| Revision as of 08:54, 25 January 2017 edit42.2.34.156 (talk) →Famine: changed "adverse" to "bad" and removed redundant "conditions"← Previous edit | Revision as of 22:06, 25 January 2017 edit undo69.47.178.35 (talk) GGTag: blankingNext edit → | ||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
| ໝຄງີແGG bruhs GG | |||
| {{Use dmy dates|date=April 2011}} | |||
| {{Infobox famine | |||
| | famine_name = <!-----Overrides {{PAGENAME}}, do not use without careful consideration)-----> | |||
| | famine_name_in_local = 三年大饥荒 | |||
| | image_1 = | |||
| | image_title_1 = | |||
| | image_width_1 = 250<!-----The default image size is 126px or 252px depending on the number of images. You can use this parameter to override the default size.-----> | |||
| | image_2 = <!-----2nd image-----> | |||
| | image_title_2 = <!-----Title for 2nd image-----> | |||
| | image_width_2 = <!-----The default image size is 126px or 252px depending on the number of images. You can use this parameter to override the default size.------> | |||
| | country = {{flagicon|People's Republic of China|1958}} ] | |||
| | location = ] | |||
| | coordinates = <!-----(use {{coord}})-----> | |||
| | period = 1959–1961 | |||
| | excess_mortality= <!-----Deaths directly due to famine starvation-----> | |||
| | from_disease = <!-----Indirect famine deaths from subsequent diseases-----> | |||
| | total_deaths = 15 million excess deaths (government statistics)<br />15 to 30 million (scholarly estimates)<ref>Holmes, Leslie. ''Communism: A Very Short Introduction'' (] 2009). ISBN 978-0-19-955154-5. p. 32 "Most estimates of the number of Chinese dead are in the range of 15 to 30 million."</ref><br />At least 45 million (Dikötter) | |||
| | death_rate = <!-----Death rate----> | |||
| | observations = Considered China's most devastating catastrophe by ]. A part of the ] movement. | |||
| | theory = | |||
| | relief = | |||
| | food_situation = | |||
| | demographics = <!-----Example: population declined by 10% due to mortality or 5% of the people emigrated, etc-----> | |||
| | consequences = Termination of the ] movement | |||
| | memorial = <!-- links to website? --> | |||
| | preceded = | |||
| | succeeded = | |||
| | footnotes = <!-----Test footnote-----> | |||
| }} | |||
| The '''Three Years of Great Chinese Famine''' ({{zh|s=三年大饥荒|t=三年大饑荒|p=Sānnián dà jīhuāng}}), referred to by the ] as the '''Three Years of Natural Disasters''' ({{zh|s=三年自然灾害|t=三年自然災害|p=Sānnián zìrán zāihài}}), the '''Three Years of Difficulty''' ({{zh|s=三年困难时期|t=三年困難時期|p=Sānnián kùnnán shíqī}}) or '''Great Leap Forward Famine''', was a period in the ] between the years 1959 and 1961 characterized by widespread ]. Drought, poor weather, and the policies of the ] contributed to the famine, although the relative weights of the contributions are disputed due to the ]. | |||
| According to government statistics, there were 15 million excess deaths in this period. However, the Chinese government at this time was taken over by market reformers who were strongly opposed to the Great Leap Forward.<ref>Ó Gráda, Famine: A Short History, p.95</ref> Unofficial estimates vary, but scholars have estimated the number of famine victims to be between 20 and 43 million.<ref name="xiz">Peng Xizhe (彭希哲), "Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's Provinces," ''Population and Development Review'' 13, no. 4 (1987), 639–70.<br />For a summary of other estimates, please refer to ''Necrometrics'' </ref> Historian ], having been granted special access to Chinese archival materials, estimates that there were at least 45 million premature deaths from 1958 to 1962, although far from all these deaths came about as a result of starvation.<ref name="indepedent">{{cite news |url = http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/news/maos-great-leap-forward-killed-45-million-in-four-years-2081630.html |title = Mao's Great Leap Forward 'killed 45 million in four years'|last=Akbar|first=Arifa|date=17 September 2010|accessdate=20 September 2010|location=London|work=The Independent}}</ref><ref name="Dikotter333">Dikötter, Frank. ''Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-62.'' Walker & Company, 2010. p. 333. ISBN 0-8027-7768-6</ref> | |||
| Chinese journalist ] concluded there were 36 million deaths due to starvation, while another 40 million others failed to be born, so that "China's total population loss during the Great Famine then comes to 76 million."<ref name=nyt>{{cite news|last=Mirsky|first=Jonathan|title=Unnatural Disaster: 'Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958–1962,' by Yang Jisheng|url=http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/books/review/tombstone-the-great-chinese-famine-1958-1962-by-yang-jisheng.html?nl=books&emc=edit_bk_20121207|accessdate=December 7, 2012|newspaper=The New York Times Sunday Book Review|date=December 9, 2012 |page = BR22}}</ref> The term "Three Bitter Years" is often used by Chinese peasants to refer to this period.<ref>{{cite web |language=Chinese |url = http://www.gmw.cn/content/2007-05/22/content_610656.htm |title=Different Life of Scientist Yuan Longping|publisher=]|date=22 May 2007|accessdate=16 March 2012 }}</ref> | |||
| ==Famine== | |||
| ] on an airplane, 1957.]] | |||
| The great Chinese famine was caused by a combination of bad weather, social pressure, economic mismanagement, and radical changes in agriculture imposed by government regulations. | |||
| ], chairman of the Chinese communist party, introduced drastic changes in farming which prohibited farm ownership. Failure to abide by the policies led to persecution. The social pressure imposed on the citizens in terms of farming and business, which the government controlled, led to state instability. Owing to the laws passed during the period and ] during 1958–1962, according to government statistics, about 36 million people died in this period.<ref>Jisheng, Yang "Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958–1962". Book Review. ''New York Times''. Dec, 2012. March 3, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/books/review/tombstone-the-great-chinese-famine-1958-1962-by-yang-jisheng.html</ref> | |||
| Until the early 1980s, the ]'s stance, reflected by the name "Three Years of Natural Disasters", was that the famine was largely a result of a series of natural disasters compounded by several planning errors. Researchers outside China argued that massive institutional and policy changes that accompanied the Great Leap Forward were the key factors in the famine, or at least worsened nature-induced disasters.<ref>{{cite video|people=Sue Williams (director), Howard Sharp (editor), ] (narrator)|title=China: A Century of Revolution|publisher=WinStar Home Entertainment|date=1997}}</ref><ref>{{citation|contribution=Famine in China|year=2003|title=Encyclopedia of Population|editor-last=Demeny|editor-first=Paul|editor2-last=McNicoll|editor2-first=Geoffrey|volume=1|pages=388–390|place=New York|publisher=Macmillan Reference USA}}</ref> Since the 1980s there has been greater official Chinese recognition of the importance of policy mistakes in causing the disaster, claiming that the disaster was 30% due to natural causes and 70% by mismanagement.<ref>Yang, Jisheng, Edward Friedman, Jian Guo, and Stacy Mosher. Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-1962. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012. Print. p. 452-3</ref> | |||
| During the Great Leap Forward, farming was organized into ] and the cultivation of private plots forbidden. Iron and steel production was identified as a key requirement for economic advancement. Millions of peasants were ordered away from agricultural work to join the iron and steel production workforce. | |||
| ] would summarize the effect of the focus on production targets in 2008: | |||
| <blockquote>In Xinyang, people starved at the doors of the grain warehouses. As they died, they shouted, "Communist Party, Chairman Mao, save us". If the granaries of ] and ] had been opened, no one need have died. As people were dying in large numbers around them, officials did not think to save them. Their only concern was how to fulfill the delivery of grain.<ref name=trans>Translation from , chinaelections.org, 7 July 2008 of content from ], ''墓碑 －－中國六十年代大饑荒紀實 (Mu Bei - - Zhong Guo Liu Shi Nian Dai Da Ji Huang Ji Shi)'', Hong Kong: Cosmos Books (Tian Di Tu Shu), 2008, ISBN 9789882119093 {{zh icon}} {{dead link|date=August 2016}}</ref></blockquote> | |||
| Along with ], the central government decreed several changes in agricultural techniques based on the ideas of Soviet pseudoscientist ].<ref>{{cite book|title=The People's Republic of China, 1949–76|edition=second|first=Michael|last=Lynch|location=London|publisher=Hodder Education|year=2008|page=57}}</ref> One of these ideas was close planting, whereby the density of seedlings was at first tripled and then doubled again. The theory was that plants of the same species would not compete with each other. In practice they did, which stunted growth and resulted in lower yields. | |||
| Another policy (known as "deep plowing") was based on the ideas of Lysenko's colleague Terentiy Maltsev, who encouraged peasants across China to eschew normal ] depths of 15-20 centimeters and instead plow extremely deeply into the soil (1 to 2 meters). The deep plowing theory stated that the most fertile soil was deep in the earth, and plowing unusually deep would allow extra strong root growth. However, in shallow soil, useless rocks, soil, and sand were driven up instead, burying the fertile topsoil and again severely stunting seedling growth. | |||
| ] was the most notable target of the ].]] | |||
| Additionally, in the ], citizens were called upon to destroy sparrows and other wild birds that ate crop seeds, in order to protect fields. Pest birds were shot down or scared from landing until dropping in exhaustion. This resulted in an explosion of the vermin (especially crop-eating insects) population, which had no predators to thin it down. | |||
| These radically harmful changes in farming organization coincided with adverse weather patterns, including droughts and floods. In July 1959, the ] flooded in ]. According to the Disaster Center, the flood directly killed, either through starvation from crop failure or drowning, an estimated 2 million people, while other areas were affected in other ways as well.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.disastercenter.com/disaster/TOP100K.html|title=The Most Deadly 100 Natural Disasters of the 20th Century}}</ref> ] argues that most floods were not due to unusual weather, but to massive, poorly planned and poorly executed irrigation works which were part of the ].<ref name="Dikotter333"/> | |||
| In 1960, an estimated 60% of agricultural land in northern China received no rain at all.<ref name="Atimes">{{cite news|url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FD01Ad04.html|publisher=] online|title=Part 2: The Great Leap Forward not all bad|first=Henry C K|last=Liu|date=1 April 2004}}</ref> The ] yearbooks from 1958 to 1962 also reported abnormal weather, followed by droughts and floods based on Chinese government sources. This included {{convert|760|mm|in}} of rain in Hong Kong across five days in June 1959, part of a pattern that hit all of ].<ref>{{cite book|author=Fred Harding|title=Breast Cancer: Cause, Prevention, Cure|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0h2gDLv3MOEC&pg=PA381| year=2006|publisher=Tekline Publishing|isbn=978-0-9554221-0-2| page=381}}</ref> | |||
| As a result of these factors, year over year grain production dropped in China. The harvest was down by 15% in 1959. By 1960, it was at 70% of its 1958 level. There was no recovery until 1962, after the Great Leap Forward ended.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Lin|first1=Justin Yifu|last2=Yang|first2=Dennis Tao|year=2000|title=Food Availability, Entitlements and the Chinese Famine of 1959–61|journal=]|volume=110|issue=460|page=143|publisher=]|doi=10.1111/1468-0297.00494}}<!--|accessdate=14 November 2012--></ref> | |||
| ===Government distribution policies=== | |||
| According to the work of ]-winning economist and expert on famines ], most famines do not result just from lower food production, but also from an inappropriate or inefficient distribution of the food, often compounded by lack of information and indeed misinformation as to the extent of the problem.<ref>{{cite book | last = Sen | first = Amartya | authorlink = Amartya Sen| title = Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation | publisher = Clarendon Press Oxford University Press | location = Oxford New York | year = 1982 | isbn = 9780198284635 }}</ref> In the case of these Chinese famines, the urban population (under the dictates of ]) had protected legal rights for certain amounts of grain consumption, whereas the rural peasantry were given no such rights and were subject to non-negotiable production quotas, the surplus of which they were to survive on{{citation needed|date=August 2016}}. | |||
| As local officials in the countryside competed to over-report the levels of production that their communes had achieved in response to the new economic organisation, local peasants were left with a vastly decreased surplus in order to meet their quotas, and then no surplus at all{{citation needed|date=August 2016}}. When they eventually failed to produce enough crops even to meet the quotas to feed the cities, peasant farmers were unfairly accused of ], ] and other ] activities by Chinese Communist Party officials, who cited the massively inflated production estimates of the local party leaders as evidence{{citation needed|date=August 2016}}. | |||
| As the famine worsened, these accusations prompted widespread atrocities (including massive grain confiscations, leaving millions of peasants to starve) by Maoist party officials, who sought to direct blame away from the harmful changes in agriculture policy and the massive overestimation of grain yields{{citation needed|date=August 2016}}. At the time, the famine was almost exclusively blamed on a conspiracy by "]" and "unreformed ] elements" among the peasant farmers, who starved at a rate nearly three times that of the urban Chinese population{{citation needed|date=August 2016}}. | |||
| ===Cover ups=== | |||
| Local party leaders, for their part, conspired to cover up shortfalls and reassign blame in order to protect their own lives and positions. In one famous example, Mao Zedong was scheduled to tour a local agricultural commune in ] province during the heart of the famine in order to assess the conditions for himself; in preparation for his visit, local party officials ordered hundreds of starving peasants to carefully uproot and transplant hundreds of thousands of grain stalks by hand from nearby farms into one "model field", which was then shown to Mao as proof that the crops had not failed{{citation needed|date=August 2016}}. | |||
| In a similar manner to the massive Soviet famine of 1933, due to internal factors and the golden blockade (the ]), doctors were prohibited from listing "starvation" as a cause of death on death certificates. This kind of deception was far from uncommon; a famous ] picture from the famine shows Chinese children from ] province ostensibly standing atop a field of wheat, so densely grown that it could apparently support their weight. In reality, they were standing on a bench concealed beneath the plants, and the "field" was again entirely composed of individually transplanted stalks{{citation needed|date=August 2016}}. | |||
| ] puts this famine in a global context, arguing that lack of democracy is the major culprit: "Indeed, no substantial famine has ever occurred in a democratic country—no matter how poor." He adds that it is "hard to imagine that anything like this could have happened in a country that goes to the polls regularly and that has an independent press. During that terrible calamity the government faced no pressure from newspapers, which were controlled, and none from opposition parties, which were absent."<ref name="Sen1999">{{cite book|author=Amartya Kumar Sen|title=Development as freedom|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Qm8HtpFHYecC|accessdate=14 April 2011|year=1999|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-289330-7}}</ref> On a contradictory note, Sen points out how in India the numbers of "excess mortality" regularly surpass those of China during 1958-1961.<ref>Wiener, Jon. University of California Press, 2012, p. 38.</ref> | |||
| ==Outcome== | |||
| ] | |||
| According to the China Statistical Yearbook (1984), crop production decreased from 200 million tons (1958) to 143.5 million tons (1960). Due to lack of food and incentive to marry at that point in time, the population was about 658,590,000 in 1961, about 13,480,000 less than the population of 1959. Birth rate decreased from 2.922% (1958) to 2.086% (1960) and death rate increased from 1.198% (1958) to 2.543% (1960), while the average numbers for 1962–1965 are about 4% and 1%, respectively. | |||
| The officially reported death rates show much more dramatic increases in a number of provinces and counties. In ], the most populous province in China, for example, the government reported 11 million deaths out of the total population of about 700 million during 1958–1961, which is equal to one death out of every seven hundred people.{{citation needed|date=March 2009}} In ], ], the government reported 102 thousand deaths out of a population of 378 thousand in 1960. On the national level, the official statistics imply about 15 million so-called "excess deaths" or "abnormal deaths", most of them resulting from starvation.{{citation needed|date=March 2009}} | |||
| Yu Dehong, the secretary of a party official in ] in 1959 and 1960, stated, | |||
| <blockquote>I went to one village and saw 100 corpses, then another village and another 100 corpses. No one paid attention to them. People said that dogs were eating the bodies. Not true, I said. The dogs had long ago been eaten by the people.<ref name=trans/></blockquote> | |||
| It is widely believed that the government seriously under-reported death tolls: Lu Baoguo, a ] reporter in Xinyang, told ] of why he never reported on his experience: | |||
| <blockquote>In the second half of 1959, I took a long-distance bus from Xinyang to ] and ]. Out of the window, I saw one corpse after another in the ditches. On the bus, no one dared to mention the dead. In one county, ], one-third of the people had died. Although there were dead people everywhere, the local leaders enjoyed good meals and fine liquor. ... I had seen people who had told the truth being destroyed. Did I dare to write it?<ref name=trans/></blockquote> | |||
| Some Western analysts, such as ], estimate that about 20–40 million people had died of starvation caused by bad government policies and natural disasters. J. Banister estimates that this number is about 23 million. Li Chengrui, a former minister of the ], estimated 22 million (1998). His estimation was based on ] and Jiang Zhenghua's estimation of 27 million. Cao Shuji estimated 32.5 million. The aforementioned ] (2008) estimated the death toll at 36 million.<ref name=hunger>, chinaelections.org, 7 July 2008 {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120210190821/http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=18328 |date=10 February 2012 }}</ref> | |||
| Hong Kong-based historian ] (2010) estimates that, at minimum, 45 million people died from starvation, overwork and state violence during the Great Leap, claiming his findings to be based on access to recently opened local and provincial party archives.<ref name="Dikotter333"/> However, his approach to the documents, as well as his claim to be the first author to use them, have been questioned by other scholars.<ref>Dillon, Michael. "Collective Responsibility" ''The Times Literary Supplement'' January 7 (2011), p. 13.</ref> Dikötter's study also stresses that state violence exacerbated the death toll. Dikötter claims that at least 2.5 million of the victims were beaten or tortured to death.<ref>Dikötter, Frank. ''Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–62.'' Walker & Company, 2010. p. 298. ISBN 0-8027-7768-6</ref> He provides a graphic example of what happened to a family after one member was caught stealing some food: | |||
| <blockquote>Liu Desheng, guilty of poaching a sweet potato, was covered in urine ... He, his wife, and his son were also forced into a heap of excrement. Then tongs were used to prise his mouth open after he refused to swallow excrement. He died three weeks later.<ref>Issac Stone Fish. . ]. 26 September 2010.</ref></blockquote> | |||
| There are widespread oral reports, and some official documentation, of ] being practiced in various forms, as a result of the famine.<ref name="bern97">{{cite news|url=http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A0CE3D71E3DF936A35751C0A961958260|title=Horror of a Hidden Chinese Famine|publisher=]|first=Richard|last=Bernstein|date=February 5, 1997}}</ref><ref name="becker">{{cite book|title=Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine|first=Jasper|last=Becker|pages=352|isbn=978-0-68483457-3|publisher=Free Press|postscript=, title is a reference to ]|year=1997}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|title=Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–1962|first=Frank|last=Dikötter|year=2010|chapter=36. Cannibalism|pages=320–323|isbn=978-0-80277768-3}}</ref> Due to the scale of the famine, the resulting cannibalism has been described as "on a scale unprecedented in the history of the 20th century".<ref name="bern97" /><ref name="becker" /> | |||
| ==Political movement== | |||
| The Great Leap Forward was initiated in 1958, after the ] had been declared successfully completed. One point of the Great Leap was starting to set up ]s in the countryside. However, the Party had optimistically over-estimated the country's productivity during the First Five Year Plan. In reality, farming activity had gone down due to the All-Canteen. | |||
| Some activists went against the Great Leap Forward movement, but they were seen as the opponents of Mao and were silenced in the purges of the following "]". | |||
| After the Famine, then-Chairman of the People's Republic of China ] concluded that the reason for the calamity was "30% natural disaster, 70% policy". In the later ], Liu was denounced as a traitor and an enemy agent going against the ]. | |||
| ==See also== | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * '']'' | |||
| * ] | |||
| == References == | |||
| === Citations === | |||
| {{Reflist|2}} | |||
| === Sources === | |||
| {{refbegin}} | |||
| * Ashton, Basil, Kenneth Hill, Alan Piazza, Robin Zeitz, "Famine in China, 1958-61", ''Population and Development Review,'' Vol. 10, No. 4. (Dec., 1984), pp. 613–645. | |||
| * Banister, J. "Analysis of Recent Data on the Population of China", ''Population and Development,'' Vol. 10, No. 2, 1984. | |||
| * ] (1998). ''Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine.'' ]. ISBN 0-8050-5668-8 | |||
| * Cao Shuji, "The Deaths of China's Population and Its Contributing Factors during 1959–1961". ''China's Population Science'' (Jan. 2005) (In Chinese). | |||
| * ''China Statistical Yearbook'' (1984), edited by State Statistical Bureau. China Statistical Publishing House, 1984. Pages 83, 141, 190. | |||
| * ''China Statistical Yearbook'' (1991), edited by State Statistical Bureau. China Statistical Publishing House, 1991. | |||
| * ''China Population Statistical Yearbook'' (1985), edited by State Statistical Bureau. China Statistical Bureau Publishing House, 1985. | |||
| * ], ''Rapid Population Change in China, 1952–1982'', ], Washington, D.C., 1984. | |||
| * ]. '']''. ], 2010. ISBN 0-8027-7768-6. | |||
| * Gao. Mobo (2007). ''Gao Village: Rural Life in Modern China''. ]. ISBN 978-0-8248-3192-9. | |||
| * Gao. Mobo (2008). ''The Battle for China's Past''. ]. ISBN 978-0-7453-2780-8. | |||
| * Jiang Zhenghua (蒋正华)， "Method and Result of China Population Dynamic Estimation", Academic Report of Xi'a University, 1986(3). pp. 46, 84. | |||
| * Li Chengrui(李成瑞): Population Change Caused by The Great Leap Movement, Demographic Study, No.1, 1998 pp. 97–111 | |||
| * Li. Minqi (2008). ''The Rise of China and the Demise of the Capitalist World Economy''. ]. ISBN 978-1-58367-182-5 | |||
| * Peng Xizhe, "Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's Provinces", ''Population and Development Review,'' Vol. 13, No.4. (Dec., 1987), pp. 639–670 | |||
| * Thaxton. Ralph A. Jr (2008). ''Catastrophe and Contention in Rural China: Mao's Great Leap Forward Famine and the Origins of Righteous Resistance in Da Fo Village''. ]. ISBN 0-521-72230-6 | |||
| * Yang, Dali. ''Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society and Institutional Change since the Great Leap Famine''. Stanford University Press, 1996. | |||
| * ]. ''Tombstone (Mu Bei - Zhong Guo Liu Shi Nian Dai Da Ji Huang Ji Shi).'' Cosmos Books (Tian Di Tu Shu), ] 2008. | |||
| * ]. "Tombstone: An Account of Chinese Famine in the 1960s" (墓碑 － 中國六十年代大饑荒紀實 (Mubei – Zhongguo Liushi Niandai Da Jihuang Jishi), Hong Kong: Cosmos Books (Tiandi Tushu), 2008, ISBN 978-988-211-909-3 {{zh icon}}. By 2010, it was appearing under the title: 墓碑: 一九五八-一九六二年中國大饑荒紀實 (Mubei: Yi Jiu Wu Ba – Yi Jiu Liu Er Nian Zhongguo Da Jihuang Shiji) ("Tombstone: An Account of Chinese Famine From 1958–1962"). | |||
| * ]. Tombstone: The Untold Story of Mao's Great Famine, Yang Jisheng, Translators: Stacy Mosher, Guo Jian, Publisher: Allen Lane (30 Oct 2012), ISBN 978-184-614-518-6 (English translation of the above work) | |||
| ** Translated into English and abridged. Yang Jisheng, ''Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-1962'', Farrar, Straus and Giroux (October 30, 2012), hardcover, 656 pages, ISBN 0374277931, ISBN 978-0374277932 | |||
| * Official Chinese statistics, shown as a graph. {{citation|url=http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/ChinaFood/data/pop/pop_10.htm |publisher=] (IIASA) |work=Land Use Systems Group (LUC)|location=] |date= |accessdate= |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20050904001002/http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/ChinaFood/data/pop/pop_10.htm |archivedate=4 September 2005|title=Data - Population Growth}} | |||
| {{refend}} | |||
| {{Portal bar|1950s|1960s|China|Death|Disasters}} | |||
| {{coord missing|China}} | |||
| ] | |||
| ] | |||
| ] | |||
| ] | |||
| ] | |||
| ] | |||
| ] | |||
| ] | |||
Revision as of 22:06, 25 January 2017
ໝຄງີແGG bruhs GG