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Throughout World War II, Poland was a member of the Allied coalition that fought Nazi Germany. During the German occupation of Poland, some Polish citizens of diverse ethnicities collaborated with the Germans. Estimates of the number of collaborators vary. The main collaborators were members of Poland's German minority. During and after the war, the Polish State and the Resistance movement executed collaborators.

Due to differences in Nazi Germany's aims in Western, Central, and Eastern Europe, and due to Germany's historical Drang nach Osten ("Drive to the East") and Lebensraum ("living space") policies, collaboration in Poland was much less widespread and institutionalized than in Western Europe. Compared to the situations in other German-occupied countries, collaboration in Poland was marginal.

Background

Following the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, Hitler sought to establish Poland as a client state, proposing a multilateral territorial exchange and an extension of the German–Polish Non-Aggression Pact. The Polish government, fearing subjugation to Nazi Germany, instead chose to form an alliance with Britain (and later with France). In response, Germany withdrew from the non-aggression pact and, shortly before invading Poland, signed the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact with Soviet Union, safeguarding Germany against Soviet retaliation if it invaded Poland, and prospectively dividing Poland between the two totalitarian powers.

On 1 September 1939 Germany invaded Poland. The German army overran Polish defenses while inflicting heavy civilian losses, and by 13 September had conquered most of western Poland. On 17 September the Soviet Union invaded the country from the east, conquering most of eastern Poland, along with the Baltic states and parts of Finland. Some 140,000 Polish soldiers and airmen escaped to Romania and Hungary, and later many soon joining the Polish Armed Forces in France. Poland's government crossed over into Romania, later forming a government-in-exile in France and then in London, following the French capitulation. Poland as a polity never surrendered to the Germans.

Nazi authorities annexed the westernmost parts of Poland and the former Free City of Danzig, incorporating it directly to Nazi Germany, and placed the remaining German-occupied territory under the administration of the newly formed General Government. The Soviet Union annexed the rest of Poland, incorporating its territories into the Belorussian and Ukrainian republics. Germany’s primary aim in Eastern Europe was the expansion of the German Lebensraum which necessitated according to Nazi views the elimination or deportation of all non-Germanic ethnicities, including Poles; the areas controlled by the General Government were to become "free" of Poles within 15–20 years. This resulted in harsh policies which targeted the Polish population, in addition to the explicit goal of exterminating the Jewish people, which was carried out by Nazi Germany in the occupied Polish territories.

Individual collaboration

Estimates of the number of Polish collaborators vary due to varying interpretations of what constitutes collaboration. Low estimates place the number of collaborators at about 17,000, relying on the number of death sentences for treason issued by Special Courts of the Polish Underground State; Leszek Gondek describes this form of collaboration as "marginal". According to Gondek, the courts heard at least 5,000 collaboration cases and sentenced 3,500 (according to historian Czesław Madajczyk, over 10,000) people to death for collaboration. Higher estimates include "labor service" (Baudienst) workers, low-ranking Polish functionaries, the Polish Blue Police, Polish citizens who declared themselves ethnically-German Volksdeutsche (usually under duress, in those areas of prewar Poland that were now incorporated into Germany), and Poland's peasants—a socioeconomic class that benefitted from the wartime redistribution of wealth and often followed German directives. Poland’s German minority in 1939 totaled some 750,000 and was the principal group of Polish-citizen collaborators.

Historian Czesław Madajczyk estimates that 5% of the population in the General Government actively collaborated, as compared with 25% who actively resisted the occupation as members of resistance groups. Historian John Connelly writes that "only a relatively small percentage of the Polish population engaged in activities that may be described as collaboration, when seen against the backdrop of European and world history." Postwar statistics of the Israeli War Crimes Commission gave the number of Polish collaborators at around 7,000.

The Baudienst ("labor service") was instituted in May 1940 as a form of national service that combined hard labor with Nazi indoctrination. It was a prerequisite for higher education in some places, and was rewarded by pocket money. Starting in April 1942 evasion of Baudienst service was punishable by death, and by 1944 the Baudienst had grown to approximately 45,000 members. Baudienst workers were sometimes deployed in support roles in aktions - operations for deportation or murder of Jews - including for blockading Jewish quarters and searching Jewish homes. For such operations they were rewarded with copious amounts of vodka and cigarettes.

Ethnographic groups

The Germans also singled out, as potential collaborators, two ethnographic groups in Poland which had some limited separatist interests. The scheme was directed at the Kashubians in the north and the Gorals in the south. The German attempt to reach out to the Kashubians proved a "complete failure", but in the south the Germans met with limited success, and Katarzyna Szurmiak has called the resulting Goralenvolk movement "the most extensive case of collaboration in Poland during the Second World War." Still, Szurmiak writes, "when talking about numbers, the attempt to create Goralenvolk was a failure... a mere 18 percent of the population took up Goralian IDs... Goralian schools consistently boycotted, and... attempts to create Goralian police or a Goralian Waffen-SS Legion... failed miserably."

Political collaboration

Unlike the situation in most German-occupied European countries where the Germans successfully installed collaborationist governments, in occupied Poland there was no puppet government. The Germans had initially considered the creation of a collaborationist Polish cabinet to administer, as a protectorate, the occupied Polish territories that had not been annexed outright into the Third Reich. At the beginning of the war, German officials contacted several Polish leaders with proposals for collaboration, but the Poles refused the offers. A prominent peasant-party leader and former Prime Minister of Poland, Wincenty Witos, rejected several German offers to lead a puppet government, as did Janusz Radziwiłł and Stanisław Estreicher. The pro-German right-wing politician, Andrzej Świetlicki, formed the National Revolutionary Camp and approached the Germans with a collaboration offer but was ignored. Władysław Studnicki, an anti-Soviet publicist, and Leon Kozłowski, a prominent scholar and former Prime Minister, each favored Polish-German cooperation against the Soviet Union, but was rejected by the Germans. Nazi racial policies and German plans for the conquered Polish territories, on one hand, and Polish anti-German attitudes on the other, militated against any Polish-German political collaboration. No further consideration was given to forming a Polish collaborative arrangement after April 1940, when Hitler banned negotiations concerning any degree of Polish autonomy. German plans envisioned the eventual complete disappearance of the Polish nation, which was to be replaced by German settlers.

During the 1940 German invasion of France, the French government suggested that Polish politicians in France negotiate an accommodation with Germany; and in Paris the prominent journalist Stanislaw Mackiewicz tried to get Polish President Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz to negotiate with the Germans, as the French defenses were collapsing and German victory seemed inevitable. Three days later the Polish Government and Polish National Council rejected discussing capitulation and declared they would fight on until full victory over Nazi Germany. A group of eight low-ranking Polish politicians and officers broke with the Polish Government and in Lisbon, Portugal, addressed a memorandum to Germany, asking for discussions about restoring a Polish state under German occupation, which was rejected by the Germans. According to Czeslaw Madajczyk, in view of the low profile of the Poles involved and of Berlin's rejection of the memorandum, no political collaboration can be said to have taken place. For his efforts, Mackiewicz was sentenced to death by the Polish resistance (but survived to return to Poland after the war).

Security forces

The main security forces in German-occupied Poland were some 550,000 soldiers and 80,000 SS and police officials sent from Germany. In October 1939 the German authorities ordered mobilization of the prewar Polish police to serve under the German Ordnungspolizei, thus creating the auxiliary "Blue Police" that supplemented the principal German forces. The Polish policemen were to report for duty by 10 November 1939 or face death. At its peak in May 1944, the Blue Police numbered some 17,000 men. Their primary task was to act as a regular police force dealing with criminal activities, but the Germans also used them in combating smuggling and resistance, rounding up random civilians (łapanka) for forced labor or for execution in reprisal for Polish resistance activities (e.g., the Polish underground's execution of Polish traitors or egregiously brutal Germans), patrolling for Jewish ghetto escapees, and in support of military operations against the Polish resistance.

The German General Government tried to form additional Polish auxiliary police units—Schutzmannschaft Battalion 202 in 1942, and Schutzmannschaft Battalion 107 in 1943. Very few men volunteered, and the Germans were compelled to forcibly conscript men to fill out the ranks. Subsequently most of the men deserted, and the two units were disbanded. Schutzmannschaft Battalion 107 mutinied against its German officers, disarmed them, and joined the Home Army resistance.

In 1944, in the General Government, Germany tried to recruit 12,000 Polish volunteers to "join the fight against Bolshevism". The campaign failed; only 699 men were recruited, 209 of whom either deserted or were disqualified for health reasons.

Poles in the Wehrmacht

Following the German invasion of Poland in 1939, many former citizens of the Second Polish Republic from across the Polish territories annexed by Nazi Germany were forcibly conscripted into the Wehrmacht in Upper Silesia and in Pomerania. They were declared citizens of the Third Reich by law and therefore subject to drumhead court-martial in case of draft evasion. Professor Ryszard Kaczmarek of the University of Silesia in Katowice, author of a monograph, Polacy w Wehrmachcie (Poles in the Wehrmacht), noted that the scale of this phenomenon was much larger than previously assumed, because 90% of the inhabitants of these two westernmost regions of prewar Poland were ordered to register on the German People's List (Volksliste), regardless of their wishes. The exact number of these conscripts is not known; no data exist beyond 1943.

In June 1946, the British Secretary of State for War reported to Parliament that, of the pre-war Polish citizens who had involuntarily signed the Volksliste and subsequently served in the German Wehrmacht, 68,693 men were captured or surrendered to the Allies in northwest Europe. The overwhelming majority, 53,630 subsequently enlisted in the Polish Army in the West and fought against Germany to the end of World War II.

Collaboration and resistance

The main armed resistance organization in Poland was the Home Army (Armia Krajowa, or AK), numbering some 400,000 members, including Jewish fighters. The AK command rejected any talks with the German authorities, but some AK units in eastern Poland did maintain contacts with the Germans, to "gain intelligence on German morale and preparedness and perhaps to acquire some badly needed weapons. The Germans made several attempts at arming regional Armia Krajowa partisan units to encourage them to act against Soviet partisans operating around Nowogródek and Vilnius; the local units accepted the arms but used them for their own purposes, disregarding the Germans' intents and even turning them against the Germans. Tadeusz Piotrowski concludes that " were purely tactical, short-term arrangements" and quotes Joseph Rothschild that "the Polish Home Army was by and large untainted by collaboration."

The National Armed Forces (Narodowe Siły Zbrojne, or NSZ) from time to time attacked or took prisoner Jewish partisans who were part of the communist People's Army (Armia Ludowa, or AL), a Polish partisan militia that included Jewish detachments. A single NSZ unit, the "Holy Cross Mountains Brigade", numbering 800-1,500 fighters, ceased operations against the Germans for a few months in 1944, accepted logistical help, and—late in the war, with German consent, to avoid capture by the Soviets—withdrew from Poland into Czechoslovakia. Once there, the unit resumed hostilities against the Germans and on 5 May 1945 liberated the Holýšov concentration camp, saving several hundred Jewish women. The NSZ did not have a uniform view about Jews, and though generally considered antisemitic and involved in killing and handing over Jews, it also incorporated Jewish fighters, including ones in higher command positions. Some NSZ members and units rescued Jews and postwar received Righteous Among the Nations awards.

The Holocaust

Historian Martin Winstone writes that only a minority of Poles actually took part in persecuting or helping the Jews. Winstone also nuances claims regarding the purported Polish lack of resolve in saving Jews in German-occupied Poland, writing that the tendency not to help can be explained because of fear, notably of the death penalty. He also notes that the death penalty was imposed for multiple other crimes and that "it may well be that the risk of hiding a Jew was greater, but that is in itself suggestive since the Germans were not the only danger." Winstone compares the situation to other occupied countries and notes that this tendency not to help was due more to human nature rather than to ethnocentrism. Historian John Connelly wrote that the vast majority of ethnic Poles showed indifference to the fate of the Jews; and that "Polish historiography has hesitated to view such complicity as collaboration... but rather as a form of society's demoralization" associating it with criminality. Klaus-Peter Friedrich wrote that "most adopted a policy of wait-and-see... In the eyes of the Jewish population, almost inevitably had to appear as silent approval of the occupier's actions." According to historian Gunnar S. Paulsson, in occupied Warsaw (a city of 1.3 million, including 350,000 Jews before the war), some 3,000 to 4,000 Poles acted as blackmailers and informants (szmalcowniks) who turned in Jews and fellow Poles who provided assistance to them.

In 2013 historian Jan Grabowski wrote in his book Hunt for the Jews that 200,000 Jews "were killed directly or indirectly by the Poles" (in a later interview with the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, he clarified that he never meant that all 200,000 were "personally" killed by Poles, but rather that some Poles were co-responsible for the deaths through collaboration, even if the killing was done by the Germans). The book won the Yad Vashem International Book Prize but sparked controversy in Poland, and the estimate was criticized by some historians and by the Polish League Against Defamation. In response, the Polish Center for Holocaust Research in Warsaw, co-founded by Grabowski, and a group of international Holocaust scholars published letters defending Grabowski. According to statements by Poland's ambassador to Switzerland, Jakub Kumoch, reported in the Polish internet portal wPolityce and in the weekly news magazine Do Rzeczy, "Grabowski admitted that the number of fugitives from the ghettos, 250,000, is based solely on his own estimates and selective treatment of Szymon Datner's writings. Grabowski simply accepted the maximum number of ghetto escapees suggested by Datner but rejected Datner's estimate of the number of survivors. According to Grabowski, if you subtract the number of survivors (in his opinion, only 50,000) from the number of fugitives, you get 200,000. Grabowski therefore stated this number as Jews murdered by Poles." An article in the Polish nationwide daily newspaper Rzeczpospolita (The Republic) critiqued Grabowski: "Grabowski... has difficulty demonstrating, in his journalistic statements, that every Jew who escaped from German transports was murdered because of Polish 'complicity'."

Collaboration by ethnic minorities

Germans used the divide and rule method to create tensions within the Polish society, by targeting several non-Polish ethnic groups for preferential treatment or the opposite, in the case of the Jewish minority.

Ethnic Germans

During the invasion of Poland in September 1939, members of the ethnic German minority in Poland assisted Nazi Germany in its war effort. They committed sabotage, diverted regular forces and committed numerous atrocities against civilian population.

Shortly after the German invasion of Poland, an armed ethnic-German militia, called the Selbstschutz, numbering around 100,000 members, was formed. It organized the Operation Tannenberg mass murder of Polish elites. At the beginning of 1940, the Selbstschutz was disbanded, and its members transferred to various units of SS, Gestapo, and German police. The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle organized large-scale looting of property, and redistributed goods to Volksdeutsche. They were given apartments, workshops, farms, furniture, and clothing confiscated from Jewish Poles and ethnic Poles.

During the German occupation of Poland, Nazi authorities established the German People's List (Deutsche Volksliste, DVL), whereby former Polish citizens of German ethnicity were registered as Volksdeutsche. The German authorities encouraged registration of ethnic Germans, and in many cases made it mandatory. Those who joined were given benefits, including better food and better social status. However, Volksdeutsche were required to perform military service for the Third Reich, and hundreds of thousands joined the German military, either willingly or under compulsion.

Collaboration by Ukrainians and Belorussians

Before the war, Poland had a substantial population of Ukrainian and Belorussian minorities living in her eastern, Kresy regions. After the Soviet invasion of eastern Poland on 17 September 1939, those territories were annexed by the USSR. Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, German authorities recruited Ukrainians and Belorussians who had been citizens of Poland before September 1939 for service in Waffen-SS and auxiliary-police units. In District Galicia, the SS Galicia division and Ukrainian Auxiliary Police, made up of ethnic-Ukrainian volunteers, took part in widespread massacres and persecution of Poles and Jews.

Collaboration by Polish Jews

The Judenräte (s. Judenrat, literally "Jewish council") were Jewish-run governing bodies set up by the Nazi authorities in Jewish ghettos across German-occupied Poland. The Judenräte functioned as a self-enforcing intermediary and were used by the Germans to control the Jewish population and to manage the ghetto's day-to-day administration. The Germans also required Judenräte to confiscate property, organize forced labor, collect information on the Jewish population and facilitate deportations to extermination camps. In some cases, Judenrat members exploited their positions to engage in bribery and other abuses. In the Łódź Ghetto, the reign of Judenrat head Chaim Rumkowski was particularly inhumane, as he was known to get rid of his political opponents by submitting their names for deportation to concentration camps, hoard food rations, and sexually abuse Jewish girls. Political theorist Hannah Arendt stated that without the assistance of the Judenräte, the German authorities would have encountered considerable difficulties in drawing up detailed lists of the Jewish population, thus allowing for at least some Jews to avoid deportation.

The Jewish Ghetto Police (Jüdischer Ordnungsdienst) were volunteers recruited from among Jews living in the ghettos who could be relied on to follow German orders. They were issued batons, official armbands, caps, and badges, and were responsible for public order in the ghetto. Also, the policemen were used by the Germans for securing the deportation of other Jews to concentration camps. The numbers of Jewish police varied greatly depending on the location, with the Warsaw Ghetto numbering about 2,500, Łódź Ghetto 1,200 and smaller ghettos such as that at Lwów about 500. The Jewish ghetto police distinguished themselves by their shocking corruption and immorality. Historian and Warsaw Ghetto archivist Emanuel Ringelblum described the cruelty of the Jewish Ghetto Police as "at times greater than that of the Germans."

In Warsaw the criminal-collaborationist groups Żagiew and Group 13, led by Abraham Gancwajch and colloquially known as the "Jewish Gestapo", inflicted considerable damage on both Jewish and Polish underground resistance movements. Over a thousand such Jewish Nazi collaborators, some armed with firearms, served under the German Gestapo as informers on Polish resistance efforts to hide Jews, and engaged in racketeering, blackmail, and extortion in the Warsaw Ghetto. A 70-strong group led by a Jewish collaborator called Hening was tasked with operating against the Polish resistance, and was quartered at the Gestapo's Warsaw headquarters on ulica Szucha (Szuch Street). Similar groups and individuals operated in towns and cities across German-occupied Poland — including Józef Diamand in Kraków and Szama Grajer in Lublin. One of the Jewish collaborationist groups' baiting techniques was to send agents out as supposed ghetto escapees who would ask Poles for help; if they agreed to, the household was reported to the Germans, who (as a matter of announced policy) executed the entire family or arrested those willing to help Jews. It is estimated that at the end of 1941 and the start of 1942 there were some 15,000 "Jewish Gestapo" agents in the General Government.

Some members of Jewish Social Self-Help (Jüdische Soziale Selbsthilfe), also known as the Jewish Social Assistance Society, collaborated with Nazi authorities in the deportation of Warsaw Jews to death camps. The group was formed as a humanitarian organization funded by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, which also supplied it with legal cover, and was allowed to operate within the General Government. Concerned with its lack of effectiveness, and seeing it as a cover for Nazi atrocities, both Jewish and Polish underground movements actively resisted the organization.

See also

• Polish resistance movement in World War II
• Collaboration with the Axis Powers during World War II
• Szmalcownik
• Trawniki
• Sonderkommando
• Sonderdienst
• Judenjagd

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51. Winstone, Martin (2014). The Dark Heart of Hitler's Europe: Nazi rule in Poland under the General Government. London: Tauris. pp. 181–186. ISBN 978-1-78076-477-1.
52. Winson, Chu (24 July 2015). "Review of M. Winstone: The Dark Heart of Hitler's Europe". H-Soz-Kult. Retrieved 2 June 2018.
53. "Warsaw". www.ushmm.org. Retrieved 2018-03-02.
54. Maciorowski, Mirosław. "Prof. Jan Grabowski: Pomagaliśmy Niemcom zabijać Żydów". "Nigdy nie mówiłem o 200 tys. Żydów zamordowanych własnoręcznie przez Polaków". Gazeta Wyborcza. Retrieved 2018-05-06.
55. Grabowski, Jan (2013). Hunt for the Jews : betrayal and murder in German-occupied Poland. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ISBN 9780253010742. OCLC 868951735.
56. "Hunt for the Jews snags Yad Vashem book prize", Times of Israel (JTA), 8 December 2014.
57. "Professor Jan Grabowski wins the 2014 Yad Vashem International Book Prize", Yad Vashem, 4 December 2014.
58. "Stanowczo sprzeciwiamy się działalności i wypowiedziom Jana Grabowskiego" (in Polish). wPolityce.
59. "Canadian historian joins uproar in Israel over Polish Holocaust law". CBC. 20 February 2018.
60. "Historians defend prof who wrote of Poles' Holocaust complicity". Times of Israel (JTA). 13 June 2017.
61. Wildt, Michael (19 June 2017). "Solidarity with Jan Grabowski". Retrieved 8 April 2018.
62. Perkel, Colin (June 20, 2017). "University of Ottawa scholar says he's a target of Polish 'hate' campaign | CBC News". CBC. The Canadian Press. Retrieved 8 April 2018.
63. Kołodziejski, Konrad (1 March 2018). "Jan Grabowski's arithmetic has failed. Who came up with 40,000 Holocaust survivors?" [Padła kolejna liczba Jana Grabowskiego. Kto wymyślił 40 tysięcy ocalonych z Holokaustu?]. wPolityce.pl.
64. Kumoch, Jakub; Tomaszewska, Weronika (2 March 2018). "Where did the number of 40,000 Holocaust survivors come from? Poland's ambassador to Switzerland unmasks Jan Grabowski: [Grabowski] cites secondary sources that fit his thesis" [Skąd liczba 40 tys. ocalonych z Holokaustu? Ambasador RP w Szwajcarii demaskuje Jana Grabowskiego: Powołuje się na źródła wtórne pasujące do jego tezy]. wPolityce.pl. Fratria.
65. "Skąd niska liczba ocalonych z Holokaustu? Ambasador demaskuje prof. Grabowskiego". MSN Polska. 2018-03-03. Retrieved 2018-05-12.
66. Zaremba, Piotr (2018-04-15). "Rewizjoniści w drodze donikąd". Rzeczpospolita. Retrieved 2018-05-12.
67. Maria Wardzyńska, Był rok 1939 Operacja niemieckiej policji bezpieczeństwa w Polsce. Intelligenzaktion, IPN Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2009 ISBN 978-83-7629-063-8
68. Browning, Christopher R.; Matthäus, Jürgen (2004). The origins of the Final Solution: the evolution of Nazi Jewish policy, September 1939-March 1942. Comprehensive history of the Holocaust. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 978-0-8032-1327-2.
69. Michael Geyer, Sheila Fitzpatrick, Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 155.
70. August Frank, "Memorandum, September 26, 1942, Utilization of property on the occasion of settlement and evacuation of Jews" in NO-724, Pros. Ex. 472. United States of America v. Oswald Pohl, et al. (Case No. 4, the "Pohl Trial). V. pp. 965–967.
71. Historia Encyklopedia Szkolna, Warsaw, Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, 1993, pp. 357–58.
72. Czesław Partacz, Krzysztof Łada, Polska wobec ukraińskich dążeń niepodległościowych w czasie II wojny światowej, (Toruń: Centrum Edukacji Europejskiej, 2003)
73. Timothy Snyder. (2004) The Reconstruction of Nations. New Haven: Yale University Press: pp. 165–166
74. Hilberg 1995, p. 106. sfn error: no target: CITEREFHilberg1995 (help)
75. Bauman, Robert J. (2012-04-19). Extension of Life. Xlibris Corporation. ISBN 9781469192451.
76. ^ Hannah Arendt (2006). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Penguin. ISBN 1101007168. Retrieved 16 June 2015. {{cite book}}: |work= ignored (help)
77. Rees, Laurence,Auschwitz: The Nazis and the "Final Solution", especially the testimony of Lucille Eichengreen, pp. 105-131. BBC Books. ISBN 978-0-563-52296-6.
78. Rees, Laurence."Auschwitz: Inside the Nazi state". BBC/KCET, 2005. Retrieved: 01.10.2011.
79. "Judischer Ordnungsdienst". Museum of Tolerance. Simon Wiesenthal Center. Retrieved 14 January 2008.
80. ^ Collins, Jeanna R. "Am I a Murderer?: Testament of a Jewish Ghetto Policeman (review)". Mandel Fellowship Book Reviews. Kellogg Community College. Retrieved 13 January 2008.
81. 1926-2007., Hilberg, Raul, (2003). The destruction of the European Jews. Yale University Press. OCLC 49805909. {{cite book}}: |last= has numeric name (help)CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
82. Ringelblum, Emmanuel (2015-11-06). Notes From The Warsaw Ghetto: The Journal Of Emmanuel Ringelblum. Pickle Partners Publishing. ISBN 9781786257161.
83. ^ Piecuch, Henryk (1999). Syndrom tajnych służb: czas prania mózgów i łamania kości. Agencja Wydawnicza CB. ISBN 83-86245-66-2.
84. Israel Gutman, The Jews of Warsaw, 1939–1943: Ghetto, Underground, Revolt, Indiana University Press, 1982, ISBN 0-253-20511-5, pp. 90–94.
85. Itamar Levin, Walls Around: The Plunder of Warsaw Jewry during World War II and Its Aftermath, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004, ISBN 0-275-97649-1, pp. 94–98.
86. Dąbrowa-Kostka, Stanisław (1972). W okupowanym Krakowie: 6.IX.1939 - 18.I.1945 (in Polish). Wydaw. Min. Obrony Nar.
87. Radzik, Tadeusz (2007). Extermination of the Lublin ghetto (in Polish). Wydawn. Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej.
88. Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Rejestr faktów represji na obywatelach polskich za pomocą ludności żydowskiej w okresie II wojny światowej, 2014, pp. 347-50. Retrieved 2018-05-26.
89. Joanna Kierylak, Treblinka Museum, "12 sprawiedliwych z Paulinowa", 2013, retrieved 2018-05-25. "Akcja niemiecka, zakrojona na szeroką skalę... Posłużono się tu prowokacją. Rozpoznania dokonali prowokatorzy. Byli nimi Żydzi, jeden z Warszawy, drugi ze Sterdyni – Szymel Helman. Prowokator z Warszawy dołączył do ukrywających się Żydów, podając się za Żyda francuskiego, zbiegłego z transportu przesiedleńców wiezionych do Treblinki." (" large-scale German operation... use was made of provocation. The scouting-out was done by agent-provocateurs. They were Jews, here one from Warsaw, the other from Sterdyń—Szymel Helman. The agent-provocateur from Warsaw joined some Jews who were in hiding, giving himself out to be a French Jew who had escaped from a transport of deportees who were being sent to Treblinka.")
90. Teresa Prekerowa, Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences, "Who Helped Jews during the Holocaust in Poland", Acta Poloniae Historica, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, vol. 76, p. 166. "The gravest provocation involving Jews took place in 1943, some 100 km east of Warsaw; a Jewish Gestapo agent posing as a fugitive was given, or promised, help by 14 inhabitants of the village of Paulinów." Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1997
91. Witold W. Mędykowski, "Przeciw swoim: Wzorce kolaboracji żydowskiej w Krakowie i okolicy", Zagłada Żydów - Studia i materiały, Rocznik naukowy Centrum Badań nad Zagładą Żydów IFiS PAN, no. 2 (2006), p. 206. "Zdarzało się jednak, że urządzano prowokacje, by aresztować osoby mające kontakty z podziemiem, pośredniczące przy wyrobie fałszywych dokumentów czy zajmujące się przemytem ludzi i nielegalnym handlem. Na przykład w 1942 roku do Elżbiety Jasińskiej, mającej kontakty z konspiracją, przyszła Marta Puretz, prosząc o wyrobienie kenkarty. Jasińska zgodziła się wyrobić jej ten dokument za 2000 zł. Puretz miała zgłosić się do niej za dwa dni. Kiedy jednak przyszła do niej w umówionym czasie, pod dom zajechało Gestapo, Jasińska została aresztowana, a następnie wywieziona do Auschwitz. Gdy później szwagier Jasińskiej spotkał Martę Puretz na ulicy bez opaski, kazał ją aresztować. Ona jednak na komisariacie policji przy ul. Franciszkańskiej wylegitymowała się dokumentem współpracownika Gestapo i została wypuszczona na wolność. Zagroziła szwagrowi Jasińskiej, że jeśli wejdzie jej w drogę, wsypie go... Podobnie działała Stefania Brandstätter."
92. "Do zachowań jednoznacznie kolaboracyjnych ze strony przedstawicieli żydowskich instytucji 'samorządowych' dochodziło podczas wysiedleń do obozów zagłady w ramach 'akcji Reinhard', gdy niemieckie oddziały wysiedleńcze wymagały od żydowskich funkcyjnych czynnego wspomagania akcji. W Warszawie przy organizowaniu deportacji do obozu zagłady uczestniczyli nie tylko żydowscy policjanci, lecz także członkowie żydowskiej służby ratunkowej, część judenratu, a nawet niektórzy członkowie Żydowskiej Samopomocy Społecznej." ("Unambiguous acts of collaboration on the part of Jewish 'self-government' institutions took place during deportations to extermination camps under 'Operation Reinhard' when German units involved in the expulsions demanded active support from Jewish functionaries. In Warsaw, deporations to extermination camps involved not only Jewish policemen but also members of the Jewish rescue service , part of the Judenrat, and even some members of Jewish Social Self-Help.")
93. Alexandra Garbarini, Jewish Responses to Persecution: 1938–1940, p. 198.
94. "Jewish Historical Institute". www.jhi.pl.

• Collaboration during World War II
• German occupation of Poland during World War II
• Poland in World War II