| Revision as of 22:49, 8 December 2016 edit134.124.93.126 (talk) Added citation to Alyssa Ney's 2014 volume, and an argument by analogy invoked by eternalists to support four-dimensionalism.Tag: Visual edit← Previous edit | Revision as of 02:28, 9 December 2016 edit undo134.124.95.151 (talk) →Temporal parts: Added citations to Ney 2014 in discussing perdurantism, deleted some extraneous discussion of growing block and presentist theories of time, added discussion of Exdurantism and Sider's "All the World's a Stage".Tag: Visual editNext edit → | ||
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| In ], '''four-dimensionalism''' (also known as the ''doctrine of ])'' is an ] position that an object's persistence through time is like its extension through space |
In ], '''four-dimensionalism''' (also known as the ''doctrine of ])'' is an ] position that an object's persistence through time is like its extension through space. Thus, an object that exists in time has temporal parts in the various subregions of the total region of time it occupies, just like an object that exists in a region of space has at least one part in every subregion of that space.<ref name="Sider1997">{{Cite journal |title=Four-Dimensionalism |first=Theodore |last=Sider |publisher=Duke University Press |journal=The Philosophical Review |volume=106 |issue=2 |pages=197–231 |date=April 1997 |url=http://tedsider.org/papers/4d.pdf |jstor=2998357}}</ref> | ||
| Four |
Four-dimensionalists typically argue for treating time as analogous to space, usually leading them to endorse the doctrine of ''']'''. This is a philosophical approach to the ontological nature of ], according to which all points in time are equally "real", as opposed to the ] idea that only the present is real.<ref>{{Cite book|title=General Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues |first=Theo A.F.|last=Kuipers|publisher=North Holland|year=2007|isbn=978-0-444-51548-3|page=326|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qUMuFaXjNjEC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA326#v=onepage&q&f=false}}</ref> As some eternalists argue by analogy, just as all spatially distant objects and events are equally as real as those close to us, temporally distant objects and events are as real as those currently present to us.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/870919144|title=Metaphysics : an introduction|last=Alyssa.|first=Ney,|publisher=|year=|isbn=|location=|pages=174|oclc=870919144|quote=|via=}}</ref> | ||
| '''Perdurantism'''—or perdurance theory—is a philosophical theory of persistence and ],<ref name="sep-temporal-parts">{{cite encyclopedia |last=Hawley |first=Katherine |title=Temporal Parts |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |editor=Edward N. Zalta |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/temporal-parts/|year=2010 |edition=Winter 2010}}</ref> according to which an individual has distinct |
''']'''—or perdurance theory—is a closely related philosophical theory of persistence and ],<ref name="sep-temporal-parts">{{cite encyclopedia |last=Hawley |first=Katherine |title=Temporal Parts |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |editor=Edward N. Zalta |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/temporal-parts/|year=2010 |edition=Winter 2010}}</ref> according to which an individual has distinct temporal parts throughout its existence, and the persisting object is the sum or set of all of its temporal parts. This sum or set is colloquially referred to as a "space-time worm", which has earned the perdurantist view the moniker of "the worm view".<ref name=":0" /> While all perdurantists are plausibly considered four dimensionalists, at least one variety of four dimensionalism does not count as perdurantist in nature. This variety, known as '''exdurantism''' or the "stage view", is closely akin to the perdurantist position. They also countenance a view of persisting objects which have temporal parts that succeed one another through time. However, instead of identifying the persisting object as the entire set or sum (the "space-time worm") of the temporal parts which compose the object, the exdurantist argues that any object under discussion is a single stage (time-slice, temporal part, etc.), and that the other stages or parts which compose the persisting object are related to that part by a "temporal ]" relation.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sider|first=Theodore|date=1996-09-01|title=All the world's a stage|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048409612347421|journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy|volume=74|issue=3|pages=433–453|doi=10.1080/00048409612347421|issn=0004-8402}}</ref> | ||
| Though they have often been conflated, eternalism is a theory of what time is like and what times exist, while perdurantism is a theory about persisting objects and their identity conditions over time. Eternalism and perdurantism tend to be discussed together because many philosophers argue for a combination of eternalism and perdurantism. Sider (1997)<ref name="Sider1997" /> uses the term ''four-dimensionalism'' to refer to perdurantism, but Michael Rea (Forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook for Metaphysics), uses the term "four-dimensionalism" to mean the view that presentism is false as opposed to "perdurantism", the view that endurantism is false and persisting objects have temporal parts.<ref>{{quotation|.. This view is variously called "four-dimensionalism", "perdurantism", or "the doctrine of temporal parts". Some think that four-dimensionalism understood as the denial of presentism implies four-dimensionalism understood as perdurantism. But whether or not that is true, the important thing to recognize is that these are two very different views. To avoid confusion, I will in this paper reserve the term "four-dimensionalism" exclusively for the view that presentism is false, and I will use the term "perdurantism" to refer to the view that objects last over time without being wholly present at every time at which they exist.|MICHAEL C. REA|FOUR DIMENSIONALISM|Forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook for Metaphysics}} </ref> | |||
| Eternalism and perdurantism tend to be discussed together because many philosophers argue for a combination of eternalism and perdurantism, considering both as better theories than their counterparts, ] and ], respectively. | |||
| Contemporary four-dimensionalists include, according to Sider (1997), Armstrong (1980), Hughes (1986), Heller (1984, 1990,1992,1993) and Lewis (1983, 1986). | |||
| ==Temporal parts== | |||
| {{main|Temporal parts}} '''Temporal parts''' are a concept used in contemporary ] in the debate over the persistence and identity conditions of material objects. Typically, four-dimensionalist Just as spatially extended objects can manifest incompatible properties at different spatial locations (i.e. being hot at one part and cold at another), temporal parts are invoked by four-dimensionalist philosophers in order to allow for objects having incompatible properties at different temporal locations (i.e. being young at one time and old at another). | |||
| ==Presentism vs. eternalism (and the growing block theory)== | |||
| Presentism is an ] viewpoint which attempts to account for how consciousness functions in relation to time. Presentism asserts that only the present exists. The past and the future, therefore, are seen as non-existent. To a presentist, the memory accounts for the collection of events that have already occurred. Similarly, the future is ]ualized as being a mental ]. Therefore, presentism is attempting to demonstrate that the total sum of the actual world occupies the present moment. | |||
| Consequently, ] is the ontological view which postulates that past, present and future all equally exist. While the presentist asserts that the past and future are only logical constructs, the eternalist believes that time exists as an objective manifestation. Eternalism is the basic construct behind four-dimensionalism, as it accounts for the reality of past and future rather than proposing that all events occupy the present. | |||
| Additionally there is the "growing block theory" which accepts present and past objects (and events) into its ontology but not future ones. This purportedly allows for an open future (and closed past), thus making room for libertarian free will. It also makes good on the intuition that there is a significant metaphysical distinction to be made between past and future. | |||
| ==A-series and B-series== | ==A-series and B-series== | ||
| {{main|A-series and B-series}} | {{main|A-series and B-series}} | ||
| ] in |
] in '']'', identified two descriptions of time, which he called the A-series and the B-series. The A-series identifies positions in time as past, present, or future, and thus assumes that the "present" has some objective reality, as in both ] and the ].<ref> by Dean Zimmerman, p. 7</ref> The B-series defines a given event as earlier or later than another event, but does not assume an objective present, as in four-dimensionalism. Much of the contemporary literature in the ] of time has been taken to spring forth from this distinction, and thus takes McTaggart's work as its starting point. | ||
| == |
==Contrast with three-dimensionalism== | ||
| Unlike the four dimensionalist, the three dimensionalist considers time to be a unique ] that is not analogous to the three spatial dimensions: ], ] and ]. Whereas the four dimensionalist proposes that objects are extended across time, the three dimensionalist adheres to the belief that all objects are wholly present at any moment at which they exist. While the three dimensionalist agrees that the parts of an object can be differentiated based on their spatial dimensions, they do not believe an object can be differentiated into temporal parts across time. For example, in the three dimensionalist account, "Descartes in 1635" is the same object as "Descartes in 1620", and both are identical to Descartes, himself. However, the four dimensionalist considers these to be distinct |
Unlike the four dimensionalist, the three dimensionalist considers time to be a unique ] that is not analogous to the three spatial dimensions: ], ] and ]. Whereas the four dimensionalist proposes that objects are extended across time, the three dimensionalist adheres to the belief that all objects are wholly present at any moment at which they exist. While the three dimensionalist agrees that the parts of an object can be differentiated based on their spatial dimensions, they do not believe an object can be differentiated into temporal parts across time. For example, in the three dimensionalist account, "Descartes in 1635" is the same object as "Descartes in 1620", and both are identical to Descartes, himself. However, the four dimensionalist considers these to be distinct temporal parts.<ref name="3D/4D debate">{{cite web |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/#3D4Con | ||
| |title=Time: The 3D/4D Controversy | |title=Time: The 3D/4D Controversy | ||
| |date=2002-11-25 |accessdate=2008-12-15 |publisher=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |quote=As in the case of the disputes between A Theorists and B Theorists, on the one hand, and Presentists and Non-presentists, on the other hand, the 3D/4D controversy is part of a general disagreement among philosophers of time concerning the degree to which time is dissimilar from the dimensions of space. That general disagreement has been an important theme in the philosophy of time during the last one hundred years, and will most likely continue to be so for some time to come.}}</ref> | |date=2002-11-25 |accessdate=2008-12-15 |publisher=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |quote=As in the case of the disputes between A Theorists and B Theorists, on the one hand, and Presentists and Non-presentists, on the other hand, the 3D/4D controversy is part of a general disagreement among philosophers of time concerning the degree to which time is dissimilar from the dimensions of space. That general disagreement has been an important theme in the philosophy of time during the last one hundred years, and will most likely continue to be so for some time to come.}}</ref> | ||
| == Prominent Arguments in Favor of Four-Dimensionalism == | |||
| Several lines of argumentation have been advanced in favor of four-dimensionalism, each of which will be discussed in turn below. | |||
| Firstly, four-dimensional accounts of time are argued to better explain paradoxes of change over time (often referred to as the paradox of the ]) than three-dimensional theories. A contemporary account of this paradox is introduced in Ney (2014)<ref name=":0" />, but the original problem has its roots in Greek antiquity. A typical Ship of Theseus paradox involves taking some changeable object with multiple material parts, for example a ship, then sequentially removing and replacing its parts until none of the original component parts are left. At each stage of the replacement until the last, the ship is presumably identical with the original, since the replacement of a single part need not destroy the ship and create an entirely new one. But, it is also plausible that an object with none of the same material parts as another is not identical with the original object. So, how can an object survive the replacement of any of its parts, and in fact all of its parts? The four-dimensionalist can argue that the persisting object is in fact a single space-time worm which has all the replacement stages as temporal parts, or in the case of the stage view that each succeeding stage bears a temporal counterpart relation to the original stage under discussion. | |||
| Secondly, problems of temporary intrinsics are argued to be best explained by four-dimensional views of time that involve temporal parts. | |||
| ==See also== | ==See also== | ||
| Line 48: | Line 41: | ||
| * Armstrong, David M. (1980). "Identity Through Time". In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, 67-68 Dordrecht: D. Reidel. | * Armstrong, David M. (1980). "Identity Through Time". In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, 67-68 Dordrecht: D. Reidel. | ||
| * Hughes, C. (1986). "Is a Thing Just the Sum of Its Parts?" ''Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society'' 85: 213-33. | * Hughes, C. (1986). "Is a Thing Just the Sum of Its Parts?" ''Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society'' 85: 213-33. | ||
| * Heller, Mark (1984). "Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects". '' |
* Heller, Mark (1984). "Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects". Philosophical Studies'' 46: 323-34. Reprinted in Rea 1997: 12.-330.'' | ||
| sophical Studies'' 46: 323-34. Reprinted in Rea 1997: 12.-330. | |||
| * Heller, Mark (1990). ''The Ontology of Physical Objects'': Four-dimensional Hunks of Matter''. | * Heller, Mark (1990). ''The Ontology of Physical Objects'': Four-dimensional Hunks of Matter''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. | ||
| Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. | |||
| * Heller, Mark (1992). "Things Change". ''Philosophy and Phenomenological Research'' 52: 695-304 | * Heller, Mark (1992). "Things Change". ''Philosophy and Phenomenological Research'' 52: 695-304 | ||
| * Heller, Mark (1993). "Varieties of Four Dimensionalism". ''Australasian Journal of Philosophy'' 71: 47-59. | * Heller, Mark (1993). "Varieties of Four Dimensionalism". ''Australasian Journal of Philosophy'' 71: 47-59. | ||
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In philosophy, four-dimensionalism (also known as the doctrine of temporal parts) is an ontological position that an object's persistence through time is like its extension through space. Thus, an object that exists in time has temporal parts in the various subregions of the total region of time it occupies, just like an object that exists in a region of space has at least one part in every subregion of that space.
Four-dimensionalists typically argue for treating time as analogous to space, usually leading them to endorse the doctrine of Eternalism. This is a philosophical approach to the ontological nature of time, according to which all points in time are equally "real", as opposed to the presentist idea that only the present is real. As some eternalists argue by analogy, just as all spatially distant objects and events are equally as real as those close to us, temporally distant objects and events are as real as those currently present to us.
Perdurantism—or perdurance theory—is a closely related philosophical theory of persistence and identity, according to which an individual has distinct temporal parts throughout its existence, and the persisting object is the sum or set of all of its temporal parts. This sum or set is colloquially referred to as a "space-time worm", which has earned the perdurantist view the moniker of "the worm view". While all perdurantists are plausibly considered four dimensionalists, at least one variety of four dimensionalism does not count as perdurantist in nature. This variety, known as exdurantism or the "stage view", is closely akin to the perdurantist position. They also countenance a view of persisting objects which have temporal parts that succeed one another through time. However, instead of identifying the persisting object as the entire set or sum (the "space-time worm") of the temporal parts which compose the object, the exdurantist argues that any object under discussion is a single stage (time-slice, temporal part, etc.), and that the other stages or parts which compose the persisting object are related to that part by a "temporal counterpart" relation.
Though they have often been conflated, eternalism is a theory of what time is like and what times exist, while perdurantism is a theory about persisting objects and their identity conditions over time. Eternalism and perdurantism tend to be discussed together because many philosophers argue for a combination of eternalism and perdurantism. Sider (1997) uses the term four-dimensionalism to refer to perdurantism, but Michael Rea (Forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook for Metaphysics), uses the term "four-dimensionalism" to mean the view that presentism is false as opposed to "perdurantism", the view that endurantism is false and persisting objects have temporal parts.
A-series and B-series
Main article: A-series and B-seriesJ.M.E. McTaggart in The Unreality of Time, identified two descriptions of time, which he called the A-series and the B-series. The A-series identifies positions in time as past, present, or future, and thus assumes that the "present" has some objective reality, as in both presentism and the growing block universe. The B-series defines a given event as earlier or later than another event, but does not assume an objective present, as in four-dimensionalism. Much of the contemporary literature in the metaphysics of time has been taken to spring forth from this distinction, and thus takes McTaggart's work as its starting point.
Contrast with three-dimensionalism
Unlike the four dimensionalist, the three dimensionalist considers time to be a unique dimension that is not analogous to the three spatial dimensions: length, width and height. Whereas the four dimensionalist proposes that objects are extended across time, the three dimensionalist adheres to the belief that all objects are wholly present at any moment at which they exist. While the three dimensionalist agrees that the parts of an object can be differentiated based on their spatial dimensions, they do not believe an object can be differentiated into temporal parts across time. For example, in the three dimensionalist account, "Descartes in 1635" is the same object as "Descartes in 1620", and both are identical to Descartes, himself. However, the four dimensionalist considers these to be distinct temporal parts.
Prominent Arguments in Favor of Four-Dimensionalism
Several lines of argumentation have been advanced in favor of four-dimensionalism, each of which will be discussed in turn below.
Firstly, four-dimensional accounts of time are argued to better explain paradoxes of change over time (often referred to as the paradox of the Ship of Theseus) than three-dimensional theories. A contemporary account of this paradox is introduced in Ney (2014), but the original problem has its roots in Greek antiquity. A typical Ship of Theseus paradox involves taking some changeable object with multiple material parts, for example a ship, then sequentially removing and replacing its parts until none of the original component parts are left. At each stage of the replacement until the last, the ship is presumably identical with the original, since the replacement of a single part need not destroy the ship and create an entirely new one. But, it is also plausible that an object with none of the same material parts as another is not identical with the original object. So, how can an object survive the replacement of any of its parts, and in fact all of its parts? The four-dimensionalist can argue that the persisting object is in fact a single space-time worm which has all the replacement stages as temporal parts, or in the case of the stage view that each succeeding stage bears a temporal counterpart relation to the original stage under discussion.
Secondly, problems of temporary intrinsics are argued to be best explained by four-dimensional views of time that involve temporal parts.
See also
- Rietdijk–Putnam argument for an argument advocating this position.
- World line
References
- ^ Sider, Theodore (April 1997). "Four-Dimensionalism" (PDF). The Philosophical Review. 106 (2). Duke University Press: 197–231. JSTOR 2998357.
- Kuipers, Theo A.F. (2007). General Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues. North Holland. p. 326. ISBN 978-0-444-51548-3.
- ^ Alyssa., Ney,. Metaphysics : an introduction. p. 174. OCLC 870919144.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - Hawley, Katherine (2010). "Temporal Parts". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 ed.).
- Sider, Theodore (1996-09-01). "All the world's a stage". Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 74 (3): 433–453. doi:10.1080/00048409612347421. ISSN 0004-8402.
-
.. This view is variously called "four-dimensionalism", "perdurantism", or "the doctrine of temporal parts". Some think that four-dimensionalism understood as the denial of presentism implies four-dimensionalism understood as perdurantism. But whether or not that is true, the important thing to recognize is that these are two very different views. To avoid confusion, I will in this paper reserve the term "four-dimensionalism" exclusively for the view that presentism is false, and I will use the term "perdurantism" to refer to the view that objects last over time without being wholly present at every time at which they exist.
— MICHAEL C. REA, FOUR DIMENSIONALISM, Forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook for Metaphysics - Presentism and the Space-Time Manifold by Dean Zimmerman, p. 7
- "Time: The 3D/4D Controversy". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2002-11-25. Retrieved 2008-12-15.
As in the case of the disputes between A Theorists and B Theorists, on the one hand, and Presentists and Non-presentists, on the other hand, the 3D/4D controversy is part of a general disagreement among philosophers of time concerning the degree to which time is dissimilar from the dimensions of space. That general disagreement has been an important theme in the philosophy of time during the last one hundred years, and will most likely continue to be so for some time to come.
- Armstrong, David M. (1980). "Identity Through Time". In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, 67-68 Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
- Hughes, C. (1986). "Is a Thing Just the Sum of Its Parts?" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 85: 213-33.
- Heller, Mark (1984). "Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects". Philosophical Studies 46: 323-34. Reprinted in Rea 1997: 12.-330.
- Heller, Mark (1990). The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-dimensional Hunks of Matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Heller, Mark (1992). "Things Change". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 695-304
- Heller, Mark (1993). "Varieties of Four Dimensionalism". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71: 47-59.
- Lewis, David (1983). "Survival and Identity". In Philosophical Papers, Volume 1, 55-7. Oxford: Oxford University Press. With postscripts. Originally published in Amelie O. Rorty, ed., The Identities of Persons (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 17-40.
- Lewis, David (1986a). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Lewis, David (1986b). Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McTaggart John Ellis (1908). "The Unreality of time" in Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 17 (1908): 456-473. <http://en.wikisource.org/The_Unreality_of_Time>
- Lewis, D. 1976: Survival and identity. Pp. 17-40 in Rorty, A.O. (ed.) The identities of persons. Berkeley: University of California Press. Google books
- Markosian, N. 2004: A defense of presentism. Pp. 47-82 in Zimmerman, D.W. (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Google books
- Muis, R. 2005: Four-dimensionalism: an ontology of persistence and time. By Theodore Sider. Ars Disputandi, 5 ISSN 1566-5399 PDF
- Robinson, D. 1985: Can amoebae divide without multiplying? Australasian journal of philosophy, 63(3): 299–319. doi:10.1080/00048408512341901
External links
- Rea, M. C., "Four Dimensionalism" in The Oxford Handbook for Metaphysics. Oxford Univ. Press. Describes presentism and four-dimensionalism.
- "Time" in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
T Sider - 2003 - arsdisputandi.org, Four-dimensionalism: An ontology of persistence and time, Cited by 744 http://www.arsdisputandi.org/publish/articles/000200/article.pdf. In analytical metaphysics, there are three, closely related, debates about time and the nature of change and persistence. The first is about what there is. Presentists believe that only present things exist, whereas eternalists think that also past and future things exist, even though ...
- MICHAEL C. REA- The Oxford handbook of metaphysics, 2003 - books.google.com, Four-dimensionalism,
CHAPTER 9 FOUR-DIMENSIONALISM i. INTRODUCTION. Cited by 48 . FOUR-DIMENSIONALISM, as it will be understood in this chapter, is a view about the ontological status of non-present objects. Presentists say that only present objects exist. There are no ...
- K Koslicki - Philosophical Studies, 2003 - Springer, The crooked path from vagueness to four-dimensionalism. Cited by 37
How do the familiar concrete objects of common-sense – houses, trees, people, cars and the like – persist through time? According to the position known as 'four-dimensionalism' or 'the doctrine of temporal parts', ordinary concrete objects persist through time by perduring, i.e., by ...
- Markosian - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
2, Two Arguments from Sider's Four‐Dimensionalism, Cited by 19 . The Argument from Vagueness Sider's argument from vagueness for Four-Dimensionalism is adapted from his reconstruction of David Lewis's argument for the following conclusion about fusions.2 ... The Principle of Universal Fusions (PUF): Every class of objects has a fusion.
- Miller - Erkenntnis, 2005 - Springer, The metaphysical equivalence of three and four dimensionalism. Cited by 15 . ABSTRACT. I argue that two competing accounts of persistence, three and four dimensionalism, are in fact metaphysically equivalent. I begin by clearly defining three and four dimensionalism, and then I show that the two theories are inter- translatable and equally ...
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