Misplaced Pages

Revision as of 10:46, 24 October 2006

The bombing of Dresden led by the British Royal Air Force (RAF) and involving the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) between February 13 and February 15, 1945 remains one of the more controversial Allied actions of World War II. Historian Frederick Taylor says:

"The destruction of Dresden has an epically tragic quality to it. It was a wonderfully beautiful city and a symbol of baroque humanism and all that was best in Germany. It also contained all of the worst from Germany during the Nazi period. In that sense it is an absolutely exemplary tragedy for the horrors of 20th Century warfare…"

Reasons for the attack

Early in 1945, the Allies' political-military leadership started to consider how they might aid the Soviets with the use of the strategic bomber force. The plan was to bomb Berlin and several other eastern cities in conjunction with the Soviet advance. In the summer of 1944, plans for a large and intense offensive targeting these cities had been discussed under the code name Operation Thunderclap, but then shelved on August 16. These were re-examined, but the decision was made to draw up a more limited plan. Sir Charles Portal, the Chief of the Air Staff, noted on January 26 1945, that "a severe blitz will not only cause confusion in the evacuation from the East, but will also hamper the movement of troops from the West". However, he mentioned that aircraft diverted to such raids should not be taken away from the current primary tasks of destroying oil production facilities, jet aircraft factories, and submarine yards. Sir Norman Bottomley, the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, requested Arthur "Bomber" Harris, Commander-in-Chief of RAF Bomber Command and an ardent supporter of area bombing, to undertake attacks on Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig, and Chemnitz as soon as moon and weather conditions allowed, "with the particular object of exploiting the confused conditions which are likely to exist in the above mentioned cities during the successful Russian advance".

On the same day, Winston Churchill pressed the Secretary of State for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair: "I asked whether Berlin, and no doubt other large cities in east Germany, should not now be considered especially attractive targets. ... Pray report to me tomorrow what is going to be done". On January 27 Sinclair replied:

"The Air Staff have now arranged that, subject to the overriding claims of attacks on enemy oil production and other approved target systems within the current directive, available effort should be directed against Berlin, Dresden, Chemnitz and Leipzig or against other cities where severe bombing would not only destroy communications vital to the evacuation from the east, but would also hamper the movement of troops from the west."

The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) had come to the conclusion that the Germans could reinforce their eastern front with up to 42 divisions (half a million men) from other fronts and that, if the Soviet advance could be helped by hindering that movement, it could shorten the war. They thought that the Germans could complete the reinforcement by March 1945. The JIC's analysis was backed up by Ultra Enigma-code intercepts, which confirmed that the Germans had such plans. Their recommendation was:

"We consider, therefore, that the assistance which might be given to the Russians during the next few weeks by the British and American strategic bomber forces justifies an urgent review of their employment to this end. …Attacks against oil targets should continue to take precedence over everything else,…"

The Soviets had several discussions with the Allies on how the strategic bomber force could help their ground offensives once the eastern front line approached Germany. The US ambassador to Russia, W. Averell Harriman, discussed it with Joseph Stalin as did General Eisenhower's deputy at SHAEF, British Air Marshal Arthur W. Tedder in January 1945, when he explained how the strategic bomber could support the Soviet attack as Germany began to shuffle forces between the fronts. On January 31 after studying the JIC recommendation which was contained in a document entitled "Strategic Bombing in Relation to the Present Russian Offensive" and consulting with the Soviets, Tedder and his air staff concurred and issued a recommendation that Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden, and associated cities should be attacked. The intention to use the strategic bomber forces in a tactical air-support role was similar to that for which Eisenhower had employed them before the Normandy invasion in 1944. He was counting on strategic airpower in 1945 to "prevent the enemy from switching forces back and forth at will" from one front to the other.

When the Allies met at the Yalta Conference on February 4, the Western Allies had already decided to target Dresden. The Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff, General Aleksei Antonov raised two issues at the conference relating to the Western Allied strategic bomber force. The first was the demarcation of a bomb-line running north to south where to avoid accidentally bombing Soviet forces, Western Allied aircraft would not bomb east of the line without specific Soviet permission. The second was to hamper the movement of troops from the western front, Norway and Italy, in particular by paralysing the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig with aerial bombardment. In response to the Soviet requests, Portal (who was in Yalta) sent a request to Bottomley to send him a list of objectives which could be discussed with the Soviets. The list sent back to him included oil plants, tank and aircraft factories and the cities of Berlin and Dresden. In the discussions which followed, the Western Allies pointed out that unless Dresden was bombed as well, the Germans could route rail traffic through Dresden to compensate for any damage caused to Berlin and Leipzig. Antonov agreed and requested that Dresden be added to his list of requests. Once the targets had been agreed at Yalta, the Combined Strategic Targets Committee, SHAEF (Air), informed the USAAF and the RAF Bomber commands that Dresden was among the targets selected to degrade German lines of communication. Their authority to do this came directly from the Western Allies' Combined Chiefs of Staff.

RAF Air Staff documents state that it was their intention to use RAF bomber command to "destroy communications" to hinder the eastward deployment of German troops, and to hamper evacuation, not to kill the evacuees. The priority list drafted by Bottomley for Portal, so that he could discuss targets with the Soviets at Yalta, included only two eastern cities with a high enough priority to fit into the RAF targeting list as both transportation and industrial areas. These were Berlin and Dresden. Both were bombed after Yalta.

Soviet military intelligence asserted that trains stuck in the main station were troop trains passing through Dresden to the front. This proved incorrect, as they were trains evacuating refugees from the east. RAF briefing notes mentioned a desire to show "the Russians, when they arrive, what Bomber Command can do." The specific intent of this statement is now unclear, and there are different possible interpretations: a statement of pride in the RAF's abilities; or to show the Soviets that the Western Allies were doing all they could to aid the Soviet advance; or a demonstration of western strength as a warning or threat to the Soviets in the lead-up to the Cold War.

The attacks

The railway yards, near the centre of Dresden, had been targeted and bombed twice before the night of February 13 by the USAAF Eighth Air Force in daytime raids: on October 7 1944 with 70 tons of high-explosive bombs, and then again with 133 bombers on January 16, 1945 during which 279 tons of high-explosives and 41 tons of incendiaries were dropped.

The firebombing campaign was supposed to begin with an USAAF Eighth Air Force raid on Dresden on February 13 but bad weather over Europe prevented any American operations. Due to the conditions, RAF Bomber Command carried out the first raid. During the evening of February 13 796 Avro Lancasters and 9 De Havilland Mosquitoes were dispatched in two separate waves and dropped 1,478 tons of high explosive and 1,182 tons of incendiary bombs by the early hours of February 14. The first attack was carried out entirely by No. 5 Group, using their own low-level marking methods, which allowed the first bombs to be released over Dresden at 22:14 (CET) with all but one bomber releasing all their bombs within two minutes. This last Lancaster bomber of No 5 group dropped its bombs at 22:22. A band of cloud still remained in the area and this attack, in which 244 Lancasters dropped more than 800 tons of bombs, was only moderately successful.

The second attack, 3 hours later, was by Lancaster aircraft of 1, 3, 6 and 8 Groups, with 8 Group providing standard Pathfinder marking. The weather had by then cleared and 529 Lancasters dropped more than 1,800 tons of bombs with great accuracy between 01:21 and 01:45. RAF casualties on the two raids were 6 Lancasters lost, with 2 more crashed in France and 1 in England.

Later on February 14, from 12:17 until 12:30 311 American B-17s dropped 771 tons of bombs on Dresden, with the railway yards as their aiming point. "Part of the American Mustang-fighter escort was ordered to strafe traffic on the roads around Dresden to increase the chaos". There are reports that civilians fleeing the firestorm engulfing Dresden in February 1945 were strafed by American aircraft, but these claims have been refuted by the historian Götz Bergander. During this raid there was a brief, but possibly intense dogfight between American and German fighters around Dresden, some rounds may have struck the ground and been mistaken for strafing fire. The Americans continued the bombing on February 15 dropping 466 tons of bombs. During these four raids a total of around 3,900 tons of bombs were dropped.

The firebombing consisted, of the by-then standard methods, of dropping large amounts of high-explosive to blow off the roofs to expose the timbers within buildings, followed by incendiary devices (fire-sticks) to ignite them and then more high-explosives to hamper the efforts of the fire services. The consequences of these standard methods were particularly effective in Dresden: the bombings eventually created a self-sustaining firestorm with temperatures peaking at over 1500 °C. After a wide area caught fire, the air above the bombed area became extremely hot and rose rapidly. Cold air then rushed in at ground level from outside, and people were sucked into the fire.

After the main firebombing campaign between the 13th and 15th, there were two further raids on the Dresden railway yards by the USAAF. The first was on March 2 by 406 B-17s which dropped 940 tons of high-explosive bombs and 141 tons of incendiaries. The second was on April 17 when 580 B-17s dropped 1,554 tons of high-explosive bombs and 165 tons of incendiaries.

Impact of the attack

A Dresden police report written shortly after the attacks stated that the old town and the inner eastern suburbs had been engulfed in a single fire which had destroyed almost 12,000 dwellings including residential barracks. The report also said that the raid had destroyed "24 banks; 26 insurance buildings; 31 stores and retail houses; 647 shops; 64 warehouses; 2 market halls; 31 large hotels; 26 public houses; 63 administrative buildings; 3 theatres; 18 cinemas; 11 churches; 6 chapels; 5 cultural-historical buildings; 19 hospitals including auxiliary, overflow hospitals, and private clinics; 39 schools; 5 consulates; 1 zoological garden; 1 waterworks, 1 railway facility; 19 postal facilities; 4 tram facilities; 19 ships and barges. The report also mentioned that the Wermacht's main command post in the Tauschenberg Palace, 19 military hospitals and a number of less significant military facilities were destroyed. Almost 200 factories were damaged, 136 seriously (including several of the Zeiss Ikon optical/precision engineering works), 28 with medium to serious damage, and 35 with light damage.

"British assessments, ... concluded that 23 per cent of the city’s industrial buildings were seriously damaged and that 56 per cent of the non-industrial buildings (exclusive of dwellings) had been heavily damaged. Of the total number of dwelling units in the city proper, 78,000 were regarded as demolished, 27,700 temporarily uninhabitable but ultimately repairable, and 64,500 readily repairable from minor damage. This later assessment indicated that 80 per cent of the city’s housing units had undergone some degree of damage and that 50 per cent of the dwellings had been demolished or seriously damaged." and that the USAAF "raids against the city’s railway facilities on 14 and 15 February resulted in severe and extensive damage that entirely paralyzed communications. ..." and that "The railway bridges over the Elbe river—vital to incoming and outgoing traffic—were rendered unusable and remained closed to traffic for many weeks after the raids".

The precise number of dead is difficult to ascertain and is not known. Estimates are made difficult by the fact that the city and surrounding suburbs which had a population of 642,000 in 1939 was crowded at that time with up to 200,000 refugees, and some thousands of wounded soldiers. The fate of some of the refugees is not known as they may have been killed and incinerated beyond recognition in the fire-storm, or they may have left Dresden for other places without informing the authorities. Earlier reputable estimates varied from 25,000 to more than 60,000, but historians now view around 25,000–35,000 as the likely range with the latest (1994) research by the Dresden historian Friedrich Reichert pointing toward the lower part of this range. It would appear from such estimates that the casualties suffered in the Dresden bombings were not out of proportion to those suffered in other German cities which were subject to firebombing attacks during area bombardment.

Contemporary official German records give a number of 21,271 registered burials, including 6,865 who were cremated on the Altmarkt. There were around 25,000 officially buried dead by March 22 1945, war related or not, according to official German report Tagesbefehl (Order of the Day) no. 47 ("TB47"). There was no registration of burials between May and September 1945. War-related dead found in later years, from October 1945 to September 1957, are given as 1,557; from May 1945 until 1966, 1,858 bodies were recovered. None were found during the period 1990–1994, even though there was a lot of construction and excavation during that period. The number of people registered with the authorities as missing was 35,000; around 10,000 of those were later found to be alive. In recent years, the estimates have become a little higher in Germany and lower in Britain; earlier it was the opposite.

There have been higher estimates for the number of dead, ranging as high as 300,000. They are from disputed and unreliable sources, such as the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda headed by Joseph Goebbels, Soviet historians, and David Irving, the once popular, but now discredited self-taught historian who retracted his higher estimates. Both the Columbia Encyclopedia and Encarta Encyclopedia list the number as "from 35,000 to more than 135,000 dead", the higher figure of which is in line with Irving's incorrect retracted estimates.

The Nazis made use of Dresden in their propaganda efforts and promised swift retaliation. The Soviets also made propaganda use of the Dresden bombing in the early years of the Cold War to alienate the East Germans from the Americans and British.

The tonnage of bombs dropped on Dresden was actually lower than in many other areas. However, ideal weather conditions at the target site, the wooden-framed buildings, and "breakthroughs" linking the cellars of contiguous buildings and the lack of preparation for the effects of air-raids by Gauleiter Martin Mutschmann, conspired to make the attack particularly devastating. For these reasons the loss of life in Dresden was higher than many other bombing raids during World War II. For example Coventry, the English city which is now twinned with Dresden, and is often compared and contrasted with it, lost 1,236 in two separate raids in 1940. In late 2004, an RAF man involved in the raid said in an interview on the BBC's Radio 4 that another factor was the lower-than-expected level of anti-aircraft fire, which allowed a high degree of accuracy on the part of the bombers.

Overall, Anglo-American bombing of German cities claimed between 305,000 and 600,000 civilian lives. Whether these attacks hastened the end of the war is a controversial question.

Immediate responses to the bombing

German

Development of a German political response to the raid took several turns. Initially, some of the leadership, especially Robert Ley and Joseph Goebbels, wanted to use it as a pretext for abandonment of the Geneva Conventions on the Western Front. In the end, the only political action the German government took was to exploit it for propaganda purposes.

Goebbels inflated the numbers of the dead by a factor of ten, and German diplomats circulated the figures, along with photographs of the destruction, the dead, and badly burned children, in neutral countries. By coincidence, the day before the Dresden raid, a German foreign affairs paper had been circulated to neutral countries describing Arthur Harris, as "the arch enemy of Europe" and a leading proponent of "Terror Bombing".

On February 16, the Propaganda Ministry issued a press release that outlined the Nazi line: Dresden had no war industries, it was a place of culture and clinics. On February 25, a new leaflet with photographs of two burned children was released under the title "Dresden – Massacre of Refugees" and stating that not 100,000 but 200,000 had died. Since no official estimate had yet been developed, the numbers were speculative, but foreign journals such as the Stockholm Svenska Morgonbladet used phrases like "privately from Berlin". Frederick Taylor states that "there is good reason to believe that later in March copies of — or extracts from — were leaked to the neutral press by Goebbels's Propaganda Ministry… doctored with an extra zero to make 202,040". On March 4, Das Reich, a weekly general newspaper founded by Goebbels, published a lengthy article emphasising the suffering and the destruction of a cultural icon without mentioning any damage the attacks had caused to the German war effort.

Taylor observes that this propaganda was quite effective, as it not only influenced attitudes in neutral countries at the time but even reached the British House of Commons when Richard Stokes quoted information from the German Press Agency (controlled by the Propaganda Ministry). Taylor suggests that, although the destruction of Dresden would have affected people's perception of the Allies' claim to absolute moral superiority in any event, part of the outrage involves Goebbels's master stroke of propaganda.

British

At a press briefing held by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force two days after the raids, British Air Commodore Grierson told journalists "First of all they are the centres to which evacuees are being moved. They are centres of communications through which traffic is moving across to the Russian Front, and from the Western Front to the East, and they are sufficiently close to the Russian Front for the Russians to continue the successful prosecution of their battle. I think these three reasons probably cover the bombing." one of the journalists asked whether the principal aim of bombing of Dresden would be to cause confusion among the refugees or to blast communications carrying military supplies. Grierson answered that the primary aim was communications to prevent them moving military supplies, and to stop movement in all directions if possible. He then added in an offhand remark that the raid also helped destroying "what is left of German morale" Howard Cowan, an Associated Press war correspondent, subsequently filed a story saying that the Allies had resorted to terror bombing. There were follow up newspaper editorials on the issue and a long time opponent of strategic bombing, Richard Stokes MP, asked questions in the House of Commons.

The destruction of the city provoked unease in intellectual circles in Britain. According to Max Hastings, by February 1945, attacks upon German cities had become largely irrelevant to the outcome of the war and the name of Dresden possessed a resonance for cultured people all over Europe — "the home of so much charm and beauty, a refuge for Trollope’s heroines, a landmark of the Grand Tour." He argues that the bombing of Dresden was the first time Allied populations questioned the military actions used to defeat the Nazis.

Churchill, who approved of the targeting of Dresden and supported the bombing prior to the event, distanced himself from it. On March 28, in a memo sent by telegram to General Ismay for the British Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff he wrote:

"It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts, should be reviewed. Otherwise we shall come into control of an utterly ruined land… The destruction of Dresden remains a serious query against the conduct of Allied bombing. I am of the opinion that military objectives must henceforward be more strictly studied in our own interests than that of the enemy.
The Foreign Secretary has spoken to me on this subject, and I feel the need for more precise concentration upon military objectives such as oil and communications behind the immediate battle-zone, rather than on mere acts of terror and wanton destruction, however impressive."

Having been given a paraphrased version of Churchill's draft memo by Bottomley, on March 29, Harris wrote to the Air Ministry:

"I assume that the view under consideration is something like this: no doubt in the past we were justified in attacking German cities. But to do so was always repugnant and now that the Germans are beaten anyway we can properly abstain from proceeding with these attacks. This is a doctrine to which I could never subscribe. Attacks on cities like any other act of war are intolerable unless they are strategically justified. But they are strategically justified in so far as they tend to shorten the war and preserve the lives of Allied soldiers. To my mind we have absolutely no right to give them up unless it is certain that they will not have this effect. I do not personally regard the whole of the remaining cities of Germany as worth the bones of one British Grenadier.

The feeling, such as there is, over Dresden, could be easily explained by any psychiatrist. It is connected with German bands and Dresden shepherdesses. Actually Dresden was a mass of munitions works, an intact government centre, and a key transportation point to the East. It is now none of these things." (the phrase "worth the bones of one British grenadier" was a deliberate echo of a famous sentence used by Bismarck "The whole of the Balkans is not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.")

On reflection, under pressure from the Chiefs of Staff and in response to the views expressed by Portal and Harris among others, Churchill withdrew his memo and issued a new one. This final version of the memo completed on April 1 1945, stated:

"It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of the so called 'area-bombing' of German cities should be reviewed from the point of view of our own interests. If we come into control of an entirely ruined land, there will be a great shortage of accommodation for ourselves and our allies… We must see to it that our attacks do no more harm to ourselves in the long run than they do to the enemy's war effort."

Was the bombing a war crime?

The nature of the bombing of Dresden has made it a unique point of contention and debate. Arguments for and against the bombing being a war crime come from all across the political spectrum and are supported in a variety of ways.

Günter Grass, the German novelist and Nobel laureate for literature and Simon Jenkins, the former editor of The Times, have both referred to the Dresden bombing as a war crime. The historian Max Hastings said in an article subtitled, 'the Allied Bombing of Dresden', "I believe it is wrong to describe strategic bombing as a war crime, for this might be held to suggest some moral equivalence with the deeds of the Nazis. Bombing represented a sincere, albeit mistaken, attempt to bring about Germany's military defeat."

Dr. Gregory H. Stanton, president of Genocide Watch, wrote: Nazi Holocaust was among the most evil genocides in history. But the Allies' firebombing of Dresden and nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were also war crimes and, as Leo Kuper and Eric Markusen have argued, also acts of genocide." Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn write in their book "The History and Sociology of Genocide" (page 24) that " definition of genocide also excludes civilian victims of aerial bombardment in belligerent states. In this we differ from Jean-Paul Sartre and Leo Kuper."

Nationalist politicians in Germany promote the term holocaust of bombs for the Allied aerial bombings, especially for the Dresden raids. Udo Voigt, the chairman of the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), supported the use of the term and a parliamentary representative of the NPD in Saxony, Holger Apfel, said to the Saxon Landtag on January 22, 2005 that the Allied bombing of Dresden was a "holocaust of Germans". A number of mainstream political opponents in Germany have criticised such actions, claiming that the party is using the controversial firebombing to advance its own cause, exploiting the intense sentiment surrounding the event not only to win votes, but also to show a moral parity between the Allies of World War II and the Axis. Others have suggested that the appellation holocaust of bombs should be considered a violation of German law which forbids Holocaust denial. In an evaluation of these charges in April 2005, the Hamburg public prosecutor's office decided that Udo Voigt's description of the 1945 RAF bombing of Dresden as a "holocaust" was a constitutionally protected exercise of free speech because defamation of the Jewish dead was not the primary aim of his argument.

The word "holocaust comes from the ancient Greek word for 'burnt', so some feel that it might seem apt for Dresden, as the city was immolated by the fires caused by the bombing. Others argue that this is in "bad taste" due to its suggested relativity to the suffering of the Jews during World War II.

Legal considerations

The Hague Conventions, addressing the codes of wartime conduct on land and at sea, were adopted before the rise of air power. The only considerations made in regards to aerial assault involve the dropping of projectiles from balloons and even here only a mutual and temporary ban was recognized by those in attendance.

For details on the treaty obligations of the belligerents of World War II engaged in aerial bombardment see aerial area bombardment and international law in 1945.

The case for the bombing as a war crime

The governments of the former Allied powers have consistantly defended their actions in Dresden. However, the bombing of civilian targets and an awareness of the devastation known to be caused by firebombing are held by supporters of the war crime position to establish their case on a prima facie basis. The contention is that, without even commenting on the lack of military necessity, Dresden's cultural significance or the intentions of the Allies, the bombing represents a war crime.

Michael Zezima comments on the procedure utilized in Dresden:

"Using the Dresden soccer stadium as a reference point, over 2000 British Lancasters and American Flying Fortresses dropped loads of gasoline bombs every 50 square yards out from this marker. The enormous flame that resulted was eight square miles wide, shooting smoke three miles high. For the next eighteen hours, regular bombs were dropped on top of this strange brew. Twenty-five minutes after the bombing, winds reaching 150 miles-per-hour sucked everything into the heart of the storm. Because the air became superheated and rushed upward, the fire lost most of its oxygen, creating tornadoes of flame that can suck the air right out of human lungs. Seventy percent of the Dresden dead either suffocated or died from poison gases that turned their bodies green and red. The intense heat melted some bodies into the pavement like bubblegum, or shrunk them into three-foot long charred carcasses. Clean-up crews wore rubber boots to wade through the "human soup" found in nearby caves. In other cases, the superheated air propelled victims skyward only to come down in tiny pieces as far as fifteen miles outside Dresden."

The Allies were aware of the devestation known to be caused by firebombing. Over a year and a half earlier, Winston Churchill had urged British scientists to cook up "a new kind of weather" in lieu of a recently completed British raid on Hamburg. It had killed between 45,000 and 48,000. In all fairness, the Germans had utilized these methods during the Blitz in 1940. However, as historian Richard Rhodes states, there were only 20,083 civilian deaths during the entire Battle of Britain compared to the 45,000 Germany suffered during one instance in Hamburg.

Regarding the effects on non-partisan victims, Roy Akehurst, a wireless operator for the RAF who took part in the Dresden fireboming recalled, "I found myself making comments to the crew: "Oh God, those poor people." It was completely uncalled for. You can't justify it." Group Captain Leonard Cheshire later called the Allied rationale for the bombing sensless.

Simon Jenkins argues that a mass assault against civilians simply constitutes a crime against humanity. In Fire Sites, German revisionist historian Jörg Friedrich posits that Winston Churchill's decision to bomb Germany between January and March 1945 constitutes a war crime. He argues that by January 1945, the Germans had clearly lost the war, yet between January and March, it is known that the number of sorties over Germany had actually increased, suggesting an intention to target civilians. Historian Christopher Hitchens even accused the Allies of incinerating German cities in 1944 and 1945 simply because they could, and are of the opinion that many small German residential districts were destroyed for no reason other than to serve as "bomb-fodder". Regarding such claims, it is known that in the event of excessive cloud cover, standard orders were to abandon primary industrial targets and instead unleash the payload onto city centers, regardless of their military importance.

As for the official rationale behind the bombing, A Royal Air Force memorandum issues prior to the attack states:

The seventh largest city in Germany and not much smaller than Manchester, is also by far the largest unbombed built-up area the enemy has got. In the midst of winter with refugees pouring west-wards and troops to be rested, roofs are at a premium, not only to give shelter to workers, refugees and troops alike, but also to house the administrative services evacuated from other areas...

Churchill had the following to say about the deliberate targeting of civilians in aerial bombardment in the midst of the war: "it's simply a question of fashion - similar to that of whether short or long dresses are in." In addition, Churchill's initial misgivings after Dresden focused not on the fate of its populace, but his concern that the Allies would come into "control of an utterly ruined land." Putting the bombing in an entirely different perspective, Churchill had voiced his opinion, shared with President Roosevelt that the German people should live "no higher a standard of living" than the rest of Europe and should be reduced to "simple, agrarian lifestyle."

While the destruction of Dresden also ensured that the Soviets would encounter the least resistance, politics were a primary consideration, not the threat of a German buildup, as the "race to Berlin" involved a dispute over the spoils. It was Eisenhower, collaborating with Stalin, who pressed for the Dresden raid and was opposed to Patton and Montgomery advancing past Berlin. Also countering the claim that Dresden was a significant military target, Friedrich's later book, Der Brand focuses on the evidence showing that the German forces were in full retreat by February 1945. He argues that the impact on civilians was out of all proportion to the military goal, reiterrating the argument that the Allied forces were aware of the destruction caused by incendiary bombs. Friedrich also argues that the Allies had known that future attacks were likely to cause ever increasing numbers of civilian deaths. British historian Anthony Beevor wrote that in 1945, Dresden was considered relatively safe, having been out of range of Allied attacks throughout the war. At the time of the raids, there were up to 300,000 refugees in the city seeking sanctuary; that meant that the city's population had swelled from its usual 600,000 to at least one million. With the Soviets moving quickly in the direction of Berlin, tens of thousands fled towards Dresden, believing it to be safe from attack for this reason as well. The early Hague convention does not give insight on Dresden's "illegality" or establish the rules of aerial bombardment. However, it does mention that

"necessary measures must be taken to spare as far as possible sacred edifices, buildings used for artistic, scientific, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick or wounded are collected, on the understanding that they are not used at the same time for military purposes."

As also mentioned, the importance of Dresden as a culture site should be taken into account. Since the dated of the 1907 Hague, numerous international conferences have reiterrated the importance of preserving historical and cultural sites. Before the bombing, Dresden was regarded as a beautiful city and a cultural centre, and was sometimes known as Elbflorenz, or Florence on the Elbe. Dresden was known for its china and its Baroque and Rococo architecture and it contained galleries of priceless work by Vermeer, Rembrandt, Rubens, and Botticelli. Its notable architecture included the Zwinger Palace, the Dresden State Opera House, and the Dresden Frauenkirche, its historic cathedral. Before the war, the city's main industries had been the production of porcelain, cups and saucers, and tobacco products.

In Der Brand, Friedrich also suggests that by 1945, the German air defense had collapsed. As for the counter claim that the nationalization of the air-defense system, the Kammhuber Line, meant Dresden was defended, and therefore, a permissable military target, a closer examination is necessary. Given the state of the Luftwaffe after December 1944, the ability for routine air patrols was severely reduced due to fuel shortages. Furthermore, the Allies were completely in control of the air, and Germany had committed all of its fighters originally dedicated to air defense at the Battle of the Bulge Concerning grounded anti-aircraft capacity, it took an average of 16,000 88 mm Flak shells to bring down a single Allied heavy bomber. Thus, the meaning of "defended" is disputable - much like the phrase "war crime."

The case against the bombing as a war crime

The Military of the United States contended that the bombing of Dresden did not constitute a war crime based on the following claims:

1. The raid had legitimate military ends, brought about by exigent military circumstances.
2. Military units and anti-aircraft defenses were sufficiently close that it was valid not to consider the city "undefended".
3. The raid did not use extraordinary means, but was comparable to other raids used against comparable targets.
4. The raid was carried out through the normal chain of command, pursuant to directives and agreements then in force.
5. The raid achieved the military objective, without "excessive" loss of civilian life.

The first declaration regarding the legitimacy of the raid depends on two claims; first, that the railyards subjected to American precision bombing were an important logistical target, functioning beyond their ordinary value as a communication centre. The second claim is that the city was also an important industrial centre.

In reference to the first claim, an inquiry conducted at the behest of the US Secretary of War, General George C. Marshall, found that the raid was justified by the available intelligence. The inquiry declared that the elimination of the German ability to reinforce a counter-attack against Marshall Konev's extended line or, alternatively, to retreat and regroup using Dresden as a base of operations, were important military objectives. As Dresden had been largely untouched during the war due to its location, it was one of the few remaining functional rail and communications centres. A secondary objective was to disrupt the industrial use of Dresden for munitions manufacture, which American intelligence believed to be the case. The shock to military planners and to the Allied civlian populations of a Nazi counter attack known as the Battle of the Bulge had ended speculation that the war was almost over, and may have contributed to the decision to continue with the area bombardment of German cities.

As far as Dresden being a militarily significant industrial centre, an official 1942 guide described the German city as "one of the foremost industrial locations of the Reich" and in 1944, the German Army High Command's Weapons Office listed 127 medium-to-large factories and workshops which supplied the army with materiel. Dresden was one of the 15 largest cities in Germany that had not been bombed by October 1944 and thus, contributing to the defense of Germany itself. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey listed at least 110 factories and industries in Dresden, albeit mainly in the outskirts, which were far less affected by the February 1945 raid. This reflects on a trend in late war German industrial production, as many industries began moved their manufacturing operations into the suburbs or even underground. Nevertheless, the city still contained the Zeiss-Ikon optical factory and the Siemens glass factory, both of which, according to the Allies, were entirely devoted to manufacturing military gunsights. The immediate suburbs contained factories building radar and electronics components, and fuses for anti-aircraft shells. Other factories produced gas masks, engines for Junkers aircraft and cockpit parts for Messerschmitt fighters.

The second of the five points addresses the prohibition in the Hague Conventions, of "attack or bombardment" of "undefended" towns. Marshall's inquiry concluded that the presence of active German military units nearby, and the presence of fighters and anti-aircraft within an effective range, Dresden qualified as "defended". By this stage in the war both the British and the Germans had integrated air defences at the national level. The Germans national air-defence system could be used to argue - as the tribunal did - that no German city was "undefended".

In reference to the first claim, an inquiry conducted at the behest of the US Secretary of War, General George C. Marshall, found that the raid was justified by the available intelligence. The inquiry declared that the elimination of the German ability to reinforce a counter-attack against Marshall Konev's extended line or, alternatively, to retreat and regroup using Dresden as a base of operations, were important military objectives. As Dresden had been largely untouched during the war due to its location, it was one of the few remaining functional rail and communications centres. A secondary objective was to disrupt the industrial use of Dresden for munitions manufacture, which American intelligence believed to be the case. The shock to military planners and to the Allied civlian populations of a Nazi counter attack known as the Battle of the Bulge had ended speculation that the war was almost over, and may have contributed to the decision to continue with the area bombardment of German cities.

The third and fourth points claim that the size of the Dresden raid - in terms of numbers, types of bombs and the means of delivery - were commensurate with the military objective and similar to other Allied bombings. On February 23, 1945, the Allies bombed Pforzheim and caused an estimated 20,000 civilian fatalities; a raid on Tokyo on March 9/10 caused civilian casualties over 100,000. The tonnage and types of bombs listed in the service records of the Dresden raid were comparable to (or less than) throw weights of bombs dropped in other air attacks carried out in 1945. One contributing factor to the large loss of life in Dresden was the lack of preparation for the effects of air-raids by Gauleiter Martin Mutschmann, as the city did not expect to be bombed. In addition, its inhabitants at the time, including migrants from further east, were not used to "life under bombs". When Braunschweig was bombed on nights of October 14 and 15 1944, hochbunkers and well trained fire fighters saved 23,000 people from death in a firestorm. However, in the case of Dresden, the hour break in between the raids was an intentional measure to vaporize the rescue crews who believed the raid to be over.

Marshall's tribunal declared that no extraordinary decision was made to single out Dresden , take advantage of the large number of refugees, or purposely terrorize the German populace, in spite of the consequences. it was argued that the intent of area bombing was to disrupt industrial production, not to kill dislocated civilians. The American inquiry established that the Soviets, pursuant to allied agreements for the United States and the United Kingdom to provide air support for the Soviet offensive toward Berlin, had requested area bombing of Dresden in order to prevent a counter attack through Dresden, or the use of Dresden as a regrouping point after a strategic retreat.

The fifth point is that the firebombing achieved the intended effect of disabling the industry in Dresden. It was estimated that at least 23% of the city’s industrial buildings were destroyed or severely damaged. The damage to other infrastructure and communications was immense, which would have severely limited the potential use of Dresden to stop the Soviet advance. The report concludes with: "The specific forces and means employed in the Dresden bombings were in keeping with the forces and means employed by the Allies in other aerial attacks on comparable targets in Germany. The Dresden bombings achieved the strategic objectives that underlay the attack and were of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians."

Dresden and the Holocaust

During February 1945 several hundred remaining Jews still resident in Dresden were destined to be transported. The chaos following the bombing provided many a chance to escape, while others were put to work in rebuilding the city. According to the diary of Victor Klemperer, the order was given on February 12 1945 to deliver call-up letters in order to assemble the remaining handful of Jews in Dresden for deportation. However, the bombing the next night destroyed much of the train station and threw much of the city into chaos. Victor Klemperer and his wife, Eva, fled amid the chaos. He removed the "J" and yellow Star of David from his jacket and they began heading south. By walking, riding on carts, trucks and trains they eventually reached Bavaria. They had picked up temporary identification papers, which did not show his Jewish origins.

Today, a placard at the Dresden Main Station memorializes the Jewish citizens of Dresden who were sent from there to the Nazi concentration camps.

Post-war reconstruction and reconciliation

After the war, and especially after German reunification, great efforts were made to rebuild some of Dresden's former landmarks, such as the Frauenkirche, the Semperoper, and the Zwinger. A new synagogue was also built. Despite its location in the Soviet occupation zone (subsequently the DDR), in 1956 Dresden entered a twin-town relationship with Coventry, which had suffered the worst destruction of any English city at the hands of the Luftwaffe, including the destruction of its cathedral (the official death toll in Coventry, an important center of aeroplane and vehicle manufacturing, was 1,236). Groups from both cities were involved in moving demonstrations of post-war reconciliation. During her visit to Germany in November 2004, Queen Elizabeth II hosted a concert in Berlin to raise money for the reconstruction of the Dresden Frauenkirche. The visit was accompanied by speculation in the British and German press, fuelled mostly by the tabloids, over a possible apology for the attacks, which did not occur. On February 13, 2005, a cross made by Alan Smith, the son of one of the bombers, from medieval nails recovered from the ruins of the roof of Coventry cathedral in 1940, was presented to the Lutheran Bishop of Saxony. On Sunday 30 October 2005 the Frauenkirche was rededicated, some 1,800 guests including the Duke of Kent, Germany's president, Horst Köhler, and the previous and current chancellors, Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel, attended the service.

Influences on art and culture

• Author Kurt Vonnegut had been captured during the Battle of the Bulge and was a prisoner of war held in Dresden during the bombing. He later wrote about his experiences and feelings in his novel Slaughterhouse-Five. Critics have pointed out Dresden's influence in each of his first six novels.
• Science fiction novelists Larry Niven and Jerry Pournelle placed the general who ordered the bombing of Dresden in Hell in their novel Inferno.
• British comedy troupe Monty Python's Flying Circus created a sketch in 1972 depicting a boxing match between Harry the Reaper and Harry the Bomber.
• Since 1990, the bombing of Dresden has become an increasingly popular theme in German culture, becoming the subject of many books and documentaries (like that of Guido Knopp).
• In Jonathan Safran Foer's 2005 novel Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close, the firebombing of Dresden is one of two traumatic events -- the other being the September 11th attacks -- that define the narrator's family history.
• The "cabaret punk" group The Dresden Dolls also take their name from a picture taken of a destroyed doll factory following the bombing.
• Australian pub-rock group Cold Chisel wrote a song about the firebombings on their 1979 album Breakfast At Sweethearts, named "Dresden".
• Lamb and Lynx Gaede of the white nationalist duo Prussian Blue, have a younger sister named Dresden who was named in memory of the city's bombing.
• In horror novelist Brian Hodge's book Hellboy: On Earth As It Is In Hell B.P.R.D.correspondent Dr. Kate Corrigan proposes the controversial theory that Dresden was destroyed by Seraphim, just like Sodom and Gomorrah.
• The 2006 ZDF film Dresden starring Felicitas Woll and John Light is set in Dresden at the time of the February 13/14, 1945 raids.
• The band Sorry About Dresden
• The composition "Symphony No. 1 (In Memoriam, Dresden, 1945)," by Daniel Bukvich.

See also

References

• Beevor, Antony; Berlin: the Downfall, 1945. ISBN 0-670-88695-5 * Bergander, Götz , Dresden im Luftkrieg: Vorgeschichte-Zerstörung-Folgen (Wilhelm Heyne Verlag, Munich, 1977)
• Longmate, Norman; "The Bombers", Hutchins & Co, (1983), ISBN 0-09-151508-7
• Taylor, Frederick; Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945; US review, Pub (NY): HarperCollins, ISBN 0-06-000676-5; UK review, Pub (Lon): Bloomsbury. ISBN 0-7475-7078-7.
• USAF Historical Division Research Studies Institute Air University Historical Analysis of the 14-15 February 1945 Bombings of Dresden

Further reading

• Grayling, A. C. (2006). Among the Dead Cities. New York: Walker Publishing Company Inc. ISBN 0-8027-1471-4.
• US Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (European War) September 30, 1945
• RAF Museum 1945 Page:"13-14 February"
• Quotes from accounts and sources regarding the bombing (Spartacus site)
• Alan Forbes on wartime atrocities, Boston Review, October/November 1995
• Reconstruction of the Frauenkirche in Dresden
• Horrific fire-bombing images published, BBC News
• In German, but with many pictures of modern buildings, easy to understand
• The legacy of Dresden
• "Surviving the Firestorm" (Excert from the diary of Victor Klemperer describing the bombing of Dresden)
• The Fire-bombing of Dresden — An eye-witness account
• Machine-gunning civilian refugees
• The 'Bomber Harris Trust' Homepage
• Necessary or not, Dresden remains a topic of anguish By John Keegan Daily Telegraph 31 October 2005
• Winston Churchill and the Bombing of Dresden UK online material from the National Archives.
• Website of the film Asche-1945 with a different (german nationalist) point of view.
• German website with a large photo gallery of the bombing.
• Photo gallery of the bombing from David Irving's book "The Destruction of Dresden"
• Williamson Murray The meaning of World War II (PDF) pages 1,5-6.

Footnotes

1. "Dresden Bombing Is To Be Regretted Enormously", interview with Frederick Taylor, Spiegel Online, February 11, 2005
2. Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945. By Frederick Taylor, page 207, see References
3. "The Bombers" by Norman Longmate", page 332, see References
4. Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945. By Frederick Taylor, page 212, see References
5. Taylor, References, page 212
6. Longmate, References page 332
7. "The Bombers" by Norman Longmate", page 332, see References
8. Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945. By Frederick Taylor, page 213, see References
9. Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945. By Frederick Taylor, pages 206-208, see References
10. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 14-15 FEBRUARY 1945 BOMBINGS OF DRESDEN Prepared by USAF Historical Division Research Studies Institute Air University, II. Section ANALYSIS: Dresden as a Military Target, paragraph 9 (backup site) pages 14,15 and 16.
11. AIR FORCE Magazine Online: The Dresden Legend October 2004, Vol. 87, No. 10
12. Berlin: the Downfall, 1945. by Antony Beevor page 83, see References
13. Historical Analysis of the 14-15 February 1945 Bombings of Dresden Prepared by USAF Historical Division Research Studies Institute Air University, II. Table in the Introduction.
14. ^ Official RAF site: Bomber Command: Dresden, February 1945
15. Dresden im Luftkrieg: Vorgeschichte-Zerstörung-Folgen. by Götz Bergander, see References
16. The Bombing of Dresden in 1945, by Richard J. Evans, Professor of Modern History, University of Cambridge, a detailed critique of problems with David Irving's book. �UNIQ704eeea35fa82acd-HTMLCommentStrip34f1f02426d16b5200000001
17. Frederick Taylor References, pages 497-498
18. Frederick Taylor References page 365
19. Norman Longmante References pages 162-164
20. Historical Analysis of the 14-15 February 1945 Bombings of Dresden Prepared by USAF Historical Division Research Studies Institute Air University, II. Table in the Introduction.
21. Frederick Taylor, References page 408
22. Frederick Taylor, References page 409
23. USAF Historical Division references Paragraphs 25 and 26
24. Historical Analysis of the 14-15 February 1945 Bombings of Dresden Prepared by USAF Historical Division Research Studies Institute Air University, II. Section The Immediate Consequences of the Dresden Bombings on the Physical Structure and Populace of the City. (backup site) paragraph 28. Chart
25. Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945. By Frederick Taylor, page 262-266, see References There were an unknown number of refugees in Dresden, so the historians Matthias Neutzner, Götz Bergander and Frederick Taylor have used historical sources and deductive reasoning, to estimate that the number of refugees in the city and surrounding suburbs was around 200,000, or less, on the first night of the bombing
26. Dresden im Luftkrieg: Vorgeschichte-Zerstörung-Folgen. by Götz Bergander, see References
27. The Bombing of Dresden in 1945:Falsification of statistics, by Richard J. Evans, Professor of Modern History, University of Cambridge, a detailed critique of problems with David Irving's book .
28. Friedrich Reichert, Verbrannt bis zur Unkenntlichkeit — Die Zerstörung Dresdens 1945, Dresdner Museum, Dresden, 1994
29. Historical Analysis of the 14-15 February 1945 Bombings of Dresden Prepared by USAF Historical Division Research Studies Institute Air University, II. Section: The Immediate Consequences of the Dresden Bombings on the Physical Structure and Populace of the City. (backup site). Paragraph 29. The comparisons use data extracted from "Fire Raids on German Cities", United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Physical Damage Division, January 1945. Supporting Document No. 34.
30. The Bombing of Dresden in 1945, by Richard J. Evans, Professor of Modern History, University of Cambridge, a detailed critique of problems with David Irving's book .
31. Luftkriegslegenden in Dresden von Helmut Schnatz
32. The Bombing of Dresden in 1945, by Richard J. Evans, Professor of Modern History, University of Cambridge, a detailed critique of problems with David Irving's book .
33. Richard Ingram Irving was the author of his own downfall in The Independent 25 February 2006: In 1969, after David Irving's support for Rolf Hochhuth, the German playwright who accused Winston Churchill of murdering the Polish wartime leader General Sikorski, The Daily Telegraph issued a memo to all its correspondents. "It is incorrect," it said, "to describe David Irving as a historian. In future we should describe him as an author."
34. The Dresden Raids letter to the Editor from The Times 7 July 1966 a correction to "The Destruction of Dresden". By David Irving Pub: William Kimber; London 1963; In this letter Irving, who had previously used figures as high as 250,000 admitted the confirmed casualty figures were actually 18,375, expected to rise to 25,000 including when those not registered in the city were taken into account. Despite the admission of his mistake contained in the letter, he has still used figures as high as 100,000 in articles and books on his own web site fpp.org some written as late as 2004.
35. Official RAF site: Campaign Diary March 1945 Note 11 March, Essen (1,079 aircraft) and 12 March, Dortmund (1,108 aircraft)
36. Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945. By Frederick Taylor, page 5, see References
37. German Deaths by aerial bombardment (It is not clear if these totals includes Austrians, of whom about 24,000 were killed (see Austrian Press & Information Service, Washington, D.C) and other territories in the Third Reich but not in modern Germany)
    • 600,000 about 80,000 were children in Hamburg, Juli 1943 in Der Spiegel © SPIEGEL ONLINE 2003 (in German)
    • Twentieth Century Atlas - Death Tolls lists the following totals and sources:
      • more than 305,000 (1945 Strategic Bombing Survey);
      • 400,000 Hammond Atlas of the 20th Century (1996)
      • 410,000 R. J. Rummel, 100% democidal;
      • 499,750 Michael Clodfelter Warfare and Armed Conflict: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1618-1991;
      • 593,000 John Keegan The Second World War (1989);
      • 593,000 J. A. S. Grenville citing "official Germany" in A History of the World in the Twentieth Century (1994)
      • 600,000 Paul Johnson Modern Times (1983)
38. Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945. By Frederick Taylor, page 420-426, see References
39. Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945. By Frederick Taylor, page 421, see References
40. Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945. By Frederick Taylor, page 421, see References
41. Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945. By Frederick Taylor, page 423, see References
42. Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945. By Frederick Taylor, page 424, see References
43. Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945. By Frederick Taylor, page 424, see References
44. Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945. By Frederick Taylor, page 426, see References
45. ^ Taylor, ],413
46. "Longmate", References, page 344
47. Still Explosive, RA Magazine, Spring 2003, Verified 26 February 2005 from http://195.172.125.151/03SPRING/grass.htm. N.B. this source appears to be a personal workstation and not the official online version of the magazine which was non-functional at the time of verification
48. "The Bombers" by Norman Longmate", page 345, see References Churchill quote source: "The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany" (SOA), HMSO (1961) vol 3 pp 117-9
49. Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945. By Frederick Taylor, page 431, see References
50. British Bombing Strategy in World War Two, Detlef Siebert, 2001-08-01, BBC History, verified 26 February 2005
51. Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945. By Frederick Taylor, page 430, see References
52. Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945. By Frederick Taylor, page 432, see References
53. "The Bombers" by Norman Longmate", page 346, see References
54. Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945. By Frederick Taylor, page 432, see References
55. "The Bombers" by Norman Longmate", page 346, see References Harris quote source: Public Records Office ATH/DO/4B quoted by Lord Zuckerman "From Apes to Warlords" p.352
56. Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945. By Frederick Taylor, page 433, see References
57. "The Bombers" by Norman Longmate", page 346, see References
58. Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945. By Frederick Taylor, page 432, see References
59. Eyes Open to the Past, RA Magazine, Spring 2003, Verified 26 February 2005 from http://195.172.125.151/03SPRING/grass.htm. N.B. this source appears to be a personal workstation and not the official online version of the magazine which was non-functional at the time of verification
60. Europe: Then And Now, Michael Elliott, Time Magazine Europe, 10 August 2003, retrieved 26 February 2005 from http://www.time.com/time/europe/etan/story.html
61. Still Explosive, RA Magazine, Spring 2003, Verified 26 February 2005 from http://195.172.125.151/03SPRING/grass.htm. N.B. this source appears to be a personal workstation and not the official online version of the magazine which was non-functional at the time of verification
62. How we can prevent genocide by Dr. Gregory H. Stanton, president of Genocide Watch.
63. The History and Sociology of Genocide" by Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, page 24
64. Casualties of total war Leading article, in The Guardian February 12, 2005
65. German ruling says Dresden was a holocaust by Hannah Cleaver in the Daily Telegraph 12 April 2005
66. German ruling says Dresden was a holocaust by Hannah Cleaver in the Daily Telegraph 12 April 2005
67. Terrorism and the Protection of Cultural Heritage, August 2005, Copenhagen. IFLA Conference http://www.museumbeveiliging.com/terrorism.pdf
68. Michael Zezima, quoted in From Dresden to Baghdad: 50 Years of Shock and Awe
69. Allan Forbes, The Boston Review
70. Roy Akehurst makes an appearance on Anniversary of allied destruction of Dresden during World War II noted., ABC report for Wednesday, Feb 13, 1985, TRT: 4:30. Hosted by Peter Jennings.
71. Leonard Cheshire makes an appearance on 1945 destruction of Dresden, Germany, recalled., CBS report for Friday, Feb 08, 1985, TRT: 3:30
72. Dresden: Time to Say We're Sorry by Simon Jenkins in the Wall Street Journal February 14, 1995, (originally published The Times and The Spectator
73. Luke Harding German historian provokes row over war photos in The Guardian, October 21, 2003
74. Luke Harding German historian provokes row over war photos in The Guardian, October 21, 2003
75. Richard G. Davis,Bombing of the European Powers: a historical digest of the combined bomber offensive , 1939-1945(Alabama: Air University Press,2006), 324-339.
76. Hitchens,ChristopherWas Dresden a war crime?, National Post, September 6, 2006
77. Richard G. Davis, Bombing of the European Powers
78. See: Frederick Taylor, prologue
79. Kate Connolly Germans call Winston Churchill a War Criminal http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2002/11/19/nchurc19.xml
80. Correspondence exchanged between Churchill and Air Marshall Arthur Harris, 28th March 1945
81. Berlin: the Downfall, 1945. by Antony Beevor page 83, see References
82. Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War (Hague IX); October 18, 1907. In the Avalon Project at Yale Law School
83. Documents from conferences relating to cultural heritage protection http://www2.rgu.ac.uk/schools/mcrg/stdoc.htm
84. Michael Zezima,From Dresden to Baghdad: 50 Years of Shock and Awe
85. ^ Otto Mehr, JSTOR review of Wolfgang Birkenfeld, Der synthetische Treibstoff 1933-1945(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1967), 429.
86. Richard G. Davis,Bombing of the European Powers: a historical digest of the combined bomber offensive , 1939-1945(Alabama: Air University Press,2006), Page 473.
87. Richard G. Davis,Bombing of the European Powers: a historical digest of the combined bomber offensive , 1939-1945(Alabama: Air University Press,2006), Page 594
88. Williamson Murray, German Military Effectiveness, Nautical & Aviation Pub Co of Amer (July 1992), Page 78.
89. Historical Analysis of the 14-15 February 1945 Bombings of Dresden Prepared by USAF Historical Division Research Studies Institute Air University, II. Section ANALYSIS: Dresden as a Military Target, paragraph 9 (backup site) pages 14,15 and 16.
90. Taylor References page 196.
91. Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945. By Frederick Taylor, page 169, see References
92. Taylor References
93. Historical Analysis of the 14-15 February 1945 Bombings of Dresden Prepared by USAF Historical Division Research Studies Institute Air University, II. Section ANALYSIS: Dresden as a Military Target, paragraph 9 (backup site) pages 14,15 and 16.
94. AIR FORCE Magazine Online: The Dresden Legend October 2004, Vol. 87, No. 10(PDF) (Google Cache)
95. Taylor References page 196.
96. Taylor References Chaper 12: "The Reich's air raid shelter"
97. Taylor References prologue
98. Historical Analysis of the 14-15 February 1945 Bombings of Dresden Prepared by USAF Historical Division Research Studies Institute Air University, II. Section ANALYSIS: Dresden as a Military Target, paragraph 9 (backup site) III. CONCLUSION
99. VICTOR KLEMPERER'S DRESDEN DIARIES Surviving the Firestorm Review in Der Spiegel online Special February 11, 2005
100. Cathedral hit by RAF is rebuilt by Luke Harding in The Guardian October 31, 2005

Template:Link FA

• World War II strategic bombing
• 1945
• Dresden