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===Formations=== ===Zamburak===
The Marathas had powerful artillery or more than 200 pieces commanded by Ibrahim gardi
The Maratha lines began a little to the north of ]. They had thus blocked the northward path of Abdali's troops and at the same time were blocked from heading south—in the direction of Delhi, where they could get badly needed supplies—by those same troops. Bhau, with the Peshwa's son and the household troops, was in the centre. The left wing consisted of the ''gardis'' under ]. Holkar and Sindhia were on the extreme right.<ref name="Rawlinson"/>
.Abdali on the other hand ,had no heavy guns of maratha type ;he had instead an efficient firearm of about two thousands light guns, camel borne swivels which could inflict severe havoc upon the dense mass of maratha ranks at short range. The destruction of Maratha army was completed by the Afghan squadron of 1500 camel swivels firing from a close range.


===Combatants===
The Maratha line was to be formed up some 12&nbsp;km across, with the artillery in front, protected by infantry, pikemen, musketeers and bowmen. The cavalry was instructed to wait behind the artillery and bayonet-wielding musketeers, ready to be thrown in when control of the battlefield had been fully established. Behind this line was another ring of 30,000 young Maratha soldiers who were not battle-tested, and then the roughly 30,000 civilians entrained.<ref name="Rawlinson"/> Many were middle-class men, women and children on their pilgrimage to Hindu holy places and shrines. Behind the civilians was yet another protective infantry line, of young, inexperienced soldiers.{{citation needed|date=September 2015}}
The Marhatta force consisted of 300,000 men, including 55,000 Marhatta Cavalry, and had three hundred pieces of cannon The “Gul-i-Rahmat” and the “Tarikh-i-Najibabad” by Akbar Shah Khan give the number of the Marhatta forces at three lacs. In local tales common among the people of Panipat the number is raised to nine lacs, which seems an exaggeration.
Ahmad Shah had 40,000 Afghans and Persians, 13,000 Rohilla cavalry and 38,000 Rohilla infantry, with 70 pieces of cannon borrowed from Rohilla allies.
Muhammad Jafar Shamlu, an eye witness to the battle of panipat, was a camp follower of Shah pasand khan, a famous military officer of Ahmad Shah Abdali. According to him, Marathas had 3.5 lakhs combatants while Afghans numbered one lakh and fourteen thousands. The Maratha Kashi raj, on the other hand, claimed that Afghans numbered 42,000 horsemen and 38,000 infantry while Marathas numbered 55,000 cavalry, 15,000 infantry and 15,000 pindaris.


===Formations===
On the other side the Afghans formed a somewhat similar line, probably a few metres to the south of today's Sanauli Road. Their left was being formed by Najib and their right by two brigades of troops. Their left centre was led by two Viziers, ] with 3,000 soldiers and 50–60 cannons and Ahmad Shah's Vizier Shah Wali with a choice body of 19,000 mailed Afghan horsemen.<ref name="Rawlinson"/> The right centre consisted of 15,000 ] under ] and other chiefs of the Rohilla Pathans. Pasand Khan covered the left wing with 5,000 cavalry, Barkurdar Khan and Amir Beg covered the right with 3,000 Rohilla cavalry.{{citation needed|date=September 2015}} Long-range musketeers were also present during the battle. In this order the army of Ahmed Shah moved forward, leaving him at his preferred post in the centre, which was now in the rear of the line, from where he could watch and direct the battle.{{citation needed|date=September 2015}}
The Maratha army's front line was 12 km long. Its left wing consisted mainly of ibrahim's gardis lined up behind heavy artillery. Damaji giakwad's and vithal shivdeo's light cavalry and other small contingents supported him. in the center stood bhau and wishwasrao together with peshwa's household cavalry, the huzurat . To the right stood Maratha cavalry's main mass under the sirdars - Antaji mankeshwar, yaswantrao pawar, jankoji schindia, malhorao holkar and other minor captains.
Afghan battle array too crescent shape whose right wing faced marathas's left wing. This wing consisted mainly of Rohilla's matchlock men under Hafiz Rehmat Khan Rohilla and Dunde Khan Rohilla supported by infantry under Barkhurdar khan and amir beg. In the center stood Shah wali khan's cavalry, kabuli infantry and upto 2,000 camel guns. The left wing consisted of Najib-ud-daula's infantry and dismounted cavlary, shah pasand khan with Persian horse and shuja-ud-daula's forces. The Afghan left and Maratha right stood approximately 3 miles away from each other , much farther than the other opposing wings. Ahmad Shah durrani stood behind his battle line with his elite cavalry.


===Early phases=== ===Early phases===

Revision as of 16:29, 3 August 2016

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Third Battle of Panipat

The Third Battle of Panipat, 14 January 1761, Hafiz Rahmat Khan, standing right of Ahmad Shah Durrani, who is shown sitting on a brown horse.
Date14 January 1761
LocationPanipat
(in present-day Haryana, India)29°23′N 76°58′E / 29.39°N 76.97°E / 29.39; 76.97
Result Decisive Afghan victory
Territorial
changes
Marathas lost suzerainty over Punjab and Delhi to the Afghans. Ahmad Shah Durrani vacates Delhi soon after the battle, appoints Mughal emperor as nominal head and returns to Afghanistan.
Belligerents
Durrani Empire Supported by
Maratha Empire
Commanders and leaders
Ahmad Shah Durrani (Shah of Durrani Empire)
Timur Shah Durrani
Wazir Wali Khan
Shah Pasand Khan
Jahan Khan
Shuja-ud-Daula
Najib-ud-Daula

Hafiz Rahmat Khan
Dundi Khan
Banghas Khan
Sadashivrao Bhau (commander-in-chief of Maratha Army)
Vishwasrao
Malharrao Holkar
Mahadji Shinde
Ibrahim Khan Gardi
Jankoji Shinde
Bhivrao Panse
Bhoite
Purandare
Vinchurkar (Infantry & Cavalry)
Sidoji Gharge
Strength
40,000 Afghans
38,000 Rohilla infantry
13,000 Rohilla Cavalry
70 pieces of cannon
2,000 zamburak
55,000 cavalry
245,000 infantry
300 pieces of artillery
totally an army of 300,000.
Casualties and losses
20,000 combatants killed. 200,000 combatants killed.
Campaigns of Ahmad Shah Durrani


The Third Battle of Panipat took place on 14 January 1761, at Panipat, about 60 miles (97 km) north of Delhi between a northern expeditionary force of the Maratha Empire and the forces of the King of Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah Abdali, supported by two Indian Muslim allies—the Rohilla Afghans of the Doab, and Shuja-ud-Daula, the Nawab of Awadh. Militarily, the battle pitted the French origin artillery and cavalry of the Marathas against the heavy cavalry and mounted artillery (zamburak and jizail) of the Afghans and Rohillas led by Ahmad Shah Abdali and Najib-ud-Daulah, both ethnic Afghans (the former is also known as Ahmad Shah Abdali). The battle is considered one of the largest and most eventful fought in the 18th century, and has perhaps the largest number of fatalities in a single day reported in a classic formation battle between two armies.

The decline of the Mughal Empire following the 27-year Mughal-Maratha war (1680–1707) had led to rapid territorial gains for the Maratha Empire. Under Peshwa Baji Rao, Gujarat, Malwa and Rajputana came under Maratha control. Finally, in 1737, Baji Rao defeated the Mughals on the outskirts of Delhi, and brought much of the former Mughal territories south of Delhi under Maratha control. Baji Rao's son, Balaji Baji Rao (popularly known as Nana Saheb), further increased the territory under Maratha control by invading Punjab in 1758. This brought the Marathas into direct confrontation with the Durrani empire of Ahmad Shah Abdali. In 1759 he raised an army from the Pashtun tribes and Baloch tribes and made several gains against the smaller Maratha garrisons in Punjab. He then joined with his Indian allies—the Rohilla Afghans of the Gangetic Doab—forming a broad coalition against the Marathas. The Marathas, under the command of Sadashivrao Bhau, responded by gathering an army of around 300,000. The Maratha camp finally reached Delhi on 1 August 1760, and took the city the next day. There followed a series of skirmishes along the banks of the river Yamuna, and a battle at Kunjpura, which the Marathas won against a heavily outnumbered Afghan garrison (at this time, Abdali and the other Afghan forces were on the eastern side of the Yamuna river). However, Abdali daringly crossed the river Yamuna on the 25 October at Baghpat, cutting off the Maratha camp from their base in Delhi. This eventually turned into a two-month-long siege led by Abdali against the Marathas in the town of Panipat. During the siege both sides tried to cut off the other's supplies. At this the Afghans were considerably more effective, so that by the end of November 1760 they had cut off almost all food supplies into the besieged Maratha camp (which had about 300,000 combatants as well as thousands more who were non-combatants). According to all the chronicles of the time, food in the Maratha camp ran out by late December or early January and cattle died by the thousands. Reports of soldiers dying of starvation began to be heard in early January. On 13 January the Maratha chiefs begged their commander, Sadashiv Rao Bhau, to be allowed to die in battle than perish by starvation. The next day the Marathas left their camp before dawn and marched south towards the Afghan camp in a desperate attempt to break the siege. The two armies came face-to-face around 8:00 a.m., and the battle raged until evening.

The specific site of the battle itself is disputed by historians, but most consider it to have occurred somewhere near modern-day Kaalaa Aamb and Sanauli Road. The battle lasted for several days and involved over 125,000 troops. Protracted skirmishes occurred, with losses and gains on both sides. The forces led by Ahmad Shah Durrani came out victorious after destroying several Maratha flanks. The extent of the losses on both sides is heavily disputed by historians, but it is believed that between 200,000 were killed in fighting, while 22,000 prisoners were taken after the battle.

The result of the battle was the halting of further Maratha advances in the north, and a destabilization of their territories, for roughly 10 years. Ahmad Shah Durrani restored Shah Alam II as the rightful ruler of Dehli and returned to Afghanistan victorious.

Background

Main article: Maratha conquest of North-west India

Lahore, Multan, Kashmir and other subahs on this side of Attock are under our rule for the most part, and places which have not come under our rule we shall soon bring under us. Ahmad Shah Durrani's son Timur Shah Durrani and Jahan Khan have been pursued by our troops, and their troops completely looted. Both of them have now reached Peshawar with a few broken troops... So Ahmad Shah Durrani has returned to Kandahar with some 12-14 thousand broken troops.. Thus all have risen against Ahmad who has lost control over the region. We have decided to extend our rule up to Kandahar.
Raghunathrao's letter to the Peshwa, 4 May 1758

Decline of Mughal Empire

Main article: Mughal Empire
File:India 18th century.JPG
Extent of the Maratha Empire, 1758
(shown here in orange).

The Mughal Empire had been in decline since the death of the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb in 1707 due to rise of Marathas. The decline was accelerated by the invasion of India by Nader Shah in 1739 during the rule of Muhammad Shah who ruled from 1719-1748. Nader Shah also took away Takht-i-Taus (the peacock throne) and the Kohinoor Diamond. Continued rebellions by the Marathas in the south, and the de facto separation of a number of states (including Hyderabad and Bengal), weakened the state further. Within a few years of Aurangzeb's death, the Marathas had reversed all his territorial gains in the Deccan and had conquered almost all Mughal territory in central and northern India. Mughals had thus become just the titular heads of Delhi. At the same time Punjab saw frequent invasions by Ahmad Shah Abdali, the great Punjabi poet Baba Waris Shah said of the situation, "khada peeta wahy da, baqi Ahmad Shahy da"--"we have nothing with us except what we eat and wear, all other things are for Ahmad Shah". Abdali appointed his son, Timur Shah Durrani, as his governor in Punjab and Kashmir. In 1758 the Maratha Empire's Gen. Raghunathrao marched onwards, attacked and conquered Lahore and Peshawar and drove out Timur Shah Durrani. Lahore, Multan, Kashmir and other subahs on the south and eastern side of Peshawar were under the Maratha rule for the most part. In Punjab and Kashmir the Marathas were now major players.

Rise of the Marathas

Main article: Maratha Empire

The Marathas had gained control of a considerable part of India in the intervening period (1707–1757). In 1758 they occupied Delhi, captured Lahore and drove out Timur Shah Durrani, the son and viceroy of the Afghan ruler, Ahmad Shah Abdali. This was the high-water mark of the Maratha expansion, where the boundaries of their empire extended in the north to the Indus and the Himalayas, and in the south nearly to the extremity of the peninsula. This territory was ruled through the Peshwa, who talked of placing his son Vishwasrao on the Mughal throne. However, Delhi still remained under the nominal control of Mughals, key Muslim intellectuals including Shah Waliullah and other Muslim clergy in India who were alarmed at these developments. In desperation they appealed to Ahmad Shah Abdali, the ruler of Afghanistan, to halt the threat.

Prelude

Main article: Durrani Empire

Imad-ul-Mulk had called in Marathas, under their chief Ragho Nath Rao, who had ousted Najib-ud-daula out of the Delhi fort. He induced Adina beg to invite Ragho Nath to occupy Punjab. He along with Malhar Rao entered the Punjab and Adina Beg joined them at the Sutlej. The Marathas defeated Abdus Samad Khan Durrani, the governor of Sirhind. The Sikh followers of Adina Beg completely devastated the city of Sirhind.

After fall of the Sirhind, the Joint forces of Adina Beg and the Marathas advanced to Lahore. En-route they defeated Prince Taimoor at place called Kachi Sarai near Wazirabad. The latter retreated across the Indus. Lahore was occupied by the Marathas. Sahid Patel, a Maratha general, marched to the fort of attock with ten thousand troops, in pursuit of Prince Taimoor. The power of Marathas at this time was at its zenith and the prophecy of Shivaji, the founder of their monarchy, that they should water their horses in the Indus on the west and the hoogli on east, was fulfilled.

Defeat of Malharrao Holkar at Sikanderabad

jankoji schindia, deputy of dattaji schindia , took command of the marathas fugitives during their flight from barari ghat to kotputli. On 15 janaury 1760 , they reached kotputli and were joined by army of malharrao holkar. The next day holkar order the marathas to retrace their steps towards delhi to engage the afghans untill the arrival of reinforcements. A maratha contingent was reversed by Jahan khan near rewari on 11 febraury. Soon after the marathas troops under Holkar were sighted by afghans at bahadurgarh , which compelled abdali to raise seige of Dig and retrace his steps towards delhi. Holkar, however, bypassed the capital and retired to the Ganga doab, by crossing over the jamuna on night of 26 febrauary, abdali made it to delhi two days later. The town of sikandrabad was plundered by holkar on the first of March. Thereafter, holkar spent 3 or 4 days in search of suitable ford to cross the ganga into Rohilkhund for loot and plunder. Abdali had followed close upon the heels of marathas during their march from delhi. On 4 march adavnce gaurd of the marathas was sighted and annihilated by afghans about 13 kms from holkar main camp. It panicked holkar who at once decamped and retired towrds agra. From there he made his way to bharatpur and sought protection with suraj mal.

Abdali sets up his camp at Aligarh

abdali proceeded with his main army to Koil (modern aligarh), accomapnied by najib khan. The pargana of koil then belonged to suraj mal , who had wrested it from Rohillas a few years ago. It was under control of a jat governor and its main fort was called ramgarh by them. The fort was invested by abdali on 5 march on the advice of najib. The fort soon fell into the hands of Afghans. Ahmad Shah abdali gave it name of aligarh. The marathas had some isolated military posts in the region, all of which, with the exeption of etawah, were overrun by Najib-ud-daula in collaboration with abdali troops. Shuja-ud-daula, nawab of oudh, who had cordial relations with marathas, was also persuaded by najib to join abdali's camp.

Arrival of fresh Maratha armies in the North

Sadashiv rao, popularly known as Bahau, a cousin of Peshwa, was given command of the expedition to North to retrieve maratha fortunes. Vishwas rao, the eldest son of peshwa was given the supreme command of Maratha forces. Maratha forces reached the jat territories along the jamuna on 12 july 1760. Suraj mal immediately joined bhau camp with 10,000 troops and was soon followed by imad-ul-mulk, the mughal wazir.

Reoccupation of Delhi by Marathas (1 August 1760)

Sadashive bahau made straight for the Delhi and reached the metropolis on 22 july, took the city the same day. Yakub Ali, the Afghan governor of Delhi, retreated into the red fort and prepared for its defense. The fort was invested by marathas in collaboration with troops of Suraj mal and Imad-ul-mulk. bahuo oredered the bombardment of fort on july 29. The very next day Afghan governor sued for peace. The fort was reoccupied by Marathas on 1 august 1760. On hearing this news, abdali left koil with his army and arriving on other side of jamuna near shahdra but couldn't cross the river to attack Maraha camp due to flood in the river.

Imad-ul-mulk and suraj mal desert the marathas

http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-2ql7se4AgzA/U-9vukCDtMI/AAAAAAAAAy4/QpUIX-JLcAw/s1600/maratha1.png http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-jjZcfDzJlJk/U-9vwSWZkAI/AAAAAAAAAzA/1Gq4DlH9TJE/s1600/maratha2.png http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-da6TnSiu2_w/U-9vtoVwHJI/AAAAAAAAAyw/OoAmM63m0jE/s1600/maratha3.png

Capture of Kunjpura

The Kunjpura fort was held by Najabat khan with 10,000 Rohilla troops. In this fort huge quantity of grain, fodder, and ordinance had been stored. In 16 October 1760, Marathas closed in on kunjpura, when abdali heard about the Maratha move, he sent a contingent to help the garrison in the fort. But as the river was in floods, it couldnt cross over. The Afghan governor of Sirhind, Abdus Samad Khan, Momin khan and Qutab Khan Rohilla, were camping outside the fort with 2,000 soldiers and within it were 8,000 fighters. The Maratha army came in the vicitinty of Kunjpura in 17 October and beseiged the fort. Soon action began. The fort couldnt withstand the heavy bombardment of european artillary of Ibrahim khan gardi and was soon taken down.

Najabat Khan was taken captive in wounded condition , and he succumbed to his injuries soon after. Abdus Samad Khan was also killed. Qutub Khan Rohilla was tortured to death by maratha soldiers. Kunjpura was plundered.

Ahmad Shah was encamped on the left bank of the Jamuna River, which was swollen by rains. The massacre of the Kanjpura garrison, within the sight of the Durrani camp, exasperated him to such an extent that he ordered crossing of the river at all costs. S M Lateef, “History of the Punjab”, p-235, quotes "Tarikh-i-Ahmadi", and writes:

“The Shah is said to have recited some verses of the Holy Quran, and, having blown them on an arrow, discharged from his quiver into the river. Raising then the cry “Bismillah-i-Allah-o- Akbar” meaning, ‘in the name of God the great God’ he plunged into the river, followed by his bodyguards and the troops.”

Battle

Engraving of a Maratha soldier by James Forbes.
Afghan royal soldiers of the Durrani Empire.

Zamburak

The Marathas had powerful artillery or more than 200 pieces commanded by Ibrahim gardi .Abdali on the other hand ,had no heavy guns of maratha type ;he had instead an efficient firearm of about two thousands light guns, camel borne swivels which could inflict severe havoc upon the dense mass of maratha ranks at short range. The destruction of Maratha army was completed by the Afghan squadron of 1500 camel swivels firing from a close range.

Combatants

The Marhatta force consisted of 300,000 men, including 55,000 Marhatta Cavalry, and had three hundred pieces of cannon The “Gul-i-Rahmat” and the “Tarikh-i-Najibabad” by Akbar Shah Khan give the number of the Marhatta forces at three lacs. In local tales common among the people of Panipat the number is raised to nine lacs, which seems an exaggeration. Ahmad Shah had 40,000 Afghans and Persians, 13,000 Rohilla cavalry and 38,000 Rohilla infantry, with 70 pieces of cannon borrowed from Rohilla allies. Muhammad Jafar Shamlu, an eye witness to the battle of panipat, was a camp follower of Shah pasand khan, a famous military officer of Ahmad Shah Abdali. According to him, Marathas had 3.5 lakhs combatants while Afghans numbered one lakh and fourteen thousands. The Maratha Kashi raj, on the other hand, claimed that Afghans numbered 42,000 horsemen and 38,000 infantry while Marathas numbered 55,000 cavalry, 15,000 infantry and 15,000 pindaris.

Formations

The Maratha army's front line was 12 km long. Its left wing consisted mainly of ibrahim's gardis lined up behind heavy artillery. Damaji giakwad's and vithal shivdeo's light cavalry and other small contingents supported him. in the center stood bhau and wishwasrao together with peshwa's household cavalry, the huzurat . To the right stood Maratha cavalry's main mass under the sirdars - Antaji mankeshwar, yaswantrao pawar, jankoji schindia, malhorao holkar and other minor captains. Afghan battle array too crescent shape whose right wing faced marathas's left wing. This wing consisted mainly of Rohilla's matchlock men under Hafiz Rehmat Khan Rohilla and Dunde Khan Rohilla supported by infantry under Barkhurdar khan and amir beg. In the center stood Shah wali khan's cavalry, kabuli infantry and upto 2,000 camel guns. The left wing consisted of Najib-ud-daula's infantry and dismounted cavlary, shah pasand khan with Persian horse and shuja-ud-daula's forces. The Afghan left and Maratha right stood approximately 3 miles away from each other , much farther than the other opposing wings. Ahmad Shah durrani stood behind his battle line with his elite cavalry.

Early phases

Before dawn on 14 January 1761, the Maratha troops broke their fast with the last remaining grain in camp and prepared for combat, coming from their lines with turbans disheveled and turmeric-smeared faces. They emerged from the trenches, pushing the artillery into position on their prearranged lines, some 2 km from the Afghans. Seeing that the battle was on, Ahmad Shah positioned his 60 smooth-bore cannon and opened fire. However, because of the short range of the Afghan weapons and the static nature of the Maratha artillery, the Afghan cannons proved ineffectual.

The initial attack was led by the Maratha left flank under Ibrahim Khan, who in his eagerness to prove his worth advanced his infantry in formation against the Rohillas and Shah Pasand Khan. The first salvos from the Maratha artillery went over the Afghans' heads and did very little damage. Nevertheless, the first Afghan attack was broken by Maratha bowmen and pikemen, along with a unit of the famed Gardi musketeers stationed close to the artillery positions. The second and subsequent salvos were fired at point-blank range into the Afghan ranks. The resulting carnage sent the Rohillas reeling back to their lines, leaving the battlefield in the hands of Ibrahim for the next three hours, during which the 8,000 Gardi musketeers killed about 12,000 Rohillas.

In the second phase, Bhau himself led the charge against the left-of-center Afghan forces, under the Afghan Vizier Shah Wali Khan. The sheer force of the attack nearly broke the Afghan lines, and soldiers started to desert their positions in the confusion. Desperately trying to rally his forces, Shah Wali appealed to Shuja ud Daulah for assistance. However, the Nawab did not break from his position, effectively splitting the Afghan force's center. Despite Bhau's success, the overenthusiasm of the charge and a phenomenon called "Dakshinayan" on that fateful day, the attack itself failed because the sunlight shone directly into the eyes of the attackers' horses, many of them half-starved Maratha mounts who were exhausted long before they had traveled the two kilometers to the Afghan lines; some simply collapsed.

Final phase

In the final phase the Marathas, under Scindia, attacked Najib. Najib successfully fought a defensive action, however, keeping Scindia's forces at bay. By noon it looked as though Bhau would clinch victory for the Marathas once again. The Afghan left flank still held its own, but the centre was cut in two and the right was almost destroyed. Ahmad Shah had watched the fortunes of the battle from his tent, guarded by the still unbroken forces on his left. He sent his bodyguards to call up his 15,000 reserve troops from his camp and arranged them as a column in front of his cavalry of musketeers (Qizilbash) and 2,000 swivel-mounted shutarnaals or Ushtranaal—cannons—on the backs of camels. The shaturnals, because of their positioning on camels, could fire an extensive salvo over the heads of their own infantry at the Maratha cavalry. The Maratha cavalry was unable to withstand the muskets and camel-mounted swivel cannons of the Afghans. They could be fired without the rider having to dismount and were especially effective against fast-moving cavalry. He therefore sent 500 of his own bodyguards with orders to raise all able-bodied men out of camp and send them to the front. He sent 1,500 more to any those front-line troops who attempted to flee the battle and kill without mercy any soldier who would not return to the fight. These extra troops, along with 4,000 of his reserve troops, went to support the broken ranks of the Rohillas on the right. The remainder of the reserve, 10,000 strong, were sent to the aid of Shah Wali, still labouring unequally against the Bhao in the centre of the field. These mailed warriors were to charge with the Vizir in close order and at full gallop. Whenever they charged the enemy in front, the chief of the staff and Najib were directed to fall upon either flank.

With their own men in the firing line, the Maratha artillery could not respond to the shathurnals and the cavalry charge. Some 7,000 Maratha cavalry and infantry were killed before the hand-to-hand fighting began at around 14:00. By 16:00 the tired Maratha infantry began to succumb to the onslaught of attacks from fresh Afghan reserves, protected by armoured leather jackets.

Outflanked

Sadashivrao Bhau, seeing his forward lines dwindling and civilians behind, had not kept any reserves, and upon seeing Vishwasrao disappear in the midst of the fighting, he felt he had no choice but to come down from his elephant and lead the battle. Taking advantage of this, some Afghan soldiers who had been captured by the Marathas earlier during the siege of Kunjpura revolted. The slaves deliberately spread rumours about the defeat of the Marathas. This brought confusion and great consternation to loyal Maratha soldiers, who thought that the enemy had attacked from their rear. Some Maratha troops, seeing that their general had disappeared from his elephant, panicked and began to flee.

Abdali had given a part of his army the task of surrounding and killing the Gardis under Ibrahim Khan Gardi, who were at the leftmost part of the Maratha army. Bhausaheb had ordered Vitthal Vinchurkar (with 1500 cavalry) and Damaji Gaikwad (with 2500 cavalry) to protect the Gardis. However, after seeing the Gardis fight, they lost their patience, became overenthusiastic and decided to fight the Rohillas themselves. Thus they broke the round—they didn’t follow the idea of round battle and went all out on the Rohillas, and the Rohilla riflemen started accurately firing at the Maratha cavalry, which was equipped only with swords. This gave the Rohillas the opportunity to encircle the Gardis and outflank the Maratha centre while Shah Wali pressed on attacking the front. Thus the Gardis were left defenceless and started falling one by one.

Vishwasrao had already been killed by a shot to the head. Bhau and his loyal bodyguards fought to the end, the Maratha leader having three horses shot out from under him. At this stage Holkar, realising the battle was lost, broke from the Maratha left flank and retreated. The Maratha army was routed and fled under the devastating attack. While 15,000 soldiers managed to reach Gwalior, the rest of the Maratha forces—including large numbers of non-combatants—were either killed or captured.

Rout

The Afghans pursued the fleeing Maratha army and civilians. The Maratha front lines remained largely intact, with some of their artillery units fighting until sunset. Choosing not to launch a night attack, many Maratha troops escaped that night. Bhau's wife Parvatibai, who was assisting in the administration of the Maratha camp, escaped to Pune with her bodyguard (Janu Bhintada).

Reasons for the outcome

Durrani had both numeric as well as qualitative superiority over Marathas. The combined Afghan army was much larger than that of Marathas. Though the infantry of Marathas was organized along European lines and their army had some of the best French-made guns of the time, their artillery was static and lacked mobility against the fast-moving Afghan forces. The heavy mounted artillery of Afghans proved much better in the battlefield than the light artillery of Marathas.

The main reason for the failure of the Marathas was that they went to war without good allies. They were expecting support from their allies- Rajputs, Jats and Sikhs, but none of them supported Marathas in the battle. The Marathas had interfered in the internal affairs of the Rajput states (present-day Rajasthan) and levied heavy taxes and huge fines on them. They had also made large territorial and monetary claims upon Awadh. Their raids in the Jat territory had resulted in the loss of trust of Jat chiefs like Suraj Mal. They had, therefore, to fight their enemies alone. Marathas treated Sikhs, who assisted them in their north-west conquest as a non-entity in Punjab affairs. According to an assessment, the Sikhs were ever ready to co-operate with the Marathas, but it goes to the discredit of the Marathas that they did not make a proper confederacy with Sikhs. Kirpal Singh writes: Unlike Ahmad Shah Abdali who subsequently raised a cry of jihad, the Marathas couldn't mobilize their resources and make a common cause with the Sikhs in order to pay the Afghan Emperor in his own coin.

Moreover, the senior Maratha chiefs constantly bickered with one another. Each had ambitions of carving out their independent states and had no interest in fighting against a common enemy. Some of them didn't support the idea of a round battle and wanted to fight using guerilla tactics instead of charging the enemy head-on. The Marathas were fighting alone at a place which was 1000 miles away from their capital Pune.

The Maratha army was also burdened with over 300,000 pilgrims who wished to worship at Hindu places of worship like Mathura, Prayag, Kashi, etc. The pilgrims wanted to accompany the army, as they would be secure with them. Apart from just fighting the battle, the Maratha troops had the responsibility to protect the non-combatants from Afghans. That was the reason why Marathas suffered heavy losses even after the battle. They could not retreat quickly as they were to protect the non-combatants who were accompanying them.

Peshwa's decision to appoint Sadashivrao Bhau as the Supreme Commander instead of Malharrao Holkar or Raghunathrao proved to be an unfortunate one, as Sadashivrao was totally ignorant of the political and military situation in North India.

If Holkar had remained in the battlefield, the Maratha defeat would have been delayed but not averted. Ahmad Shah’s superiority in pitched battle could have been negated if the Marathas had conducted their traditional ganimi kava, or guerrilla warfare, as advised by Malharrao Holkar, in Punjab and in north India. Abdali was in no position to maintain his field army in India indefinitely. Marathas had used guerrilla warfare in North India. The Turki horses could not have handled the plundering and cutting of supply lines by the Marathas.

Najib, Shuja and the Rohillas knew North India very well and that most of North India had allied with Abdali. Abdali used shaturnals, camels with mobile artillery pieces at his disposal. He was also diplomatic, striking agreements with Hindu leaders, especially the Jats and Rajputs, and former rivals like the Nawab of Awadh, appealing to him in the name of religion. He also had better intelligence on the movements of his enemy, which played a crucial role in his encirclement of the enemy army.

Massacres after the battle

The Afghan cavalry and pikemen ran wild through the streets of Panipat, killing tens of thousands of Maratha soldiers and civilians. The women and children seeking refuge in streets of Panipat were hounded back in Afghan camps as slaves. Children over 14 were beheaded before their own mothers and sisters. Afghan officers who had lost their kin in battle were permitted to carry out massacres of 'infidel' Hindus the next day also, in Panipat and the surrounding area. They arranged victory mounds of severed heads outside their camps. According to the single best eye-witness chronicle- the bakhar by Shuja-ud-Daula's Diwan Kashi Raj, about 40,000 Maratha prisoners were slaughtered in cold blood the day after the battle. According to Mr. Hamilton of Bombay Gazette about half a million Marathi people were present there in Panipat town and he gives a figure of 40,000 prisoners as executed by Afghans. Many of the fleeing Maratha women jumped into the Panipat wells rather than risk rape and dishonour.

All of the prisoners were transported on bullock carts, camels and elephants in bamboo cages.

Siyar-ut-Mutakhirin says:

The unhappy prisoners were paraded in long lines, given a little parched grain and a drink of water, and beheaded... and the women and children who survived were driven off as slaves - twenty-two thousand, many of them of the highest rank in the land.

Aftermath

Mahadaji Shinde restored the Maratha domination on northern India, within a decade after the war.

The bodies of Vishwasrao and Bhau were recovered by the Marathas and were cremated according to Hindu custom. Bhau's wife Parvatibai was saved by Holkar, per the directions of Bhau, and eventually returned to Pune.

Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao, uninformed about the state of his army, was crossing the Narmada with reinforcements when a tired charkara arrived with a cryptic message: "Two pearls have been dissolved, 27 gold coins have been lost and of the silver and copper the total cannot be cast up". The Peshwa never recovered from the shock of the total debacle at Panipat. He returned to Pune and died a broken man in a temple on Paravati Hill.

Jankoji Scindia was taken prisoner and executed at the instigation of Najib. Ibrahim Khan Gardi was tortured and executed by enraged Afghan soldiers. The Marathas never fully recovered from the loss at Panipat, but they remained the predominant military power in India and managed to retake Delhi 10 years later. However, their claim over all of India ended with the three Anglo-Maratha Wars, almost 50 years after Panipat.

The Jats under Suraj Mal benefited significantly from not participating in the Battle of Panipat. They provided considerable assistance to the Maratha soldiers and civilians who escaped the fighting. Suraj Mal himself was killed in battle against Najib-ud-Daula in 1763. Suraj Mal died on 25 December 1763 fighting the Rohillas under Najib, the very people against whom he could have helped the Marathas.

Ahmad Shah's victory left him, in the short term, the undisputed master of North India. However, his alliance quickly unravelled amidst squabbles between his generals and other princes, the increasing restlessness of his soldiers over pay, the increasing Indian heat and arrival of the news that Marathas had organised another 100,000 men in the south to avenge their loss and rescue captured prisoners.

Though Abdali won the battle, he also had heavy casualties on his side. So, he sought immediate peace with the Marathas. Abdali sent a letter to Nanasaheb Peshwa (who was moving towards Delhi albeit at a very slow pace to join Bhau against Abdali) pleading to the Peshwa that he was not the one who attacked Bhau and that he was just defending himself. Abdali wrote in his letter to Peshwa on 10 February 1761:

There is no reason to have animosity amongst us. Your son Vishwasrao and your brother Sadashivrao died in battle, was unfortunate. Bhau started the battle, so I had to fight back unwillingly. Yet I feel sorry for his death. Please continue your guardianship of Delhi as before, to that I have no opposition. Only let Punjab until Sutlaj remain with us. Reinstate Shah Alam on Delhi's throne as you did before and let there be peace and friendship between us, this is my ardent desire. Grant me that desire.

These circumstances forced Abdali to leave India at the earliest, never to return again. Before departing, he ordered the Indian chiefs, through a Royal Firman (order) (including Clive of India), to recognise Shah Alam II as Emperor.

Ahmad Shah also appointed Najib-ud-Daula as ostensible regent to the Mughal Emperor. In addition, Najib and Munir-ud-daulah agreed to pay to Abdali, on behalf of the Mughal king, an annual tribute of four million rupees. This was to be Ahmad Shah's final major expedition to North India, as he became increasingly preoccupied with the increasingly successful rebellions by the Sikhs. Abdali, haven't had achieved much from the battle of Panipat, died soon after on 16 October 1772 in Kandahar Province.

Shah Shuja was to regret his decision to join the Afghan forces. In time his forces became embroiled in clashes between the orthodox Sunni Afghans and his own Shia followers. He is alleged to have later secretly sent letters to Bhausaheb through his spies regretting his decision to join Abdali.

After the Battle of Panipat the services of the Rohillas were rewarded by grants of Shikohabad to Nawab Faiz-ullah Khan and of Jalesar and Firozabad to Nawab Sadullah Khan. Najib Khan proved to be an effective ruler. However, after his death in 1770, the Rohillas were defeated by the British East India Company. Najib died on October 30, 1770/

Maratha revenge

Marathas re-captured Delhi and restored their power in North India just after ten years of the battle by 1771 under Peshwa Madhavrao. Marathas restored Mughal emperor Shah Alam to the throne of Delhi in 1772. In 1770, Mahadji Shinde defeated Nawal Singh Jat of Mathura and annihilated his power. The forces of Mahadji Shinde, Visaji Krishna and Ramchandra Ganesh Kanade captured Delhi in 1771. After taking control of Delhi, Marathas sent a large army in 1772 to "punish" Afghan Rohillas for Panipat.

Najib's son Zabita Khan was defeated by the Marathas, led by Mahadji Sindhia and the fort of Pathargarh was completely looted by the Marathas in the form of horses, elephants, guns and other valuable things, which the Rohillas had looted at Panipat, they also destroyed his grave, scattering the bones all around.

The Rohillas were also forced to pay a heavy war indemnity. Maratha army devastated Rohilkhand by looting and plundering and also took the members of royal family as captives. Maratha general Mahadaji was “very much pleased with the revenge taken by his men” for Panipat. After punishing the Rohillas, the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II was restored to the throne by the Marathas.

Legacy

Further information: Anglo-Maratha Wars

The valor displayed by the Marathas was praised by Ahmad Shah Abdali himself, who paid a flowing tribute to his rivals in a letter to the then Jaipur ruler, Madhav Singh, he wrote :

The Marathas fought with the greatest valour which was beyond the capacity of other races. These dauntless blood-shedders didn't fall short in fighting and doing glorious deeds. But ultimately we won with our superior tactics and with the grace of the Divine Lord.

The Third Battle of Panipat saw an enormous number of deaths and injuries in a single day of battle. It was the last major battle between indigenous South Asian military powers until the creation of Pakistan in 1947.

To save their kingdom, the Mughals once again changed sides and welcomed the Afghans to Delhi. The Mughals remained in nominal control over small areas of India, but were never a force again. The empire officially ended in 1857 when its last emperor, Bahadur Shah II, was accused of being involved in the Sepoy Mutiny and exiled.

The Marathas' expansion was delayed due to the battle, and infighting soon broke out within the empire. They recovered their position under the next Peshwa Madhavrao I and by 1771 were back in control of the north, finally occupying Delhi. However, after the death of Madhavrao, due to infighting and increasing pressure from the British, their claims to empire only officially ended in 1818 after three wars with the British.

Meanwhile, the Sikhs—whose rebellion was the original reason Ahmad invaded—were left largely untouched by the battle. They soon retook Lahore. When Ahmad Shah returned in March 1764 he was forced to break off his siege after only two weeks due to a rebellion in Afghanistan. He returned again in 1767, but was unable to win any decisive battle. With his own troops complaining about not being paid, he eventually abandoned the district to the Sikhs, who remained in control until 1849 when it was annexed by the British Empire.

The Marathi term "Sankrant Kosalali" (सक्रांत कोसळली), meaning "Sankranti has befallen us", is said to have originated from the events of the battle. There are some verbs in the Marathi language related to this loss as "Panipat zale" (पानिपत झाले) . This verb is even today used in Marathi language. A common pun is "Aamchaa Vishwaas Panipataat gela" (आमचा विश्वास पानीपतात गेला) . Just before death of brave Dattaji Shinde, when asked whether he would still fight, lionheart Dattaji replied "Bachenge to Aur Bhi Ladenge" (बचेंगे तो औरभी लडेंगे।) . Many historians, including British historians of the time, have argued that had it not been for the weakening of Maratha power at Panipat, the British might never have gotten a strong foothold in India.

The battle proved the inspiration for Rudyard Kipling's poem "With Scindia to Delhi".

"Our hands and scarfs were saffron-dyed for signal of despair,
When we went forth to Paniput to battle with the ~Mlech~ ,
Ere we came back from Paniput and left a kingdom there."

It is, however, also remembered as a scene of valour on both sides. Santaji Wagh's corpse was found with over 40 mortal wounds. The bravery of Vishwas Rao, the Peshwa's son, and Sadashiv Bhau was acknowledged even by the Afghans. Yashwantrao Pawar also fought with great courage, killing many Afghans.

Afghan military prowess was to inspire hope in many orthodox Muslims and Mughal royalists and fear in the British.

The present-day Baloch tribes Bugtis and Marris are thought to be the descendants of Maratha soldiers and civilians who were taken as prisoners of war

See also

References

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Further reading

  • Britannica "Panipat, Battles of" (2007) Retrieved 24 May 2007, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online.
  • T S Shejwalkar, Panipat 1761 Deccan College Monograph Series. I., Pune (1946)
  • H. G. Rawlinson, An Account Of The Last Battle of Panipat and of the Events Leading To It, Hesperides Press (2006) ISBN 978-1406726251
  • Vishwas Patil, Panipat" – a novel based on the 3rd battle of Panipat, Venus (1990)
  • Uday S. Kulkarni, A Non Fiction book - 'Solstice at Panipat - 14 January 1761' Mula-Mutha Publishers, Pune (2011). ISBN 978-81-921080-0-1 An Authentic Account of the Campaign of Panipat.
  • Third Battle of Panipat by Abhas Verma ISBN 9788180903397 Bharatiya Kala Prakashana

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