chiefest strength and safeguard in the loyal hearts and goodwill of my subjects; and, therefore, I am come amongst you as you see at this time, not for my recreation and disport, but being resolved, in the midst and heat of battle, to live or die amongst you all – to lay down for my God, and for my kingdoms, and for my people, my honour and my blood even in the dust. I know I have the body of a weak and feeble woman; but I have the heart and stomach of a king – and of a King of England too, and think foul scorn that Parma or Spain, or any prince of Europe, should dare to invade the borders of my realm; to which, rather than any dishonour should grow by me, I myself will take up arms – I myself will be your general, judge, and rewarder of every one of your virtues in the field. I know already, for your forwardness, you have deserved rewards and crowns, and, we do assure you, on the word of a prince, they shall be duly paid you. In the mean time, my lieutenant general shall be in my stead, than whom never prince commanded a more noble or worthy subject; not doubting but by your obedience to my general, by your concord in the camp, and your valour in the field, we shall shortly have a famous victory over those enemies of my God, of my kingdom, and of my people.

Return to Spain

In September 1588 the Armada sailed around Scotland and Ireland into the North Atlantic. The ships were beginning to show wear from the long voyage, and some were kept together by having their hulls bundled up with cables. Supplies of food and water ran short. The intention would have been to keep well to the west of the coast of Scotland and Ireland, in the relative safety of the open sea. However, there being at that time no way of accurately measuring longitude, the Spanish were not aware that the Gulf Stream was carrying them north and east as they tried to move west, and they eventually turned south much further to the east than planned, a devastating navigational error. Off the coasts of Scotland and Ireland the fleet ran into a series of powerful westerly winds, which drove many of the damaged ships further towards the lee shore. Because so many anchors had been abandoned during the escape from the English fireships off Calais, many of the ships were incapable of securing shelter as they reached the coast of Ireland and were driven onto the rocks. Local inhabitants looted the ships. The late 16th century, and especially 1588, was marked by unusually strong North Atlantic storms, perhaps associated with a high accumulation of polar ice off the coast of Greenland, a characteristic phenomenon of the "Little Ice Age." As a result, more ships and sailors were lost to cold and stormy weather than in direct combat.

Following the gales it is reckoned that 5,000 men died, by drowning, starvation and slaughter at the hands of English forces after they were driven ashore in Ireland. Reports of the passage around Ireland abound with strange accounts of hardship and survival.

In the end, 67 ships and fewer than 10,000 men survived. Many of the men were near death from disease, as the conditions were very cramped and most of the ships ran out of food and water. Many more died in Spain, or on hospital ships in Spanish harbours, from diseases contracted during the voyage. It was reported that, when Philip II learned of the result of the expedition, he declared, "I sent the Armada against men, not God's winds and waves".

English Armada

The English fleet was still cautious of the remaining Armada after the Battle of Gravelines, requiring it to remain on duty even as some of its sailors died. The following year Elizabeth I launched the Counter Armada, under Sir Francis Drake, but it was unsuccessful in its goals, resulting in Philip II retaining naval superiority.

It is true that the Spanish failed to gain control of the Channel from the English, nor stop their intervention in the region of Flanders or their privateer transatlantic raids; however, for the sixteen years that the war continued, the English ultimately failed in their systematic pretensions against the various fleets of the Indies, despite the great number of military personnel mobilized every year. The English were also unsuccessful in plots to achieve the uprising of the kingdom of Portugal and its division from the Spanish crown. Spanish naval power not only continued its hegemony in the key trade routes but also in the creation of the Armada de Barlovento. An important fortification effort ensued in different fortifications at both sides of the Atlantic, notably in Cartagena or Portobelo. Despite the efforts by the English and Dutch, Spain remained the predominant power in Europe for several decades, thanks to sufficient financing and organization as well as superior technology to enhance its naval strength.

Technological revolution

The outcome seemed to vindicate the English strategy and resulted in a revolution in naval battle tactics with the promotion of gunnery, which until then had played a supporting role to the tasks of ramming and boarding. Most military historians hold that the battle of Gravelines reflected a lasting shift in the balance of naval power in favour of the English, in part because of the gap in naval technology and armament it confirmed between the two nations, which continued into the next century. In the words of Geoffrey Parker, by 1588 'the capital ships of the Elizabethan navy constituted the most powerful battlefleet afloat anywhere in the world.' The English navy yards were leaders in technical innovation, and the captains devised new tactics. Parker argues that the full-rigged ship was one of the greatest technological advances of the century and permanently transformed naval warfare.

In 1573 English shipwrights introduced designs, first demonstrated in Dreadnought, that allowed the ships to sail faster and manoeuvre better and permitted heavier guns. Whereas before warships had tried to grapple with each other so that soldiers could board the enemy ship, now they more often stood off and fired broadsides that could sink the enemy vessel. Superior English ships and seamanship had foiled the invasion. The English also took advantage of Spain's over-complex strategy that required coordination between the invasion fleet and the Spanish army on shore. But the poor design of the Spanish cannon meant they were much slower in reloading in a close-range battle, allowing the English to take control. Spain still had numerically larger fleets, but England was catching up.

Legacy

In England, the boost to national pride lasted for years, and Elizabeth's legend persisted and grew long after her death. The repulsing of the Spanish naval force may have given heart to the Protestant cause across Europe and the belief that God was behind the Protestant cause. This was shown by the striking of commemorative medals that bore variations on the inscription, "1588. Flavit Jehovah et Dissipati Sunt" - with "Jehovah" in Hebrew letters ("God blew, and they are scattered"), or He blew with His winds, and they were scattered. There were also more lighthearted medals struck, such as the one with the play on the words of Julius Caesar: Venit, Vidit, Fugit (he came, he saw, he fled). The victory was acclaimed by the English as their greatest since Agincourt.

The English attempted to press home their advantage the following year, when the Drake–Norris Expedition of 1589, with a comparable fleet of English privateers, sailed to establish a base in the Azores, attack Spain, and raise a revolt in Portugal. This expedition, led by Sir Francis Drake and John Norreys raided Corunna but withdrew from Lisbon after failing to coordinate its strategy effectively with the Portuguese.

Two more armadas were sent by Spain, in 1596 and 1597, but both were scattered by storms.

The Spanish Navy underwent a major organizational reform that helped it to maintain control over its trans-Atlantic routes. High-seas buccaneering and the supply of troops to Philip II's enemies in the Netherlands and France continued, but brought few tangible rewards for England.

The memory of the victory over the Armada was evoked during both the Napoleonic Wars and the Second World War, when Britain again faced a concrete danger of invasion.

Historiography

Knerr (1989) has reviewed the main trends in historiography over five centuries. For 150 years writers relied heavily on Petruccio Ubaldini's A Discourse Concernye the Spanish Fleete Invadinye Englande (1590), which argued that God decisively favoured the Protestant cause. William Camden (1551–1623) pointed in addition to elements of English nationalism and the private enterprise of the sea dogs. He also emphasized that the Duke of Medina Sidonia was an incompetent seaman. David Hume (1711–76) praised the leadership of Queen Elizabeth. However the Whig historians, led by James A. Froude (1818–94), rejected Hume's interpretation and argued that Elizabeth was vacillating and almost lost the conflict by her unwillingness to spend enough to maintain the fleet. Scientific modern historiography came of age with the publication of two volumes of primary documents by John K. Laughton in 1894. This enabled the leading naval scholar of the day Julian Corbett (1854–1922) to reject the Whig views and turn attention to the professionalization of the Royal Navy as a critical factor. Twentieth-century historians have focused on technical issues, such as the relative power of English and Spanish guns and the degree of credit due Francis Drake and Charles Howard.

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In popular culture

The preparations of the Armada and the Battle of Gravelines form the backdrop of two graphic novels in Bob de Moors Cori, de Scheepsjongen ("Cori le Moussaillon" in French, "Cori, the Cabin Boy" in English) (Les Espions de la Reine and Le Dragon des Mers'). In them, Cori the cabin boy works as a spy in the Armada for the English.

The Armada and intrigues surrounding its threat to England form the backdrop of the films Fire Over England (1937), with Laurence Olivier and Flora Robson, and The Sea Hawk with Errol Flynn.

The Battle of Gravelines and the subsequent chase around the northern coast of Scotland form the climax of Charles Kingsley's 1855 novel Westward Ho!, which in 1925 became the first novel to be adapted into a radio drama by BBC.

In golf, Seve Ballesteros and José María Olazábal, who had a Ryder Cup record of 11–2–2 as a team—the best record for a pairing in the history of the competition—came to be called the "Spanish Armada".

The Battle of Gravelines is the climax of the 2007 film, Elizabeth: The Golden Age starring Cate Blanchett and Clive Owen.

Australian band "Paper Boat Armada" take their name from the stories of "The invincible Spanish Armada".

In the twentieth season of The Simpsons, an episode depicts the reason for the Armada's attack as Queen Elizabeth's rebuff of the King of Spain. Homer Simpson (as Walter Raleigh) accidentally sets the only English ship on fire; then collides with the Armada, setting all their ships on fire, creating victory for England.

The Final Jeopardy! response on 20 May 2009 on Jeopardy! was "The Spanish Armada". The clue was "It was the 'they' in the medal issued by Elizabeth I reading, 'God breathed and they were scattered.'"

Winston Graham wrote a history of "The Spanish Armadas" and a historical novel, The Grove of Eagles, based on it - the plural "Armadas" referring to a lesser-known second attempt by Philip II of Spain to conquer England during 1598, which Graham argued was better planned and organized than the famous one of 1588 but was foiled by a fierce storm scattering the Spanish ships and sinking many of them.

Several alternate history writers have published variant descriptions of how history might have proceeded had the Spanish Armada won, including John Brunner (Times Without Number, 1962), Keith Roberts (Pavane, 1969) and Harry Turtledove (Ruled Britannia 2002).

See also

• English Armada
• Francisco de Cuellar
• The Armada Service

References

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Bibliography

• Corbett, Julian S. Drake and the Tudor Navy: With a History of the Rise of England as a Maritime Power (1898) online edition vol 1; also online edition vol 2
• Cruikshank, Dan: Invasion: Defending Britain from Attack, Boxtree Ltd, 2002 ISBN 0-7522-2029-2
• Fernández-Armesto, Felipe. The Spanish Armada: The Experience of War in 1588. (1988). 336 pp.
• Froude, James Anthony. The Spanish Story of the Armada, and Other Essays (1899), by a leading historian of the 1890s full text online
• Hanson, Neil. The Confident Hope Of A Miracle: The True History Of The Spanish Armada Random House, 2011, ISBN 9781446423226
• Kilfeather T. P.: Ireland: Graveyard of the Spanish Armada, Anvil Books Ltd, 1967
• Knerr, Douglas. "Through the "Golden Mist": a Brief Overview of Armada Historiography." American Neptune 1989 49(1): 5–13. Issn: 0003-0155
• Konstam, Angus. The Spanish Armada: The Great Enterprise against England 1588 (2009)
• Lewis, Michael. The Spanish Armada, New York: T.Y. Crowell Co., 1968.
• Mcdermott, James (2005). England and the Spanish Armada: The Necessary Quarrel. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ISBN 0-3001-0698-X.
• Martin, Colin, and Geoffrey Parker. The Spanish Armada (2nd ed. 2002), 320pp by leading scholars; uses archaeological studies of some of its wrecked ships excerpt and text search
• Martin, Colin (with appendices by Wignall, Sydney: Full Fathom Five: Wrecks of the Spanish Armada (with appendices by Sydney Wignall), Viking, 1975
• Mattingly, Garrett. The Armada (1959). the classic narrative excerpt and text search
• Parker, Geoffrey. "Why the Armada Failed." History Today 1988 38(may): 26–33. Issn: 0018-2753. Summary by leadfing historian.
• Pierson, Peter. Commander of the Armada: The Seventh Duke of Medina Sidonia. (1989). 304 pp.
• Rasor, Eugene L. The Spanish Armada of 1588: Historiography and Annotated Bibliography. (1992). 277 pp.
• Rodger, N. A. M. The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain 660–1649 vol 1 (1999) 691pp; excerpt and text search
• Rodriguez-Salgado, M. J. and Adams, Simon, eds. England, Spain, and the Gran Armada, 1585–1604 (1991) 308 pp.
• Tenace, Edward (2003), "A Strategy of Reaction: The Armadas of 1596 and 1597 and the Spanish Struggle for European Hegemony", English Historical Review, 118 (478): 855–882, doi:10.1093/ehr/118.478.855
• Thompson, I. A. A. "The Appointment of the Duke of Medina Sidonia to the Command of the Spanish Armada", The Historical Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2. (1969), pp. 197–216. in JSTOR
• Vego, Milan N. (2013). Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas. Routledge. ISBN 9781136317941.
• Alcalá-Zamora, José N. (2004). La empresa de Inglaterra: (la "Armada invencible" : fabulación y realidad). Taravilla: Real Academia de la Historia ISBN 978-84-95983-37-4

Popular studies

• The Confident Hope of a Miracle. The True History of the Spanish Armada, by Neil Hanson, Knopf (2003), ISBN 1-4000-4294-1.
• Holmes, Richard. The Oxford Campanion to Military History. Oxford University Press. 2001. ISBN 978-0-19-860696-3
• From Merciless Invaders: The Defeat of the Spanish Armada, Alexander McKee, Souvenir Press, London, 1963. Second edition, Grafton Books, London, 1988.
• The Spanish Armadas, Winston Graham, Dorset Press, New York, 1972.
• Mariner's Mirror, Geoffrey Parker, 'The Dreadnought Revolution of Tudor England', 82 (1996): pp. 269–300.
• The Spanish Armada, Michael Lewis (1960). First published Batsford, 1960 – republished Pan, 1966
• Armada: A Celebration of the Four Hundredth Anniversary of the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, 1588–1988 (1988) ISBN 0-575-03729-6
• England and the Spanish Armada (1990) ISBN 0-7317-0127-5
• The Enterprise of England (1988) ISBN 0-86299-476-4
• The Return of the Armadas: the Later Years of the Elizabethan War against Spain, 1595–1603, R. B. Wernham ISBN 0-19-820443-4
• The Voyage of the Armada: The Spanish Story, David Howarth (1981) ISBN 0-00-211575-1
• T. P. Kilfeather Ireland: Graveyard of the Spanish Armada (Anvil Books, 1967)
• Winston Graham The Spanish Armadas (1972; reprint 2001) ISBN 0-14-139020-4
• Historic Bourne etc., J.J. Davies (1909)

External links

2. Part 2

• The Story of the Tobermory Spanish Galleon
• Top 10 myths and muddles about the Spanish Armada, history’s most confused and misunderstood battle. Wes Ulm, Harvard University
• The Defeat of the Spanish Armada. Insight into the context, personalities, planning and consequences. Wes Ulm
• English translation of Francisco de Cuellar's account of his service in the Armada and on the run in Ireland
• Elizabeth I and the Spanish Armada – a learning resource and teachers notes from the British Library
• The story of the Armada battles with pictures from the House of Lords tapestries
• BBC-ZDF etc. TV coproduction Natural History of Europe
• Discovery Civilization Battlefield Detectives – What Sank The Armada?

50°10′00″N 4°15′42″W / 50.16667°N 4.26167°W / 50.16667; -4.26167

1. Mattingly p. 401 the defeat of the Spanish armada really was decisive
2. Parker & Martin p. 5 an unmitigated disaster
3. Vego p 148 the decisive defeat of the Spanish armada.
4. Lucy Hughes-Hallett notes that the action off Gravelines "was the fight which would enter English history books as “the defeat of the Spanish Armada,” but to those who took part in it the engagement appeared inconclusive. By the end of it the Armada was battered but still battleworthy, while the English were almost entirely out of ammunition". Hughes-Hallett, Lucy: Heroes: A History of Hero Worship. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2010. ISBN 9780307485908, p. 327.
5. "The 1588 campaign was a major English propaganda victory, but in strategic terms it was essentially indecisive". Holmes, Richard; Marix Evans, Martin: Battlefield: Decisive Conflicts in History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. ISBN 9780191501173, p. 108.
6. According to José Alcalá-Zamora Queipo de Llano, "the confused and partial news of the indecisive naval actions fought between both naval formations in the English Channel were transformed into adulatory, courtier and political victorious reports". Alcalá-Zamora, José N.: La empresa de Inglaterra: (la "Armada invencible": fabulación y realidad). Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 2004. ISBN 9788495983374, p. 20.
7. Parker & Martin p. 245
8. Alcalá-Zamora p 56
9. Richard Holmes 2001, Battlefield: Decisive Conflicts in History, p. 858: "The 1588 campaign was a major English propaganda victory
10. Mattingly 362
11. ^ Colin Martin, Geoffrey Parker, The Spanish Armada, Penguin Books, 1999, ISBN 1-901341-14-3, p. 40.
12. Colin Martin, Geoffrey Parker,The Spanish Armada, Penguin Books, 1999, ISBN 1-901341-14-3, pp.10, 13, 19, 26.
13. Lewis, Michael.The Spanish Armada, New York: T.Y. Crowell Co., 1968, p. 184.
14. John Knox Laughton,State Papers Relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, Anno 1588, printed for the Navy Records Society, MDCCCXCV, Vol. II, pp. 8–9, Wynter to Walsyngham: indicates that the ships used as fire-ships were drawn from those at hand in the fleet and not hulks from Dover.
15. Lewis, p. 182.
16. Aubrey N. Newman, David T. Johnson, P.M. Jones (1985) The Eighteenth Century Annual Bulletin of Historical Literature 69 (1), 108 doi:10.1111/j.1467-8314.1985.tb00698.
17. Casado Soto, José L.: Atlantic shipping in sixteenth-century Spain and the 1588 Armada, in Rodríguez-Salgado, M. J. and Simon Adams (eds.): England, Spain and the Gran Armada, 1585-1604. Edinburgh: John Donald, 1991. ISBN 9780859763004, p. 122.
18. Garrett Mattingly rejects old estimations, makes a recount and concludes: "So, lost, at most, 31 ships (not 41), 10 pinnaces at most (not 20), 2 galleasses (not 3), 1 galley. Total, not more than 44 (not 65), probably five or six and perhaps a doze less." Mattingly, Garrett: The Armada. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987. ISBN 9780395083666, p. 426.
19. Lewis p. 208
20. Lewis p. 208-9
21. Hanson pg 563
22. "The Safeguard of the Sea, A Naval History of Britain, 660-1649", N. A. M. Rodgers, Penguin, 2004, p 263-269
23. John A. Wagner (2010). Voices of Shakespeare's England: Contemporary Accounts of Elizabethan Daily Life: Contemporary Accounts of Elizabethan Daily Life. ABC-CLIO. p. 91.
24. Colin Martin; Geoffrey Parker (1999). The Spanish Armada (revised ed.). Manchester University Press. p. 5.
25. Damrosh, David, et al. The Longman Anthology of British Literature, Volume 1B: The Early Modern Period. Third ed. New York: Pearson Longman, 2006
26. Brian Fagan, The Little Ice Age: How Climate Made History 1300–1850,. New York: Basic Books, 2000
27. Mattingly, Garrett (1959). The Armada. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. p. 369. ISBN 978-0-395-08366-6. LCCN 87026210. OCLC 16806339. OL 2396450M. ID information is for the 1987 reprint. The English Lord Deputy's orders were for the English soldiers in Ireland to kill Spanish prisoners which was done on several occasions instead of asking for ransom as was common during that period.
28. Winston S. Churchill, "The New World", vol. 3 of A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, (1956) Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, p. 130.
29. In the end as many as two-thirds of the armada's original complement of 30,000 died and for every one killed in battle or perishing of their wounds another six or eight died due to (non-combat losses), Hanson pg 563
30. SparkNotes: Queen Elisabeth – Against the Spanish Armada
31. José Luis, Casado Soto (1988). Spanish Naval Construction in the 16th Century and the Great Armada. Madrid: San Martin. p. 84. ISBN 84-7140-263-7. Es cierto que los españoles no lograron el control seguro del Canal Los británicos fracasaron en sus sistemáticas pretensiones de hacerse con alguna de las flotas de Indias, a pesar de los abundantes efectivos movilizados cada año para ese fin, de los 16 años que aún duró la guerra. Tampoco tuvieron éxito ni en los ataques directos ni en las conspiraciones encaminadas a lograr el levantamiento del reino de Portugal y su desmembración de la corona de España. El poder naval español no sólo siguió siendo hegemónico en las tareas fundamentales, sino que creció considerablemente, gracias a las cuantiosas nuevas fábricas de buques de guerra y privados y a la consolidación de las estructuras de las armadas permanentes preexistentes, como las del Océano de la Guarda de la Carrera de Indias, de Barlovento o del mar del Sur. Paralelamente se llevó a cabo un importante esfuerzo de fortificación de los puertos a ambos lados del Atlántico, lo que impidió o dificultó en gran medida la repetición de los magnificados golpes de mano a poblaciones desprotegidas e indefensas como los efectuados por Drake y compañía. -->
32. Aubrey N. Newman, David T. Johnson, P.M. Jones (1985) The Eighteenth Century Annual Bulletin of Historical Literature 69 (1), 93–109 doi:10.1111/j.1467-8314.1985.tb00698.
33. Geoffrey Parker, 'The Dreadnought Revolution of Tudor England', Mariner's Mirror, 82 (1996): 273.
34. Geoffrey Parker, "The 'Dreadnought' Revolution of Tudor England", Mariner's Mirror, Aug 1996, Vol. 82, Issue 3, pp 269-300
35. Geoffrey Parker, "Why the Armada Failed", History Today, May 1988, Vol. 38 Issue 5, pp 26-33
36. ^ Richard Holmes 2001, p. 858: "The 1588 campaign was a major English propaganda victory, but in strategic terms it was essentially indecisive"
37. Hart, Francis Rußel, Admirals of the Caribbean, Hougton Mifflin Co., 1922, pp. 28–32, describes a large privateer fleet of 25 ships commanded by Drake in 1585 that raided about the Spanish Caribbean colonies.
38. Parker & Martin p. 244
39. Tenace 2003, pp. 855–882.
40. Douglas Knerr, "Through the "Golden Mist": a Brief Overview of Armada Historiography." American Neptune 1989 49(1): 5–13.
41. Briggs, Asa. The BBC: The First Fifty Years. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1985. 63.
42. Harig, Bob (11 May 2011). "Seve, Ryder Cup almost never happened". ESPN. Retrieved 11 May 2011.

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