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==Relations with other movements== ==Relations with other movements==
Having formed as a reaction against the reformist Deobandi movement, relations between the two groups have often been strained. Ahmad Raza Khan, the founder of Barelvis, went as far as to declare all Deobandis ] and ].<ref>Kenneth W. Jones, ''Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India, Part 3'', vol. 1, pg. 71. ]: ], 1989.</ref> Having formed as a reaction against the reformist Deobandi movement, relations between the two groups have often been strained. Ahmad Raza Khan, the founder of Barelvis, declared some of the early scholars of Deoband as non-muslims by presenting evidence from their own book. ] and ].<ref>Kenneth W. Jones, ''Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India, Part 3'', vol. 1, pg. 71. ]: ], 1989.</ref>


Although conflict has occurred, relations with other Muslim movements in South Asia have not always been hostile. In mid-2012, leaders of both the Barelvi and Ahl al-Hadith movements in the Kashmir Valley denied that there was any animosity between the two sects in the region. Saying that Kashmiris can ill afford sectarian strife after two decades of bloodbath.<ref>Sheikh Qayoom, . Thaindian, courtesy of ]: Saturday, 28 April 2012.</ref> Although conflict has occurred, relations with other Muslim movements in South Asia have not always been hostile. In mid-2012, leaders of both the Barelvi and Ahl al-Hadith movements in the Kashmir Valley denied that there was any animosity between the two sects in the region. Saying that Kashmiris can ill afford sectarian strife after two decades of bloodbath.<ref>Sheikh Qayoom, . Thaindian, courtesy of ]: Saturday, 28 April 2012.</ref>
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===Sectarian violence=== ===Sectarian violence===
Analysts and journalists have produced conflicting opinions about the underlying nature of the Barelvi movement, with some describing the group as moderate and peaceful,<ref>See: Analysts and journalists have produced conflicting opinions about the underlying nature of the Barelvi movement, with most describing the group as moderate and peaceful,<ref>See:
*. Viewpoint Online. *. Viewpoint Online.
*Manjari Mishra, . ], 6 January 2010. *Manjari Mishra, . ], 6 January 2010.
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*Zeeshan Haider, . ], 13 May 2009.</ref> while others describe it as being affected by intolerance and radicalism in ways similar to other Islamic movements in the region.<ref name=saag/><ref name=post/><ref>Syed Hamad Ali, ], Wednesday 12 October 2011.</ref><ref name=jam>], , 24 February 2011. ]: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 8. Accessed 11 March 2013.</ref><ref name=time>Omar Waraich, . ], Thursday, 7 Apr. 2011.</ref><ref name=per>Pervez Hoodbhoy, . ], 4 January 2012.</ref> *Zeeshan Haider, . ], 13 May 2009.</ref> while others describe it as being affected by intolerance and radicalism in ways similar to other Islamic movements in the region.<ref name=saag/><ref name=post/><ref>Syed Hamad Ali, ], Wednesday 12 October 2011.</ref><ref name=jam>], , 24 February 2011. ]: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 8. Accessed 11 March 2013.</ref><ref name=time>Omar Waraich, . ], Thursday, 7 Apr. 2011.</ref><ref name=per>Pervez Hoodbhoy, . ], 4 January 2012.</ref>


In the 1990s and 2000s, sporadic violence resulted from disputes between the Barelvi and Deobandi movements over control of Pakistani mosques,<ref>Rana Tanveer, . The Express Tribune, 20 September 2011.</ref> with the conflict coming to a head in May 2001 when sectarian riots broke out after the assassination of ] leader Saleem Qadri.<ref name=hindu>{{cite web|url=http://www.hindu.com/2006/04/18/stories/2006041805780800.htm | location=Chennai, India | work=The Hindu | title=Serious threat to Pakistan's civil society | date=18 April 2006}}</ref> In April 2006 in ], a ] in celebration of Muhammad's birthday killed at least 57 people, including several central leaders of the Sunni Tehreek.<ref>, ], 11 April 2006</ref><ref> {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091231050408/http://www.jang.com.pk/important_events/karachi_blast_11apr06/english%2013%20april.htm |date=31 December 2009 }}, ] Online</ref> In April 2007, Sunni Tehreek activists attempted forcibly to gain control of a mosque in Karachi, opening fire on the mosque and those inside, killing one person and injuring three others.<ref> ], 11 April 2007</ref> On 27 February 2010, militants believed to be affiliated with the Taliban and ] attacked Barelvis celebrating mawlid in ] and ], again sparking tensions among the rival sects.<ref>, ] via ], 28 February 2010</ref> In the 1990s and 2000s, sporadic violence resulted from disputes between the Barelvi and Deobandi movements over control of Pakistani mosques,<ref>Rana Tanveer, . The Express Tribune, 20 September 2011.</ref> with the conflict coming to a head in May 2001 when sectarian riots broke out after the assassination of ] leader Saleem Qadri.<ref name=hindu>{{cite web|url=http://www.hindu.com/2006/04/18/stories/2006041805780800.htm | location=Chennai, India | work=The Hindu | title=Serious threat to Pakistan's civil society | date=18 April 2006}}</ref> In April 2006 in ], a ] in celebration of Muhammad's birthday killed at least 57 people, including several central leaders of the Sunni Tehreek.<ref>, ], 11 April 2006</ref><ref> {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091231050408/http://www.jang.com.pk/important_events/karachi_blast_11apr06/english%2013%20april.htm |date=31 December 2009 }}, ] Online</ref> ], 11 April 2007</ref> On 27 February 2010, militants believed to be affiliated with the Taliban and ] attacked Barelvis celebrating mawlid in ] and ], again sparking tensions among the rival sects.<ref>, ] via ], 28 February 2010</ref>


=== Stand on Blasphemy Law === === Stand on Blasphemy Law ===
On 4 January 2011, the ], ], was assassinated by a member of the Barelvi group ], ], due to Taseer's opposition to the ].<ref name=time/><ref>{{cite news|title=Assassin linked with Dawat-i-Islami|url=http://www.dawn.com/2011/01/05/assassin-linked-with-dawat-i-islami.html|newspaper=]|date=4 January 2011}}</ref> Over five hundred scholars of the Barelvi movement voiced support for the crime and urged a boycott of Taseer's funeral.<ref name=saag/><ref name=post/><ref name=jam/><ref name=per/><ref>See also: On 4 January 2011, the ], ], was assassinated by ], due to Taseer's opposition to the ]. Over five hundred scholars of the Barelvi movement voiced support for the crime and urged a boycott of Taseer's funeral.<ref name=saag/><ref name=post/><ref name=jam/><ref name=per/><ref>See also:
*Carlotta Gall, . The New York Times, 5 January 2011. *Carlotta Gall, . The New York Times, 5 January 2011.
*Ayesha Nasir, ''Time'' Online, Saturday, 8 Jan. 2011. *Ayesha Nasir, ''Time'' Online, Saturday, 8 Jan. 2011.
*: Religious bloc condones murder. The Express Tribune.</ref> According to ], ] rewarded the assassin's family<ref>. ''The Nation'', 8 October 2011.</ref><ref>PPI, . ''Dawn'', 1 October 2011.</ref> and threatened Taseer's family,<ref name=time/><ref>, The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 January 2011.</ref> while another Barelvi group abducted Taseer's son, ].<ref>Rana Tanveer, . The Express Tribute, 4 September 2011.</ref> Supporters attempted to prevent police from bringing the perpetrator to an anti-terrorism court, blocking the way and cheering on the assassin.<ref name="Demonstrators Prevent">{{cite news| url= http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/south/Disruptions-Mark-Remand-of-Alleged-Pakistani-Assassin-113016474.html| title= Demonstrators Prevent Court Appearance of Alleged Pakistani Assassin| publisher= ]| date= 6 January 2011}}</ref> In 2014 a Sunni ] was built in ] named after Mumtaz Qadri, whose worshippers are Barelvis; as of 2014, the mosque was so popular that it started raising funds to double its capacity;<ref>{{cite web|author1=Jon Boone |title=Pakistan mosque built to honour politician's killer to double in size |url= https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/30/pakistan-mosque-killer-mumtaz-qadri-salaman-taseer |website=] |accessdate=29 February 2016 |date=30 April 2014}}</ref> however, during the same period, a number of Barelvi scholars condemned the assassination.<ref> {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130109120559/http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/the-assertion-of-barelvi-extremism |date=9 January 2013 }}. Current Trends.</ref><ref>. The Nation, 14 October 2011.</ref> *: Religious bloc condones murder. The Express Tribune.</ref> According to ], ] rewarded the assassin's family<ref>. ''The Nation'', 8 October 2011.</ref><ref>PPI, . ''Dawn'', 1 October 2011.</ref> and threatened Taseer's family,<ref name=time/><ref>, The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 January 2011.</ref> His Son was abducted by Taliban.<ref>Syed Ali Shah, . The Express Tribute, 4 September 2011.</ref> Supporters attempted to prevent police from bringing the perpetrator to an anti-terrorism court, blocking the way and cheering on the assassin.<ref name="Demonstrators Prevent">{{cite news| url= http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/south/Disruptions-Mark-Remand-of-Alleged-Pakistani-Assassin-113016474.html| title= Demonstrators Prevent Court Appearance of Alleged Pakistani Assassin| publisher= ]| date= 6 January 2011}}</ref> In 2014 a Sunni ] was built in ] named after Mumtaz Qadri, whose worshippers are Barelvis; as of 2014, the mosque was so popular that it started raising funds to double its capacity;<ref>{{cite web|author1=Jon Boone |title=Pakistan mosque built to honour politician's killer to double in size |url= https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/30/pakistan-mosque-killer-mumtaz-qadri-salaman-taseer |website=] |accessdate=29 February 2016 |date=30 April 2014}}</ref> however, during the same period, a number of Barelvi scholars condemned the assassination.<ref> {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130109120559/http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/the-assertion-of-barelvi-extremism |date=9 January 2013 }}. Current Trends.</ref><ref>. The Nation, 14 October 2011.</ref>


==Criticism== ==Criticism==

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Barelvi (Template:Lang-ur, Barēlwī, Hindustani pronunciation: [bəreːlʋi]) is a movement following the Sunni Hanafi school of jurisprudence, originating in Bareilly with over 200 million followers in South Asia. The name derives from the north Indian town of Bareilly, the hometown of its founder and main leader Ahmed Raza Khan (1856–1921). Although Barelvi is the commonly used term in the media and academia, the followers of the movement often prefer to be known by the title of Ahle Sunnat wa Jama'at, (Template:Lang-ur) or as Sunnis, a reference to their perception as forming an international majority movement.

The movement emphasizes personal devotion to the Islamic prophet Muhammad and a synthesis of Sharia with Sufi practices such as veneration of saints. Because of this, they are often called Sufi, although they have little in common with the Sufism of classical Islamic mystics. The movement later identified as Barelvis to differentiate itself from the Deobandi movement, which was influenced by the Wahhabi movement in Arabia.

Etymology

The Barelvi movement is named after the town of Bareilly, India, from where this movement was originated.

To its followers, the Barelvi movement is the Ahle Sunnat wal Jama'at, or "People of the traditions and the community," and they refer to themselves as Sunnis. This terminology is used to lay exclusive claim to be the only legitimate form of Sunni Islam in South Asia, in opposition to the Deobandi, Ahl-i Hadith, Salafis and Darul Uloom Nadwatul Ulama followers.

History

The Barelvi movement is the actual Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jammat but became known as Barelvi due to their respective leader Ahmad Raza Khan who established Islamic schools in 1904 with the Manzar-e-Islam. The Barelvi movement formed as a defense of the traditional mystic practices of South Asia, which it sought to prove and support.

Although the Darul Uloom Nadwatul Ulama was founded in 1893 to reconcile South Asia's Muslim sectarian differences, the Barelvis eventually withdrew their support from the council and criticized its efforts due to their heretical and radical beliefs counter to the Islamic values.

In contrast with the Deobandi movement, the Barelvis showed unequivocal support for the Movement for Pakistan. In the aftermath of the 1948 Partition, they formed an association to represent the movement in Pakistan, called Jamiyyat-u Ulam-i Pakistan (JUP). Like ulema of the Deobandi and Ahl-i Hadith movements, Barelvi ulema have advocated application of sharia law across the country.

As a reaction to the anti-Islam film Innocence of Muslims, a conglomerate of forty Barelvi parties called for a boycott of Western goods, while at the same time condemning violence which had taken place in protest against the film.

Presence

India Today estimates that the vast majority of Muslims in India adhere to the Barelvi movement, and The Heritage Foundation, Time and The Washington Post give similar assessments for the vast majority of Muslims in Pakistan. Political scientist Rohan Bedi estimates that 60% of Pakistani Muslims are Barelvis.

The majority of Pakistani and Kashmir origin people in the United Kingdom are descended from Barelvi-majority areas. The Barelvi movement in Pakistan has received funding from Barelvis in the UK, in part as a reaction to rival movements in Pakistan also receiving funding from abroad. According to an editorial in the English-language Pakistani newspaper The Daily Times, many of these mosques have been however usurped by Saudi-funded radical organizations.

Beliefs and practices

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Like other Sunni Muslims, Barelvis base their beliefs on the Quran and Sunnah and believe in monotheism and the prophethood of Muhammad. Although Barelvis may follow any one of the Ashari and Maturidi schools of Islamic theology and one of the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali madhhabs of fiqh in addition to optionally choosing from one of the Sunni Sufi orders like the Qadiri, Chishti or the Suhrawardi tariqas, most Barelvis in South Asia follow the Maturidi school of Islamic theology and the Hanafi madhhab of fiqh.

Beliefs regarding Muhammad

Barelvis have several beliefs regarding Muhammad's nature that distinguish them from Deobandi, Salafi and Shi'i groups in South Asia:

  • He is a human being but created from light.
  • He is present in many places at the same time.
  • He is still witnessing all that goes on in the world.
  • He has knowledge of that which is unknown, including the future.

Practices

  • Public celebration of Muhammad's birthday.
  • Veneration of dead and living saints. This consists of the intervention of an ascending, linked and unbroken chain of holy personages claimed to reach ultimately to Muhammad, who Barelvis believe intercede on their behalf with God.
  • Visiting the tombs of Muhammad, his companions and of pious Muslims, an act the Barelvis claim is supported by the Quran, Sunnah and acts of the companions, but which some opponents call "shrine-worshipping" and Grave worshiping and consider to be un-Islamic.
  • Use of devotional music (Sfeir 2007, p. 339) harv error: no target: CITEREFSfeir2007 (help) and dhikr.
  • Leaving the beard to grow for men; the movement views a man who trims his beard to less than a fist-length as a sinner, and shaving the beard is considered abominable.

Mosques

Relations with other movements

Having formed as a reaction against the reformist Deobandi movement, relations between the two groups have often been strained. Ahmad Raza Khan, the founder of Barelvis, declared some of the early scholars of Deoband as non-muslims by presenting evidence from their own book. infidels and apostates.

Although conflict has occurred, relations with other Muslim movements in South Asia have not always been hostile. In mid-2012, leaders of both the Barelvi and Ahl al-Hadith movements in the Kashmir Valley denied that there was any animosity between the two sects in the region. Saying that Kashmiris can ill afford sectarian strife after two decades of bloodbath.

According to New Delhi analyst Sushant Sareen, in contrast to the substantial Saudi funds received by the Pakistani Deobandi and Ahle Hadith movements, the country's Barelvi movement has received almost no foreign funding. He says this is one reason no Barelvi jihadist group has grown large enough to get involved in Pakistan's Islamist and sectarian politics.

Conflicts with the Deobandi

The conflict with the Deobandi movement has been particularly heated and uncivil. While both the Barelvi and Deobandi movements tend to prefer the Hanafi madhhab and accept Sufism, their fundamental beliefs and way in practicing Sufism has kept them at odds. Commenting on this, historian Usha Sanyal, in her research entitled Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Raza Khan Barelwi and His Movement, 1870–1920, stated:

Not only did Ahmad Raza Khan obtain confirmatory signatures from other scholars in the South Asia, he managed to get agreement from a number of prominent ulama in Mecca. That occurred in the first years of the twentieth century—long before the Al-Saud and their Wahhabi allies got control of the Haramayn. The feat was, nevertheless, stunning. The antipathy of the Deobandis toward the Ahl-i Sunnah on the emotional level becomes more comprehensible when Ahmad Riza's fatwa receives a full explication.

Historically, relations between the Barelvi movement and the British administration of India have been better than those of other Islamic movements. R. Upadhyay and Rajesh T. Krishnamachari of the India-based South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG) have denied that a simple comparison exists between Barelvism and Deobandism on any scale of tolerance or moderation. According to the same SAAG analysis, the "Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry is also known to be rooted to their ethnic rivalry."

Conflicts with the Taliban

The Barelvi movement has taken a stance against the various Taliban movements in South Asia, organising rallies and protests in India and Pakistan, condemning what they perceive as unjustified sectarian violence. The Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC), an amalgamation of eight Sunni organizations, launched the Save Pakistan Movement to stem the process of Talibanisation. Terming the Taliban a product of global anti-Islam conspiracies, the leaders of SIC charged the Taliban with playing into the hands of the United States to divide Muslims and bring a bad name to Islam.

Supporting this movement, the Pakistan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, said: "The Sunni Tehreek has decided to activate itself against Talibanisation in the country. A national consensus against terrorism is emerging across the country."

In 2009 another prominent Islamic scholar and mufti, or jurisconsult, of the movement, the late Sarfraz Ahmed Naeemi, issued a fatwa denouncing suicide bombings, as well as criticizing Taliban leader Sufi Muhammad by saying he "should wear bangles if he is hiding like a woman". Naeemi added: "Those who commit suicide attacks for attaining paradise will go to hell, as they kill many innocent people". Naeemi himself was killed by a suicide bomber.

Sectarian violence

Analysts and journalists have produced conflicting opinions about the underlying nature of the Barelvi movement, with most describing the group as moderate and peaceful, while others describe it as being affected by intolerance and radicalism in ways similar to other Islamic movements in the region.

In the 1990s and 2000s, sporadic violence resulted from disputes between the Barelvi and Deobandi movements over control of Pakistani mosques, with the conflict coming to a head in May 2001 when sectarian riots broke out after the assassination of Sunni Tehreek leader Saleem Qadri. In April 2006 in Karachi, a bomb attack on a Barelvi gathering in celebration of Muhammad's birthday killed at least 57 people, including several central leaders of the Sunni Tehreek. Daily Times (Pakistan), 11 April 2007</ref> On 27 February 2010, militants believed to be affiliated with the Taliban and Sipah-e-Sahaba attacked Barelvis celebrating mawlid in Faisalabad and Dera Ismail Khan, again sparking tensions among the rival sects.

Stand on Blasphemy Law

On 4 January 2011, the governor of Punjab, Salmaan Taseer, was assassinated by Mumtaz Qadri, due to Taseer's opposition to the blasphemy law. Over five hundred scholars of the Barelvi movement voiced support for the crime and urged a boycott of Taseer's funeral. According to Time, Sunni Tehreek rewarded the assassin's family and threatened Taseer's family, His Son was abducted by Taliban. Supporters attempted to prevent police from bringing the perpetrator to an anti-terrorism court, blocking the way and cheering on the assassin. In 2014 a Sunni mosque was built in Islamabad named after Mumtaz Qadri, whose worshippers are Barelvis; as of 2014, the mosque was so popular that it started raising funds to double its capacity; however, during the same period, a number of Barelvi scholars condemned the assassination.

Criticism

Some commentators see the Barelvi movement as a radical movement which does not accept the views of the Deoband Ulama, the Ahl al-Hadith and some others.

Notable scholars

Early scholars

Present scholars

Notable organizations

In Pakistan, prominent Sunni Barelvi religious and political organizations include:

In India:

Main institutions

India

Pakistan

United Kingdom

See also

Notes

  1. "Barelvi - Oxford Reference". oxfordreference.com. Retrieved 24 September 2014.
  2. Illustrated Dictionary of the Muslim World, pg. 113. Marshall Cavendish, 2011. ISBN 9780761479291
  3. Globalisation, Religion & Development, pg. 53. Eds. Farhang Morady and İsmail Şiriner. London: International Journal of Politics and Economics, 2011.
  4. Elizabeth Sirriyeh, Sufis and Anti-Sufis: The Defense, Rethinking and Rejection of Sufism in the Modern World, pg. 49. London: Routledge, 1999. ISBN 0-7007-1058-2.
  5. Rowena Robinson, Tremors of Violence: Muslim Survivors of Ethnic Strife in Western India, pg. 191. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2005. ISBN 0761934081
  6. Usha Sanyal. Generational Changes in the Leadership of the Ahl-e Sunnat Movement in North India during the Twentieth Century. Modern Asian Studies (1998), Cambridge University Press.
  7. ^ Understanding Islam: The First Ten Steps - C. T. R. Hewer - Google Books. Books.google.com.my. Retrieved 24 September 2012.
  8. John L. Esposito, ed. (2014). "Ahl al-Sunnah wa'l-Jamaah". The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Unknown parameter |subscription= ignored (|url-access= suggested) (help)
  9. ^ Netton, Ian (19 December 2013). Encyclopedia of islam. Routledge. p. 88. Retrieved 11 April 2015.
  10. ^ Roy, Oliver; Sfeir, Antoine (2007). The Columbia World Dictionary of Islamism. {{cite book}}: |work= ignored (help), page 92: "...as distinct from the reformist construction of Deoband."
  11. ^ Riaz, Ali (2008). Faithful Education: Madrassahs in South Asia. Rutgers University Press. ISBN 978-0-8135-4345-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help), page 123: "...were advanced by Imam Ahmad Reza Khan of Bareilly in 1906 as the original form of Islam and as the alternative to the austere path of the Deobandis."
  12. Khaled Ahmed, The Barelvi pushback. The Indian Express, 28 January 2017. Accessed 14 August 2017.
  13. Bad Moon Rising. The Economist, 14 April 2016. Accessed 14 August 2017.
  14. Geaves 2006: 148
  15. Roshen Dalal, The Religions of India: A Concise Guide to Nine Major Faiths, pg. 51. Revised edition. City of Westminster: Penguin Books, 2010. ISBN 9780143415176
  16. Barbara D. Metcalf, Islam in South Asia in Practice, pg. 342. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
  17. Gregory C. Doxlowski. Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Raza Khan Barelwi and His Movement, 1870–1920. Journal of the American Oriental Society, Oct–Dec 1999.
  18. Barbara Daly Metcalf, Islamic revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900, pg. 312. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. ISBN 9780195660494
  19. Riaz 2008, p. 91. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFRiaz2008 (help)
  20. Riaz 2008, p. 76. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFRiaz2008 (help)
  21. Jaffrelot, Christophe, A History of Pakistan and Its Origins, pp. 224–225
  22. Anti-Islam movie: Barelvi parties call for Western boycott. The Express Tribune, 5 October 2012.
  23. Sandeep Unnithan and Uday Mahurkar (31 July 2008). "The radical sweep". India Today. Archived from the original on 12 January 2009. Retrieved 30 September 2009. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |dead-url= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  24. Curtis, Lisa; Mullick, Haider (4 May 2009). "Reviving Pakistan's Pluralist Traditions to Fight Extremism". The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved 31 July 2011.
  25. "Pakistan plays Sufi card against jihadis | World War 4 Report". Ww4report.com. Retrieved 30 September 2009.
  26. Rania Abouzeid, Taliban Targets, Pakistan's Sufi Muslims Fight Back. Time, Wednesday, 10 Nov. 2010.
  27. ^ Karin Brulliard, In Pakistan, even anti-violence Islamic sect lauds assassination of liberal governor. The Washington Post, Saturday, 29 January 2011; 9:55 PM.
  28. Bedi, Rohan (April 2006), Have Pakistanis Forgotten Their Sufi Traditions?"] (PDF), Singapore: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at Nanyang Technological University, archived from the original (PDF) on 2 November 2013 {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  29. Karamat Bhatty, Religious groups find lucrative sources abroad. The Express Tribune, 7 September 2011.
  30. Editorial: Britain, Al Qaeda and Pakistan. Thursday, 26 March 2009. Accessed Sunday, 19 May 2013.
  31. http://www.geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/deobandi-islam-vs-barelvi-islam-in-south-asia
  32. http://themuslim500.com/downloads/The%20Muslim%20500%20-%202018%20Edition%20-%20Free%20eBook.pdf
  33. Ahmed Raza. "Noor o Bashar ::Islamic Books, Books Library". Faizaneraza.org. Retrieved 24 September 2012.
  34. ^ N. C. Asthana & A.Nirmal. Urban Terrorism : Myths And Realities. Publisher Pointer Publishers, 2009 ISBN 81-7132-598-X, 9788171325986. pg. 67
  35. Clinton Bennett. Muslims and modernity: an introduction to the issues and debates. Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005 ISBN 0-8264-5481-X, 9780826454812. pg. 189
  36. Sirriyeh 1999: 49
  37. Sirriyeh 2004: 111
  38. Martin Parsons (1 January 2006). Unveiling God: Contextualizing Christology for Islamic Culture. William Carey Library. pp. 149–. ISBN 978-0-87808-454-8. Retrieved 20 April 2011.
  39. Abdulkader, Tayob. Muslim Schools and Education. Waxxman Verlag. p. 76. Retrieved 11 April 2015.
  40. Urban Terrorism: Myths and Realities - N. C. Asthana & A.Nirmal - Google Books. Books.google.com.my. Retrieved 24 September 2012.
  41. Urban Terrorism: Myths and Realities - N. C. Asthana & A.Nirmal - Google Books. Books.google.com.my. Retrieved 24 September 2012.
  42. "outlookindia.com". M.outlookindia.com. Archived from the original on 31 January 2013. Retrieved 24 September 2012. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  43. Curriculum in Today's World: Configuring Knowledge, Identities, Work and ... - Lyn Yates, Madeleine Grumet - Google Books. Books.google.com.my. 25 February 2011. Retrieved 24 September 2012.
  44. Tremors of Violence: Muslim Survivors of Ethnic Strife in Western India - Rowena Robinson - Google Books. Books.google.com.my. Retrieved 24 September 2012.
  45. Urban Terrorism: Myths and Realities - N. C. Asthana & A.Nirmal - Google Books. Books.google.com.my. Retrieved 24 September 2012.
  46. Indian Defence Review: April - June 2007 - Bharat Verma - Google Books. Books.google.com.my. 19 February 2008. Retrieved 24 September 2012.
  47. Arun Shourie, The World of Fatwas or the Sharia in Action, pg. 135. ASA Publications, 1995. ISBN 9788190019958
  48. Kenneth W. Jones, Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India, Part 3, vol. 1, pg. 71. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
  49. Sheikh Qayoom, Kashmir’s Barelvi, Ahle Hadith leaders deny sectarian tension. Thaindian, courtesy of Indo-Asian News Service: Saturday, 28 April 2012.
  50. Sushant Sareen, The Jihad Factory: Pakistan's Islamic Revolution in the Making, pg. 282. New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 2005.
  51. Ashok K. Behuria, Sects Within Sect: The Case of Deobandi–Barelvi Encounter in Pakistan. Strategic Analysis, vol. 32, no. 1. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, January 2008.
  52. Riaz 2008. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFRiaz2008 (help)
  53. Haramayn refers to the Masjid al-Haram ("Sacred Mosque") in Mecca and the Al-Masjid al-Nabawi ("Mosque of the Prophet") in Medina. Dictionary of Islamic Architecture
  54. Gregory C. Doxlowski. Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi and His Movement, 1870-1920. The Journal of the American Oriental Society, Oct–Dec, 1999
  55. ^ R. Upadhyay, Barelvis and Deobandhis: "Birds of the Same Feather".
  56. Tembarai Krishnamachari, Rajesh. "Myths blown away by Taseer killing", South Asia Analysis Group, New Delhi, 12 January 2011.
  57. Indian Muslims protest against Talibani terrorism. TwoCircles.net 17 June 2009
  58. Pakistan’s Sunnis unite against Talibanisation. Thaindian News. 9 May 2009
  59. Clashing interpretations of Islam. Daily Times (Pakistan), 5 May 2009
  60. Bombers target two Pakistani cities Al Jazeera
  61. Anti-Taliban views cost Mufti Naeemi his life – Daily Times
  62. See:
  63. Syed Hamad Ali, Why are Pakistan's 'moderate' clerics defending Salman Taseer's murderer? The Guardian, Wednesday 12 October 2011.
  64. ^ The Jamestown Foundation, Sufi Militants Struggle with Deobandi Jihadists in Pakistan, 24 February 2011. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 8. Accessed 11 March 2013.
  65. ^ Omar Waraich, Why Pakistan's Taliban Target the Muslim Majority. Time, Thursday, 7 Apr. 2011.
  66. ^ Pervez Hoodbhoy, A long, sad year after Salman Taseer's killing. The Hindu, 4 January 2012.
  67. Rana Tanveer, Rites and wrongs: Mosque sealed after Barelvi-Deobandi clash. The Express Tribune, 20 September 2011.
  68. "Serious threat to Pakistan's civil society". The Hindu. Chennai, India. 18 April 2006.
  69. Bomb carnage at Karachi prayers, BBC Online, 11 April 2006
  70. Special Coverage of Nishtar Park bombing Archived 31 December 2009 at the Wayback Machine, Jang Group Online
  71. Sectarian clashes kill seven in Pakistan, Agence France-Presse via Sydney Morning Herald, 28 February 2010
  72. See also:
  73. ST offers Rs200m blood money for Qadri's release. The Nation, 8 October 2011.
  74. PPI, Sunni Tehreek rejects capital punishment to Mumtaz Qadri. Dawn, 1 October 2011.
  75. Taseer's daughter warned to back off, The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 January 2011.
  76. Syed Ali Shah, . The Express Tribute, 4 September 2011.
  77. "Demonstrators Prevent Court Appearance of Alleged Pakistani Assassin". Voice of America. 6 January 2011.
  78. Jon Boone (30 April 2014). "Pakistan mosque built to honour politician's killer to double in size". The Guardian. Retrieved 29 February 2016.
  79. The Assertion of Barelvi Extremism Archived 9 January 2013 at the Wayback Machine. Current Trends.
  80. Taseer no blasphmer, claim Barelvi ulema. The Nation, 14 October 2011.
  81. Islam in Britain: Past, Present and the Future by Mohammad Shahid Raza
  82. http://tanzeemulirshad.com/personality-detail.php?id=723
  83. https://jamestown.org/program/potential-new-strand-islamist-extremism-pakistan/
  84. https://www.dawateislami.net/
  85. https://www.dawateislami.net/
  86. http://idaratulmustafa.com/?page=home
  87. http://www.jamiafaridia.org.pk/
  88. https://www.minhaj.org/
  89. jamiafaridia.org.pk

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