| Revision as of 10:01, 26 July 2006 editBluebot (talk | contribs)349,597 edits formatting headings per the MOS← Previous edit | Revision as of 05:46, 18 September 2006 edit undoElonka (talk | contribs)Autopatrolled, Administrators70,958 editsm tagging as uncategorized using AWBNext edit → | ||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
| {{uncat|September 2006}} | |||
| '''Commercial Speech''' is an ] related solely to the economic interest of the speaker and the speaker's audience. It comes from ] rulings in the ]. In more plain english, "Commercial Speech" is ] done on behalf of a ] or ] for the intent of making a ]. It is ] in nature and usually has the intent of convincing the audience to partake in a particular action, often purchasing a specific product. | '''Commercial Speech''' is an ] related solely to the economic interest of the speaker and the speaker's audience. It comes from ] rulings in the ]. In more plain english, "Commercial Speech" is ] done on behalf of a ] or ] for the intent of making a ]. It is ] in nature and usually has the intent of convincing the audience to partake in a particular action, often purchasing a specific product. | ||
Revision as of 05:46, 18 September 2006
 | This article has not been added to any content categories. Please help out by adding categories to it so that it can be listed with similar articles. |
Commercial Speech is an expression related solely to the economic interest of the speaker and the speaker's audience. It comes from Supreme Court rulings in the United States. In more plain english, "Commercial Speech" is speech done on behalf of a company or individual for the intent of making a profit. It is economic in nature and usually has the intent of convincing the audience to partake in a particular action, often purchasing a specific product.
The idea of "Commercial Speech" was first introduced by the Supreme Court when it upheld Valentine v. Chrestensen (1942). In upholding the regulation, the Supreme Court said, "We are … clear that the Constitution imposes … no restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising."
In a 1978 decision, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, the Court offered this defense:
We have not discarded the "common-sense" distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech. To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather than subject the First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.
There are those on the Supreme Court that disagree with this "common-sense" distinction, though. Justice Clarence Thomas replied, in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island (1996), that "I do not see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting that 'commercial' speech is of 'lower value' than 'noncommercial' speech."
Federal judge Alex Kozinski stated, in regards to the 1942 ruling, "the Supreme Court plucked the commercial speech doctrine out of thin air."
See also
First Amendment to the United States Constitution