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A pseudoscience is any body of alleged knowledge, methodology, belief, or practice that claims to be scientific but does not follow the scientific method. 

The term pseudoscience appears to have been first used in 1843 as a combination of the Greek root pseudo, meaning false, and the Latin scientia, meaning knowledge or a field of knowledge. It generally has negative connotations, because it asserts that things so labeled are inaccurately or deceptively described as science. As such, those labeled as practicing or advocating a "pseudoscience" normally reject this classification.

Introduction

The standards for determining whether a body of alleged knowledge, methodology, field, belief, or practice is scientific vary from field to field, but involve agreed principles including reproducibility and intersubjective verifiability. Such principles aim to ensure that evidence can be reproduced and/or measured given the same conditions. This allows a hypothesis or theory to be test for validity and reliabilty. The Scientific method is expected to be applied always, and bias controlled or eliminated, either through experimental designs including double-blind studies, or via statistical means. All data, including experimental/environmental conditions, are expected to be documented for scrutiny and made available for peer review, allowing further experiments or studies to be conducted to confirm or falsify results, as well as to determine other important factors such as statistical significance, confidence intervals, and margins of error. Fulfillment of these requirements allows other researchers and practitioners the opportunity to assess whether to accept or reject those results in their own scientific work or in a particular field of applied science, technology, therapy or other form of practice.

In the mid-20th Century Karl Popper suggested the additional criterion of falsifiability. Some theories cannot be proven false under any circumstance, for example, the theory that God created the universe. Such theories may be true, but are not scientific; they lie outside the scope of (at least present-day) science; Popper differentiated between mythological, religious or metaphysical formulations, which may prefigure later scientifically formulated theories but do not follow a scientific methodology, and actually pseudoscientific formulations — though without providing a clear demarcation between the two. Popper advocated that, in addition to the expectation for a hypothesis or theory to be empirically verifiable, scientific propositions should be limited to statements that are presented in such a way that in the event they are false, they should be capable of being clearly shown to be false through experimental testing. Another criterion applicable to theoretical work is the heuristic of parsimony, also known as Occam's Razor, which guides the theorist to seek explanations that account for all relevant evidence without unnecessary additional assumptions.

Some historians and philosophers of science (including Paul Feyerabend) have argued, from a sociology of knowledge perspective, that a clear philosophical distinction between science and pseudoscience is neither possible nor desirable.  Both the theories and methodologies of science evolve, sometimes very slowly, and in other cases quite rapidly. In addition, standards applicable to one branch of science may not be those employed in another branch. For instance, physicists may expect a 100% correlation of cause and effect in certain areas of inquiry (any significant divergence from this signifying a serious lack of understanding of the causal factors, the method of measurement and/or the testing environment), whereas psychologists may find 5% statistical correlation worthy of consideration if it can be consistently repeated. 

Critics of pseudoscience such as Richard Dawkins, Mario Bunge, Carl Sagan, and James Randi consider almost all forms of pseudoscience to be harmful, whether or not they result in immediate harm to their adherents. These critics generally consider that advocacy of pseudoscience may occur for a number of reasons, ranging from simple naïveté about the nature of science and the scientific method, to deliberate deception for financial or political gain. At the extreme, issues of personal health and safety may be very directly involved, for example in the case of physical or mental therapy or treatment, or in assessing safety risks. In such instances the potential for direct harm to patients, clients or even the general public may be an issue in assessing pseudoscience. (See also: Junk science.)

The concept of pseudoscience as antagonistic to bona fide science appears to have emerged in the mid-19th century. The first recorded use of the word "pseudo-science" appears to have been in 1844 in the Northern Journal of Medicine, I 387: "That opposite kind of innovation which pronounces what has been recognised as a branch of science, to have been a pseudo-science, composed merely of so-called facts, connected together by misapprehensions under the disguise of principles".

Identifying pseudoscience

A field, practice, or body of knowledge is reasonably called pseudoscience or pseudoscientific when (1) it has presented itself as scientific (i.e., as empirically and experimentally verifiable); and (2) it fails to meet the accepted norms of scientific research, most importantly the use of scientific method.   Within the various expectations of legitimate scientific methodology, by far the most important is that of making data and methodology available for close scrutiny by other scientists and researchers, as well as making available any additional relevant information used to arrive at particular results or methods of practice. To the degree that thorough documentation of data and method is unavailable for detailed scrutiny by others, a body of knowledge, practice, or field of inquiry will tend, as a result, to meet at least several of the characteristics of pseudoscience introduced below.

The following characteristics have been argued by the cited authors to be useful in identifying pseudoscience.

Use of vague, exaggerated or untestable claims

• Assertion of scientific claims that are vague rather than precise, and that lack specific measurements as a basis .
• Failure to make use of operational definitions 
• Failure to adhere to the principle of parsimony, i.e. failing to seek an explanation that requires the fewest possible additional assumptions when multiple viable explanations are possible (see: Occam's Razor) 
• Use of obscurantist language. Many proponents of pseudoscience use grandiose or highly technical jargon in an effort to provide their disciplines with the superficial trappings of science.
• Lack of boundary conditions: Most well-supported scientific theories possess boundary conditions (well articulated limitations) under which the predicted phenomena do and do not apply. In contrast, many or most pseudoscientific phenomena are purported to operate across an exceedingly wide range of conditions.

Over-reliance on confirmation rather than refutation

• Assertion of scientific claims that cannot be falsified in the event they are incorrect, inaccurate, or irrelevant (see also: falsifiability)  
• Assertion of claims that a theory predicts something that it has not been shown to predict (see, e.g.:validity, relevance, Ignoratio elenchi; Argument from ignorance)   
• Assertion that claims which have not been proven false must be true, and vice versa (see: Argument from ignorance)  
• Overreliance on testimonials and anecdotes. Testimonial and anecdotal evidence can be useful for discovery (i.e., hypothesis generation) but should not be used in the context of justification (i.e., hypothesis testing). Proponents of pseudoscientific claims frequently invoke reports from selected cases as evidence for these claims.
• Selective use of experimental evidence: presentation of data that seems to support its own claims while suppressing or refusing to consider data that conflict with its claims 
• Reversed burden of proof. In science, the burden of proof rests on the individual making a claim, not on the critic. Proponents of a pseudoscience frequently neglect this principle and demand that skeptics demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a claim (e.g., an assertion regarding the efficacy of a novel therapeutic technique) is false. It is essentially impossible to prove a universal negative, so this tactic incorrectly places the burden of proof on the skeptic rather than the claimant.
• Appeals to holism: Proponents of pseudoscientific claims, especially in organic medicine, alternative medicine, naturopathy and mental health, often resort to the “mantra of holism” to explain negative findings.

For example, according to Williams (2000), Intelligent design is considered unfalsifiable and pseudoscientific because it is impossible to disprove the existence of the designer (God). Lilienfeld et al (2004) state that Alternative medicine is sometimes stated to be holistic so that negative findings cannot be concluded, and according to Hines (1988) proponents of extrasensoryperception (ESP) have interpreted isolated cases of worse than chance performance on parapsychological tasks as evidence of ESP.

Lack of openness to testing by other experts

• Evasion of peer review before publicizing them (called "science by press conference")   Many proponents of pseudoscience avoid subjecting their work to the often ego-bruising process of peer review, sometimes on the grounds that peer review is inherently biased against claims that contradict established paradigms, and sometimes on the grounds that assertions cannot be evaluated adequately using standard scientific methods. By remaining insulated from the peer review process, some proponents of pseudoscience forego an invaluable opportunity to obtain corrective feedback from informed colleagues..
• Failure to provide adequate information for other researchers to reproduce the claimed results 
• Assertion of claims of secrecy or proprietary knowledge in response to requests for review of data or methodology 

Lack of progress

• Failure to progress towards additional evidence of its claims  
• Lack of self correction: both scientific and pseudoscientific research programmes make mistakes, but most scientific research programs tend to eliminate these errors over time, whereas most pseudoscientific research programs do not. Intellectual stagnation is a hallmark of most pseudoscientific research programs.

For example, astrology has changed very little in the past two millenia (Hines, 1988).

Personalization of issues

• Tight social groups and granfalloons. Authoritarian personality, suppression of dissent, and groupthink can enhance the adoption of pseudoscientific beliefs. In attempting to confirm their pseudoscience (confirmation bias), the group tends to identify critics of the pseudoscience as enemies, whereupon the group generates a set of arguments against critics.
• Assertion of claims of a conspiracy on the part of the scientific community to suppress the results 
• Attacking the motives or character of anyone who questions the claims (see Ad hominem fallacy.) 
• Denouncing an entire scientific discipline, or the edifice of science itself, as corrupt, incorrect, or worthless.
• Demonization of opponents.

Subjects may be considered pseudoscientific for various reasons and with an emphasis on particular characteristics; Popper considered astrology to be pseudoscientific simply because astrologers keep their claims so vague that they could never be refuted, whereas Thagard considers astrology pseudoscientific because its practitioners make little effort to develop the theory, show no concern for attempts to critically evaluate the theory in relation to others, and are selective in considering evidence.

Some characteristics that are often true of pseudoscience are also true to some extent of some new genuinely scientific work. These include:

• claims or theories unconnected to previous experimental results
• claims which contradict experimentally established results
• work failing to operate on standard definitions of concepts
• emotion-based resistance, by the scientific community, to new claims or theories 

Pseudoscience is also distinguishable from revelation, theology, or spirituality in that it claims to offer insight into the physical world obtained by "scientific" means. Systems of thought that rely on "divine" or "inspired" knowledge are not considered pseudoscience if they do not claim either to be scientific or to overturn well-established science. There are also bodies of practical knowledge that are not claimed to be scientific. These are also not pseudoscience.

The term "pseudoscience" may by used by adherents of fields considered pseudoscientific to criticize their mainstream critics and vice versa, in which case the appearance is of two opposing camps both accusing each other of pseudoscience.

Some statements and commonly held beliefs in popular science may not meet the criteria of science. "Pop" science may blur the divide between science and pseudoscience among the general public, and may also involve science fiction. Indeed, pop science is defined by the fact that it is disseminated to, and can also easily emanate from, persons not accountable to scientific methodology and expert peer review.

Another class of pseudoscience dubbed pseudoskepticism by the late professor of sociology, Marcello Truzzi, refers to a non-rigorous skepticism that is itself erroneously presented as skepticism, and taking a stance of denial, rather than doubt. Truzzi noted that while "Many claims of anomalies are bunk and deserve proper debunking .. those I term scoffers often make judgements without full inquiry"

Pseudoscience contrasted with protoscience

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Pseudoscience also differs from protoscience. Protoscience is a term sometimes used to describe a hypothesis that has not yet been adequately tested by the scientific method, but which is otherwise consistent with existing science or which, where inconsistent, offers reasonable account of the inconsistency. It may also describe the transition from a body of practical knowledge into a scientific field.

Pseudoscience, in contrast, is characteristically inadequately tested; indeed, it may even be untestable in principle. If tests appear to contradict its evidence, supporters may insist that the existing scientific results are false. Pseudoscience is often unresponsive to ordinary scientific procedures (for example, peer review, publication in standard journals). If untestable claims have been made, the failure to test and disprove these claims is often cited as evidence of the truth of the pseudoscience.

The boundaries between pseudoscience, protoscience, and "real" science are often unclear to non-specialist observers and sometimes even to experts. Especially where there is a significant cultural or historical distance (as, for example, modern chemistry reflecting on alchemy), protosciences can be misinterpreted as pseudoscientific. Many people have tried to offer objective distinctions, with mixed success. Often the term pseudoscience is used simply as a pejorative to express the speaker's low opinion of a given field, regardless of any objective measures.

If the claims of a given field can be experimentally tested and methodological standards are upheld, it is real scientific work, however odd, astonishing, or counter-intuitive. If claims made are inconsistent with existing experimental results or established theory, but the methodology is sound, caution should be used; much of science consists of testing hypotheses that turn out to be false. In such a case, the work may be better described as as yet unproven or research in progress. Conversely, if the claims of any given "science" cannot be experimentally tested or scientific standards are not upheld in these tests, it fails to meet the modern criteria for a science.

In such circumstances it may be difficult to distinguish which of two opposing "sciences" is valid; for example, both the proponents and opponents of the Kyoto Protocol on global warming have recruited the help of scientists to endorse their contradictory positions, because of differing political goals. The enlistment of science in the service of politics or business is sometimes called "junk science".

Demarcation problem and criticisms of the concept of pseudoscience

After over a century of dialogue among philosophers of science and scientists in varied fields, and despite broad agreement on the basics of scientific method, the boundaries between science and non-science continue to be debated. This is known as the problem of demarcation.

Many commentators and practitioners of science, as well as supporters of fields of inquiry and practices labelled as pseudoscience, question the rigor of the demarcation, as some disciplines now accepted as science previously had features cited as those of pseudoscience, such as lack of reproducibility, or the inability to create falsifiable experiments. Many accepted scientific concepts including: plate tectonics, and the Big Bang, were criticized by some as being pseudoscientific when first proposed.

It has been argued by several notable commentators that experimental verification is not in itself decisive in scientific method. Thomas Kuhn states that in neither Popper's nor his own theory "can testing play a quite decisive role." Daniel Rothbart said that "the defining feature of science does not seem to be experimental success, for most clear cases of genuine science have been experimentally falsified." The latter proposed that a scientific theory must "account for all the phenomena that its rival background theory explains" and "must clash empirically with its rival by yielding test implications that are inconsistent with the rival theory". A theory is thus scientific or not depending upon its historical situation; if it betters the current explanations of phenomena, it marks scientific progress. "Many domains in ancient Greece, for example, domains that today are called superstition, religion, magic and the occult, were at that time clear cases of legitimate science." This is an explicitly competitive model of scientific work; Rothbart also notes that it is not a completely effective model.

Kuhn postulated that proponents of competing paradigms may resort to political means (such as invective) to garner support from a public which lacks the ability to judge competing scientific theories on their merits. Philosopher of science Larry Laudan has suggested that pseudoscience has no scientific meaning and mostly describes our emotions: "If we would stand up and be counted on the side of reason, we ought to drop terms like ‘pseudo-science’ and ‘unscientific’ from our vocabulary; they are just hollow phrases which do only emotive work for us".

Scientific theories once criticized as pseudoscience

A number of presently accepted scientific theories were once rejected by mainstream scientists and mathematicians of their time as being pseudoscientific, irrational or obviously false. None of these fields are generally considered as pseudoscientific any more. These include:

• Big Bang theory 
• Black holes
• Continental drift 
• Cosmology 
• Electromagnetic fields 
• Meteors

At the time these theories were not accepted, each was backed up by varying levels of evidence, or none at all. Fields can also reject their pseudoscientific notions in favour of the more limited range of scientifically supported element/s of their field. For example, Atwood (2004) suggested that "osteopathy has, for the most part, repudiated its pseudoscientific beginnings and joined the world of rational healthcare.".

Pseudomathematics

Pseudomathematics is a mathematics-like activity undertaken either by non-mathematicians or mathematicians themselves which does not conform to the rigorous standards usually applied to mathematical theories.

Demographics

In the United States, the National Science Foundation indicated that public belief in pseudoscience rose during the 1990's, peaked near 2001, and has mildly declined since. Nevertheless, pseudoscientific beliefs remain ubiquitous.

Pseudoscience in psychotherapy and popular psychology

Neurologists and clinical psychologists such as Drenth (2003:38), Lilienfeld (2004:20) and Beyerstein (1991:34) are concerned about the increasing amount of what they consider pseudoscience promoted in psychotherapy and popular psychology, and are also concerned about what they see as pseudoscientific therapies such as Neuro-linguistic programming, Rebirthing, Reparenting, and Primal Scream Therapy being adopted by government and professional bodies and by the public. They state that scientifically unsupported therapies may harm vulnerable members of the public, undermine legitimate therapies, and tend to spread misconceptions about the nature of the mind and brain to society at large.

A typical pseudoscientific concept used in some fringe psychotherapies is orgone energy. "There is an increasing degree of overlapping and blending of orgone therapy with New Age and other therapies that manipulate the patient’s biofields, such as Therapeutic Touch and Reiki. 'Biofield' is a pseudoscientific term often used synonymously with orgone energy. Klee states that "there is even an organization of psychiatrists which promotes the theories and methods of orgone therapy.

Several publications are available to help identify and educate practitioners on the subject of pseudoscience. The publication Scientific Review of Alternative Medicine (SRAM) states its purpose is to apply the best tools of science and reason to determine whether hypotheses are valid and treatments are effective. Scientific Review of Mental Health Practice (SRMHP) , a new mental health journal interested in the recent growth of therapies that have not been adequately tested, states its purpose "to facilitate improved research and thinking about critical questions on the fringes of present scientific knowledge concerning mental health."

Fields regarded as pseudoscience

The following is an example list of theories and fields of endeavor that are commonly criticized as pseudoscientific in whole or in part, and are faulted as failing to meet the norms and standards of scientific practice.

Some of these fields, or parts of them, may be the subject of scientific research; see the individual articles for more information.

Note: EOP: Encyclopedia of Pseudoscience. Williams, William F. (ed.), New York (2000)

See also

• Bad science
• Cargo cult science
• The Demon-Haunted World
• Junk science
• Pathological science
• Pathological skepticism (or Pseudoskepticism)
• Quackery
• Sokal Affair

People

• Michael Behe : advocates the idea that some structures are too complex to be adequately explained without God.
• Erich von Däniken : controversial Swiss author who is best known for authoring works about prehistoric times.
• Kent Hovind : American evangelist and prominent "Young Earth" creationist.
• John Hutchison
• Michael Shermer : science writer, founder of The Skeptics Society, and editor of its magazine Skeptic.
• Marcello Truzzi : professor of sociology at Eastern Michigan University and director for the Center for Scientific Anomalies Research.
• Ernest Muldashev : Russian ufologist

Lists

• Crank (article which contains a list of theories)
• List of pseudoscientific theories
• List of misconceptions

Notes

1. "Pseudoscientific - pretending to be scientific, falsely represented as being scientific", from the Oxford American Dictionary, published by the Oxford English Dictionary.
2. http://skepdic.com/pseudosc.html
3. Magendie, F. (1843). An Elementary Treatise on Human Physiology. 5th Ed. Tr. John Revere. New York: Harper, p. 150. Magendie refers to phrenology as "a pseudo-science of the present day" (note the hyphen).
4. However, from the "them vs. us" polarization that its usage engenders, the term may also have a positive function because " derogatory labeling of others often includes an unstated self-definition "(p.266); and, from this, the application of the term also implies "a unity of science, a privileged tree of knowledge or space from which the pseudoscience is excluded, and the user's right to belong is asserted " (p.286) -- Still, A. & Dryden, W., "The Social Psychology of "Pseudoscience": A Brief History", Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, Vol.34, No.3, (September 2004), pp.265-290.
5. See, e.g., Gauch, Hugh G., Jr., Scientific Method in Practice (2003) 3-5 ff.
6. Gauch (2003), 191 ff, especially Chapter 6, "Probability", and Chapter 7, "inductive Logic and Statistics"
7. Popper, Karl, "Science, Conjectures and Refutations" (orig. 1963), in Cover, J.A., Curd, Martin (Eds, 1998) Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, 3-10.
8. Popper, Karl, "Science: Conjectures and Refutations", reprinted in Grim, Patrick, Philosophy of Science and the Occult, Albany 1990, pp. 104-110.
9. Gauch (2003) 269 ff, "Parsimony and Efficiency".
10. Feyerabend, Paul, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, (1975)
11. For a perspective on Feyerabend from within the scientific community, see, e.g., Gauch (2003) at p.4: "Such critiques are unfamiliar to most scientists, although some may have heard a few distant shots from the so-called science wars."
12. See, e.g., Meyers, Anne, and Hansen, Christine H., Experimental Psychology (4th Ed., 2001)
13. See also, e.g., Shaughnessy, John J., Research Methods in Psychology (6th Ed., 2002)
15. Williams, William F. (editor) (2000) Encyclopedia of Pseudoscience: From Alien Abductions to Zone Therapy.
16. Cover, J.A., Curd, Martin (Eds, 1998) Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, 1-82.
17. See, e.g., Gauch, Hugh G., Jr. (2003) Scientific Method in Practice, 124 ff, esp. section on "Full Disclosure".
18. See, e.g., Gauch (2003), op cit at 211 ff (Probability, "Common Blunders").
19. For a well-developed explanation of operational definitions, see, e.g.,
20. Gauch, op cit (2003) 269 ff, "Parsimony and Efficiency"
21. Cite error: The named reference Lilienfeld20 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
22. Hines, T. (1988) Pseudoscience and the Paranormal: A Critical Examination of the Evidence. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books. A Skeptical Inquirer Reader.
23. Lakatos, Imre. "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." in Lacatos, Imre, and Musgrave, Alan. (eds.). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970) 91-195.
24. Popper, Karl (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery.
25. See, e.g., Gauch (2003), op cit at 178 ff (Deductive Logic, "Fallacies"), and at 211 ff (Probability, "Common Blunders").
26. See, e.g.,
27. Macmilllan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol 3, "Fallacies" 174 'ff, esp. section on "Ignoratio elenchi".
28. Argument from ignorance is also properly termed "argument to ignorance", "argumentum ad ignorantiam". For a definition, see, e.g.,
29. Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol 3, "Fallacies" 174 'ff, esp. 177-178.
30. Bunge, Mario (1983) "Demarcating science from pseudoscience," Fundamenta Scientiae 3: 369-388, 381.
31. Thagard, op cit (1978) at 227, 228.
32. Lilienfeld S.O. (2004) Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology. Guilford Press (2004) ISBN 1-59385-070-0
33. Ruscio, J. (2001) Clear thinking with psychology: Separating sense from nonsense, Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth.
34. Peer review and the acceptance of new scientific ideas (Warning: 469 kB PDF)
35. *Peer review – process, perspectives and the path ahead
36. Lilienfeld Scott O. (2004) Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology. Guilford Press (2004) ISBN 1-59385-070-0
37. For an opposing perspective, see, e.g.: Peer Review as Scholarly Conformity
38. Ruscio, J. (2001) Clear thinking with psychology: Separating sense from nonsense. Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth.
39. Gauch, op cit (2003) at 124 ff, "Full Disclosure"
40. Gauch, op cit (2003) at 124 ff, "Full Disclosure"
41. Lakatos, Imre. "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." in Lakatos, Imre, and Musgrave, Alan. (eds.). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970) 91-195.
42. Thagard, Paul R. "Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience" (1978) In PSA 1978, Volume 1, edited by P.D. Asquith and I. Hacking (East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1978) 223 ff. Thagard writes, at 227, 228: "We can now propose the following principle of demarcation: A theory or discipline which purports to be scientific is pseudoscientific if and only if: it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces many unsolved problems; but the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations."
43. Ruscio, J. (2001) Clear thinking with psychology: Separating sense from nonsense. Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth, p120.
44. In contrast to sciences, in which erroneous claims tend to be gradually ferreted out by a process akin to natural selection, pseudosciences tend to remain stagnant in the face of contradictory evidence. The work Scientists Confront Velikovsky, 1976, Cornell University, also delves into these features in some detail, as does the work of Thomas Kuhn, e.g., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) which also discusses some of the items on the list of characteristics of pseudoscience.
45. ^ Devilly, Grant J. (2005) "Power Therapies and possible threats to the science of psychology and psychiatry", in Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, Volume 39, Number 6, June 2005, pp. 437-445(9)
46. An example of such a Web site is archivefreedom.org which claims that "The list of suppressed scientists even includes Nobel Laureates!"
47. See, e.g.,
48. Kuhn, Thomas, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962)
49. http://www.popularscience.co.uk/features/feat20.htm
50. Marcello Truzzi, Editorial, Zetetic Scholar, 12–13 (1987) 3–4. "Since 'skepticism' properly refers to doubt rather than denial — nonbelief rather than belief — critics who take the negative rather than an agnostic position but still call themselves 'skeptics' are actually pseudo-skeptics and have, I believed, gained a false advantage by usurping that label."
51. Marcello Truzzi, "Pseudoscience," in Gordon Stein, editor, Encyclopedia of the Paranormal. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books. Pp. 560-575. Also described in "Anomalistics" (1998)
52. Popper, op. cit.
53. Gauch, Hugh G., Jr., Scientific Method in Practice (2003) 3-7.
54. Cover, J.A., Curd, Martin (Eds, 1998) Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, 1-82.
55. http://www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/geology/techist.html , regarding plate techtonics' early reception.
56. http://map.gsfc.nasa.gov/m_uni/uni_101bb1.html , regarding the Big Bang.
57. Kuhn, Thomas, "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" in Grim, op. cit., p. 125.
58. Rothbart, Daniel, "Demarcating Genuine Science from Pseudoscience", in Grim, op. cit., pp. 114.
59. Rothbart, Daniel, op. cit., pp. 114-20.
60. Laudan, Larry, "The demise of the demarcation problem" in Ruse, Michael, But Is It Science?: The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy (1996) 337-350.
61. EOP
62. EOP, p. 156
63. EOP
64. Stephen Hawking, Hawking on the Big Bang and Black Holes (1993) World Scientific, ISBN 981-02-1078-7. "Cosmology was thought of as pseudoscience where wild speculation was unconstrained by any possible observations".
65. Albert Einstein: "It is possible that there exist emanations that are still unknown to us. Do you remember how electrical currents and 'unseen waves' were laughed at?"
66. See here
67. National Science Board. 2006. Science and Engineering Indicators 2006. Two volumes. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation (volume 1, NSB-06-01; NSB 06-01A).
68. Gerald D. Klee, M.D, "The Resurrection of Wilhelm Reich and Orgone Therapy", The Scientific Review of Mental Health Practice Summer 2005 (Vol. 4, No. 1)." | available online
69. L'Imposture Scientifique en Dix Lecons, "Pseudoscience in Ten Lessons.", By Michel de Pracontal. Editions La Decouverte, Paris, 2001. ISBN 2-7071-3293-4.
70. "A book for burning?". Nature. 293 (5830): 245–246. 24 Sep 1981. doi:10.1038/293245b0. Attributed to Nature's senior editor, John Maddox (commenting on Sheldrake's book A New Science of Life (1981)), Maddox wrote: "Sheldrake's argument is an exercise in pseudo-science. — Many readers will be left with the impression that Sheldrake has succeeded in finding a place for magic within scientific discussion — and this, indeed, may have been a part of the objective of writing such a book."

References

• Atwood K,C. Naturopathy, Pseudoscience, and Medicine: Myths and Fallacies vs Truth. Medscape General Medicine. 2004;6(1):e53
• Beyerstein,D. (1996) A Skeptical Look at Alternative Healthcare. The Rational Enquirer. Vol 12, No. 2, Nov, 02
• Bunge, M. (1983) Demarcating science from pseudoscience," Fundamenta Scientiae 3: 369-388.
• Hines, Terence, Pseudoscience and the Paranormal: A Critical Examination of the Evidence, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY, 1988. ISBN 0-87975-419-2.
• Beyerstein, B.L. (1990) Brainscams: Neuromythologies of the New Age. Int'l. J. of Mental Health, 19(3):27-36.
• Carroll, Robert Todd, (2003). The Skeptic's Dictionary: A Collection of Strange Beliefs, Amusing Deceptions, and Dangerous Delusions, John Wiley & Sons, ISBN 0-471-27242-6
• Ford, J. (2001). Healing homosexuals: A psychologist's journey through the ex-gay movement and the pseudo-science of reparative therapy. Journal of Gay & Lesbian Psychotherapy, 5(3-4), 69-86.
• Klee G.D. (2005) THE RESURRECTION OF WILHELM REICH AND ORGONE THERAPY The scientific review of mental health practice. Spring ~ Summer 2005 Volume 4 Number 1
• Lilienfeld S.O. (2004) Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology. Guilford Press (2004) ISBN 1-59385-070-0
• Bernard Ortiz de Montellano (1992). "Magic Melanin: Spreading Scientific Illiteracy Among the Minorities (part 2)". Skeptical Inquirer. 16 (2): 162–66. Retrieved June 25, 2006. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)
• Shermer, Michael, Why People Believe Weird Things: Pseudoscience, Superstition, and Other Confusions of Our Time, Owl Books, New York, NY, 2002, ISBN 0-8050-7089-3
• Victor J. Stenger (1995). The Unconscious Quantum: Metaphysics in Modern Physics and Cosmology. Prometheus Books. ISBN 1-57392-022-3.
• Williams, William F. (editor) (2000). Encyclopedia of Pseudoscience: From Alien Abductions to Zone Therapy, Facts on File, ISBN 0-8160-3351-X
• Wilson, Fred, The Logic and Methodology of Science and Pseudoscience, Canadian Scholars Press, 2000. ISBN 1-55130-175-X
• Plate Tectonics: The Rocky History of an Idea by Anne Weil, University of California, Berekley, Museum of Palenotology, retrieved Aug 2, 2006
• Big Bang Cosmology by Gary Hinshaw, WMAP, NASA, retrieved Aug 2, 2006
• A History of Quantum Mechanics by J J O'Connor and E F Robertson, JOC/EFR May 1996, retrieved Aug 2, 2006

External links

• Debating pseudoscientists - Philip Plait
• Distinguishing Science from Pseudoscience - Barry L. Beyerstein
• Pseudoscience - Robert Todd Carroll, PhD
• Pseudoscience. What is it? How can I recognize it? - Stephen Lower
• The Seven Warning Signs of Bogus Science - Robert L. Park
• Science Needs to Combat Pseudoscience - A statement by 32 Russian scientists and philosophers
• Science, Pseudoscience, and Irrationalism - Steven Dutch
• Why Is Pseudoscience Dangerous? - Edward Kruglyakov
• Why SETI is science and UFOlogy is not - Mark Moldwin

• Pseudoscience