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The 1999-2000 battle of Grozny was the siege and assault of the Chechen capital Grozny by the Russian Army, lasting from throught the late 1999 to early 2000.

Siege

On October 15 Russian forces took control of a strategic ridge within artillery range of the Chechen capital Grozny after mounting an intense tank and artillery barrage against Chechen fighters. Russian forces reportedly made several attempts to seize positions on the outskirts of the capital, but were rebuffed two kilometers from Grozny. On December 4 1999 the commander of Russian forces in the North Caucasus, General Viktor Kazantsev, claimed that Grozny was fully blockaded by Russian troops.

Tactics

Even while Chechen capital of Grozny was surrounded by late November 1999, more than two additional weeks of shelling and bombing were required before Russian troops were able to claim a foothold within any part of the heavily fortified city. Supported by a powerful air force, the Russian army vastly outnumbered and outgunned the Chechen irregulars, comprising several thousand fighters, and was considerably larger than the Russian force that had been defeated in Chechnya during the previous war. In addition, Russia's tactics in this second campaign were drastically different. The strategy in 1999 was to hold back tanks, vulnerable armoured personnel carriers and infantry and subject the entrenched Chechens to an intensive barrage of heavy artillery and aerial bombardment before engaging them. In a surprising and threatening move, the federal forces relied heavily on fuel air explosives and tactical missiles (SCUD and SS-21 Scarab). These systems suppressed the Chechens both physically and psychologically and these assets were used to attack fighters hiding in basements. Such fire strikes were designed for maximum psychological pressure—to demonstrate the hopelessness of further resistance against a foe that could strike with impunity and that was invulnerable to countermeasures. The TOS-1 heavy flamethrower system (a multiple rocket launcher mounted on a T-72 tank chassis) played a particularly prominent role as a terror weapon.

Grozny itself was transformed into a fortress under the leadership of Chechen field commander Aslambek Ismailov. The Chechen fighters in the capital put up a fierce resistance to the Russians throughout the months of November and December. Grozny's Chechen defenders built a system of bunkers behind apartment buildings, laid mines throughout the city, placed snipers on rooftops, and withstood the heavy Russian bombardment for the chance to finally come to grips with the enemy in an environment of their choosing. The Chechens spent an inordinate amount of time digging trenches and antitank ditches for the city's defense. Journalists reported that many men and women were taken from basements to dig the trenches. The Chechens used the trenches to move between houses and as sniper positions; as the Russian force focused on the tops of buildings or on windows, they were often attacked from the trenches. They boarded up all first-story windows and doors, making it impossible to simply walk into a building; while trying to climb ladders or knock in doorways, Russian soldiers became targets for Chechen snipers positioned on upper floors. Chechen fighters used the weather conditions to step up attacks on federal troops. Well-organized bands of no more than 15 rebel fighters moved freely about the city, often sneaking behind Russian lines and attacking unsuspecting soldiers from the rear. Finally, the impressive mobility of the Chechen force included escape routes from interconnected firing positions and use of the sewer network to move about the city. The Chechens stated that in the city they did not use body armor because it slowed them down.

Pro-Russian militia and civilians

In November, the Kremlin appointed Beslan Gantamirov, former mayor of Grozny, as head of the pro-Moscow Chechen State Council. Gantamirov was just pardoned by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and released from a 6-year sentence for embezzling federal funds to rebuild Chechnya in 1995-1996; he was chosen to lead a pro-Russian Chechen militia force in the upcoming battle. Gantamirov soon locked horns with the then interior minister, Vladimir Rushailo, who refused to supply Chechen troops with APCs, mortars or sniper rifles, limiting their combat arsenal to "obsolete AK-47s which jammed after a few shots". In the wake of the Grozny siege, Rushailo publicly accused Gantamirov of accepting "any volunteers into the ranks of the Chechen militia including rebel fighters". However, the Chechen militia went on to play a pivotal role in the siege of Grozny, suffering more than 700 casualties during the fighting. On 30 May 2000, Russia's main official in Chechnya, Nikolai Koshman, said his deputy, Gantemirov was dismissed for "non-fulfilment of his duties." Koshman also said that the pro-Moscow Chechen militia has lost 295 out of its remaining 353 members for absenteeism.

The majority of the city's civilian population fled, leaving the streets mostly deserted. However, as many as 40,000 civilians, many of them ethnic Russians, remained trapped in Grozny during the Russian siege of the city, suffering from the bombing, cold and hunger. Civilian convoys attempting to leave besieged areas via Russian-guarded safe corridors were fired on at Russian police checkpoints, wounded survivors reported.

December 5 ultimatum

On December 5 Russian planes, which had been dropping bombs on Grozny, switched to leaflets with an ominous warning from the general staff: "Persons who stay in the city will be considered terrorists and bandits and will be destroyed by artillery and aviation. There will be no further negotiations." The Russian forces outside of the Grozny apparently planned to attack the city with a heavy air and artillery bombardment, intending to level the city to the extent where it is impossible for the rebels to defend it.

The Russians set a deadline, urging residents of Grozny to leave by 11 December. The UK foreign secretary Robin Cook "wholeheartedly condemned" the Russian ultimatum to the people of the Chechen capital Grozny to flee or die. "We condemn vigorously what Milosevic did in Kosovo and we condemn vigorously what Russia is doing in Chechnya," he said. In the face of international outrage by the United States, the European Union and human rights groups, Russia withdrew the ultimatum. Russian commanders prepared a corridor to allow safe passage for those wishing to escape Grozny, but reports from the war zone suggested few people were using it when it opened on 11 December, while desperate refugees who got away were telling stories of bombing and shelling and brutality. Russia put the number of people remaining in Grozny at 15,000, while a group of Chechen exiles who in Geneva confirmed other reports estimating the civilian population at 50,000.

By January 2000, Russia's heavy bombardments had finally begun to take their toll. Using multiple rocket launchers and massed tank and artillery fire, the Russians flattened most of Grozny in preparation for a mass assault.

Russian offensive

By December 13 Russian troops regained control of Chechnya's main airport in a Grozny Khankala suburb. The airport was a main Russian military base during the First Chechen War. It was one of the first targets hit by warplanes at the start of the current conflict, and had since been out of action. Fighting was concentrated in the eastern outskirts of Grozny, with reconnaissance teams entering the capital to identify rebel strongholds. Russian ground forces met stiff resistance from rebel fighters as they advanced, beginning a slow, neighborhood-by-neighborhood ground invasion with fighting focused on a strategic hill overlooking the city. On December 14 dozens of soldiers were killed when an armored column of Russian troops was ambushed and trapped in Minutka Square.

Russian ground troops advanced slowly toward the center from three directions. The strategy appears to be to draw fire from rebels, then pull back and pound the Chechen positions with artillery and rocket fire, while the command of federal forces hoped to take the city by New Year's Day. Public support for the war, which was previously overwhelming, appeared to fade as casualties mounted. The government came in for increasing criticism in the tightly controlled Russian media for understating casualty figures. On January 3, Russian General Valentin Astaviyev said on state television that Russian forces had suffered only three dead in the past 24 hours; but the commander of an Interior Ministry unit in Grozny told AFP news agency that 50 men had been killed in the previous 48 hours. An undercover investigation by NTV has reported that up to 50 Russian soldiers are being killed in Chechnya daily; the figure was compiled from reports from witnesses, morgue officials, railway workers and coroner's assistants. On January 2 Chechen fighters attacked and destroyed a Russian armoured column which entered the village of Duba-Yurt a day before. On January 4, Chechen fighters in Grozny had launched counter attacks and broken through Russian lines in at least two places, temporarily seizing the village of Alkhan-Kala. Both sides accused each other of launching chemical attacks.

Rebel counteroffensive

On Monday, January 10 2000, Chechen forces outside Grozny launched a major counter-offensive, briefly recapturing major towns of Shali, Argun and Gudermes, and opening a new supply corridor to the besieged capital; they also ambushed and destroyed a supply convoy near Dzhalka, on the Argun-Gudermes road. The commander for the North Caucasus, General Viktor Kazantsev, said mistakes by "soft-hearted" Russian interior ministry officials had allowed the rebels to counter-attack; he said from now on only boys under 10, old men over 60 and girls and women would be considered as refugees. An interior ministry spokesman said 26 Russian soldiers had died in the past 24 hours, the heaviest one-day official death toll since fighting began last September. On January 19, Russian Major-General Mikhail Malofeyev was killed in Grozny; his body was found only 4 days later. The Russian command said small bands of rebel fighters were cutting off Russian units from the main forces; on January 21, 20 members of a Russian regiment were killed in north-west Grozny when rebels snuck through sewage tunnels to attack them from the rear.

On January 26, the Russian government announced that 1,173 servicemen had been killed since October - a more than double rise from 544 killed reported 19 days earlier, on January 6, with just 300 killed reported on January 4.

By mid-January, tens of thousands of Russian soldiers began an advance on central Grozny from three directions; during this fighting, possession of several suburbs and key buildings adjoining the city center changed hands several times. With their supply routes interdicted by an increasingly effective Russian blockade, ammunition running low and their losses mounting, the Chechen leadership began to contemplate an escape. It was decided that taking on the Russians in frontal combat was becoming too costly. As the Russian army closed in on their positions, the Chechen commanders decided on a desperate gamble; success was not assured, for the city was encircled by mine fields and three layers of Russian forces.

Rebel breakout

The Chechens began to escape on the last day of January and first day of February under intense Russian bombardment. As the Chechen fighters broke out, moving in a southwesterly direction, they were met with artillery fire. The main column, led by Shamil Basayev, hit a minefield between the city and the village of Alkhan-Kala. As Russian artillery fire homed in on their position, several of the Chechens' field commanders personally led their retreating soldiers in a charge across the minefields. Volunteers were asked to run ahead of the main force to clear a path for their retreating comrades. Scores of Chechen shaheed were killed as well as several prominent Chechen commanders, including generals Khunkarpasha Israpilov and Aslambek Ismailov, the mastermind behind the defense of Grozny, and the city mayor Lecha Dudayev. In addition to these commanders, many rank-and-file Chechen fighters were apparently killed in the bloody escape. The Russians later claimed to have killed 200 Chechen fighters. Another 200 were maimed, including Basayev.

A rebel post-operative war council was held in Alkhan-Yurt, where it was decided that the Chechen forces would retreat into the inaccessible Vedeno and Argun gorges in the southern mountains to carry on a guerrilla war against the Russians. The Russian army's last chance to destroy the rebels in a concentrated position was thus lost, and the Chechens scattered into the southern mountains to continue the war.

In Grozny itself, the Russian generals initially refused to admit that the Chechens had escaped from the blockaded city, saying that fierce fighting continued within the city. Russian spokesman and Putin's aide Sergei Yastrzhembsky said, "If they left Grozny, we would have informed you." It was not until February 6 that the Russians were able to raise the Russian flag above the city centre. About 500 rebel fighters remained in the city, hiding in underground communication tunnels and basements by day.

In March, the Russian army began to allow residents to return to the city.

See also

• 1994-95 battle of Grozny

References

1. "Grozny's Maverick Mayor Resigns". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
2. "Chechnya: Russia Continues Major Offensive". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
3. "Russians fired on refugees". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
4. "UK condemns Chechnya ultimatum". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
5. "Refugees fear Grozny assault". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
6. "Russians ambushed in Grozny". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
7. "Russia media criticise Chechen campaign". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
8. "Chechens 'break Grozny siege'". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
9. "Russian army battered in Grozny". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
10. "Chechens 'break Grozny siege'". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
11. "Chechens use tunnels, snipers to stop Russians in Grozny". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
12. "Russia admits heavy casualties". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
13. "Russian army battered in Grozny". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
14. "Russia media criticise Chechen campaign". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
15. "Chechen 'Spirits' Haunt Russians". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
16. "Chechen fighters 'abandon Grozny'". Retrieved 2006-06-10.

• Battles of Second Chechen War
• Sieges
• Urban warfare