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An Idealist's Rise And Fall | |||
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How an ambitious officer tried to make a difference - but compromised himself in the process | |||
'''Gen. Prabowo''' or Prabowo Subianto was ]'s son-in-law who allegedly staged the chaos, plunderings, rapings, and murders during the ]. He is the son of former finance minister, ] and his brother, ], was the controller of one of Indonesia's larger conglomerates, the ], before it went bankrupt during the 1997-98 economic crisis. | |||
By JOSE MANUEL TESORO Jakarta | |||
Prabowo was considered ] and ] figure. Back at the ], he was involved in many human rights violation at the conflict zone. But most of his crimes were done during the 1998 Reformation. By the time, he was involved in the kidnappings, tortures, abuses, and murders over the anti-Suharto intellectuals and activists. The sadistic operations were mostly done using his men and loyalists within the ], especially its elite unit, ]. Many of the victims were still missing and believed to be dead by now, including poet and artist ], and Bimo Petrus Anugerah, Ismail, Mochammad Yusuf, Sonny, Ryan or Yani Afri, Ucok Munandar Siahaan, Yadin Muhyidin, Noval Said Alkatiri, Herman Hendrawan, Suyat, Deddy Hamdun, dan Hendra Hambali. But some of his victims were still alive to tell the story, including ], Desmon Mahesa, Haryanto Taslam, and those who are now members of IKOHI (Ikatan Keluarga Orang Hilang Indonesia - Indonesian association of family of the missing people), which are Mugiyanto, Aan Rusdiyanto, Nezar Patria, Faisol Reza, Rahardjo Waluyo Jati, dan ]. | |||
Tempo | |||
Strategic Match: Probowo and Titiek, Suharto's second daughter, at their 1983 wedding | |||
Nearly 30 years ago, while still a cadet, Prabowo wrote to a close friend about struggling for power. "Because by getting power," he explained, "we can do good." That Prabowo was ambitious is no secret. Most in Indonesia believe that this lust for power drove him to join the military, marry into the First Family - and then in May 1998 assemble a plot against his enemies. But why did Prabowo want power? The answer could be his story's most surprising revelation. He may have been less a schemer than someone who answered a question all young idealists ask of themselves: Does one work inside or outside a system to change it? Prabowo made his choice and kept to it. His life since is the consequence. | |||
Beside the abuses over the activists, Prabowo, Kopasus, and also his- in ''de facto'' -controlled Army were also believed to be the field-executor in triggering chaos during this time, 1997 and 1998, which mostly targeting the minority race of ]. This theory was supported by many facts: | |||
Prabowo's earliest memories are of his grandfather taking him to the graves of two uncles killed in the anticolonial struggle. Prabowo had been given the older martyr's name, Subianto. "My grandfather inculcated me with the values of the ksatria - the warrior - and patriotism," he says. | |||
*1. One of the worst chaos occurred at the city of ], ]. While, the headquarters of Kopasus was just a few miles southwest of the city. This at least conclude that: either the Kopasus (which in that scale of chaos supposed to be supporting the overwhelmed polices to stabilize the condition), was passively letting the angry mob rampaged the city, or worse, Kopasus was the field-mastermind behind the chaos of the city. | |||
*2. By end of May 1998, Minister of Security and Defense and the highest commander of ] ( Indonesian military), ] seemed to understand the situation and the crooks behind the mess. He understood that the main sources of the chaos was actually the supposed-to-be peacekeepers, the army. And he understood that in ''de facto'' condition, he was maybe weaker than Prabowo, as he was only somekind of puppet leader established by ] at the post. So, he brilliantly asked for an army top officials summit at ] because he believed that this summit could pull out the chaos-masterminds from the chaos zones. At the same day, Wiranto brought the ] from East Java to ] and ] to ease the chaos. Miraculously, the chaos decreased overnight. At another side, Prabowo publicly stated his opposing stance against Wiranto's move, especially the summit, and he is still angry at this summit until now. This case could brought speculation theory that the summit at East Java forced Prabowo to leave his 'operation zone', which decreased the scale of the chaos. | |||
Prabowo saw those values tested when his father, a respected economist, was forced out by the government of first president Sukarno. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo fled Indonesia in 1958 for what became a 10-year exile. The family moved constantly, ultimately ending up in Europe. There, Prabowo's nationalism grew, as did his admiration for Western ideas. | |||
*3. Some witnesses said that in many plunderings, pillages, and arsons that occurred at Jakarta, the capital city, and also at Solo, Central Java, there were few men who used sophisticated tools - which nearly impossible to be possessed by ordinary civilians, such as flame-shooting weapons. | |||
ALSO IN ASIAWEEK | |||
Cover: The Scapegoat? | |||
Blamed for the riots surrounding the fall of Suharto, controversial ex-general Prabowo Subianto tells his story | |||
- Investigation: No single "mastermind" was behind the May 1998 turmoil. There were many players, and many plots | |||
- Insight: Re-examining Prabowo's record in East Timor | |||
- Insider: How the general and son-in-law benefited - and was compromised - by being part of the First Family | |||
Editorial: The Internet is the most compelling agent of economic reform | |||
Editorial: A good year for Kim Jong Il - but watch out | |||
Malaysia: The real campaign for national leadership heats up | |||
- Anwar: A decision on Mahathir's testimony is put off again | |||
- Shadows: A play looks at Malaysia's troubled political soul | |||
Hong Kong: The former colony is starting to trust the motherland | |||
Taiwan: Beijing demands unification talks - or else | |||
Japan: Obuchi raises (but doesn't fire) the starting gun for polls | |||
Cambodia: A culture of violence and impunity undermines justice | |||
Fashion: The spirited new styles suit Asia's mood | |||
- Accessories: The rule is - there is no rule | |||
- Menswear: Casual, chic - and inspired by womenswear | |||
- Kenzo: The Japanese couturier bids farewell to the catwalk | |||
Tom.com: Investors rush for a piece of a Hong Kong company with no history, few employees and lots of hype | |||
Kosdaq: Korea's over-the-counter stock market soars | |||
Scandal: Can Manila recover from the BW Resources fiasco? | |||
Investing: Betting on the New India | |||
The Net: The freebie formula gets tested in Singapore | |||
Cutting Edge: A keyboard you can fit on your Palm | |||
Newsmakers: Japan's crown prince vents his anger | |||
Viewpoint: To fight corruption, reform China's politics | |||
RELATED STORIES | |||
Asiaweek | |||
If it's in Asia, it's in Asiaweek | |||
TIME Asia | |||
Analysis and commentary from the Asian Edition of TIME Magazine | |||
CNN.com/ASIANOW | |||
Asia's most comprehensive source for latest breaking news and information | |||
In 1965, Indonesia saw the rise of a young general named Suharto following a failed communist coup. Prabowo had already been accepted into college in the U.S. when he begged his father to let him return to Indonesia. "A lot of things were happening - student demonstrations, the New Order," he says. "I said: I want to be part of that. I want to come back." | |||
Prabowo returned home in 1968 and fell straight into the ferment. As Suharto succeeded Sukarno, a debate began among the young activists: Do they work with the emerging military regime or do they stay outside and try to keep it in check? Many of the political and business figures who prospered during Suharto's rule chose the former. Most of Prabowo's friends and mentors opted for the latter. | |||
But Prabowo's fascination for the military, instilled by his grandfather, ran deep. "I told my friends I was thinking of going into the military," recalls Prabowo. "They looked at me: Are you serious? I explained: The military is very important. Some of us must be in the military. You guys be the technocrats. We will meet one day and take part in the modernization of our country." Some friends were supportive, others not. "One said: Prabowo, you'll be indoctrinated. You'll come out a fascist. I said: No, we must modernize from within. We must carry out reforms from within." | |||
In 1970, Prabowo enrolled in the military academy. Life there was a far cry from the comforts he had known. He felt his seniors were harder on him and other children of the elite. When he was demoted for a disciplinary violation, his mother told him he could leave the academy if he wanted. He declined. "I said: No, I love the army. Whatever happens, I will stay in the army." | |||
The decision proved fateful. The army brought him in contact with Indonesia's First Family. His special forces group commander in the early 1980s was Suharto's brother-in-law. The First Family was intrigued by the well-born officer and matched him with Suharto's second daughter, Siti Hediati Harijadi ("Titiek"). The couple wed on May 8, 1983. | |||
Prabowo cannot tell exactly when the murmurings began after that, but he knew their content. That he was Suharto's favored. That his path had been smoothed through promotion. That he received orders directly from the president, bypassing layers of more senior officers. That he enjoyed both the Suharto clan's business interests as well as that of his own family. Prabowo believes the resentment was not just because of his access. It was because, son-in-law or not, he was enacting a vision of the military at odds with what its leaders expected. "I wanted merit. I wanted professionalism. I wanted discipline," he says. "But many of , they don't give a damn. They say I come from a rich family. But they are more feudal." | |||
As head of training for the Kopassus special forces group, Prabowo rationalized drills, cleaned up the management and even banned his officers from playing golf, a game favored by generals. In 1995, he became Kopassus deputy commander; he was promoted to commander the following year. Kopassus quickly gained a reputation for being one of the best-trained - and best-funded - branches of the military. Prabowo admits to raising money from business contacts outside the military. "I was not the only one doing it," he protests. "Many officers were doing it. You had to do it. Our budget was never enough." | |||
Prabowo also suggested - cautiously - that the First Family should embrace change. Over the years, he tried to warn of the growing public dissatisfaction with Suharto's autocratic rule and its corruption, especially among his in-laws. Even his wife was developing business interests. Prabowo says he tried to discourage her, to no avail. "I slowly became exasperated," he says. "He was so overconfident. He didn't think there needed to be any improvement to the system." So in addition to frictions with Suharto's generals, Prabowo built up tensions with Suharto's children. He says: "In the end, I found out that all the smiles were just a front. They would say something to me and do another thing behind my back." | |||
Yet Prabowo continued to be loyal to Suharto. "I'm too much of a samurai," he says. "You don't leave your lord." Prabowo's fidelity may be key to why Suharto tolerated him. As long as Prabowo remained loyal, all his quirks and obsessions - his ideas for reform, his criticisms, his ties to New Order opponents - could be turned into assets. "There's one thing about Pak Harto," says retired general Hasnan Habib. "He knew people by intuition." | |||
Was being Suharto's son-in-law useful to Prabowo's career? Not always. Prabowo and Lt.-Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono entered the academy at the same time; both became three-star generals within a month of each other. Still, Prabowo avoided desk jobs and provincial commands that were the common fate of officers. He got combat duties as he wanted. | |||
The constant frictions with his superiors probably hastened his downfall. Former military spokesman Maj.-Gen. Sudrajat recalls spending long nights discussing military reform with Prabowo. "His ideas were brilliant," recalls Sudrajat. "But he was too impatient. He didn't wait for the system to do it. He made shortcuts, which offended his superiors." Prabowo acknowledges his mistake: "I thought, in the end, results would prevail. I didn't think too much about how I'd have to please people. I thought my reputation, my performance would be enough." | |||
Prabowo naïvely believed that winning the game of politics could simply be a matter of his own personal excellence. That stubborn single-mindedness sustained him in his ascent and his struggles in Suharto's system, and gave him his charisma. But it also left him vulnerable to manipulation and self-delusion. By the end, he was convinced that the authoritarian New Order was worth defending. Perhaps he no longer had any choice. As Suharto's general and son-in-law, he had become an inextricable part of it. The idealist who had set out for the top had just gotten in too deep. | |||
"I hoped against hope that might in the end reform or hand the reins to somebody who would," he says. "That was always my hope: reform from within, reform from above. But when the system becomes so clogged, it cannot be done. Maybe that is one of my failures - that I could not see that." | |||
The reason for the chaos-triggering was actually pretty simple. Prabowo was Suharto's loyalist. While, Suharto was pushed by the people to resign by the time. So, to show and strengthen the believe that "only Suharto could keep the country safe", Suharto believed to be ordering his loyalists to trigger chaos. This was hopefully could tell the people that "if you push the Big President, then you'll get chaos". But the chaos went to far and uncontrolled, which by the turn bited Suharto back. Finally, Suharto resigned from his post at May 1998 and replaced by his successor and vice-president, ]. | |||
Even by now, after Suharto had resigned, Prabowo is still considered a powerful man, and pretty untouchable one. By now, he was never put to trial or at least investigation for crimes he committed. It means that even by now he hadn't account for crimes he'd committed. By end of 2003, Prabowo, who still had support in the ], daringly, without any shame, ran for President. But he was defeated by Wiranto in the party's congress to decide the party's representative for President candidacy. And by now, Prabowo is still active in the politic and still waiting for a good opportunity to seize. Last year, he was believed to be involved in the spreading of "Wiranto AFI VCD", it was a VCD with cover of AFI ])], but consisted a documentation VCD of chaos of May 1998, and the documentation was mostly blaming the chaos to Wiranto. He also recently published a book under the help of his colleague, Fadli Zon, about his version of the May 1998 chaos climax, entitled "Politik Huru-Hara Mei 1998" - Mei 1998 Chaos Politic. The book was very subjectively blaming the chaos to the ''de jure'' leader by the time, Wiranto (although it has to be set clear that Wiranto by the time was just official leader, but all of the commands came directly from top - from the President; and also, Prabowo by the time was believed to own more field power than Wiranto as he had close ties with the Suharto himself. For note also, is that after Suharto resigned, Wiranto tried as best as he could to stabilize the country, especially with the "Malang summit strategy" that had been explained above). | |||
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Gen. Prabowo or Prabowo Subianto was Suharto's son-in-law who allegedly staged the chaos, plunderings, rapings, and murders during the 1998 Reformation. He is the son of former finance minister, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and his brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo, was the controller of one of Indonesia's larger conglomerates, the Tirtamas Group, before it went bankrupt during the 1997-98 economic crisis.
Prabowo was considered opportunist and sadistic figure. Back at the East Timor, he was involved in many human rights violation at the conflict zone. But most of his crimes were done during the 1998 Reformation. By the time, he was involved in the kidnappings, tortures, abuses, and murders over the anti-Suharto intellectuals and activists. The sadistic operations were mostly done using his men and loyalists within the Indonesian Army, especially its elite unit, Kopassus. Many of the victims were still missing and believed to be dead by now, including poet and artist Wiji Tukul, and Bimo Petrus Anugerah, Ismail, Mochammad Yusuf, Sonny, Ryan or Yani Afri, Ucok Munandar Siahaan, Yadin Muhyidin, Noval Said Alkatiri, Herman Hendrawan, Suyat, Deddy Hamdun, dan Hendra Hambali. But some of his victims were still alive to tell the story, including Pius Lustri Lanang, Desmon Mahesa, Haryanto Taslam, and those who are now members of IKOHI (Ikatan Keluarga Orang Hilang Indonesia - Indonesian association of family of the missing people), which are Mugiyanto, Aan Rusdiyanto, Nezar Patria, Faisol Reza, Rahardjo Waluyo Jati, dan Andi Arif.
Beside the abuses over the activists, Prabowo, Kopasus, and also his- in de facto -controlled Army were also believed to be the field-executor in triggering chaos during this time, 1997 and 1998, which mostly targeting the minority race of Indonesian-Chinese. This theory was supported by many facts:
- 1. One of the worst chaos occurred at the city of Solo, Central Java. While, the headquarters of Kopasus was just a few miles southwest of the city. This at least conclude that: either the Kopasus (which in that scale of chaos supposed to be supporting the overwhelmed polices to stabilize the condition), was passively letting the angry mob rampaged the city, or worse, Kopasus was the field-mastermind behind the chaos of the city.
- 2. By end of May 1998, Minister of Security and Defense and the highest commander of ABRI ( Indonesian military), General Wiranto seemed to understand the situation and the crooks behind the mess. He understood that the main sources of the chaos was actually the supposed-to-be peacekeepers, the army. And he understood that in de facto condition, he was maybe weaker than Prabowo, as he was only somekind of puppet leader established by Suharto at the post. So, he brilliantly asked for an army top officials summit at East Java because he believed that this summit could pull out the chaos-masterminds from the chaos zones. At the same day, Wiranto brought the Marines from East Java to West Java and Central Java to ease the chaos. Miraculously, the chaos decreased overnight. At another side, Prabowo publicly stated his opposing stance against Wiranto's move, especially the summit, and he is still angry at this summit until now. This case could brought speculation theory that the summit at East Java forced Prabowo to leave his 'operation zone', which decreased the scale of the chaos.
- 3. Some witnesses said that in many plunderings, pillages, and arsons that occurred at Jakarta, the capital city, and also at Solo, Central Java, there were few men who used sophisticated tools - which nearly impossible to be possessed by ordinary civilians, such as flame-shooting weapons.
The reason for the chaos-triggering was actually pretty simple. Prabowo was Suharto's loyalist. While, Suharto was pushed by the people to resign by the time. So, to show and strengthen the believe that "only Suharto could keep the country safe", Suharto believed to be ordering his loyalists to trigger chaos. This was hopefully could tell the people that "if you push the Big President, then you'll get chaos". But the chaos went to far and uncontrolled, which by the turn bited Suharto back. Finally, Suharto resigned from his post at May 1998 and replaced by his successor and vice-president, Habibie.
Even by now, after Suharto had resigned, Prabowo is still considered a powerful man, and pretty untouchable one. By now, he was never put to trial or at least investigation for crimes he committed. It means that even by now he hadn't account for crimes he'd committed. By end of 2003, Prabowo, who still had support in the Golkar, daringly, without any shame, ran for President. But he was defeated by Wiranto in the party's congress to decide the party's representative for President candidacy. And by now, Prabowo is still active in the politic and still waiting for a good opportunity to seize. Last year, he was believed to be involved in the spreading of "Wiranto AFI VCD", it was a VCD with cover of AFI , but consisted a documentation VCD of chaos of May 1998, and the documentation was mostly blaming the chaos to Wiranto. He also recently published a book under the help of his colleague, Fadli Zon, about his version of the May 1998 chaos climax, entitled "Politik Huru-Hara Mei 1998" - Mei 1998 Chaos Politic. The book was very subjectively blaming the chaos to the de jure leader by the time, Wiranto (although it has to be set clear that Wiranto by the time was just official leader, but all of the commands came directly from top - from the President; and also, Prabowo by the time was believed to own more field power than Wiranto as he had close ties with the Suharto himself. For note also, is that after Suharto resigned, Wiranto tried as best as he could to stabilize the country, especially with the "Malang summit strategy" that had been explained above).
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