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*Norcross J.C. Garofalo. A. Koocher.G.P. (2006) Discredited psychological treatments and tests. A Delphi Poll. Professional Psychology. Research and Practice. 2006 Vol 37 No5 515-522


==Literature== ==Literature==

Revision as of 09:21, 1 December 2006

Phrenology is regarded today as a classic example of pseudoscience.

A pseudoscience is any body of alleged knowledge, methodology, belief, or practice that claims to be scientific but does not follow the scientific method. Alternatively it has been described as the promotion of ideas as scientific when they are not in fact scientific.

The term pseudoscience appears to have been first used in 1843 as a combination of the Greek root pseudo, meaning false, and the Latin scientia, meaning knowledge or a field of knowledge. The term has negative connotations, because it is used to indicate that subjects so labeled are inaccurately or deceptively portrayed as science. Accordingly, those labeled as practicing or advocating a "pseudoscience" normally reject this classification.

As it is taught in certain introductory science classes, pseudoscience is any subject that appears superficially to be scientific or whose proponents state is scientific but nevertheless contravenes the testability requirement of the scientific method. Professor Paul DeHart Hurd argued that a large part of gaining scientific literacy is being able to distinguish science from pseudo-science such as astrology, quackery, the occult, and superstition. Certain introductory survey classes in science take careful pains to delineate the objections scientists and skeptics have to practices that make direct claims contradicted by the scientific discipline in question.

Beyond the initial introductory analyses offered in science classes, there is some epistemological disagreement about whether it is possible to distinguish "science" from "pseudoscience" in a reliable and objective way. Those who believe that characterising some areas as pseudoscientific is useful and valid stress the use of vague, exaggerated or untestable claims, over-reliance on confirmation rather than refutation, lack of openness to testing by other experts, and a lack of progress in theory development.

Introduction

Main article: Demarcation problem

The standards for determining whether a body of alleged knowledge, methodology, or practice is scientific can vary from field to field, but involve agreed principles including reproducibility and intersubjective verifiability. Such principles aim to ensure that relevant evidence can be reproduced and/or measured given the same conditions, which allows further investigation to determine whether a hypothesis or theory related to given phenomena is both valid and reliable for use by others, including other scientists and researchers. Scientific methods are expected to be applied throughout, and bias is expected to be controlled or eliminated, by double-blind studies, or statistically through fair sampling procedures. All gathered data, including experimental/environmental conditions, are expected to be documented for scrutiny and made available for peer review, thereby allowing further experiments or studies to be conducted to confirm or falsify results, as well as to determine other important factors such as statistical significance, confidence intervals, and margins of error. Fulfillment of these requirements allows others a reasonable opportunity to assess whether to rely upon the reported results in their own scientific work or in a particular field of applied science, technology, therapy, or other form of practice.

In the mid-20th Century Karl Popper suggested the criterion of falsifiability to distinguish science from non-science. Statements such as "God created the universe" may be true or false, but they are not falsifiable, so they are not scientific; they lie outside the scope of science. Popper subdivided non-science into philosophical, mathematical, mythological, religious and/or metaphysical formulations on the one hand, and pseudoscientific formulations on the other — though without providing clear criteria for the differences. He gave astrology and psychoanalysis as examples of pseudoscience, and Einstein's theory of relativity as an example of science. More recently, Paul Thagard (1978) proposed that pseudoscience is primarily distinguishable from science when it is less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and the selective and or lack of attempts by proponents to solve problems with the theory. Mario Bunge (1984) has suggested the categories of "belief fields" and "research fields" to help distinguish between science and pseudoscience.

Philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend has argued, from a sociology of knowledge perspective, that a distinction between science and non-science is neither possible nor desirable.  Among the issues which can make the distinction difficult are that both the theories and methodologies of science evolve at differing rates in response to new data. In addition, the specific standards applicable to one field of science may not be those employed in other fields. Thagard (1978) also writes from a sociological perspective and states that "elucidation of how science differs from pseudoscience is the philosophical side of an attempt to overcome public neglect of genuine science."

Both the skeptics and the brights movement, most prominently represented by Richard Dawkins, Mario Bunge, Carl Sagan and James Randi, consider all forms of pseudoscience to be harmful, whether or not they result in immediate harm to their adherents. These critics generally consider that pseudoscience may occur for a number of reasons, ranging from simple naïveté about the nature of science and the scientific method, to deliberate deception for financial or political gain. At the extreme, issues of personal health and safety may be very directly involved, for example in the case of physical or mental therapy or treatment, or in assessing safety risks. In such instances the potential for direct harm to patients, clients or even the general public may be an issue in assessing pseudoscience. (See also Junk science.)

The concept of pseudoscience as antagonistic to bona fide science appears to have emerged in the mid-19th century. Among the first recorded uses of the word "pseudo-science" was in 1844 in the Northern Journal of Medicine, I 387: "That opposite kind of innovation which pronounces what has been recognized as a branch of science, to have been a pseudo-science, composed merely of so-called facts, connected together by misapprehensions under the disguise of principles".

Identifying pseudoscience

A field, practice, or body of knowledge might reasonably be called pseudoscientific when (1) it is presented as consistent with the accepted norms of scientific research; but (2) it demonstrably fails to meet these norms, most importantly, in misuse of scientific method.

The following have been proposed to be indicators of poor scientific reasoning.

Use of vague, exaggerated or untestable claims

  • Assertion of scientific claims that are vague rather than precise, and that lack specific measurements.
  • Failure to make use of operational definitions. (ie. a scientific description of the operational means in which which a range of numeric measurements can be obtained).
  • Failure to make reasonable use of the principle of parsimony, i.e. failing to seek an explanation that requires the fewest possible additional assumptions when multiple viable explanations are possible (see: Occam's Razor)
  • Use of obscurantist language, and misuse of apparently technical jargon in an effort to give claims the superficial trappings of science.
  • Lack of boundary conditions: Most well-supported scientific theories possess boundary conditions (well articulated limitations) under which the predicted phenomena do and do not apply.

Over-reliance on confirmation rather than refutation

  • Assertion of scientific claims that cannot be falsified in the event they are incorrect, inaccurate, or irrelevant (see also: falsifiability)
  • Assertion of claims that a theory predicts something that it has not been shown to predict
  • Assertion that claims which have not been proven false must be true, and vice versa (see: Argument from ignorance)
  • Over-reliance on testimonials and anecdotes. Testimonial and anecdotal evidence can be useful for discovery (i.e. hypothesis generation) but should not be used in the context of justification (i.e. hypothesis testing).
  • Selective use of experimental evidence: presentation of data that seems to support its own claims while suppressing or refusing to consider data that conflict with its claims.
  • Reversed burden of proof. In science, the burden of proof rests on the individual making a claim, not on the critic. "Pseudoscientific" arguments may neglect this principle and demand that skeptics demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a claim (e.g. an assertion regarding the efficacy of a novel therapeutic technique) is false. It is essentially impossible to prove a universal negative, so this tactic incorrectly places the burden of proof on the skeptic rather than the claimant.
  • Appeals to holism: Proponents of pseudoscientific claims, especially in organic medicine, alternative medicine, naturopathy and mental health, often resort to the “mantra of holism” to explain negative findings.

Lack of openness to testing by other experts

  • Evasion of peer review before publicizing results (called "science by press conference"). Some proponents of theories that contradict accepted scientific theories avoid subjecting their work to the often ego-bruising process of peer review, sometimes on the grounds that peer review is inherently biased against claims that contradict established paradigms, and sometimes on the grounds that assertions cannot be evaluated adequately using standard scientific methods. By remaining insulated from the peer review process, these proponents forego the opportunity of corrective feedback from informed colleagues.
  • Failure to provide adequate information for other researchers to reproduce the claimed results.
  • Assertion of claims of secrecy or proprietary knowledge in response to requests for review of data or methodology.

Lack of progress

  • Failure to progress towards additional evidence of its claims. Terrence Hines has identified astrology as a subject that has changed very little in the past two millennia.
  • Lack of self correction: scientific research programmes make mistakes, but they tend to eliminate these errors over time. . By contrast, theories may be accused of being pseudoscientific because they have remained unaltered despite contradictory evidence.

Personalization of issues


Subjects may be considered pseudoscientific for various reasons; Popper considered astrology to be pseudoscientific simply because astrologers keep their claims so vague that they could never be refuted, whereas Thagard considers astrology pseudoscientific because its practitioners make little effort to develop the theory, show no concern for attempts to critically evaluate the theory in relation to others, and are selective in considering evidence. More generally, Thagard stated that pseudoscience tends to focus on resemblances rather than cause-effect relations.

Some criticisms that lead to the accusation of pseudoscience are also true to some extent of some new genuinely scientific work. These include:

  • claims or theories unconnected to previous experimental results
  • claims which contradict experimentally established results
  • work failing to operate on standard definitions of concepts
  • emotion-based resistance, by the scientific community, to new claims or theories 

Science is also distinguishable from revelation, theology, or spirituality in that it claims to offer insight into the physical world obtained by "scientific" means. Systems of thought that derive from "divine" or "inspired" knowledge are not considered pseudoscience if they do not claim either to be scientific or to overturn well-established science.

Some statements and commonly held beliefs in popular science may not meet the criteria of science. "Pop" science may blur the divide between science and pseudoscience among the general public, and may also involve science fiction. Indeed, pop science is disseminated to, and can also easily emanate from, persons not accountable to scientific methodology and expert peer review.

Pseudoscience contrasted with protoscience

Protoscience is a term sometimes used to describe a hypothesis that has not yet been adequately tested by the scientific method, but which is otherwise consistent with existing science or which, where inconsistent, offers reasonable account of the inconsistency. It may also describe the transition from a body of practical knowledge into a scientific field.. By contrast, "pseudoscience" is reserved to describe theories which are either untestable in practice or in principle, or which are maintained even when tests appear to have refuted them.

It is widely disputed (notably by Feyeraband, see above) whether any clear or meaningful boundaries can be drawn between pseudoscience, protoscience, and "real" science. Especially where there is a significant cultural or historical distance (as, for example, modern chemistry reflecting on alchemy), protosciences can be misinterpreted as pseudoscientific. Many people have tried to offer objective distinctions, with mixed success.

If the claims of a given field can be experimentally tested and methodological standards are upheld, it is not "pseudoscience", however odd, astonishing, or counter-intuitive. If claims made are inconsistent with existing experimental results or established theory, but the methodology is sound, caution should be used; much of science consists of testing hypotheses that turn out to be false. In such a case, the work may be better described as ideas that are not yet generally accepted. Conversely, if the claims of any given "science" cannot be experimentally tested or scientific standards are not upheld in these tests, it fails to meet the modern criteria for a science.

Demarcation problem and criticisms of the concept of pseudoscience

Main article: Demarcation problem

After over a century of dialogue among philosophers of science and scientists in varied fields, and despite broad agreement on the basics of scientific method, the boundaries between science and non-science continue to be debated. This is known as the problem of demarcation.

Many commentators and practitioners of science, as well as supporters of fields of inquiry and practices labeled as pseudoscience, question the rigor of the demarcation, as some disciplines now accepted as science previously had features cited as those of pseudoscience, such as lack of reproducibility, or the inability to create falsifiable experiments.

It has been argued by several notable commentators that experimental verification is not in itself decisive in scientific method. Thomas Kuhn states that in neither Popper's nor his own theory "can testing play a quite decisive role." Daniel Rothbart said that "the defining feature of science does not seem to be experimental success, for most clear cases of genuine science have been experimentally falsified." The latter proposed that a scientific theory must "account for all the phenomena that its rival background theory explains" and "must clash empirically with its rival by yielding test implications that are inconsistent with the rival theory". A theory is thus scientific or not depending upon its historical situation; if it betters the current explanations of phenomena, it marks scientific progress. "Many domains in ancient Greece, for example, domains that today are called superstition, religion, magic and the occult, were at that time clear cases of legitimate science." This is an explicitly competitive model of scientific work; Rothbart also notes that it is not a completely effective model.

Kuhn postulated that proponents of competing paradigms may resort to political means (such as invective) to garner support from a public which lacks the ability to judge competing scientific theories on their merits. Philosopher of science Larry Laudan has suggested that pseudoscience has no scientific meaning and mostly describes our emotions: "If we would stand up and be counted on the side of reason, we ought to drop terms like ‘pseudo-science’ and ‘unscientific’ from our vocabulary; they are just hollow phrases which do only emotive work for us". Richard McNally, Professor of Psychology at Harvard University, states: "The term 'pseudoscience' has become little more than an inflammatory buzzword for quickly dismissing one’s opponents in media sound-bites" and "When therapeutic entrepreneurs make claims on behalf of their interventions, we should not waste our time trying to determine whether their interventions qualify as pseudoscientific. Rather, we should ask them: How do you know that your intervention works? What is your evidence?".

Demographics of pseudoscience

The National Science Foundation stated that, in the USA, "pseudoscientific" beliefs became more widespread during the 1990's, peaked near 2001 and mildly declined since; nevertheless, pseudoscientific beliefs remain common in the USA. As a result, according to the NSF report, there is a lack of knowledge of pseudoscientific issues in society and pseudoscientific practices are commonly followed. Bunge (1999) states that "A survey on public knowledge of science in the United States showed that in 1988 '50% of American adults evolution, and 88% astrology is a science'".

Commentators on pseudoscience perceive it in many fields; for example Pseudomathematics is a term used for mathematics-like activity undertaken either by non-mathematicians or mathematicians themselves which does not conform to the rigorous standards usually applied to mathematical theorems.

Pseudoscience in psychology

Norcross et al (2006:517) state that Lilienfeld et al (2003), Della Sala (1999), Eisner (2000) and Carroll (2003) seek to idenfity pseudoscienctific psychotherapies. Neurologists and clinical psychologists are concerned about the increasing amount of what they consider pseudoscience promoted in psychotherapy and popular psychology, and also about what they see as pseudoscientific therapies such as Neuro-linguistic programming, Rebirthing, Reparenting, and Primal Scream Therapy being adopted by government and professional bodies and by the public. They state that scientifically unsupported therapies might harm vulnerable members of the public, undermine legitimate therapies, and tend to spread misconceptions about the nature of the mind and brain to society at large. . Norcross et al (2006:517) have approached the science/pseudoscience issue by conducting a survey of experts that seeks to specify which theory or therapy is considered to be definitely discredited, and they outline 14 fields that have been definitely discredited.

Some psychiatrists and psychologists also perceive pseudoscientific ideas in more popularly accepted branches of psychotherapy, such as co-counselling, Gestalt Therapy, Re-evaluation Counseling and even in the work of Twelve-step program bodies such as Alcoholics Anonymous. There often seems to be an overlap between psychological movements or theories denounced as "pseudoscientific" and those labeled "cults", for example in the case of Dianetics and Scientology.

A typical concept used in some fringe psychotherapies is orgone energy. "There is an increasing degree of overlapping and blending of orgone therapy with New Age and other therapies that manipulate the patient’s biofields, such as Therapeutic Touch and Reiki. 'Biofield' is a pseudoscientific term often used synonymously with orgone energy. Klee states that there is even an organization of psychiatrists which promotes orgone therapy. .

Dangers of pseudoscience in health care

According to Ostrander et al (2004) the promotion of shark cartilage as a cancer cure on the basis of an alleged lack of cancer in sharks, has led to a decline in shark populations, and patients have been diverted from effective cancer treatment ; they suggest that "the evidence-based mechanisms of evaluation used daily by the scientific community should be added to the training of media and governmental professionals".

Psychological explanations for pseudoscientific beliefs

Pseudoscientific thinking has been explained in terms of psychology and social psychology. The human proclivity for seeking confirmation rather than refutation (confirmation bias) , the tendency to hold comforting beliefs, and the tendency to overgeneralize have been proposed as reasons for the common adherence to pseudoscientific thinking. Also, Beyerstein (1991) argues that humans are prone to associations based on resemblances only, and often prone to misattribution in cause-effect thinking.

Scientific theories once criticized as pseudoscience

There are examples of presently accepted scientific theories that were once criticised by some as being pseudoscientific. Continental drift theory was once considered pseudoscientific (Williams 2000:58), but is now part of mainstream science especially since the paleomagnetic evidence was discovered that supported plate tectonics.

Fields can also repudiate notions that some consider to be pseudoscientific in favour of more conventional element(s) of their field. For example, Atwood (2004) suggested that "osteopathy has, for the most part, repudiated its pseudoscientific beginnings and joined the world of rational healthcare."

At times, scientists use the descriptor "pseudoscience" to distinguish between even mainstream investigations of varying rigor. As observational evidence and theoretical descriptions improve and fields develop, disciplines criticized for having pseudoscientific aspects may become more respected by the scientific community. The field of physical cosmology has had such a history. Currently, string theory has been criticized by certain researchers as suffering from the same problems

See also

Lists

People

References

  1. "Pseudoscientific - pretending to be scientific, falsely represented as being scientific", from the Oxford American Dictionary, published by the Oxford English Dictionary
  2. http://skepdic.com/pseudosc.html
  3. Magendie, F (1843) An Elementary Treatise on Human Physiology. 5th Ed. Tr. John Revere. New York: Harper, p 150. Magendie refers to phrenology as "a pseudo-science of the present day" (note the hyphen).
  4. However, from the "them vs. us" polarization that its usage engenders, the term may also have a positive function because " derogatory labeling of others often includes an unstated self-definition "(p.266); and, from this, the application of the term also implies "a unity of science, a privileged tree of knowledge or space from which the pseudoscience is excluded, and the user's right to belong is asserted " (p.286) -- Still A & Dryden W (2004) "The Social Psychology of "Pseudoscience": A Brief History", J Theory Social Behav 34:265-290
  5. For example, Hewitt et al. Conceptual Physical Science Addison Wesley; 3 edition (July 18, 2003) ISBN 0-321-05173-4, Bennett et al. The Cosmic Perspective 3e Addison Wesley; 3 edition (July 25, 2003) ISBN 0-8053-8738-2
  6. Memorial Resolution: Paul DeHart Hurd. www-sul.stanford.edu/depts/cubberley/collections/memorial.html retrieved 6 Nov. 2006
  7. Hurd, P. D. (1998). "Scientific literacy: New minds for a changing world". Science Education, 82, 407–416.. Abstract online at www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/32148/ABSTRACT; retrieved 6 Nov. 2006
  8. For example, consider this introductory course offered at the University of Maryland entitled "Science & Pseudoscience"
  9. The philosopher of science Paul Feyeraband in particular is associated with the view that attempts to distinguish science from non-science are flawed and pernicious. "The idea that science can, and should, be run according to fixed and universal rules, is both unrealistic and pernicious. ... the idea is detrimental to science, for it neglects the complex physical and historical conditions which influence scientific change. It makes our science less adaptable and more dogmatic:"
  10. e.g. Gauch HG Jr. Scientific Method in Practice (2003) 3-5 ff
  11. Gauch (2003), 191 ff, especially Chapter 6, "Probability", and Chapter 7, "inductive Logic and Statistics"
  12. Popper, KR (1959) "The Logic of Scientific Discovery" (English translation, 1959).
  13. Popper KR "Science: Conjectures and Refutations", reprinted in Grim P (1990) Philosophy of Science and the Occult, Albany, pp. 104-110
  14. Popper KR (1962) Science, Pseudo-Science, and Falsifiability. Conjectures and Refutations
  15. Feyerabend P Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge (1975)
  16. For a perspective on Feyerabend from within the scientific community, see, e.g., Gauch (2003) at p.4: "Such critiques are unfamiliar to most scientists, although some may have heard a few distant shots from the so-called science wars."
  17. Thagard PR (1978) "Why astrology is a pseudoscience" (1978) In PSA 1978, Volume 1, ed. Asquith PD and Hacking I (East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1978) 223 ff. Thagard writes, at 227, 228: "We can now propose the following principle of demarcation: A theory or discipline which purports to be scientific is pseudoscientific if and only if: it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces many unsolved problems; but the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations."
  18. Cover JA, Curd M (Eds, 1998) Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, 1-82
  19. e.g. Gauch (2003) op cit at 211 ff (Probability, "Common Blunders")
  20. Paul Montgomery Churchland, Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (1999) MIT Press. p.90. "Most terms in theoretical physics, for example, do not enjoy at least some distinct connections with observables, but not of the simple sort that would permit operational definitions in terms of these observables. If a restriction in favor of operational definitions were to be followed, therefore, most of theoretical physics would have to be dismissed as meaningless pseudoscience!"
  21. Gauch HG Jr. (2003) op cit 269 ff, "Parsimony and Efficiency"
  22. Hines T (1988) Pseudoscience and the Paranormal: A Critical Examination of the Evidence Buffalo NY: Prometheus Books. A Skeptical Inquirer Reader
  23. Lakatos I (1970) "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." in Lakatos I, Musgrave A (eds) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge pp 91-195; Popper KR (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery
  24. e.g. Gauch (2003) op cit at 178 ff (Deductive Logic, "Fallacies"), and at 211 ff (Probability, "Common Blunders"). e.g. Macmilllan Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol 3, "Fallacies" 174 'ff, esp. section on "Ignoratio elenchi"
  25. Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol 3, "Fallacies" 174 'ff esp. 177-178
  26. Bunge M (1983) Demarcating science from pseudoscience Fundamenta Scientiae 3:369-388, 381
  27. Thagard (1978)op cit at 227, 228
  28. Lilienfeld SO (2004) Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology Guildford Press (2004) ISBN 1-59385-070-0
  29. Ruscio J (2001) Clear thinking with psychology: Separating sense from nonsense, Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth
  30. Peer review and the acceptance of new scientific ideas (Warning 469 kB PDF)*Peer review – process, perspectives and the path ahead; Lilienfeld (2004) op cit For an opposing perspective, e.g. Peer Review as Scholarly Conformity
  31. Ruscio (2001) op cit.
  32. Gauch (2003) op cit 124 ff"
  33. Gauch (2003) op cit 124 ff"
  34. Lakatos I (1970) "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." in Lakatos I, Musgrave A (eds.) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge 91-195; Thagard (1978) op cit writes: "We can now propose the following principle of demarcation: A theory or discipline which purports to be scientific is pseudoscientific if and only if: it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces many unsolved problems; but the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations."
  35. Hines T, Pseudoscience and the Paranormal: A Critical Examination of the Evidence, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY, 1988. ISBN 0-87975-419-2. Thagard (1978) op cit 223 ff
  36. name=Ruscio120>Ruscio J (2001) op cit. p120
  37. The work Scientists Confront Velikovsky (1976) Cornell University, also delves into these features in some detail, as does the work of Thomas Kuhn, e.g. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) which also discusses some of the items on the list of characteristics of pseudoscience.
  38. ^ Devilly GJ (2005) Power therapies and possible threats to the science of psychology and psychiatry Austral NZ J Psych 39:437-445(9) Cite error: The named reference "Devilly" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  39. e.g. archivefreedom.org which claims that "The list of suppressed scientists even includes Nobel Laureates!"
  40. Kuhn TS (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
  42. Popper KR op. cit.
  43. Gauch HG Jr (2003)op cit 3-7.
  44. Cover JA, Curd M (Eds, 1998) Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, 1-82
  45. Kuhn TS "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" in Grim, op. cit. p. 125
  46. Rothbart D "Demarcating Genuine Science from Pseudoscience", in Grim, op. cit. pp.114.
  47. Rothbart, Daniel, op. cit. pp. 114-20.
  48. Laudan L (1996) "The demise of the demarcation problem" in Ruse, Michael, But Is It Science?: The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy pp. 337-350.
  49. McNally RJ (2003) Is the pseudoscience concept useful for clinical psychology? SRMHP Vol 2 Number 2 Fall/Winter
  50. National Science Board. 2006. Science and Engineering Indicators 2006 Two volumes. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation (volume 1, NSB-06-01; NSB 06-01A)
  51. e.g. Drenth (2003) ; Herbert JD, et al. (2000) Science and pseudoscience in the development of eye movement desensitization and reprocessing: implications for clinical psychology. Clin Psychol Rev. 20:945-71 )
  52. Klee GD (2005) The Resurrection of Wilhelm Reich and Orgone Therapy The Scientific Review of Mental Health Practice (Vol. 4, No. 1)" | available online
  53. Ostrander GK et al. (2004) Shark cartilage, cancer and the growing threat of pseudoscience. Cancer Res64:8485-91. Erratum in: Cancer Res. 65:374. PMID 15574750
  54. (Devilly 2005:439)
  55. Atwood KC (2004) Naturopathy, pseudoscience, and medicine: myths and fallacies vs truth. Medscape Gen Med6:e53 available online
  56. Stephen W. Hawking, Hawking on the Big Bang and Black Holes (1993) World Scientific Publishing Company, Page 1 See also and .
  57. For example: Smolin L The Trouble with Physics: The Rise of String Theory, the Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next. Houghton Mifflin Company. (2006) ISBN 0-618-55105-0


  • Norcross J.C. Garofalo. A. Koocher.G.P. (2006) Discredited psychological treatments and tests. A Delphi Poll. Professional Psychology. Research and Practice. 2006 Vol 37 No5 515-522

Literature

  • The Scientific Review of Mental Health Practice is a mental health journal whose stated purpose is "to facilitate improved research and thinking about critical questions on the fringes of present scientific knowledge concerning mental health."
  • Beyerstein BL (1990) Brainscams: Neuromythologies of the New Age. Int'l. J. of Mental Health, 19(3):27-36.
  • Georges Charpak (2004) Debunked!, Johns Hopkins University Press
  • Derksen, AA, (1993) The seven sins of pseudo-science J Gen Phil Sci 24:17-42.
  • Derksen AA (2001) The seven strategies of the sophisticated pseudo-scientist: a look into Freud's rhetorical toolbox,J Gen Phil Sci 32:329-50
  • Gardner M (1983) Science – Good, Bad and Bogus Oxford University Press, Oxford
  • Hansson SO (1996) Defining pseudoscience Philosophia naturalis 33:169-76
  • Joseph J (2002) Twin studies in psychiatry and psychology: science or pseudoscience? Psychiatric Quarterly 73:71-82
  • Martin M (1994) Pseudoscience, the paranormal, and science education Science & Education 3:1573-901
  • Ostrander.G.K, Cheng,K.C, Wolf.J.C. WolfeM.J. Shark Cartilage, Cancer and the Growing Threat of Pseudoscience. Cancer Research 64, 8485-8491, December 1, 2004
  • Sampson W, Beyerstein BL (1996) Traditional medicine and pseudoscience in China Skeptical Inquirer Sept-Oct
  • Shermer M (2002) Why People Believe Weird Things – Pseudoscience, superstition, and other confusions of our time New York
  • Wilson F (2000) The Logic and Methodology of Science and Pseudoscience, Canadian Scholars Press

External links

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