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Phrenology is regarded today as a classic example of pseudoscience.

A pseudoscience is any body of alleged knowledge, methodology, belief, or practice that claims to be scientific but does not follow the scientific method.

The term pseudoscience appears to have been first used in 1843 as a combination of the Greek root pseudo, meaning false, and the Latin scientia, meaning knowledge or a field of knowledge. It generally has negative connotations, because it asserts that things so labeled are inaccurately or deceptively described as science. Accordingly, those labeled as practicing or advocating a "pseudoscience" normally reject this classification.

Though there is disagreement as to exactly how to distinguish pseudoscience from legitimate science, some characteristics include: the use of vague exaggerated or un-testable claims, over-reliance on confirmation rather than refutation, lack of openness to testing by other experts, and a lack of progress in theory development.

Introduction

Main article: Demarcation problem

The standards for determining whether a body of alleged knowledge, methodology, or practice is scientific can vary from field to field, but involve agreed principles including reproducibility and intersubjective verifiability. Such principles aim to ensure that relevant evidence can be reproduced and/or measured given the same conditions, which allows further investigation to determine whether a hypothesis or theory related to given phenomena is both valid and reliable for use by others, including other scientists and researchers. Scientific methods are expected to be applied throughout, and bias is expected to be controlled or eliminated, by double-blind studies, or statistically through fair sampling procedures. All gathered data, including experimental/environmental conditions, are expected to be documented for scrutiny and made available for peer review, thereby allowing further experiments or studies to be conducted to confirm or falsify results, as well as to determine other important factors such as statistical significance, confidence intervals, and margins of error. Fulfillment of these requirements allows others a reasonable opportunity to assess whether to rely upon the reported results in their own scientific work or in a particular field of applied science, technology, therapy, or other form of practice.

In the mid-20th Century Karl Popper suggested the criterion of falsifiability to distinguish science from non-science. Theories such as God created the universe may be true or false, but they are not falsifiable, so they are not scientific; they lie outside the scope of science. Popper subdivided non-science into philosophical, mathematical, mythological, religious or and metaphysical formulations on the one hand, and pseudoscientific formulations on the other — though without providing clear criteria for the differences. He gave astrology and psychoanalysis as examples of pseudoscience, and Einstein's theory of relativity as an example of science. More recently, Paul Thagard (1978) proposed that pseudoscience is primarily distinguishable from science by its lack of progress, and the selective and or lack of attempts by proponents to solve problems with the theory. Mario Bunge (1984) has suggested the categories of "belief fields" and "research fields" to help distinguish between science and pseudoscience.

Philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend has argued, from a sociology of knowledge perspective, that a distinction between science and non-science is neither possible nor desirable.  Among the issues which can make the distinction difficult are that both the theories and methodologies of science evolve at differing rates in response to new data. In addition, the specific standards applicable to one field of science may not be those employed in other fields. Thagard (1978) also writes from a sociological perspective and states that "elucidation of how science differs from pseudoscience is the philosophical side of an attempt to overcome public neglect of genuine science."

Both the skeptics and the brights movement, most prominently represented by Richard Dawkins, Mario Bunge, Carl Sagan and James Randi, consider all forms of pseudoscience to be harmful, whether or not they result in immediate harm to their adherents. These critics generally consider that pseudoscience may occur for a number of reasons, ranging from simple naïveté about the nature of science and the scientific method, to deliberate deception for financial or political gain. At the extreme, issues of personal health and safety may be very directly involved, for example in the case of physical or mental therapy or treatment, or in assessing safety risks. In such instances the potential for direct harm to patients, clients or even the general public may be an issue in assessing pseudoscience. (See also: Junk science.)

The concept of pseudoscience as antagonistic to bona fide science appears to have emerged in the mid-19th century. Among the first recorded uses of the word "pseudo-science" was in 1844 in the Northern Journal of Medicine, I 387: "That opposite kind of innovation which pronounces what has been recognized as a branch of science, to have been a pseudo-science, composed merely of so-called facts, connected together by misapprehensions under the disguise of principles".

Identifying pseudoscience

A field, practice, or body of knowledge might reasonably called pseudoscience or pseudoscientific when (1) it is presented as consistent with the accepted norms of scientific research); but (2) it demonstrably fails to meet these norms, most importantly, in misuse of scientific method.   One accepted norm for example is that of making data and methodology available for scrutiny by other scientists and researchers, as well as making available any additional relevant information used to arrive at particular results or methods of practice. To the degree that thorough documentation of data and method is unavailable for detailed scrutiny by others, a body of knowledge, practice, or field of inquiry will tend, to meet at least several of the characteristics below.

The following characteristics have been argued by the cited authors to be useful in identifying pseudoscience.

Use of vague, exaggerated or un-testable claims

  • Assertion of scientific claims that are vague rather than precise, and that lack specific measurements.
  • Failure to make use of operational definitions.
  • Failure to adhere to the principle of parsimony, i.e. failing to seek an explanation that requires the fewest possible additional assumptions when multiple viable explanations are possible (see: Occam's Razor)
  • Use of obscurantist language. It is alleged that many proponents of pseudoscience misuse apparently technical jargon in an effort to give their disciplines the superficial trappings of science.
  • Lack of boundary conditions: Most well-supported scientific theories possess boundary conditions (well articulated limitations) under which the predicted phenomena do and do not apply. In contrast, many or most pseudoscientific phenomena are purported to operate across an exceedingly wide range of conditions.

Over-reliance on confirmation rather than refutation

  • Assertion of scientific claims that cannot be falsified in the event they are incorrect, inaccurate, or irrelevant (see also: falsifiability)
  • Assertion of claims that a theory predicts something that it has not been shown to predict (see, e.g.: validity, relevance, Ignoratio elenchi; Argument from ignorance) 
  • Assertion that claims which have not been proven false must be true, and vice versa (see: Argument from ignorance)
  • Over-reliance on testimonials and anecdotes. Testimonial and anecdotal evidence can be useful for discovery (i.e., hypothesis generation) but should not be used in the context of justification (i.e., hypothesis testing). Proponents of pseudoscientific claims frequently invoke reports from selected cases as evidence for these claims.
  • Selective use of experimental evidence: presentation of data that seems to support its own claims while suppressing or refusing to consider data that conflict with its claims.
  • Reversed burden of proof. In science, the burden of proof rests on the individual making a claim, not on the critic. Proponents of a pseudoscience frequently neglect this principle and demand that skeptics demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a claim (e.g., an assertion regarding the efficacy of a novel therapeutic technique) is false. It is essentially impossible to prove a universal negative, so this tactic incorrectly places the burden of proof on the skeptic rather than the claimant.
  • Appeals to holism: Proponents of pseudoscientific claims, especially in organic medicine, alternative medicine, naturopathy and mental health, often resort to the “mantra of holism” to explain negative findings.

Lack of openness to testing by other experts

  • Evasion of peer review before publicizing them (called "science by press conference"). Many proponents of pseudoscience avoid subjecting their work to the often ego-bruising process of peer review, sometimes on the grounds that peer review is inherently biased against claims that contradict established paradigms, and sometimes on the grounds that assertions cannot be evaluated adequately using standard scientific methods. By remaining insulated from the peer review process, some proponents of pseudoscience forego an invaluable opportunity to obtain corrective feedback from informed colleagues.
  • Failure to provide adequate information for other researchers to reproduce the claimed results.
  • Assertion of claims of secrecy or proprietary knowledge in response to requests for review of data or methodology.

Lack of progress

  • Failure to progress towards additional evidence of its claims.
  • Lack of self correction: both scientific and pseudoscientific research programmes make mistakes, but most scientific research programs tend to eliminate these errors over time, whereas most pseudoscientific research programs do not. Intellectual stagnation is a hallmark of most pseudoscientific research programs.

Personalization of issues

  • Tight social groups and granfalloons. Authoritarian personality, suppression of dissent, and groupthink can enhance the adoption of pseudoscientific beliefs. In attempting to confirm their pseudoscience (confirmation bias), the group tends to identify critics of the pseudoscience as enemies, whereupon the group generates a set of arguments against critics.
  • Assertion of claims of a conspiracy on the part of the scientific community to suppress the results.
  • Attacking the motives or character of anyone who questions the claims (see Ad hominem fallacy).


Subjects may be considered pseudoscientific for various reasons and with an emphasis on particular characteristics; Popper considered astrology to be pseudoscientific simply because astrologers keep their claims so vague that they could never be refuted, whereas Thagard considers astrology pseudoscientific because its practitioners make little effort to develop the theory, show no concern for attempts to critically evaluate the theory in relation to others, and are selective in considering evidence. More generally, Thagard also stated that pseudoscience tends to focus on resemblances rather than cause-effect relations.

Some characteristics that are often true of pseudoscience are also true to some extent of some new genuinely scientific work. These include:

  • claims or theories unconnected to previous experimental results
  • claims which contradict experimentally established results
  • work failing to operate on standard definitions of concepts
  • emotion-based resistance, by the scientific community, to new claims or theories 

Pseudoscience is also distinguishable from revelation, theology, or spirituality in that it claims to offer insight into the physical world obtained by "scientific" means. Systems of thought that derive from "divine" or "inspired" knowledge are not considered pseudoscience if they do not claim either to be scientific or to overturn well-established science.

Some statements and commonly held beliefs in popular science may not meet the criteria of science. "Pop" science may blur the divide between science and pseudoscience among the general public, and may also involve science fiction. Indeed, pop science is defined by the fact that it is disseminated to, and can also easily emanate from, persons not accountable to scientific methodology and expert peer review.

Pseudoscience contrasted with protoscience

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Pseudoscience also differs from protoscience. Protoscience is a term sometimes used to describe a hypothesis that has not yet been adequately tested by the scientific method, but which is otherwise consistent with existing science or which, where inconsistent, offers reasonable account of the inconsistency. It may also describe the transition from a body of practical knowledge into a scientific field.

Pseudoscience, in contrast, is characteristically inadequately tested; indeed, it may even be un-testable in principle. If tests appear to contradict its evidence, supporters may insist that the existing scientific results are false. Pseudoscience is often unresponsive to ordinary scientific procedures (for example, peer review, publication in standard journals). If un-testable claims have been made, the failure to test and disprove these claims is often cited as evidence of the truth of the pseudoscience.

The boundaries between pseudoscience, protoscience, and "real" science are often unclear to non-specialist observers and sometimes even to experts. Especially where there is a significant cultural or historical distance (as, for example, modern chemistry reflecting on alchemy), protosciences can be misinterpreted as pseudoscientific. Many people have tried to offer objective distinctions, with mixed success. Often the term pseudoscience is used simply as a pejorative to express the speaker's low opinion of a given field, regardless of any objective measures.

If the claims of a given field can be experimentally tested and methodological standards are upheld, it is real scientific work, however odd, astonishing, or counter-intuitive. If claims made are inconsistent with existing experimental results or established theory, but the methodology is sound, caution should be used; much of science consists of testing hypotheses that turn out to be false. In such a case, the work may be better described as as yet unproven or research in progress. Conversely, if the claims of any given "science" cannot be experimentally tested or scientific standards are not upheld in these tests, it fails to meet the modern criteria for a science.

Demarcation problem and criticisms of the concept of pseudoscience

Main article: Demarcation problem

After over a century of dialogue among philosophers of science and scientists in varied fields, and despite broad agreement on the basics of scientific method, the boundaries between science and non-science continue to be debated. This is known as the problem of demarcation.

Many commentators and practitioners of science, as well as supporters of fields of inquiry and practices labeled as pseudoscience, question the rigor of the demarcation, as some disciplines now accepted as science previously had features cited as those of pseudoscience, such as lack of reproducibility, or the inability to create falsifiable experiments.

It has been argued by several notable commentators that experimental verification is not in itself decisive in scientific method. Thomas Kuhn states that in neither Popper's nor his own theory "can testing play a quite decisive role." Daniel Rothbart said that "the defining feature of science does not seem to be experimental success, for most clear cases of genuine science have been experimentally falsified." The latter proposed that a scientific theory must "account for all the phenomena that its rival background theory explains" and "must clash empirically with its rival by yielding test implications that are inconsistent with the rival theory". A theory is thus scientific or not depending upon its historical situation; if it betters the current explanations of phenomena, it marks scientific progress. "Many domains in ancient Greece, for example, domains that today are called superstition, religion, magic and the occult, were at that time clear cases of legitimate science." This is an explicitly competitive model of scientific work; Rothbart also notes that it is not a completely effective model.

Kuhn postulated that proponents of competing paradigms may resort to political means (such as invective) to garner support from a public which lacks the ability to judge competing scientific theories on their merits. Philosopher of science Larry Laudan has suggested that pseudoscience has no scientific meaning and mostly describes our emotions: "If we would stand up and be counted on the side of reason, we ought to drop terms like ‘pseudo-science’ and ‘unscientific’ from our vocabulary; they are just hollow phrases which do only emotive work for us".

Social and psychological aspects of pseudoscience

The National Science Foundation indicated that, in the USA, belief in pseudoscience rose during the 1990's, peaked near 2001 and has mildly declined since; nevertheless, pseudoscientific beliefs remain common in the USA. As a result, according to the NSF report, there is a lack of knowledge of pseudoscientific issues in society and pseudoscientific practices are commonly followed. Bunge (1999) states that "A survey on public knowledge of science in the United States showed that in 1988 '50% of American adults evolution, and 88% astrology is a science'".

Pseudoscientific thinking has been explained in terms of psychology and social psychology. The human proclivity for seeking confirmation rather than refutation (confirmation bias) (Devilly 2005:439), the tendency to hold comforting beliefs, and the tendency to overgeneralize have been proposed as reasons for the common adherence to pseudoscientific thinking. Also, similar to Thagard’s notions of pseudoscience, Beyerstein (1991) argues that humans are prone to associations based on resemblances only, and often prone to misattribution in cause-effect thinking.

Commentators on pseudoscience perceive it in many fields; for example Pseudomathematics is a term used for mathematics-like activity undertaken either by non-mathematicians or mathematicians themselves which does not conform to the rigorous standards usually applied to mathematical theories.

Neurologists and clinical psychologists such as Drenth (2003:38), Lilienfeld (2004:20) and Beyerstein (1991:34) are concerned about the increasing amount of what they consider pseudoscience promoted in psychotherapy and popular psychology, and are also concerned about what they see as pseudoscientific therapies such as Neuro-linguistic programming, Rebirthing, Reparenting, and Primal Scream Therapy being adopted by government and professional bodies and by the public. They state that scientifically unsupported therapies may harm vulnerable members of the public, undermine legitimate therapies, and tend to spread misconceptions about the nature of the mind and brain to society at large. Some psychiatrists and mainstream psychologists also perceive psuodoscientific ideas in more popularly accepted branches of psychotherapy, such as co-counselling, Gestalt Therapy, Re-evaluation Counseling and even in the work of Twelve-step program bodies such as Alcoholics Anonymous. There often seems to be an overlap between psychological movements or theories denounced as "pseudoscientific" and those labeled "cults", for example in the case of Dianetics and Scientology.

A typical concept used in some fringe psychotherapies is orgone energy. "There is an increasing degree of overlapping and blending of orgone therapy with New Age and other therapies that manipulate the patient’s biofields, such as Therapeutic Touch and Reiki. 'Biofield' is a pseudoscientific term often used synonymously with orgone energy. Klee states that "there is even an organization of psychiatrists which promotes the theories and methods of orgone therapy.

Scientific theories once criticized as pseudoscience

A number of presently accepted scientific theories were once criticised by some as being pseudoscientific. Continental drift theory was once considered pseudoscientific (Williams 2000:58), but is now part of mainstream science especially since the paleomagnetic evidence was discovered that supported plate tectonics.

Fields can also repudiate notions that some consider to be pseudoscientific in favour of more conventional element(s) of their field. For example, Atwood (2004) suggested that "osteopathy has, for the most part, repudiated its pseudoscientific beginnings and joined the world of rational healthcare.

At times, scientists use the descriptor "pseudoscience" to distinguish between even mainstream investigations of varying rigor. As observational evidence and theoretical descriptions improve and fields develop, disciplines criticized for having pseudoscientific aspects may become more respected by the scientific community. The field of physical cosmology has had such a history. Currently, string theory has been criticized by certain researchers as suffering from the same problems

Fields and concepts currently regarded as pseudoscience by notable commentators

The following are some of the many fields and theories that are (or were) presented as scientific, but which have been accused of being "pseudoscientific" in whole or in part. See the individual articles and references for more information.

See also

People

Lists

Notes

  1. "Pseudoscientific - pretending to be scientific, falsely represented as being scientific", from the Oxford American Dictionary, published by the Oxford English Dictionary.
  2. http://skepdic.com/pseudosc.html
  3. Magendie, F. (1843). An Elementary Treatise on Human Physiology. 5th Ed. Tr. John Revere. New York: Harper, p. 150. Magendie refers to phrenology as "a pseudo-science of the present day" (note the hyphen).
  4. However, from the "them vs. us" polarization that its usage engenders, the term may also have a positive function because " derogatory labeling of others often includes an unstated self-definition "(p.266); and, from this, the application of the term also implies "a unity of science, a privileged tree of knowledge or space from which the pseudoscience is excluded, and the user's right to belong is asserted " (p.286) -- Still, A. & Dryden, W., "The Social Psychology of "Pseudoscience": A Brief History", Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, Vol.34, No.3, (September 2004), pp.265-290.
  5. See, e.g., Gauch, Hugh G., Jr., Scientific Method in Practice (2003) 3-5 ff.
  6. Gauch (2003), 191 ff, especially Chapter 6, "Probability", and Chapter 7, "inductive Logic and Statistics"
  7. Popper, Karl, "The Logic of Scientific Discovery" (English translation, 1959).
  8. Popper, Karl, "Science: Conjectures and Refutations", reprinted in Grim, Patrick, Philosophy of Science and the Occult, Albany 1990, pp. 104-110.
  9. Karl Popper: Science, Pseudo-Science, and Falsifiability. Conjectures and Refutations (1962)
  10. Feyerabend, Paul, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, (1975)
  11. For a perspective on Feyerabend from within the scientific community, see, e.g., Gauch (2003) at p.4: "Such critiques are unfamiliar to most scientists, although some may have heard a few distant shots from the so-called science wars."
  12. Thagard, Paul R. "Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience" (1978) In PSA 1978, Volume 1, edited by P.D. Asquith and I. Hacking (East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1978) 223 ff. Thagard writes, at 227, 228: "We can now propose the following principle of demarcation: A theory or discipline which purports to be scientific is pseudoscientific if and only if: it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces many unsolved problems; but the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations."
  13. Gauch, Hugh G., Jr., Scientific Method in Practice (2003) 3-5 ff.
  15. Williams, William F. (editor) (2000) Encyclopedia of Pseudoscience: From Alien Abductions to Zone Therapy.
  16. Cover, J.A., Curd, Martin (Eds, 1998) Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, 1-82.
  17. See, e.g., Gauch, Hugh G., Jr. (2003) Scientific Method in Practice, 124 ff, esp. section on "Full Disclosure".
  18. See, e.g., Gauch (2003), op cit at 211 ff (Probability, "Common Blunders").
  19. For a well-developed explanation of operational definitions, see, e.g.,
  20. Gauch, op cit (2003) 269 ff, "Parsimony and Efficiency"
  21. Cite error: The named reference Lilienfeld20 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  22. Hines, T. (1988) Pseudoscience and the Paranormal: A Critical Examination of the Evidence. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books. A Skeptical Inquirer Reader.
  23. Lakatos, Imre. "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." in Lacatos, Imre, and Musgrave, Alan. (eds.). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970) 91-195.
  24. Popper, Karl (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery.
  25. See, e.g., Gauch (2003), op cit at 178 ff (Deductive Logic, "Fallacies"), and at 211 ff (Probability, "Common Blunders").
  26. See, e.g.,
  27. Macmilllan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol 3, "Fallacies" 174 'ff, esp. section on "Ignoratio elenchi".
  28. Argument from ignorance is also properly termed "argument to ignorance", "argumentum ad ignorantiam". For a definition, see, e.g.,
  29. Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol 3, "Fallacies" 174 'ff, esp. 177-178.
  30. Bunge, Mario (1983) "Demarcating science from pseudoscience," Fundamenta Scientiae 3: 369-388, 381.
  31. Thagard, op cit (1978) at 227, 228.
  32. Lilienfeld S.O. (2004) Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology. Guilford Press (2004) ISBN 1-59385-070-0
  33. Ruscio, J. (2001) Clear thinking with psychology: Separating sense from nonsense, Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth.
  34. Peer review and the acceptance of new scientific ideas (Warning: 469 kB PDF)
  35. *Peer review – process, perspectives and the path ahead
  36. Lilienfeld Scott O. (2004) Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology. Guilford Press (2004) ISBN 1-59385-070-0
  37. For an opposing perspective, see, e.g.: Peer Review as Scholarly Conformity
  38. Ruscio, J. (2001) Clear thinking with psychology: Separating sense from nonsense. Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth.
  39. Gauch, op cit (2003) at 124 ff, "Full Disclosure"
  40. Gauch, op cit (2003) at 124 ff, "Full Disclosure"
  41. Lakatos, Imre. "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." in Lakatos, Imre, and Musgrave, Alan. (eds.). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970) 91-195.
  42. Thagard, Paul R. "Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience" (1978) In PSA 1978, Volume 1, edited by P.D. Asquith and I. Hacking (East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1978) 223 ff. Thagard writes, at 227, 228: "We can now propose the following principle of demarcation: A theory or discipline which purports to be scientific is pseudoscientific if and only if: it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces many unsolved problems; but the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations."
  43. Ruscio, J. (2001) Clear thinking with psychology: Separating sense from nonsense. Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth, p120.
  44. In contrast to sciences, in which erroneous claims tend to be gradually ferreted out by a process akin to natural selection, pseudosciences tend to remain stagnant in the face of contradictory evidence. The work Scientists Confront Velikovsky, 1976, Cornell University, also delves into these features in some detail, as does the work of Thomas Kuhn, e.g., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) which also discusses some of the items on the list of characteristics of pseudoscience.
  45. ^ Devilly, Grant J. (2005) "Power Therapies and possible threats to the science of psychology and psychiatry", in Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, Volume 39, Number 6, June 2005, pp. 437-445(9)
  46. An example of such a Web site is archivefreedom.org which claims that "The list of suppressed scientists even includes Nobel Laureates!"
  47. See, e.g.,
  48. Kuhn, Thomas, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962)
  49. http://www.popularscience.co.uk/features/feat20.htm
  50. Popper, op. cit.
  51. Gauch, Hugh G., Jr., Scientific Method in Practice (2003) 3-7.
  52. Cover, J.A., Curd, Martin (Eds, 1998) Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, 1-82.
  53. Kuhn, Thomas, "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" in Grim, op. cit., p. 125.
  54. Rothbart, Daniel, "Demarcating Genuine Science from Pseudoscience", in Grim, op. cit., pp. 114.
  55. Rothbart, Daniel, op. cit., pp. 114-20.
  56. Laudan, Larry, "The demise of the demarcation problem" in Ruse, Michael, But Is It Science?: The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy (1996) 337-350.
  57. National Science Board. 2006. Science and Engineering Indicators 2006. Two volumes. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation (volume 1, NSB-06-01; NSB 06-01A).
  59. Gerald D. Klee, M.D, "The Resurrection of Wilhelm Reich and Orgone Therapy", The Scientific Review of Mental Health Practice Summer 2005 (Vol. 4, No. 1)." | available online
  60. Atwood K,C. Naturopathy, Pseudoscience, and Medicine: Myths and Fallacies vs Truth. Medscape General Medicine. 2004;6(1):e53, retrieved 4 Sept. 2006. available online
  61. Stephen W. Hawking, Hawking on the Big Bang and Black Holes (1993) World Scientific Publishing Company, Page 1 See also and .
  62. For example: Smolin, Lee, The Trouble with Physics: The Rise of String Theory, the Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next. Houghton Mifflin Company. (2006) ISBN: 0618551050.
  63. ^ Fraknoi, Andrew. "Astronomical Pseudo-Science: A Skeptic's Resource List (Version 3.0; August 2003)". The Astronomical Society of the Pacific. Retrieved 2006-10-24. Cite error: The named reference "Astronomy" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  64. See List of scientific societies rejecting intelligent design
  65. L'Imposture Scientifique en Dix Lecons, "Pseudoscience in Ten Lessons.", By Michel de Pracontal. Editions La Decouverte, Paris, 2001. ISBN 2-7071-3293-4.
  66. "A book for burning?". Nature. 293 (5830): 245–6. 24 Sep 1981. doi:10.1038/293245b0. Attributed to Nature's senior editor, John Maddox (commenting on Rupert Sheldrake's book A New Science of Life (1981)), Maddox wrote: "Sheldrake's argument is an exercise in pseudo-science. — Many readers will be left with the impression that Sheldrake has succeeded in finding a place for magic within scientific discussion — and this, indeed, may have been a part of the objective of writing such a book."

References

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  • Bunge,M. (1989)“The Popular perception of science”, Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, series V, Vol. IV, 269-280
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Literature

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External links

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